會計學(xué)外文翻譯--大股東異質(zhì)性影響公司的會計質(zhì)量和信息不對稱

1、<p><b>　　畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）</b></p><p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　題 目 大股東異質(zhì)性：影響公司的會計 </p><p><b>　　質(zhì)量和信息不對稱</b></p><p>　　專 業(yè) 會計學(xué)

2、 </p><p>　　班 級 </p><p>　　學(xué) 生 </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師 </p><p><b>　　XXXX大學(xué)</b></p&

3、gt;<p><b>　　2013年</b></p><p>　　大股東異質(zhì)性:影響公司的會計質(zhì)量和信息不對稱</p><p>　　第1章：介紹、動機(jī)和貢獻(xiàn)</p><p>　　我調(diào)查了大股東與公司會計質(zhì)量和信息不對稱之間的關(guān)系。具體來說，我檢查了企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱是否與一個公司的大股東的類型，大小，以及監(jiān)測侵略性與有

4、關(guān)。最近的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,增加大股東行動主義,以及新的安全交易委員會(SEC)規(guī)則允許大股東更大的代理訪問，這些都激勵了我對此的研究。</p><p>　　此前的研究表明，大股東能夠影響企業(yè)的各種政策，如投資策略、經(jīng)理薪酬、財務(wù)決策，但幾乎沒有證據(jù)證明大股東是如何涉及到企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱的。在這些情況下，現(xiàn)存的會計文獻(xiàn)都不考慮大股東的作用，這隱含的一個假設(shè)是，所有的大股東共享類似的投資偏好，技能和監(jiān)控能力。

5、</p><p>　　鑒于大股東所有權(quán)與企業(yè)的經(jīng)營決策和公司治理相關(guān)的情況，立法者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)在資本市場已經(jīng)開始認(rèn)識到，大股東履行著重要的監(jiān)督作用。盡管SEC之前有不成功的嘗試，讓這些有影響力的業(yè)主更大的訪問董事會代表以增加大股東的影響力，但美國證券交易委員會最近仍頒布規(guī)則，允許大股東獲得更多代理材料。</p><p>　　2010年7月21日,奧巴馬總統(tǒng)將《多德-弗蘭克華爾街改革和消費(fèi)者保

6、護(hù)法案》訂為法律(白宮,2010)。該法案授權(quán)美國證券交易委員會建立規(guī)則，讓大股東獲得代理材料。在SEC新規(guī)則下，股東的代理材料中包括一名或多名公司在年度會議上被提名當(dāng)選董事的大股東。雖然威脅要更換整個石板董事的代理權(quán)爭奪，是相當(dāng)罕見的（拜伯切克，2007年）和昂貴的（<金融時報> ，2010年），美國商業(yè)團(tuán)體似乎準(zhǔn)備采取一切必要的步驟來對付這些新的SEC規(guī)則（伊格爾舍姆，2010）。</p><p>

7、;　　除了立法者和監(jiān)管者，學(xué)者也有興趣研究大股東在公司企業(yè)事務(wù)中的作用。最近，學(xué)者們越來越關(guān)注大股東在公司中的作用，特別是與公司企業(yè)決策方面有關(guān)的作用。這些文獻(xiàn)一般講述的是大股東由于他們有著大型股權(quán)投資，在企業(yè)作為一個獨(dú)特的位置，起著監(jiān)控經(jīng)理和影響經(jīng)營決策的作用。理論表明,大股東在公司積累模塊中共享控制和私人控制福利(Holderness，2003；Shleifer and Vishny，1986)。共享控制的好處是指企業(yè)價值的增加帶來

8、的好處，所有股東可能獲得大股東的監(jiān)控力度，而私人控制利益表明，由于大股東他們的影響力和所有權(quán)位置，他們能夠提取的相應(yīng)的好處。</p><p>　　最近的研究已開始認(rèn)識到,并不是所有的大股東也有類似的監(jiān)控的技能和能力。例如，Cronqvist Fahlenbrach（2009）分析大股東之間的異質(zhì)性的影響，并找到公司的投資差異顯著和重要經(jīng)濟(jì)差異在公司的投資、金融和高管薪酬政策都存在在不同類型的大股東之間。此外，在過

9、去10年的研究中大多都集中在股東維權(quán)活動上。</p><p>　　股東維權(quán)人士的文獻(xiàn)表明,目標(biāo)公司有較低的托賓Q值,降低銷售增長率、降低股息支付率,和較低的股息收益率。大多數(shù)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)積極的非正?；貓蠊蓶|維權(quán)人士圍繞宣布購買和長期積極購買異常收益率在第一年的。</p><p>　　盡管從融資文學(xué)的令人信服的證據(jù)表明，企業(yè)決策由不同類型的大股東出席，股東積極主義的堅定和無數(shù)的證據(jù)表明，大股東被

10、作為投資者類似的監(jiān)察組同質(zhì)能力。我尋求進(jìn)一步研究，并提供大股東所有權(quán)的異質(zhì)性，涉及到企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱的證據(jù)。</p><p>　　我的研究最開始是通過構(gòu)建三種規(guī)格的大股東異質(zhì)性(LSH)基于類型、大小、和監(jiān)控攻擊性的大股東存在于一個公司。接下來,我測試的是對于公司的會計質(zhì)量和信息不對稱而言，這些措施是否是重要的決定因素。最終找出了影響公司會計質(zhì)量和信息不對稱的相關(guān)因素。</p><

11、;p>　　應(yīng)用的所有權(quán)異質(zhì)性的三個措施，我首先檢查，LSH是否有助于解釋企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量的變化。我使用兩個權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制為基礎(chǔ)的指標(biāo)來衡量會計信息質(zhì)量。兩個權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制為基礎(chǔ)的模型是酌情權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制模型由塔克和Zarowin的（2006）瓊斯（1991）開發(fā)的實(shí)施，德肖和Dichev（2002），麥克尼科爾斯（2002）修改的應(yīng)計質(zhì)量模型。</p><p>　　接下來，我檢查，LSH是否基于市場的措施，企業(yè)的信息

12、不對稱有關(guān)。我使用兩個基于市場的措施，審查LSH之間的關(guān)系和企業(yè)的信息不對稱。第一個措施,以下巴倫,金,Lim,史蒂文斯(1998)——以后“BKLS”——使用分析師的信息精度作為代理的精度的,公共和私人總信息用于資本市場。第二個措施是買賣價差所使用的現(xiàn)存文獻(xiàn)作為衡量信息不對稱(例如。Glosten和米格羅姆,1985;Laksmana,2008;理查森,2000)。</p><p>　　與監(jiān)測理論相一致，我預(yù)測

13、大股東所有權(quán)的異質(zhì)性和企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量間有正相關(guān)。這一預(yù)測與大股東在公司的監(jiān)測能力是一致的。與大股東潛在的套利者/投資者獲得私人信息的動機(jī)，我預(yù)測，大股東擁有的異質(zhì)性是與企業(yè)的信息不對稱成正相關(guān)的。我還預(yù)測，這種關(guān)系會受到大股東類型的影響。具體來說，我預(yù)測，積極的大股東更積極與會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱有關(guān)系，相對于溫和的大股東而言。由于所有的大股東不同類似的監(jiān)控能力，侵略性以及某些大股東的相對規(guī)模差異造成大股東所有權(quán)的異質(zhì)性。<

14、/p><p>　　最后，我的分析側(cè)重于企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱形成的后果。我限制我的樣本公司，有新的大股東的形成。雖然這種限制顯著降低了我的樣本，但是數(shù)據(jù)提供了一個獨(dú)特的機(jī)會，大量購買的后果在前置和后置形成期的變量提供了相關(guān)證據(jù)。</p><p>　　對于新成員的建立，我預(yù)測一個新成員的形成和企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量成正相關(guān)關(guān)系。此前的研究已經(jīng)證明監(jiān)測和企業(yè)會計信息質(zhì)量的水平之間呈正相關(guān)。因此

15、，誰擁有更多地股份，這些股東對經(jīng)理的監(jiān)督作用就更強(qiáng)。我也預(yù)測，這種關(guān)系會受到大股東的類型影響，例如，新的成員中飯更積極的股東有較大的提高會計質(zhì)量，因為以前的研究顯示，侵略性大股東是較有影響力的因素，更有效地啟動改變企業(yè)內(nèi)部。</p><p>　　至于新的成員的形成和信息不對稱，我預(yù)測新成員之間和企業(yè)的信息不對稱有正相關(guān)關(guān)系。這個預(yù)測是基于之前的研究表明，大股東擁有信息優(yōu)勢超過其他市場參與者例如積極參與信息搜索的這

16、些有影響力的業(yè)主私人。在盡可能多的情況下尋找一個新的機(jī)會，一個有影響力的股東獲得私人信息和/或從事私人信息搜索要容易得多，我預(yù)測這務(wù)必增加了企業(yè)的信息不對稱。我還預(yù)測，這種關(guān)聯(lián)類型的大股東在公司有很大的影響。具體來說，積極的大股東已經(jīng)被證明是更有效地影響企業(yè)的決策因素。我認(rèn)為，在新的成員建立中監(jiān)測的侵略性與企業(yè)信息的不對稱存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。</p><p>　　我的研究結(jié)果支持了我的假設(shè)，大股東異質(zhì)性與企業(yè)的會計信

17、息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱是成正相關(guān)的。此外，由于推測，某些大股東的監(jiān)測侵略性與企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱也有正相關(guān)關(guān)系。</p><p>　　大股東異質(zhì)性方面，指標(biāo)變量捕獲不同類型的大股東，目前在一家公司里是明顯不為零的。具體來說，指標(biāo)變量捕獲咄咄逼人的大股東與會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱之間存在的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，而捕獲溫和的大股東，指標(biāo)變量是不那么顯著的。與個別大股東的投資相比，其他大股東的相對大小不會是企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)

18、量和信息不對稱的一個重要的決定因素。這個結(jié)果并不令人驚訝，由于措施變化不大，存在計算大小的差異和可能的測量問題。侵略性大股東占的比例不大，但是，顯著?？偟膩碚f，這些結(jié)果表明，積極的大股東是我研究的重點(diǎn)，這是符合我的假說監(jiān)控侵略性。</p><p>　　分析新的股東成員的建立給我提供了額外的證據(jù)，企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱的變化大都在大股東的投資后時期。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)支持了我的主要假設(shè)和新的大股東投資企業(yè)會影響會計信

19、息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱提供了證據(jù)。補(bǔ)充證據(jù)也有助于解決我在研究中的因果關(guān)系。具體來說，我的發(fā)現(xiàn)揭示了會計信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱的增加是發(fā)生在投資后期的。</p><p>　　我的這篇文獻(xiàn)的貢獻(xiàn)在于在幾個不同的方面。人們很少知道大股東與公司的會計質(zhì)量和信息不對稱之間的關(guān)聯(lián)性。因此，相關(guān)證據(jù)一致的增加或減少企業(yè)的會計信息質(zhì)量和/或水平信息不對稱與某些類型的大股東時，對投資者的影響評估當(dāng)前和未來的投資。例如，一個公司的投資者

20、更大程度上依賴有與會計信息質(zhì)量有正相關(guān)的大股東的公司，它們認(rèn)為公司的會計信息質(zhì)量較好，盈利狀況比較好。同樣，對于很少或根本沒有大股東的公司，投資者則會認(rèn)為會計信息質(zhì)量較低，公司的盈利質(zhì)量也較差。</p><p>　?。═rainor, Joseph E. Large shareholder heterogeneity: The effect on firms' accounting quality and

21、 information asymmetry[D].Florida Atlantic University.2011.page1-8.）</p><p>　　Large shareholder heterogeneity: The effect on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry</p><p>　　CHAP

22、TER1:INTRODUCTION,MOTIVATIONS,AND CONTRIBUTIONS </p><p>　　I investigate the association between large shareholders1 and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Specifically, I examine wheth

23、er the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders present in a firm are associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. The recent economic downturns, increased large shareh

24、older activism, and new Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules allowing large shareholders greater proxy access motivate my research.</p><p>　　Prior research suggests that large shareholders are able t

25、o influence a variety of corporate policies, such as investment strategy, manager compensation, and finance decisions, but little evidence exists on how large shareholders are related to firms' accounting quality and

26、 information asymmetry. In those instances when the extantaccounting literature does consider the role of large shareholders, an implicit assumption is that all large shareholders share similar investment preferences, s

27、kills,</p><p>　　Given evidence that large shareholder ownership is associated with firms' operating decisions and corporate governance, legislators and regulators have begun to recognize the important mo

28、nitoring role that large shareholders fulfill in the capital markets. Despite prior unsuccessful attempts by the SEC to increase the influence of large shareholders by allowing these influential owners greater access to

29、 board representation, the SEC was recently granted the authority to promulgate rules that al</p><p>　　On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law by P

30、resident Obama (The White House, 2010). The Act authorizes the SEC to create rules that allow large shareholders access to proxy materials. Under the new SEC rules2, large shareholders meeting certain holding requireme

31、nts would be allowed to include one or more nominees in the proxy materials distributed to shareholders prior to a firm’s annual meeting at which directors are elected. Althou</p><p>　　In addition to legisl

32、ators and regulators, academics are also interested in the role of large shareholders in firms' corporate affairs. Most recently, academics have devoted significant attention to the role of large shareholders with

33、respects to firms' corporate decision making. This literature generally portrays large shareholders as being in a unique position to monitor managers and influence operating decisions due to their large equity inves

34、tment. Theories suggest that large shareholder</p><p>　　Recent studies have begun to recognize that not all large shareholders have similar monitoring skills and abilities. For example, Cronqvist and Fahle

35、nbrach (2009) analyze the effects of heterogeneity across blockholders and find significant and economically important differences in firms' investment, financial, and executive compensation policies among different

36、types of blockholders. In addition, many studies over the last 10 years have focused on the activities of shareholder activists.</p><p>　　The shareholder activist literature suggests that target firms have

37、lower Tobin's Q, lower sales growth rates, lower payout ratios, and lower dividend yields than non-targets. Most studies find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of shareholder activist block purc

38、hases and also long-run positive abnormal returns over the first year of the block purchase.</p><p>　　Despite the compelling evidence from the finance literature suggesting that corporate decisions vary by t

39、he types of large shareholders present in a firm and myriad evidence of shareholder activism, much of the extant accounting literature has generally treated large shareholders as a homogeneous group of investors with sim

40、ilar monitoring capabilities. I seek to further this research and provide evidence on how the heterogeneity of large shareholder ownership relates to firms' accounting qualit</p><p>　　I begin my examina

41、tion by constructing three alternative specifications of large shareholder heterogeneity (LSH) based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of the large shareholders present in a firm. Next, I test whether the

42、se measures of LSH are significant determinants of firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I conclude with an examination of the consequences of new block formations on firms' accounting quality and

43、 information asymmetry. </p><p>　　Applying the three measures of ownership heterogeneity, I first examine whether LSH helps to explain the variation in firms’ accounting quality. I measure accounting quali

44、ty using two accrual-based metrics. The two accrual-based models are the discretionary accrual model developed by Jones (1991) as implemented by Tucker and Zarowin (2006), and the accrual quality model from Dechow and D

45、ichev (2002) as modified by McNichols (2002). </p><p>　　Next, I examine whether LSH is related to market-based measures of firms’ information asymmetry. I use two market-based measures to examine the relati

46、onship between LSH and firms’ information asymmetry. The first measure, following Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998)--hereafter "BKLS”--use analysts’ information precision as proxies for the precisions of total,

47、 public, and private information available to the capital markets. The second measure is the bid-ask spread which is used in the exta</p><p>　　Consistent with monitoring theory, I predict a positive associa

48、tion between large shareholder ownership heterogeneity and firms' accounting quality. This prediction is consistent with large shareholders serving in a monitoring capacity. Consistent with large shareholders as po

49、tential arbitrageurs/investors with motivation to obtain private information, I predict that large shareholder ownership heterogeneity is positively associated with firms' information asymmetry. I also predict that

50、this </p><p>　　My final analysis focuses on the consequences of block formation on firms’ accounting quality and information asymmetry. I restrict my full sample to firms that have new large shareholder blo

51、ck formations. While this restriction reduces my sample significantly, the data provide a unique opportunity to present evidence on the consequences of large block purchases by examining the levels of the dependent vari

52、ables in the pre and post-block formation periods.</p><p>　　For new block formations, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms' accounting quality in the post-block period.

53、 Prior research has demonstrated a positive association between the level of monitoring and firms' accounting quality. Therefore, new block creations represent a substantial increase in the concentration of shares

54、held by a shareholder who has more incentive to monitor managers. I also predict that this relationship is influenced by the type of large s</p><p>　　As far as new block formations and information asymmetry

55、, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms' information asymmetry. This prediction is based on prior research which suggests that large shareholders possess information advantages over

56、 other market participants and that these influential owners actively engage in private information search. In as much as new blocks create a new opportunity for an influential shareholder to gain private information an

57、d/or eng</p><p>　　The results of my study support my hypotheses that large shareholder heterogeneity is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Further, as hypoth

58、esized, the monitoring aggressiveness of certain large shareholders is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. </p><p>　　With respects to heterogeneity, large shar

59、eholder indicator variables capturing the different types of large shareholders present in a firm are significantly different from zero. Specifically, an indicator variable capturing the existence of aggressive large sh

60、areholders is positively associated with accounting quality and information asymmetry, while an indicator variable capturing moderate large shareholders is not significant. The relative size of an individual large share

61、holder's investmen</p><p>　　An analysis of new block formations provides additional evidence that changes in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry are associated with large shareholders

62、 in the post investment period. This finding supports my main hypotheses and provides evidence of the effects of new large shareholder investment on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. This supplem

63、entary evidence also helps to address causation in my study. Specifically, my findings reveal an increase in acc</p><p>　　My study contributes to the literature in several distinct respects. Little is know

64、n about the association between large shareholders and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Therefore, evidence consistent with increases or decreases in firms' accounting quality and/or level in