多個(gè)大股東控制型所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的制衡效應(yīng)——來自中國(guó)上市公司的證據(jù).pdf

1、北京交通大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文多個(gè)大股東控制型所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的制衡效應(yīng)——來自中國(guó)上市公司的證據(jù)姓名：吳翔宇申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別：碩士專業(yè)：會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)指導(dǎo)教師：馬忠20061201韭塞鑾塑塞堂速圭堂繾監(jiān)塞△墾S!基△￡!ABSTRACTABsTRACrUsingthedataofChinaslistedcorporationswiththeownershipstructureofmultiplelargeshareholdersduring2003—2004

2、，thispaperinvestigatestheeffectofcontrolcontestabilityamonglargeshareholdersontheultimatecontrollers’activityandtheoperatingperformance鶴wellasthedifferencesoftheeffectofbalanceofpowerontheopiatingperformanceThe細(xì)djngsinth

3、ispapershowthatthedistributionofvotingrightsamonglargeshareholdershasanegativeeffectonfirmvaluewhichsuggeststhathi曲controlcontestabilityreducethefirmvalueThemoreconcentratedofthemultiplelargeshareholders’ownership，thehig

4、hermarginalcostoftheultimatecontrollers’tunnelingofthefirms，whichrcstrictstheultimatecontrollers’incentiveforprivatebenefitsofcontrol，thustheconcentrationofownershipstructureofmultiplelargeshareholdershasapositiveeffecto

5、ntheoperatingperformanceWhentheidentityofmultiplelargeshareholdersisdifferent，thecontrolcontestabilityisstrengthened，thusthemonitoringincentiveofotherlargeshareholdersontheultimatecontrollersurpassesthecoalitionincentive

6、，whichhasapositiveeffectOntheoperatingperformanceAlso，whentheultimatecontrollerhashiighercashflowrJights，thecostoftheexpropriationofthecorporations’resourcesbymeansoftunnelingetcishigherthustheultimatecontrollerhasincent