公司轉(zhuǎn)型外文翻譯---如何幫助帝斯曼轉(zhuǎn)型

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文原文１</p><p>　　外文題目： HOW R&D TRANSFORMED DSM </p><p>　　出 處： Research Technology Management &

2、lt;/p><p>　　作 者： Arjan wan Rooij </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　HOW R&D TRANSFORMED DSM</p><p&g

3、t;<b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　A long-term perspective on R&D at the Dutch chemical company DSM illuminates two crucial and interrelated challenges in the management of R&D. On the one hand

4、, companies must keep their research focused on the technologies and markets they use and avoid research its sponsor cannot profit from. On the other hand, companies must enable R&D to generate the options that can r

5、evitalize its current businesses and open up new ones. These options may be risky and fall outside the framework of current ma</p><p>　　What is, and what should be, the role of R&D in a company? How shou

6、ld business management direct R&D? Such questions occupied companies during the 20th century and will continue to occupy them in this one.</p><p>　　This article explores these issues with the example of

7、the Dutch chemical company DSM. This company has survived for more than a century by transforming itself from a coal mining company to a fertilizer producer, to a diversified bulk chemicals company, and again to a compan

8、y focused on fine chemicals and high performance materials (7).These transformations make DSM a very interesting company to study.</p><p>　　Two lessons can be drawn from the case of DSM. First, R&D inves

9、tment is cyclical (2). R&D budgets rise and fall, coupled to the company's financial performance and shifts in its business climate. Moreover, management views of R&D are cyclical—the pressure for integration

10、 with (short-term) business objectives rises and falls. R&D's arena—the extent to which it can explore and develop options for the company—widens and narrows in response to these cyclical shifts in spending and s

11、trategic consider</p><p>　　The case of DSM shows, however, that R&D's arena cannot be narrowed endlessly. R&D needs to be integrated with business strategy but in such a way that short-term busin

12、ess objectives do not prevail and that R&D can generate options for the company. Business strategy offers an important way to achieve such integration.</p><p>　　The R&D Cycle——DSM transformed itself

13、three times over the course of the 20th century.</p><p>　　The R&D budget grew rapidly until 1970 but fell quickly afterwards. Spending on R&D increased again in the 1980s but not at the level of the

14、period before 1970. This is not a surprising pattern. Other companies went through similar periods of growth and (relative) decline after World War II.</p><p>　　There is, of course, a strong link with macroe

15、conomic trends. In the chemical industry, the period between 1945 and 1970 was a unique period of spectacular growth and seemingly endless technological opportunities. After 1970, growth slowed, and two oil shocks and in

16、creasingly stringent environmental regulation had a tremendous impact on the industry. From a long-term perspective, the chemical industry normalized and ups and downs followed each other periodically. In markets that gr

17、ew more slowly</p><p>　　The shifts in DSM's R&D budget also reflect, and are linked to, shifts in business strategy and the company's evolution. The Dutch government established DSM in 1902 as a

18、coal mining firm, responding to the activities of private firms in the coal-rich province of Limburg, in the south of the Netherlands. The fields to be exploited by DSM proved rich in bituminous coal, a type of coal that

19、 was particularly suited for the production of coke, a fuel used for firing blast furnaces and other industri</p><p>　　In the 1910s, the company quickly developed into a large coal company with related capab

20、ilities in mechanical engineering. The build-up of the fertilizer works in the late 1920s and in the 1930s led the company to hire chemists and engineers and to expand the internal knowledge base. At the fertilizer works

21、, and also at the coke oven plants, works laboratories conducted routine production control and analysis. In 1935, the leaders of the works laboratories proposed establishing a formal, central</p><p>　　From

22、its base in fertilizers and with its R&D laboratory, DSM expanded further and diversified in chemicals after World War II. All branches of the chemical industry grew rapidly and gradually switched from coal-based fee

23、d stocks to hydrocarbons. Synthetic materials, plastics, fibers, and resins, were new fields with high rates of innovation. DSM expanded its fertilizer operations and started production of fiber intermediates, plastics a

24、nd resins. </p><p>　　At the same time, the coal and coke businesses went into decline. In 1965, the Dutch government decided to close all coal mines in the Netherlands, including those owned by private compa

25、nies, after which DSM quickly closed its coke plants and mines, and switched the feedstock base of its chemical operations from coal to hydrocarbons. DSM's executive board concluded that the company's chemical bu

26、sinesses were strong but that further expansion was critical if the company was to survive the closure</p><p>　　Around 1970, the growth of the chemical industry slowed. Markets for new products like plastics

27、 and older products like fertilizers both showed signs of saturation, and environmental regulation tightened. Biotechnology and advanced materials attracted a lot of attention but were slow to realize their perceived com

28、mercial potential. DSM's portfolio tilted heavily toward plastics, fertilizers and other bulk chemicals that were hit hardest by the malaise. Moreover, growth of chemical markets slowed</p><p>　　Sales in

29、creased sharply in the 1970s but profitability lagged. In the late 1970s, DSM's executive board considered changing its strategy. After the company had to report its first loss in its history in 1982, strategy shifte

30、d from expansion in bulk chemicals to seeking products with high value-added. After 1985, when the company's results had improved, this strategy could be fully implemented and the R&D budget started to grow.</

31、p><p>　　In sum, DSM transformed itself three times over the course of the 20th century. From coal and coke the company started manufacturing fertilizers in 1930. From fertilizers the company transformed itself

32、into a diversified bulk chemicals company between 1945 and 1970. DSM did so by entering new product lines in the chemical industry and closing its coal and coke operations. Finally, DSM transformed itself into a company

33、with high value-added products in its portfolio after 1970, and particularly a</p><p>　　R&D Cycle and Performance——R&D clearly a crucial role in the development of DSM’s business</p><p&g

34、t;　　One important role of R&D is to help the company start manufacturing new products，Again, macroeconomic trends are important. DSM's chemical sales grew until 1970, and picked up more speed after 1970 as the co

35、mpany expanded to replace its coal-related businesses to reach a size that would ensure its survival. Profitability came under pressure, however, as markets grew less rapidly than the industry expanded. The R&D budge

36、t no longer followed sales growth and was cut as DSM economized throughout i</p><p>　　Economics is only part of the explanation, however. Business management views of R&D changed with the R&D budget

37、and the number of R&D-based diversifications. After World War II, "expansion" became the key word in DSM's business strategy; that expansion would be achieved through existing lines of business and thro

38、ugh diversification. At the same time, Central Laboratory was expanding rapidly.</p><p>　　Organizational links between the R&D organization and the remainder of the company were loose and Central Laborat

39、ory initiated projects on its own, without commitment from the production organization. Nevertheless, R&D was closely aligned with business as the company's strategy was clear. Business managers expected Central

40、Laboratory to take initiatives and R&D was seen as a vital part of the company, ensuring its survival for both the long and short term.</p><p>　　Before 1970, Central Laboratory contributed significantly

41、to a number of technological and commercial successes, fueling a virtuous cycle. Tolerance of failure was quite high. Not only Central Laboratory but business managers as well viewed R&D as a risky undertaking, but f

42、ailures were considered part and parcel of doing R&D and as such were simply accepted. </p><p>　　DSM's strategy in the 1970s failed to pay off as sales grew spectacularly but profitability declined.

43、The company gradually changed its course in the early 1980s. DSM's R&D organization had tried to keep diversification and the renewal of the company's businesses on the agenda. By the late 1970s, DSM's ex

44、ecutive board considered growth in bulk chemicals to be fragile, due to rising production costs, and to be threatened, not in the least, by increasingly stringent environmental regulations. In 1</p><p>　　The

45、 strategy of aiming for new products with high value-added was reaffirmed in 1984, while the company's profitability was improving. The R&D organization seized the opportunity and drafted a list of projects that

46、could be developed into new businesses. These projects became the so-called Corporate Development Programs. With the aim of renewing its business, DSM substantially increased its R&D budget to develop projects for th

47、e medium and long term. A committee with people from the R&D organiza</p><p>　　R&D Needs an Arena——R&D needs a playing field large enough to generate the options the company can profit from</p

48、><p>　　In a long-term, historical perspective it is clear that in-house R&D played a crucial role in the development of DSM's businesses, both by helping diversifications and improving existing processe

49、s and products. R&D is not the only company unit responsible for success or failure of innovation processes, nor is it the only source of potentially profitable innovations. However, it is hard to imagine where DSM w

50、ould be without R&D to generate options for new and existing businesses, and to search fo</p><p>　　R&D needs an arena—a playing field large enough to enable R&D to generate the options the compan

51、y can profit from. R&D spending will rise and fall, depending on the company and the markets in which it is active, but mutual commitment between R&D and business must be nurtured throughout such cycles. R&D

52、without involvement of business is sterile. At the same time, business involvement should not push R&D toward short-term projects only because the effectiveness of R&D in generating options will d</p><

53、p>　　Business strategy is a crucial tool for linking R&D and business and maintaining a balance between the two. Strategy can provide a framework of goals within which R&D can generate options. This does not me

54、an that business strategy necessarily should be to formulate first, followed by research programs; nor does this mean that strategy needs to be formulated explicitly. In the 1950s, the course DSM was taking was clear eve

55、n though it was not explicitly formulated. Similarly, the company's strateg</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　R&D如何幫助帝斯曼轉(zhuǎn)型</p><p>　　Arjan wan Rooij</p><

56、p><b>　　摘 要</b></p><p>　　從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的角度研究R&D在荷蘭DSM化學(xué)公司的作用引發(fā)了在研發(fā)管理方面的兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵且相互關(guān)聯(lián)的問(wèn)題。一方面，公司必須保持他們的研究專注于那些他們利用并且獲利的技術(shù)和市場(chǎng)。另一方面，企業(yè)必須通過(guò)研發(fā)產(chǎn)生方案，重振其現(xiàn)有的業(yè)務(wù)以及開發(fā)新的市場(chǎng)。這些方案可能會(huì)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，脫離現(xiàn)有市場(chǎng)和技術(shù)條件而無(wú)法達(dá)到，但同時(shí)，高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)能確保高利潤(rùn)和企

57、業(yè)生存競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。在意識(shí)到R&D的全部潛能時(shí)，公司需要建立一個(gè)R&D的研究場(chǎng)所：一個(gè)可以通過(guò)R&D可以產(chǎn)生方案以及R&D與公司可以相互作用的場(chǎng)所。</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　R&D在一個(gè)公司中扮演的角色到底是什么？應(yīng)該是什么？應(yīng)該如何經(jīng)營(yíng)管理直接研發(fā)？這些問(wèn)題在20世紀(jì)一直困擾著各大企業(yè)，而且將會(huì)

58、一直繼續(xù)困擾它們。</p><p>　　本文探討的是一些關(guān)于荷蘭帝斯曼化學(xué)公司案例的問(wèn)題。這家公司存活了一個(gè)多世紀(jì)，通過(guò)不斷轉(zhuǎn)型得以從一個(gè)煤炭開采公司到一個(gè)化肥生產(chǎn)者，再到一個(gè)多元化的大宗化學(xué)品生產(chǎn)公司，并再次轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐粋€(gè)以化工和高性能材料為生產(chǎn)重點(diǎn)的公司。這些轉(zhuǎn)變使得帝斯曼成為一個(gè)非常具有研究?jī)r(jià)值的公司。</p><p>　　從DSM的情況可以得出兩個(gè)啟示。首先，R&D投入是周期性

59、的，研發(fā)預(yù)算的增加與減少?zèng)Q定于該公司的財(cái)務(wù)表現(xiàn)和商業(yè)環(huán)境的變化。其次，R&D的管理政策也是周期性，受到（短期）業(yè)務(wù)目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)率的上升和下降的壓力。R&D研究場(chǎng)所的規(guī)模使它可以探索并為公司制定備選方案，以響應(yīng)擴(kuò)大或縮小周期性變化支出的戰(zhàn)略考慮。</p><p>　　然而，帝斯曼的案例表明，R&D研究場(chǎng)所的規(guī)模不能無(wú)止盡的縮小。R&D需要與經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略加以整合，研發(fā)可以為公司創(chuàng)造方案，但在

60、這樣一種方式下，企業(yè)就不能獲得短期的經(jīng)營(yíng)目標(biāo)。經(jīng)營(yíng)策略為實(shí)現(xiàn)這種一體化提供了一個(gè)重要的方式。</p><p>　　R&D周期——帝斯曼在20世紀(jì)的三次轉(zhuǎn)型</p><p>　　帝斯曼公司的研發(fā)預(yù)算從1949年至1970年迅速增長(zhǎng)而在之后又迅速下跌。R&D支出在80年代又開始增加但是沒(méi)有再達(dá)到1970年之前的水平。這不是一個(gè)令人吃驚的模式，其他公司在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)之后也經(jīng)歷了

61、類似時(shí)期的增長(zhǎng)和（相對(duì)）下降。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，研發(fā)投入的周期也與宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢(shì)有密切的聯(lián)系。在化工行業(yè)，1945年至1970年之間是一個(gè)大幅度技術(shù)提高的特殊時(shí)期。1970年之后，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，兩次石油危機(jī)和日益嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境監(jiān)管對(duì)業(yè)界產(chǎn)生了巨大的影響。從長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，化工行業(yè)各自定期的起起落落是正常的，在市場(chǎng)的增長(zhǎng)速度比較慢的時(shí)候，創(chuàng)新變得更加困難。</p><p>　　帝斯曼的研發(fā)預(yù)算

62、表也反映了公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)策略的變化和轉(zhuǎn)型。荷蘭政府在1902年成立帝斯曼煤炭開采公司，是為了響應(yīng)在荷蘭南部的煤炭大省——林堡的私營(yíng)企業(yè)的活動(dòng)。這個(gè)地方在被帝斯曼開采后證明藏有豐富的那種特別適合生產(chǎn)焦炭的煙煤，那是一種用于高爐點(diǎn)火和其他工業(yè)用途的燃料。生產(chǎn)焦炭則意味著生產(chǎn)焦?fàn)t氣體，那是一種類似于被廣泛用于取暖、照明和其他用途的氣體。焦?fàn)t氣體也包含了商業(yè)價(jià)值，例如被提取和銷售的苯和甲苯等化合物。</p><p>　　在2

63、0世紀(jì)10年代，公司迅速發(fā)展成為一個(gè)大型的與機(jī)械工程相關(guān)的煤炭開采公司。在 1920年代晚期建立了化肥工程以及在20世紀(jì)30年代公司聘請(qǐng)化學(xué)家和工程師，以擴(kuò)大在化肥生產(chǎn)以及焦?fàn)t廠這塊的內(nèi)部基礎(chǔ)知識(shí)，工程實(shí)驗(yàn)室進(jìn)行了例行的生產(chǎn)控制和分析。在1935年，工程試驗(yàn)室的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人提出建立一個(gè)正式的、獨(dú)立于生產(chǎn)組織的集中性R&D實(shí)驗(yàn)室。這項(xiàng)建議使得中心實(shí)驗(yàn)室的成立，這是一個(gè)使帝斯曼存活至20世紀(jì)90年代的最重要的研發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)。</p>

64、<p>　　帝斯曼以化肥生產(chǎn)和R&D實(shí)驗(yàn)室為基礎(chǔ)，在二戰(zhàn)后進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大多樣化生產(chǎn)化學(xué)品。化工行業(yè)的各分支機(jī)構(gòu)迅速興起，逐步轉(zhuǎn)向煤基炭氫化合物原料、合成材料、塑料、纖維和樹脂的生產(chǎn)，是對(duì)新領(lǐng)域的創(chuàng)新。帝斯曼擴(kuò)大了其肥料的生產(chǎn)運(yùn)籌，開始了對(duì)纖維中間體、塑料和樹脂的生產(chǎn)。與此同時(shí)，煤炭和焦炭產(chǎn)業(yè)開始沒(méi)落，之后，帝斯曼迅速關(guān)閉它的焦化廠和礦山，然后將化學(xué)業(yè)務(wù)基地的原料從煤炭轉(zhuǎn)變到碳?xì)浠衔?。帝斯曼公司?zhí)行委員會(huì)的結(jié)論是，公司

65、的化工業(yè)務(wù)表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁，進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大公司是至關(guān)重要的。</p><p>　　1970年左右，化工行業(yè)增長(zhǎng)放緩，對(duì)帝斯曼的化肥等大宗化學(xué)品的打擊最為嚴(yán)重。在70年代末，帝斯曼的執(zhí)行委員會(huì)審議改變其戰(zhàn)略，此前，該公司不得不報(bào)告其在1982年歷史的首次虧損，故對(duì)大宗化學(xué)品進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)移，以尋求產(chǎn)品具有高附加值。1985年以后，當(dāng)公司的結(jié)果得到改善后，這一戰(zhàn)略就全面實(shí)施，R&D預(yù)算也開始增長(zhǎng)。帝斯曼的產(chǎn)品強(qiáng)調(diào)兩個(gè)產(chǎn)品線：

66、精細(xì)化學(xué)品和高性能材料。</p><p>　　總之，帝斯曼在20世紀(jì)進(jìn)行了三次脫胎換骨，于1930年從煤和焦炭公司開始生產(chǎn)肥料；1945年至1970年從化肥公司轉(zhuǎn)變成一個(gè)多元化的大宗化學(xué)品公司；最后，帝斯曼公司在1970年，特別是1985年以后轉(zhuǎn)變其投資組合后變成了一個(gè)生產(chǎn)高附加值產(chǎn)品的公司。</p><p>　　R&D的周期和性能——R&D在帝斯曼的經(jīng)營(yíng)發(fā)展方面起著至關(guān)重

67、要的作用</p><p>　　R&D的一個(gè)重要作用是幫助公司生產(chǎn)新產(chǎn)品，再次，宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)走勢(shì)也是很重要的。帝斯曼化工銷售一直增長(zhǎng)，1970年以后由于公司擴(kuò)大，銷售增長(zhǎng)就更加迅速了，取代了煤炭相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)并達(dá)到了能確保它生存的規(guī)模。然而，隨著市場(chǎng)的增長(zhǎng)速度高于行業(yè)的擴(kuò)大，盈利收到了壓力。研發(fā)預(yù)算不再隨著銷售的增長(zhǎng)而增長(zhǎng)，而是被帝斯曼切斷了研發(fā)投入的增長(zhǎng)，相對(duì)于銷售的繼續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，研發(fā)一落千丈。</p>

68、<p>　　1970年以前，中心實(shí)驗(yàn)室對(duì)一些技術(shù)性和商業(yè)性的成功做出了重大貢獻(xiàn)，帶動(dòng)了良性循環(huán)。不僅中心實(shí)驗(yàn)室，還有經(jīng)營(yíng)管理人員對(duì)失敗相當(dāng)寬容，都認(rèn)為這是R&D應(yīng)該承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是能被接受的存在。但這種觀點(diǎn)在20世紀(jì)60年代發(fā)生了改變，帝斯曼的賴氨酸項(xiàng)目的不幸失敗，催化了眾人對(duì)R&D作用的質(zhì)疑。最后，帝斯曼的執(zhí)行委員會(huì)強(qiáng)調(diào)有必要立即擴(kuò)張，將公司推向通過(guò)購(gòu)買技術(shù)以達(dá)到多樣化的戰(zhàn)略，認(rèn)為研發(fā)只會(huì)耗費(fèi)太多的時(shí)間，中心實(shí)

69、驗(yàn)室的作用僅限于改善技術(shù)。到了70年代末，由于生產(chǎn)成本上升，并受到日益嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境保護(hù)法規(guī)的威脅，帝斯曼在大宗化學(xué)品方面的增長(zhǎng)是脆弱的。帝斯曼在1982年開展了鞏固合理大宗化學(xué)品的活動(dòng)，公司還剝離了一些不相關(guān)的活動(dòng)。與此同時(shí)，行政董事會(huì)強(qiáng)調(diào)，新的企業(yè)應(yīng)該開發(fā)高附加值的化學(xué)品，研發(fā)在此發(fā)揮了重要的作用，公司開始作出重大調(diào)整。</p><p>　　帝斯曼在1984年制定了以高附加值為目標(biāo)的戰(zhàn)略，發(fā)展新業(yè)務(wù)。隨著其業(yè)務(wù)的

70、更新，帝斯曼大幅度增加研發(fā)預(yù)算，分為中期和長(zhǎng)期的。委員會(huì)與行政機(jī)關(guān)和董事會(huì)成立R&D機(jī)構(gòu)，以檢查這些項(xiàng)目的執(zhí)行。該委員會(huì)的作用是保證研發(fā)的有關(guān)項(xiàng)目與企業(yè)之間存在密切聯(lián)系，研發(fā)預(yù)算體現(xiàn)了一種改進(jìn)企業(yè)管理的轉(zhuǎn)變。</p><p>　　鑒于上世紀(jì)80年代的研發(fā)，1985年以后，以研發(fā)為基礎(chǔ)的多樣化數(shù)量再次增加，其他研究項(xiàng)目已開始面世，同時(shí)研發(fā)作為公司的戰(zhàn)略也變得清晰。到了80年代中期，帝斯曼在某種程度上返回到了

71、20世紀(jì)50年代研發(fā)的做法，讓研發(fā)有它自己的發(fā)展空間。帝斯曼在90年代繼續(xù)研發(fā)，其在政策上超越了80年代，公司的業(yè)務(wù)進(jìn)一步向高附加值產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)變，帝斯曼制定了新的管理結(jié)構(gòu)，以應(yīng)對(duì)公司的這項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)變。公司也開始重視開放式創(chuàng)新模型，其優(yōu)良的外部環(huán)境和有益的技術(shù)，結(jié)合其內(nèi)部的R&D主要研究荷蘭設(shè)施的轉(zhuǎn)化，開放給其他公司和組織，加強(qiáng)與荷蘭大學(xué)研究的連接，也更加強(qiáng)調(diào)與國(guó)內(nèi)外研發(fā)組織的接軌。</p><p>　　研發(fā)需要一個(gè)

72、研究場(chǎng)所——帝斯曼需要一個(gè)能為公司盈利的大場(chǎng)所</p><p>　　從歷史的，長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的角度看，內(nèi)部研發(fā)的發(fā)展對(duì)帝斯曼的業(yè)務(wù)起到了至關(guān)重要的作用，既幫助實(shí)現(xiàn)多樣化又改進(jìn)了現(xiàn)有工藝和產(chǎn)品。研發(fā)并不是唯一決定公司創(chuàng)新過(guò)程成功和失敗的因素，也不是潛在創(chuàng)新的唯一來(lái)源。然而，很難想象在帝斯曼不研發(fā)產(chǎn)生新的和現(xiàn)有的業(yè)務(wù)方案，而只是從公司外部整合具有前景的技術(shù)時(shí)將會(huì)怎么樣。</p><p>　　經(jīng)營(yíng)策略是連

73、接R&D和業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)營(yíng)以及保持兩者平衡的一個(gè)重要工具，經(jīng)營(yíng)策略可以提供一系列R&D可以生成的目標(biāo)。這并不意味著經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略一定要第一個(gè)制定，研究方案第二個(gè)制定；這也不意味著戰(zhàn)略需要明確的制定好。在50年代，帝斯曼正在實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)過(guò)程，即使它沒(méi)有被明確制定，同樣，公司在80年代初的戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃為R&D機(jī)構(gòu)生產(chǎn)出對(duì)公司有利的方案提供了必要的幫助，經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略可以幫助研發(fā)和經(jīng)營(yíng)之間的相互作用，這對(duì)成功的創(chuàng)新非常有必要</p>