金融學專業(yè)外文翻譯------客戶角度下的最優(yōu)選擇銀行與保險公司聯(lián)盟

1、<p>　　外文題目： A Customer View on the Most Preferred Alliance Structure between Banks and Insurance Structure </p><p>　　出 處： Zeitschrift f&#

2、252;r Betriebswirtschaft </p><p>　　作 者：Pekka Korhonen, Lasse Koskinen and Raimo Voutilainen </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p&

3、gt;<p><b>　　Overview</b></p><p>　　In this paper, we have studied alternative alliance structures between banks and insurance companies from the point of view of Finnish customer representa

4、tives. Seven criteria were introduced for the evaluation of six alternative structure models for such alliances. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of customer representatives. As a supporting t

5、ool, we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).The alliance models based on plain cross-selling agreements were considered </p><p>　　We also studied how familiar the customer representatives were with the

6、 alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We observed that the customer representatives did not recognize the problem as well from the point of

7、 view of the supervisors as that of the executives. In addition,it was interesting to note that the customer representatives did not consider a risk aspect in the control by ownership alternatives as critical </p>

8、<p>　　Comparing the results in this study to our previous studies, we may conclude that the best compromise model from all three points of view could be the financial conglomerate on the condition that certain supe

9、rvisory and customer criteria are satisfied to a sufficient degree.</p><p>　　A. Introduction</p><p>　　Alliance formation in the financial industry has been a growing trend during the last decade

10、.Insurers in an alliance between banks and insurance companies are most often life insurance companies, but also non-life companies can be found. Financial alliances often include units like mutual fund managing companie

11、s, asset management companies, securities brokerages and corporate finance companies. In most European countries, banks are allowed to be “universal”. It is customary that they include the</p><p>　　In our pr

12、evious papers (Voutilainen [2005], Korhonen and Voutilainen [2005] and Korhonen, Koskinen, and Voutilainen [2005]), we have studied alliance structure alternatives from different perspectives. In Voutilainen [2005], we i

13、ntroduced six different alliance structure alternatives and nine criteria relevant for evaluating those alternatives from the perspective of the executives of the banks and insurance companies. The alternatives and the c

14、riteria were introduced together with bank and insu</p><p>　　In the second paper (Korhonen and Voutilainen [2005]), the same group of experts were used as a panel to find the most preferred model for a finan

15、cial alliance. As a decision support system we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty [1980].The problem was a typical AHP-problem: few alternatives and few qualitative criteria.The use of the AHP f

16、ocused the discussions on the relevant aspects of the choice problem.The final solution was found in two meetings. The second meeting </p><p>　　In the third paper (Korhonen et al. [2005]), our aim was to fin

17、d the best financial alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities in Finland.1 First, we searched for the best alliance stru

18、cture from the point of view of supervisory authorities. Together with leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities, we introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the previously defined six alternative alli<

19、;/p><p>　　The alliance alternatives based on plain cross-selling agreements received the highest ranks in the evaluation of supervisory authorities. Under certain conditions, the financial conglomerate might be

20、 an acceptable compromise alternative for the supervisory authorities as well.</p><p>　　In this paper, we have approached our problem from the point of view of customers.The importance of this perspective ha

21、s been emphazised by e.g. Belth [2000]. Customer perspective to mergers is taken in Bank Marketing International [2004]. We did not take a sample from the population of customers, because most customers are not familiar

22、with the problem at all. We were interested in the opinions of “advanced or well informed” customers.To represent those customers, we used leaders and experts of</p><p>　　We have also studied how well the cu

23、stomer representatives know the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We asked them to play the role of executives and supervisory authoriti

24、es and to make the evaluations by using their most important criteria. We also asked them which they would think were the most important executive and supervisory criteria. This provided us with interesting information a

25、bout the knowledge of th</p><p>　　The paper is organized as follows. Section B. reviews our main previous results. In Section C., we provide a brief introduction to the theory of the AHP. The decision criter

26、ia from the customer point of view are given in Section D., and in Section E., the results are given and discussed. In Section F., we present the results obtained when asking the experts to assume the roles of executives

27、 and supervisors. In section G., we compare the criteria and the prioritizations of all three decision make</p><p>　　B. Review of our earlier research on alliance structures</p><p>　　Since this

28、paper is founded on our earlier research on alliance structures, we summarize here our key results.</p><p>　　I. Structuring the problem</p><p>　　Voutilainen [2005] studied alliances between bank

29、s and insurance companies. His perspective was that of the top management of a financial enterprise in the retail market.Alliance structures were classified into three main categories depending on the degree of co-operat

30、ion of the partners. These categories were derived together with representatives of the executive management of Finnish banks and insurance companies. The categories in the increasing order of closeness of the partners w

31、ere Cross-s</p><p>　　Here a service channel can be a branch office network, but also a contact center, subside etc. Especially in the case of overlapping branch networks one easily faces channel conflict: th

32、e alliance members do not co-operate effectively in the fear of losing their customers to the other party and consequently the sales provisions etc. Non-overlapping service channels often means that the other party has n

33、o service channel at all.</p><p>　　Thus the two different sub-models are</p><p>　　? Cross-selling agreement, no overlapping service channels (abbreviated CSA1)</p><p>　　? Cross-sell

34、ing agreement, overlapping service channels (CSA2)</p><p>　　Alliance of independent partners. The alliance type is a special case of a cross-selling agreement where the alliance is tightened by cross-ownersh

35、ip and/or joint ownership in third parties. Cross-ownership means a minority stake of the other party’s shares. If the ownership were one-sided, it would probably be a sign of asymmetry and one party’s dominance of the a

36、lliance. An example of joint ownership is a mutual fund management company owned jointly by a bank (banks) and an insurance company (</p><p>　　The degree of overlapping is also used to divide this category i

37、nto two different subgoals:</p><p>　　? Alliance of independent partners, no overlapping service channels (AIP1)</p><p>　　? Alliance of independent partners, overlapping service channels (AIP2)&l

38、t;/p><p>　　Control by ownership. In both the previous models, earnings and costs are divided. The third category means the model, where all the control is in the hand of one party: a bank can simply own (a cont

39、rol of) an insurance company or vice versa, or a third party owns the both ones.</p><p>　　This category is divided into two sub-models depending on the controller:</p><p>　　? Control by ownershi

40、p, when a bank owns an insurance company or vice versa (CBO1)</p><p>　　? Control by ownership (financial conglomerate): a holding company owns one or severalbanks and one or several insurance companies (FC)&

41、lt;/p><p>　　We can notice that the classification of the different alternatives is based on the closeness of the alliance and the degree of the overlapping of the service channels.</p><p>　　Criteri

42、a. The alliance models were compared and eventually prioritized according to the following criteria (the choice of the criteria was also based on the management views).</p><p>　　1. Product development (maxim

43、ize efficiency),</p><p>　　2. One-door-principle (implement as effectively as possible),</p><p>　　3. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),</p><p>　　4. Customer relationship management (

44、maximize efficiency),</p><p>　　5. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),</p><p>　　6. Channel conflicts (minimize),</p><p>　　7. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance),</

45、p><p>　　8. Investor power (maximize),</p><p>　　9. Sales management (maximize efficiency).</p><p>　　According to the interviews the overall importance of earnings logics, synergies and

46、channel conflicts was the greatest one.</p><p>　　II. Evaluating with management criteria</p><p>　　Korhonen and Voutilainen [2005]) studied the above defined six different possible structure mode

47、ls for alliances and the nine criteria. Searching for the most preferred alliance model is a multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. To solve the problem, the AnalyticHierarchy Process (AHP) was used, see Saaty

48、 [1980].</p><p>　　The use of the AHP focused the discussions on pairwise comparisons. The panel (the same members as in Voutilainen [2005]) was also willing to consider its evaluations in case the inconsiste

49、ncy was too high. The second meeting was the initiative of the panel.The panel members felt that the problem required more considerations.</p><p>　　During the second meeting the panel first evaluated critica

50、lly the original criteria and revised some of them. The resulting criteria were</p><p>　　1. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),</p><p>　　2. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency),

51、</p><p>　　3. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),</p><p>　　4. Channel conflicts (minimize),</p><p>　　5. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance),</p><p>　　6.

52、Sales management (maximize efficiency),</p><p>　　7. Economies of scale (maximize),</p><p>　　8. Economies of scope (maximize),</p><p><b>　　9. Risk.</b></p><p&g

53、t;　　The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. Actually, the Financial conglomerate was the most preferred. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer Cross-selling agreement with no overlapping

54、 service channels or even Alliance of independent partners with no overlapping service channels to Financial conglomerate.</p><p>　　III. Compromise with supervisors</p><p>　　In the third paper,

55、Korhonen et al. [2005] broaden the analysis to include the search for the best alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities.

56、 First, the alternative alliance structures were studied from the point of view of supervisory authorities. The leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the above

57、 presented alternative alliance structur</p><p>　　1. Equality of the member companies of the alliance,</p><p>　　2. System risk management,</p><p>　　3. Capability of the authorities

58、to supervise the alliance as well as possible,</p><p>　　4. Flexibility of the alliance with respect to changes in its environment,</p><p>　　5. Optimal functioning of insurance and finance market

59、s,</p><p>　　6. Synergies brought about by the alliance,</p><p>　　7. Sufficiency of capital,</p><p>　　8. Dependency of the alliance on the competence of executive management.</p&g

60、t;<p>　　The ultimate goal was to search for the alternative which bank and insurance supervisory authorities and bank and insurance executive management might accept as a solution to the alliance problem. The Anal

61、ytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was again used.</p><p>　　The loosely connected alliance models Cross-selling agreements received the highest overall priorities largely because they got very high priorities acco

62、rding to the important criteria System risk management and Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible. The control by ownership models were not considered desirable with respect to these

63、criteria.</p><p>　　The result differs sharply from the prioritization made above by the bank and insurance executives. They favoured very clearly the control by ownership models (if the risk factor was not s

64、pecially emphasized). The executive point of view is in many ways opposite to the supervisory point of view. Also the criteria were different in seven cases out of eight.</p><p>　　Business-driven consolidati

65、on seems to be in conflict with the supervisory interests.Supervisors seem to think that brought synergies do not outweigh the risk that enters into large and complex financial institutions.</p><p>　　However

66、, the differences between the priorities of the different alliance models in this study were essentially smaller than in the previous study with the executives. Therefore it would be definitely interesting to obtain a co

67、mpromise solution acceptable for both the executives and the supervisors.</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　客戶角度下的最優(yōu)選擇：銀行與保險公司聯(lián)盟</p><p><b>　　概 述</b></p>

68、<p>　　在本文中，作為芬蘭客戶代表，我們研究了銀行與保險公司之間可選擇的合作方式。在對可選擇的6種合作方式的評估中我們提供了7個標準。此項評估是由客戶代表組成的專家委員會，借助層次分析法這個輔助工具來進行的。經(jīng)過評估，我們認為基于簡單的交叉銷售的協(xié)議合作方式是最優(yōu)的。我們同時研究了客戶代表、銀行和保險公司高層、監(jiān)管機構(gòu)三個不同立場對于這個問題的不同看法，發(fā)現(xiàn)三者之間存在著差異。此外，很有趣地發(fā)現(xiàn)客戶代表在所有者管控風險方

69、面的考慮明顯少于管理層。此次研究結(jié)果與我們前期的研究結(jié)果相比，我們認為從三方角度來看，最優(yōu)的組建方式是在一定程度上滿足監(jiān)管層和客戶要求下所進行的金融合作。</p><p><b>　　一、引 言</b></p><p>　　在過去的十年中，金融行業(yè)的相互合作是個大趨勢。大多數(shù)銀行與保險公司的合資公司是人壽保險公司，但非人壽保險的公司也是可以組建的。金融合作包括組建共同

70、基金管理公司，資產(chǎn)管理公司，證券交易行。在大多數(shù)的歐洲國家，銀行可以經(jīng)營多種業(yè)務，包括上述公司與保險公司的功能。因此此類金融合作機構(gòu)能在零售市場上獲取高利潤。</p><p>　　在我們前期的文章中，已經(jīng)從不同角度研究了合作方式。</p><p>　　在第一篇文章中，我們從銀行及保險公司高層角度提出了6種不同方式和9種評估標準，這些都是由銀行和保險公司的專家提出來的，這些專家都是芬蘭銀行和

71、保險公司的管理高層的代表。</p><p>　　在第二篇文章中，同一批專家組成了委員會來選出最佳的融資合作方式。我們選用了薩蒂的層次分析法來進行分析。這是一個典型的層次分析法問題：由少數(shù)聯(lián)盟方式和合理標準組成。層次分析法集中討論該問題的相關方面。專家召開了兩次會議，在第二個會議中成立了委員會，認為所有權管控方式是最優(yōu)的聯(lián)盟方式。不愿承擔風險的專家可能會選擇松散的聯(lián)盟方式。</p><p>

72、　　在第三篇文章中，我們的目標是找到適用于銀行及保險公司高層與芬蘭監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的金融合作方式。首先，我們找到對于芬蘭監(jiān)管者來說最合適的合作方式，同時8個可以用來評估之前所確定的6種可供選擇的合作框架。</p><p>　　監(jiān)管機構(gòu)專家代表組成的委員會對此進行評估，公認基于這種簡單的交叉銷售協(xié)議是最佳的合作方式。在特定條件下，這種金融合作方式將同樣為這些監(jiān)管機構(gòu)所認可。</p><p>　　在這

73、篇文章中，我們將從客戶的角度來解決這個問題。之前的文章已強調(diào)過此角度研究的重要性?！躲y行國際市場學》（2004）中已經(jīng)從客戶角度提出過金融兼并問題，我們之所以沒有提出具體案例，是因為很多人對于這個問題都不了解。我們很想把這些概念提前讓客戶更好地了解。為了能夠更好地反映客戶需求，我們邀請了芬蘭消費者協(xié)會和工人協(xié)會的領導人和專家作為客戶代表。前期先對這些客戶代表進行了單獨采訪，基于這些采訪內(nèi)容，我們提煉出相關的7個標準，最終評估時我們共提出

74、4個相關的標準，剔除了另外3個重要性相對較低的標準。</p><p>　　我們還研究了客戶代表若作為銀行高層或監(jiān)管機構(gòu)，他們將如何看待金融合并問題。我們要求他們假設自己為銀行高層或監(jiān)管機構(gòu)，選出自己認為的最重要的考量標準來評估金融合作問題。</p><p>　　二、對聯(lián)盟結(jié)構(gòu)早期研究的回顧</p><p>　　由于本文是基于我們對聯(lián)盟結(jié)構(gòu)的早期研究開展的，在這里先總

75、結(jié)我們的主要成果。</p><p><b>　　建構(gòu)問題</b></p><p>　　沃特萊恩從零售市場的金融企業(yè)的角度研究了銀行和保險公司的合作方式，</p><p>　　通過芬蘭的銀行和保險公司高管代表的討論，根據(jù)合作程度，我們將合作形式分為三種。</p><p>　　第一種是交叉銷售協(xié)議，它代表雙方的合作密切。在這

76、種合作方式中，雙方同意出售各自的產(chǎn)品給對方，而交叉客戶往往是片面的，最常見的是銀行對自己的客戶銷售保險公司的產(chǎn)品，原則上，它可以同時進行。該聯(lián)盟仍然可以分為兩類，取決于雙方的服務渠道是否重疊。非重疊服務渠道可以實現(xiàn)。若當事各方之間沒有任何競爭，它們可以嘗試這種交叉模式。這種服務渠道可以作為一個分支結(jié)構(gòu)網(wǎng)絡，也可以作為結(jié)構(gòu)中心。當存在交叉分支網(wǎng)絡時，容易引起渠道沖突：一雙由于害怕被對方搶去原有的客戶而取消合作。因此無交叉渠道往往意味著對方

77、沒有任何的服務渠道。以下是兩種不同的模式：交叉銷售原則，無交叉服務；交叉銷售原則，有交叉服務。</p><p>　　第二種是獨立機構(gòu)的合作。這種合作形式與交叉所有制和第三方參與所有制緊密相關，是交叉銷售協(xié)議的特殊情況。交叉所有制意味著對方持有少數(shù)股權，如果所有權只屬于一方，則表示雙方地位的不平等，控股方在合作中有絕對控制地位?；鸸芾砉揪褪菂⑴c所有制的一個例子，它是銀行和保險公司合作的產(chǎn)物。還有另外一種合作形式

78、，在交叉所有制實行過程中不使用交叉銷售協(xié)議，這種情況雖然可行，但實際操作中很少采用。這種合作方式按合作的交叉程度分為兩種：獨立合作方的合作，無交叉服務；不獨立合作方的合作，有交叉服務。</p><p>　　第三種是所有權管控。前面兩種合作形式中的收益和成本都是按比例分配的，而在這種形式中控制權在一方的手里：銀行或者保險公司或者是第三方享有全部控制權。又分為兩種：所有權管控，銀行擁有保險公司或是保險公司擁有銀行；所

79、有權管控，一個公司擁有一個或多個銀行或是一個或多個保險公司。</p><p>　　由此可以看出，以上三種合作方式是根據(jù)合作程度和服務渠道的交叉渠道程度劃分的。</p><p>　　我們通過各種合作方式的比較，總結(jié)得出以下有關管理方面的標準：</p><p>　　1.產(chǎn)品發(fā)展原則（最大效率）</p><p>　　2.單方面原則（最有效實施）&l

80、t;/p><p>　　3.盈利原則（避免沖突）</p><p>　　4.客戶關系管控原則（最大效率）</p><p>　　5.成本與收益協(xié)同管控原則（最大效率）</p><p>　　6.渠道沖突減免原則（最小值）</p><p>　　7.資本償付原則（收支平衡）</p><p>　　8.投資能力提升

81、原則</p><p>　　9.銷售管理原則（最大效率）</p><p>　　其中最重要的是盈利原則、協(xié)同原則和渠道沖突減免原則。</p><p><b>　　管理標準的評估</b></p><p>　　科爾霍寧和沃特萊恩研究了可選擇的六種合作方式提出了九項標準。在不同標準下尋找一個最優(yōu)的合作模式是很困難的。為此，我們用薩

82、特的層次分析法來討論不同模式下通用的合作原則?；诖隧椦芯康闹匾裕瘑T會同意展開第二次會議，委員會由之前的成員組成。第二次會議對第一次會議的標準進行了修改和延續(xù)。以下就是二次會議的標準：</p><p>　　1.盈利原則（避免沖突）</p><p>　　2.客戶關系管控原則（最大效率）</p><p>　　3.成本與收益協(xié)同管控原則（最大效率）</p>

83、<p>　　4.渠道沖突減免原則（最小值）</p><p>　　5.資本償付原則（收支平衡）</p><p>　　6.銷售管理原則（最大效率）</p><p>　　7.規(guī)模經(jīng)濟原則（最大值）</p><p>　　8.機會經(jīng)濟原則（最大值）</p><p><b>　　9.風險管控原則</b

84、></p><p>　　該小組首選所有權管控模式的控制。也就是說，金融集團是最優(yōu)先模式。而風險厭惡者則優(yōu)先選擇無交叉服務渠道的交叉銷售協(xié)議或無交叉服務渠道的獨立機構(gòu)合作。</p><p>　　監(jiān)管者的管理評估標準</p><p>　　在第三篇文章中，我們采用層次分析法分析以尋找適用于銀行及保險公司高管與監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的最優(yōu)合作方式。首先，我們找到對于監(jiān)管者來說最合適

85、的合作方式，并提出了八項對以上合作模式的評估標準：</p><p><b>　　1.合作方公平原則</b></p><p>　　2.系統(tǒng)風險管控原則</p><p>　　3.主管機構(gòu)監(jiān)管能力最大化原則</p><p>　　4.突發(fā)事故應變靈活性原則</p><p>　　5.保險與金融市場功能最優(yōu)化

86、原則</p><p>　　6.合作方協(xié)同發(fā)展原則</p><p><b>　　7.資本最優(yōu)化原則</b></p><p>　　8.合作獨立性原則（不受高層管理能力影響）</p><p>　　我們最終的目標就是尋找金融監(jiān)管機構(gòu)與銀行和保險公司高管都認可的合作方式，這里我們再次使用層次分析法。最后，監(jiān)管部門一致認可的是交叉銷

87、售協(xié)議，因為它符合風險管理標準，而且便于監(jiān)管。他們認為所有權管控模式是最不可取的。</p><p>　　銀行和保險公司高管與監(jiān)管者的意見存在很大分歧，他們優(yōu)先選擇的是所有權管控模式，這與監(jiān)管者的觀點相反。這主要是因為他們之間的標準完全不同，</p><p>　　商業(yè)利益與監(jiān)管者利益有時是相沖突的。監(jiān)管者認為協(xié)同效應沒有增加進入金融機構(gòu)的風險。然而，監(jiān)管者對最優(yōu)合作方式的意見分歧遠遠小于銀行