股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司業(yè)績[外文翻譯]

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel </p><p>　　Material Source: Journal of Management and Governance </p><p>　

2、　Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky </p><p>　　1.Introduction</p><p>　　For many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprieto

3、rships, partnerships or closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the

4、firm and shares its profits.</p><p>　　However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corpora

5、tion has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition, ownership is

6、 disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.</p><p>　　The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relieves financing problems, which e

7、nables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they (the professional m

8、angers) do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money (sell common stocks) in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities of professional m</p><p>　　Moderating

9、factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chan

10、ce that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the

11、 modern corporation, and it troubled many economi</p><p>　　Agency-type problems exist also in closely held firms because there are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between

12、 the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely held firms seem in general less severe.</p><p>　　The presence of agency problems weakens the central t

13、hesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases th

14、e advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, w

15、e maint</p><p>　　2. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance</p><p>　　One of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern corporati

16、ons are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.</p><p>　　There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and

17、control. Early theorists such as Williamson (1964) propose that non-owner managers prefer their own interests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed

18、firms.</p><p>　　The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavior by the manager. Fam

19、a (1980), for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board

20、constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy (1985), suggest that executive compen</p><p>　　The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed (see Short (1994) for a summary). Part of the diverse results

21、can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlled firms. These criteria, typically based on percentage ownership by large stockholde

22、rs, are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because, as demonstrated by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), the rela</p><p>　　In this study, we utilize

23、 the ownership classification scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach (1997). This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms control

24、led by a group of individuals (partners). Obviously, the control structure in each of these firm types is different. Thus, some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance might emer

25、ge.</p><p><b>　　3. Data</b></p><p>　　We employ data from a developing economy, Israel, where many forms of business organization coexist. The sample includes 280 public companies tra

26、ded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) during 1994. For each company we collect data on the 1992–1994 net income (profits after tax), 1994 total assets, 1994 equity, 1994 top management remuneration, and 1994 ownershi

27、p structure. All data is extracted from the companies financial reports except for the classification of firms according to their owner</p><p>　　The initial sample included all firms traded on the TASE (abou

28、t 560 at the time). However, sample size shrunk by half because: 1) according to the Israeli Security Authority (the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC) only 434 companies provided reliable compensation reports; 2) 147 co

29、mpanies have a negative 1992–94 average net income, which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ; and 3) for 7 firms we could not determine the ownership structure.</p><p>　　The companies in the

30、 sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nine percent of the firms do not have any majority owner. Among majority owned firms, individuals (family firms or partnerships of ind

31、ividuals) own 72% and the rest are controlled by concerns. About half (49%) of the individually-controlled firms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest (51%) are dominated by families. Professional (n

32、on-owner) CEOs are found in about 15% of</p><p>　　4. Methodology: Data Envelopment Analysis</p><p>　　In this study, we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Data En

33、velopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Operations Research for performance evaluations (see Seiford and Thrall, 1990), and previous versions of it have been used in Finance (by Elyasiani andMehdian, 199

34、2, for example).</p><p>　　The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach. For each analyzed firm, DEA constructs a “twin” comparable virtual firm consisting of a por

35、tfolio of other sample firms. Then, the relative performance of the firm can be determined. Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric, that is it estimates a “production function” and asses

36、ses each firm performance according to its residual relative to the fitted fixed parameters economy</p><p>　　The equity ratio variable represents expectation that given the firm size, the higher the investme

37、nts of stockholders (equity), the higher their return (net income). Finally, the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’ input. One of our central points is that top managers’ acti

38、ons and skills affect firm output. Hence, higher pay mangers (who presumably are also higher-skill) are expected to yield superior profits. Rosen (1982) relates executives’ pay and r</p><p>　　The DEA analysi

39、s and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets of firms: Investment companies, Industrial companies, Real-estate companies, and Trade an

40、d services companies. This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of the firms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure on firm performance.</p><p>

41、　　5.Empirical Results</p><p>　　The main results of the empirical findings reviewed above are that majority Control by a few individuals diminishes firm performance, and that professional non-owner managers

42、promote performance. The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two other findings. First, it appears that firms without professional managers and firms controlled by individua

43、ls are more likely to exhibit negative net income.Second, Table IV also presents results of regressions </p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　The empirical analysis of 280 firms in Israel reveals th

44、at ownership structure impacts firm performance, where performance is estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given the firm’s inputs. We find that:</p><p>　　Out of a

45、ll organizational forms, family owner-managed firms appear least efficient in generating profits. When all firms are considered, only family firms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than 30%, a

46、nd when performance is measured relative to the business sector, only family firms with owner-managers have an average score of less than 50%.</p><p>　　(2)Non-owner managed firms perform better than owner-ma

47、naged firms. These findings suggest that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes performance. </p><p>　　Critical readers

48、 may wonder how come “efficient” and “l(fā)ess-efficient” organizational structures coexist. The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation. The lower-performing family (and partnership cont

49、rolled) firms are likely, as time progresses, to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.</p><p>　　A few reservations are in order. First, we do not contend that every company would

50、gain by transforming into a disperse ownership public firm. For example, it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second, there remain questions about the methodology and its

51、 application (Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance). Last, we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership public firm improves performances. Future research sh</p><p>&l

52、t;b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司業(yè)績</b></p><p>　　資料來源：管理治理雜志 作者：貝尼·勞特巴赫和亞歷山大·范尼斯基 </p><p>　　多年來，在許多經(jīng)濟體中的大多數(shù)商業(yè)活動是由獨資企業(yè)、合伙企業(yè)或者非公開企業(yè)操作管理的。在這些企業(yè)組織形

53、式中，有一種小型的與個人密切相關(guān)的屬于同一家庭或有長期業(yè)務(wù)合作的團體經(jīng)營公司并分享公司的利潤。</p><p>　　然而，在最近的世紀(jì)，一種新的企業(yè)組織以非集中所有制的企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)運而生并蓬勃發(fā)展?，F(xiàn)代多種所有制企業(yè)已經(jīng)打破了所有權(quán)和公司積極管理之間的環(huán)節(jié)?，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)通常都是由職業(yè)經(jīng)理人管理運行，他們僅代表性地?fù)碛泻苌僖徊糠值墓煞莘蓊~。此外，所有權(quán)分散，就是說公司由股東擁有并且其利潤在所有股東間進(jìn)行派發(fā)。現(xiàn)代公司的優(yōu)

54、勢是多方面的。它可以緩解融資難問題，使公司能夠承擔(dān)較大規(guī)模的經(jīng)營和利用規(guī)模經(jīng)濟。它還有助于復(fù)合式運營，使得最有技能的管理者或?qū)＜襾砜刂平灰祝词顾麄儯殬I(yè)經(jīng)理）沒有足夠的資金來擁有自己的公司?，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)在資本市場中籌集資金（出售普通股），并將它們分配給職業(yè)經(jīng)理的生產(chǎn)活動。這就是為什么現(xiàn)代多種所有制企業(yè)比傳統(tǒng)“封閉型”的經(jīng)營形式要運行得好的假設(shè)是合理的。</p><p>　　干擾現(xiàn)代企業(yè)運營的因素依然存在。例如，少數(shù)

55、人持股公司可發(fā)出少數(shù)股票籌集資金，擴大業(yè)務(wù)。更重要的是，現(xiàn)代企業(yè)面臨一個嚴(yán)峻的新問題——代理問題：管理企業(yè)日常經(jīng)營活動的職業(yè)代理人有參與股東的最佳利益分配問題的一個機會。該代理問題源于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離，在這之前它困擾許多經(jīng)濟學(xué)家（例如，伯利和手段，1932年；詹森和麥克林，1976年法瑪和詹森1983）。結(jié)論是企業(yè)需要有建立一個監(jiān)控系統(tǒng)或合同，隨著財富和所有者（股東）福利的變動來調(diào)整管理者的利益和行為。</p>

56、<p>　　代理型問題也存在與封閉型企業(yè)，因為總是有少數(shù)決策者存在。不過，在這些企業(yè)的所有者和管理者之間建立個人關(guān)系，并給予更密切的監(jiān)督，封閉型企業(yè)的代理問題一般來說也不太嚴(yán)重。代理問題的存在削弱了中心論點——現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)開放更有效。這可能是一些業(yè)務(wù)部門的監(jiān)控和管理者交涉合作的成本會過高。這也可能在某些情況下，規(guī)模化經(jīng)營和專業(yè)管理的優(yōu)勢將是輕微的，而其不足超過了預(yù)期的代理成本。然而，對多種所有制企業(yè)的歷史潮流的分析，我們堅

57、持多種所有制企業(yè)比封閉型所有制企業(yè)運行得更好的這一假設(shè)。我們認(rèn)為，對多種所有制企業(yè)的趨勢分析是合理的，并可以通過績效的增加來解釋。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)代企業(yè)最重要的標(biāo)志之一是所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離?，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)通常是由只擁有一小部分股份份額的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人來運行的。關(guān)于所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離的影響和價值，在一些專著中一直都是一個的爭論。早期的理論家如威廉姆森（1964），提出非所有者的經(jīng)營者相對于成為股東來說寧愿選擇他們自

58、己的興趣。因此，非所有者經(jīng)營的企業(yè)比所有者經(jīng)營的企業(yè)的效率變小了。</p><p>　　較近期的文獻(xiàn)重新審視這一問題和預(yù)測結(jié)果。它指出存在一類機構(gòu)，來減緩非最優(yōu)預(yù)期和經(jīng)營者的自私行為。例如，法瑪（1980）認(rèn)為，管理勞動力市場的有效性和競爭，能減少管理人員作出一些不負(fù)責(zé)行為的可能性。此外，外部董事在董事會的存在約束管理行為。其他，像墨菲（1985）建議生成薪酬管理與企業(yè)績效掛鉤的行政補償方案，幫助企業(yè)分配經(jīng)營者利

59、益。因此，非所有者經(jīng)理的企業(yè)的效率才會不低于所有者經(jīng)營的企業(yè)。最有趣的是，德姆塞茨和萊恩（1985）的結(jié)論是，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)方式的變化與價值最大化一致。也就是說，當(dāng)多種所有制和非所有制管理的企業(yè)變得更有價值時，他們就會出現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　關(guān)于這一問題的實證是復(fù)雜的（見Short（1994）摘要）。各種不同的結(jié)果的一部分可以歸因于之前的研究顯示在所有者和非所有者管理控制公司區(qū)別的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，通常以大股東所有

60、權(quán)的百分比為基礎(chǔ)，比最初認(rèn)為的更成問題，因為正如Morck，Shleifer和Vishny（1988）和Mc Connell和Servaes（1990）證明的那樣，所有權(quán)比例和公司績效的關(guān)系是非線性的。此外，為描述控制結(jié)構(gòu)，僅出現(xiàn)所有權(quán)比例是不充分的。大股東總持股比率相同的兩個公司很可能有不同的控制機構(gòu)，這取決于大股東的特性。</p><p>　　在這項研究中，我們利用昂，豪瑟和Lauterbach（1997）提

61、出所有權(quán)分級方案。這項計劃區(qū)分非所有者經(jīng)營的企業(yè)，由家族控制的企業(yè)和以個人（合作伙伴）集團控制的企業(yè)。顯然，控制結(jié)構(gòu)在每種公司類型下是不同的。因此，在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系可能會出現(xiàn)一些新的觀點。</p><p>　　我們從一個發(fā)展中的經(jīng)濟體——以色列中采用數(shù)據(jù)，因為以色列有不少的企業(yè)組織形式能夠并存。樣本選取了1994年間在特拉維夫證券交易所（特拉維夫）上市交易的280家上市公司。對于每一個公司，我們收集的數(shù)

62、據(jù)包括1992年到1994年的3年凈收入（稅后收入），1994年的總資產(chǎn)，1994年的股票，1994年高層管理人員的薪酬和1994年股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。除了按照股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分類的企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)外，所有數(shù)據(jù)均摘自出版在由以色列證券管理局頒發(fā)的“利益方控股”、“Meitav股票指南”和“金球獎財務(wù)報告聯(lián)交所年鑒”上的企業(yè)財務(wù)報告。</p><p>　　樣品中的公司代表了豐富多樣的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。簡單來說，9%的公司沒有任何大股東。在大多數(shù)國有

63、企業(yè)中，個人（家族或合伙企業(yè)）擁有72％的所有權(quán)，其余是由控制問題。約一半（49％）的單獨控制的公司是由個人合伙的，其余（51％）是由家族控制為主。發(fā)現(xiàn)約15％的單獨控制企業(yè)聘請了專業(yè)（非所有者）的首席執(zhí)行官。因此以色列的數(shù)據(jù)樣本能較為全面的分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　以色列的280家公司的實證分析表明，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響公司業(yè)績，其中表現(xiàn)為該公司的實際凈收益除以該公司投入的最佳凈收益的估計比值

64、。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)：</p><p>　　剔除所有的組織形式，家族所有者經(jīng)營企業(yè)在創(chuàng)造利潤方面的效率最低。當(dāng)涉及到所有的企業(yè)時，只有所有者經(jīng)營的家族企業(yè)有一個不到30％的平均績效分?jǐn)?shù)；而當(dāng)績效測量涉及到業(yè)務(wù)部門時，只有所有者經(jīng)營的家族企業(yè)有不到50％的平均得分。</p><p>　　非所有者經(jīng)營企業(yè)的表現(xiàn)比所有者經(jīng)營的企業(yè)更好。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的組織形式，即伴隨著分散所有權(quán)和非所有者經(jīng)營的開

65、放型企業(yè)，能夠提高績效。批判性的讀者可能想知道“有效率的”和“低效率的”的組織結(jié)構(gòu)是怎么并存的。答案是，我們也許不能用文件證明一個長期得的均衡情況。較低績效的家族企業(yè)（合伙企業(yè)）很可能隨著時間的推移，轉(zhuǎn)變成受控制的非多數(shù)人擁有的上市公司。</p><p>　　一些保留意見有序排列。首先，我們不認(rèn)為每一家企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變成所有權(quán)分散的上市公司都能獲益。例如，很顯然的，發(fā)展初期的企業(yè)通常所有權(quán)集中密切發(fā)展時經(jīng)濟狀況最好。其次