資本結(jié)構(gòu)、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2825字</b></p><p><b>　　1868單詞</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻：</b></p><p>　　Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance</p>

2、;<p>　　Dimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki </p><p>　　Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manu

3、facturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’ frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using the

4、se performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the cont</p><p>　　Firm performance, capital structure and ownership</p><

5、;p>　　Conflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932

6、; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Him

7、melberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure </p><p>　　Firm performance and capital structure</p><p>　　The agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of

8、 the company’s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership a

9、nd control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take excessive risks as part of</p&g

10、t;<p>　　Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“under

11、investment” or “debt overhang” problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown

12、 to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment prob</p><p>　　However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothes

13、is. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.</p><p>　　Reverse causality fr

14、om firm performance to capital structure</p><p>　　But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more like

15、ly to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their ca

16、pital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios becaus</p><p>　　It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rat

17、es into the future will choose lower debt to equity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonacc

18、orsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capital structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Unde</p>&l

19、t;p>　　Thus the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot

20、 identify the separate substitution and income effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices.</p><p>　　Owners

21、hip structure and the agency costs of debt and equity.</p><p>　　The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle and Means (1932) who argued that widely held corporations

22、 in the US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more form

23、ally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consum</p><p>　　In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point

24、out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse ‘entrenchment’ effects that can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value

25、would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Several studies document either a direct

26、</p><p>　　Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm survival would tend to mitigate the agenc

27、y costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit

28、, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006</p><p>　　Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Am

29、it, 2006) and they may even coerce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concent

30、ration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection i</p><p>　　We summarize the contrasting ow

31、nership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two competing hypotheses. Under the ‘convergence-of-interest hypothesis’ (H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive eff

32、ect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative.</p><p>　　The presence of ownership entrenc

33、hment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm’s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism t

34、hey may prefer to use debt as a governance mechanism to control management’s consumption of perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982). In that case firms with large external blockholdings are likely to have higher debt ratio

35、s at least up to the point </p><p><b>　　外文翻譯：</b></p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效</p><p>　　摘要：本文通過對法國制造業(yè)公司的抽樣調(diào)查，研究資本結(jié)構(gòu)、所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績效的關(guān)系。我們采用非參數(shù)的數(shù)據(jù)包絡分析方法來實證構(gòu)建行業(yè)“最佳慣例”邊界，衡量公司績效與這一邊界的

36、距離。利用這些性能指標，我們可以檢驗越高效率的公司在資本結(jié)構(gòu)中選擇越多的債務或者越少的債務。我們總結(jié)在以下兩個相互競爭的假說下資本結(jié)構(gòu)效率截然不同的影響：效率風險假說和特許權(quán)價值假說。利用分位數(shù)回歸我們可以檢測杠桿效率的影響和這兩個相互競爭的假說對不同資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇上的實證效度。我們也可以通過詹森和麥考林的代理成本模型規(guī)定來檢測杠桿和效率的直接關(guān)系。通過這個分析我們考慮所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的作用和資本結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績效的類型。</p>

37、<p>　　公司績效、資本結(jié)構(gòu)與所有權(quán)</p><p>　　所有權(quán)經(jīng)理人和外部股東以及控股股東和少數(shù)股東之間的利益沖突是公司治理文化的核心(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986)。盡管有相當多的文獻研究所有權(quán)對公司績效的影響(例如，Morck 等, 1988; McConnell and S

38、ervaes, 1990; Himmelberg等, 1999)，但所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與資本結(jié)構(gòu)間的關(guān)系在很大程度上仍未發(fā)現(xiàn)。另一方面，大量的文獻致力于資本結(jié)構(gòu)和它對公司績效的影響-- Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001)的研究，來自公司治理文獻的新興共識是資本結(jié)構(gòu)和所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響公司價值的相互作用(Mahrt-Smith, 2005)。然而僅僅理論上的爭論不能明確地預測這些關(guān)系(Morck 等,

39、1988)，經(jīng)驗證據(jù)表明似乎是矛盾的。在某種程度上這些沖突的結(jié)果來自于實證研究者面對的獲得直接措施的代理成本的大小，不被管理成本之外的因素混淆(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 200</p><p><b>　　公司績效與資本結(jié)構(gòu)</b></p><p>　　代理成本理論的前提是公司管理者和股東的利益不完全一致。Jensen and M

40、eckling (1976)在他們的開創(chuàng)性論文中強調(diào)來自公司所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離的股權(quán)代理成本的重要性，管理者在意的是自身效用而不是公司價值的最大化。當管理者有動機將過多的風險轉(zhuǎn)變成投資策略風險的情況下這些沖突就會發(fā)生。這就引出了Jensen的“自由現(xiàn)金流量理論”， Jensen (1986, p. 323)指出“問題是如何激勵管理者流出現(xiàn)金而不是低于資金成本的投資或組織效率低下造成的浪費?！备哓搨时划斪鍪峭ㄟ^清算威脅減少管理者現(xiàn)金流浪

41、費的紀律設(shè)備(Grossman and Hart, 1982)或者通過壓力產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量償還債務(Jensen, 1986)。在這種情況下，債務對公司價值有積極的影響。</p><p>　　代理成本也存在于債務投資者和股權(quán)投資者的沖突中，這些沖突也來自于違約風險。Myers (1977)指出違約風險會造成“投資不足”或“債務負擔”問題。在這種情況下，債務對公司價值有消極的影響。建立在Myers (1977)和Jen

42、sen (1986)的基礎(chǔ)上，Stulz (1990)建立一個模型，債務融資被證明會緩解過度投資問題但是會加重投資不足問題。模型預測債務對公司績效既有積極作用又有消極作用，推測這兩種影響回在所有公司出現(xiàn)。我們允許代理成本模型存在實證規(guī)范的兩個影響。然而我們期望杠桿作用是完全負面的。我們從第一個可檢驗假設(shè)得出結(jié)論。根據(jù)代理成本假設(shè)，高杠桿期望低的代理成本，減少低效率，因此導致公司績效的改善。</p><p>　　資

43、本結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的反向因果關(guān)系</p><p>　　公司績效也會影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇，Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)規(guī)定效率越高的公司越有可能從給定的資本結(jié)構(gòu)中獲得更高的回報，高回報可以作為一對組合風險的緩沖，因此高效率的公司在資本結(jié)構(gòu)上以一個更好的位置用股權(quán)代替?zhèn)鶛?quán)。Hence根據(jù)效率風險假說，高效率的公司選擇較高的杠桿比率因為高效率期望降低破產(chǎn)成本和財務困境。從本質(zhì)上

44、說，效率風險假說是資本結(jié)構(gòu)權(quán)衡理論的一個剝離，其中效率不同，其他條件都相等，允許公司調(diào)節(jié)最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　期望將來維持高效率的公司會選擇降低債務與權(quán)益比率，嘗試控制由清算威脅效率產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟租金或特許權(quán)價值(Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006)。除了公平的債務替代效應，效率與資本結(jié)構(gòu)間的關(guān)系也可以被描述成收入效應的存在。根據(jù)特許權(quán)

45、價值假說，高效率公司傾向于持有額外股本，在其他條件相同的情況下，選擇較低的杠桿比率來保護未來收入和特許權(quán)價值。</p><p>　　效率風險假說和特許權(quán)價值假說反向預測關(guān)于公司效率在資本結(jié)構(gòu)上的選擇，盡管我們不能識別影響實證分析的單獨替代和收入可以決定主導不同資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇范圍。</p><p>　　所有制結(jié)構(gòu)與債務和權(quán)益的代理成本</p><p>　　所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和

46、公司績效的關(guān)系追溯到Berle and Means (1932)，他指出在美國被廣泛持有的公司的資本所有權(quán)分散在小股東和控股股東之間，集中在內(nèi)部人手中的公司表現(xiàn)不佳。這之后Jensen and Meckling (1976)發(fā)現(xiàn)更多正式傳統(tǒng)所有者經(jīng)理的代理問題。他們主張管理股份所有權(quán)會減少管理激勵消耗額外補貼，剝奪股東的財富或從事其他次優(yōu)活動，有助于調(diào)整管理者和股東之間的利益，從而降低代理成本。沿著類似的路線，Shleifer and

47、Vishny (1986)表明外部大股東因為他們監(jiān)督和紀律管理的強大動力可以緩解代理沖突。</p><p>　　與此相反，Demsetz (1983) 、 Fama 和 Jensen (1983)指出內(nèi)部股份所有權(quán)的增加可以與不良“防御”影響聯(lián)系在一起，它可以犧牲外部投資者導致管理機會主義的增加。依靠“防御”效果大量控股股東的存在會使公司價值的最大化(Claessens等, 2002; Villalonga an

48、d Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009)。幾個學術(shù)研究指出所有制結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系是直接(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens 等, 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008)或者非單調(diào)(Morcketal., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies 等, 2005)，而其他研究發(fā)現(xiàn)所有制結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效之間沒關(guān)系(De

49、msetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg 等, 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001)。</p><p>　　家族企業(yè)是大股東和獨特的激勵結(jié)構(gòu)特殊的一類。例如，關(guān)心家庭、商業(yè)信譽和企業(yè)的生存，傾向于減輕外部債務和外部權(quán)益的代理成本(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson等, 2003)，盡管控股家族股東依舊會侵吞中小股東(Claes

50、sens等, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006)。幾個研究指出家族企業(yè)尤其是大型個人所有者傾向于超越非家族企業(yè)。另外，Maury (2006)的實證結(jié)果說明西歐大型家庭控股所有制似乎有利于而不是損耗少數(shù)股東。我們期望家庭所有制對公司績效的影響作用是正相關(guān)的。</p><p>　　大型機構(gòu)投資者相反有動力監(jiān)督管理(Villalonga and Amit, 2006)，甚至是強迫與管理(

51、McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens等, 2002; Cornett等, 2007)。另外，Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta 等 (2002)指出股權(quán)集中度在大股東控制的情形下對公司績效有積極的影響，扮演一國對弱投資者和不發(fā)達歐洲大陸資本市場法律保護的替代者。</p><p>　　我們在兩個相互競爭的假設(shè)條件下總結(jié)激勵調(diào)整和鞏固

52、的對比所有權(quán)對公司績效的影響。根據(jù)“利益收斂假說”，比較集中的所有權(quán)對公司績效有積極的影響。而在“所有權(quán)防御假說”下，所有權(quán)集中對公司績效的影響是負相關(guān)的。</p><p>　　所有權(quán)預測和激勵調(diào)整的存在對公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇也有影響。我們用實證分析這些影響。因為外部大股東對減少管理機會主義有強烈的激勵作用，他們也許更喜歡使用債務作為治理機制來控制管理層額外補貼的消耗(Grossman and Hart, 1982

53、)。在這種情況下，有大量外部股權(quán)的公司可能擁有負債率至少達到破產(chǎn)風險降低債務的最高點。家族企業(yè)也許會將高負債率水平控制在他們認為是較少受到債權(quán)人風險的程度(Anderson等, 2003)。另一方面，當管理大股東選擇低債務來保護他們非分散的人力資本和公司投資財富時，杠桿作用和內(nèi)部股東之間的關(guān)系也許是負相關(guān)的(Friend and Lang, 1988)。Brailsford等 (2002)發(fā)現(xiàn)管理股東和杠桿效率非線性關(guān)系。管理層持股的低