外文翻譯--歐洲的公共養(yǎng)老與私人養(yǎng)老(節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1500單詞，8700英文字符,2700漢字</p><p>　　出處： springer link，F(xiàn)ilippo L. Calciano and Mario Tirelli/European View, 2008, Volume 7, Number 2, Pages 277-286</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p>

2、;<p>　　Public versus private old-age pensions in Europe</p><p>　　The modern idea of a ‘welfare state’ constitutes one of the most important achievements of European political thought. Old-age pensions

3、, in turn, are a crucial feature of a modern welfare state and a modern social market economy. Pensions are the main tool to provide citizens, on a large-scale basis, with acceptable welfare levels at retirement.</p&g

4、t;<p>　　In the face of this, demographic trends initiated in the past and now showing major effects are casting serious doubts on the future sustainability of national pension systems as they are organized today.

5、Countries worldwide are dealing with increasing budgetary problems in paying out pensions due to population ageing and, especially in Europe, to a historical tendency towards early retirement. Awareness of this phenomeno

6、n has triggered a widespread debate in all Member States of the European Un</p><p>　　However, pension system reform is a ‘sensitive target’, because of the very nature and importance of pensions. There are e

7、conomic, demographic, social and political aspects that must be considered. Furthermore, from a technical point of view, there is controversy about the empirical magnitude of the pension problem and the underlying econom

8、ic theory and, consequently, about best practices and policy advice for national governments. It is, therefore, no surprise that the debate on pension reform </p><p>　　What is a pension scheme?</p>&l

9、t;p>　　A pension is a contract under which an individual acquires the right to be transferred quotas of future output (the benefits) in exchange for quotas of his current output (the contributions). The contract establ

10、ishes a point in time—retirement age—when this transfer starts.</p><p>　　In principle, an individual could ‘sign a contract with himself’; that is, he could store part of his own current production for futur

11、e use. However, this is not viable for services and non-storable goods, for example health care and services for the elderly, clothing and food; these are precisely the basic kinds of good and services one is interested

12、in after retirement.</p><p>　　In face of this physical constraint on individual actions, modern societies have coordinated individual pension contracts into a pension system, where individuals do not need to

13、 consume their own past production during their retirement time, but instead, consume output produced by the individuals working actively during that time. Every modern pension system constitutes essentially a transfer o

14、f output, in each period, from the current young generation—meaning here as those actively working—to t</p><p>　　Pension systems fall theoretically into two broad categories.</p><p>　　In a pay-a

15、s-you-go system (PAYG), the current young generation contributes mandatory to the pension system through labor income taxes, whose revenues are partly transferred to the current old generation as pension benefits. In doi

16、ng so, the young generation acquires the right to receive pension benefits when they grow old. </p><p>　　In a funded pension system, the members of the current young generation mandatory contribute part of t

17、heir labor income to a pension fund, which invests in financial assets. When they retire, the fund pays out pension benefits in the form of lifetime annuities, which finance the pensioners’ consumption of goods and servi

18、ces produced by the current young generation.</p><p>　　Demographic change and public pension imbalances</p><p>　　This section discusses the problem of the current fiscal sustainability of public

19、 pension systems. A PAYG system is fiscally sustainable, or financially balanced, when in each period, the total nominal contributions—given as the contribution rate times the average wage times the number of workers—equ

20、al the total pension expenses—given as the average pension times the number of pensioners.</p><p>　　In OECD countries, public spending for retirement pensions—that is, the right-hand side of the balancing fo

21、rmula—is expected to rise dramatically in the coming decades. Recent projections for the period 2000–2050 show that public age-related expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, may rise on average by about seven points. In p

22、articular, the proportion of GDP represented by public spending for retirement pension and early-retirement programmers is projected to increase by almost 10% in Norway, by </p><p>　　For the European Union,

23、ECOFIN projects an increase of the gross (before taxes) public spending in pensions of 2.3 and 2.2 percentage points of GDP, respectively, for the EU-15 and EU-25. This implies that by 2050, the EU-15 will spend almost

24、13% of its GDP to finance public pensions, while the EU-25 will spend 12.8%.</p><p>　　The projected increase in longevity, combined with a tendency towards early retirement, is responsible for the expected i

25、ncrease in the expenditure for retirement pensions. At the same time, projected pension contributions are expected to fall because of the decreasing fertility rates. Indeed, lower fertility rates tend to lead to a decrea

26、se in the working population and, under reasonable assumptions about productivity, to only a moderate expansion of GDP. As a result, given the current public p</p><p>　　Public versus private pension schemes&

27、lt;/p><p>　　This section discusses how increasing the role of funded pension schemes can help to maintain fiscal sustainability in the presence of population ageing. It also elaborates on the effects on private

28、 pensions, savings and growth, financial markets and the protection of individuals against various types of risk, making comparisons with a PAYG system when necessary.</p><p>　　Funding allows the system to b

29、e kept financially balanced in the face of population ageing. In a fully funded system each individual in a given generation, call it ‘generation A’, builds up her own ‘pile of financial activities’ during her working li

30、fe. At retirement, the accumulated activities get transformed into a pension annuity whose actual value exactly equals the value of the accumulated assets for each individual. Under population ageing, during the retireme

31、nt period of ‘generation A’ th</p><p>　　The fact that a funded system stays financially balanced does not mean that it can keep invariant the real levels of pension annuities in presence of ageing. The decre

32、ase of the working population implies—other things being equal—a decrease in output. Hence, when ‘generation A’s’ pensioners use their annuities to buy good and services, an excess of demand may arise, leading to an infl

33、ationary process which lowers the real value of A’s pension annuities.9</p><p>　　While this argument is correct, it is a somewhat minor concern. First, the funded pension system remains nominally balanced. M

34、ost importantly, financial imbalance may cause the system to break down. Second, the argument is essentially about economic growth. It is the lack of growth, due to the decrease in the working population, which lowers re

35、al pensions. But growth is a general problem that affects PAYG and funded systems, as well as the economy as a whole. Even if it is not known whether a fu</p><p>　　Towards private pensions: government regula

36、tion</p><p>　　This section discusses financial market regulation and identifies some specific directions of intervention. This article’s position is not one that calls for ‘more’ regulation. Rather, it favor

37、s a revision of current regulations in a direction that accounts for the peculiar characteristics of pension plans.</p><p>　　To start, consumer protection from contractual risk is important. It is precisely

38、a regulatory system that should avoid a situation in which consumers bear ‘too much risk’, especially of a type they are often unable to value, as opposed as to risk transferred to intermediaries or financial institution

39、s. </p><p>　　Regulation may mitigate these two common aspects of private pension schemes. The degree of liquidity of a pension scheme is partially due to the regulatory system, and can be increased. An examp

40、le is the recent experience of mortgage contracts, which in some countries can be renegotiated at reasonable cost. For pension schemes, renegotiation may also include the possibility to switch funds and their providers.

41、Clearly, this would call for a sufficiently high degree of standardization of pension </p><p>　　Conclusions</p><p>　　This paper takes a cautious position towards a wider participation of the pri

42、vate sector in current pension systems. It argues that this may be a successful strategy provided that the transition is coupled by well-considered policy interventions fostering financial regulation. The position is not

43、 one that calls for more regulation, rather one that favors the revision of regulations in a direction. </p><p>　　Here, we want to point out that whenever a pension system has a strong redistribution objecti

44、ve. In this respect the public sector has more financing opportunities than any private institution. </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　歐洲的公共養(yǎng)老與私人養(yǎng)老</p><p>　　“福利國(guó)家”這個(gè)現(xiàn)代理念構(gòu)成了歐

45、洲政治思想的最重要的成就之一。養(yǎng)老，反過(guò)來(lái)，是現(xiàn)代福利國(guó)家和現(xiàn)代社會(huì)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要特征。養(yǎng)老金是提供給公民的主要工具，在大規(guī)模的基礎(chǔ)上，在退休時(shí)可接受的福利水平。</p><p>　　面對(duì)這個(gè)情況，過(guò)去和現(xiàn)在的人口發(fā)展趨勢(shì)顯示了人們對(duì)成現(xiàn)今國(guó)家養(yǎng)老制度未來(lái)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展表示嚴(yán)重懷疑。世界各國(guó)正在處理增加預(yù)算發(fā)放養(yǎng)老金的問(wèn)題，由于人口老齡化，特別是在歐洲，提前退休是一個(gè)歷史趨勢(shì)。這一現(xiàn)象的認(rèn)識(shí)引發(fā)了所有歐洲聯(lián)盟成員國(guó)

46、和整個(gè)世界關(guān)于國(guó)家養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)改革的廣泛討論。目前，幾乎每一個(gè)經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家和歐盟成員國(guó)都在討論養(yǎng)老問(wèn)題，并開展其自己的改革。</p><p>　　然而，養(yǎng)老制度改革是一個(gè)“敏感對(duì)象”，因?yàn)轲B(yǎng)老金的性質(zhì)和重要性。經(jīng)濟(jì)，人口，社會(huì)和政治方面是必須考慮的。此外，從技術(shù)角度來(lái)看，有關(guān)養(yǎng)老金的重要的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和潛在的經(jīng)濟(jì)理論是有爭(zhēng)議的，因此，各國(guó)政府都有自己的最佳做法和政策。因此，關(guān)于養(yǎng)老改革的爭(zhēng)論變得更加激烈和跨越各種尺度也就不足

47、為奇：從確定適當(dāng)?shù)霓k法計(jì)算養(yǎng)老金，整體經(jīng)濟(jì)影響不同養(yǎng)老金制度的設(shè)計(jì)，到更多的政治問(wèn)題的社會(huì)共識(shí)和實(shí)施。</p><p><b>　　什么是養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃？</b></p><p>　　養(yǎng)老金是根據(jù)合同取得的個(gè)人獲得的為他現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)出（貢獻(xiàn)）的配額來(lái)交換將來(lái)產(chǎn)出（利益）的配額的權(quán)力。從該合同規(guī)定的時(shí)間點(diǎn)（退休的年齡時(shí)），這個(gè)點(diǎn)開始轉(zhuǎn)換。</p><p>

48、　　原則上，個(gè)人可以“和自己簽訂合同”，也就是說(shuō)，他可以把目前擁有的產(chǎn)出的部分用來(lái)存儲(chǔ)以便將來(lái)使用。然而，這對(duì)服務(wù)和不耐儲(chǔ)存貨物是不可行的，例如醫(yī)療保健和老年服務(wù)，服裝和食品；恰恰是這些基本的商品和服務(wù)，是老人在在退休后有興趣的。</p><p>　　即使身體狀況約束了個(gè)人的行動(dòng)，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)已經(jīng)把個(gè)人養(yǎng)老合同協(xié)調(diào)到養(yǎng)老制度中，這樣在退休時(shí)個(gè)人不需要消費(fèi)自己過(guò)去的生產(chǎn)，而是使用在養(yǎng)老合同那個(gè)時(shí)候個(gè)人積極工作的產(chǎn)出。每

49、一個(gè)現(xiàn)代養(yǎng)老制度本質(zhì)上構(gòu)成了一個(gè)輸出轉(zhuǎn)移，即在每一時(shí)期，從現(xiàn)在的年輕一代（這里為那些積極工作的）到目前的老一代（被淘汰的）。</p><p>　　養(yǎng)老制度理論上分為兩大類。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制，目前的年輕一代通過(guò)勞動(dòng)所得稅強(qiáng)制性地貢獻(xiàn)到養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)，他們的收入被部分轉(zhuǎn)移到目前的老年一代作為養(yǎng)老福利。在這樣做時(shí)，年輕一代獲得在他們年老的時(shí)候領(lǐng)取退休金的權(quán)利。</p>&

50、lt;p>　　基金養(yǎng)老制，目前的年輕一代強(qiáng)制性地貢獻(xiàn)部分勞動(dòng)收入到養(yǎng)老基金，投資于金融資產(chǎn)。當(dāng)他們退休時(shí)，該基金以終身年金的形式支付養(yǎng)老福利，退休者消費(fèi)的商品和服務(wù)的資金由目前的年輕一代產(chǎn)出。</p><p>　　人口變化和公共養(yǎng)老不平衡</p><p>　　本節(jié)討論了目前的公共養(yǎng)老金制度在財(cái)政上的可持續(xù)性問(wèn)題?，F(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制是一個(gè)財(cái)政上可持續(xù)的，或財(cái)政平衡，每一個(gè)時(shí)期，總的名義的捐款（

51、當(dāng)時(shí)平均工資的貢獻(xiàn)比率乘以工人數(shù)量），等于總的養(yǎng)老金開支，即被給予的平均的養(yǎng)老金乘以領(lǐng)取養(yǎng)老金的人數(shù)。</p><p>　　在經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家中，退休養(yǎng)老金的公共支出，也就是說(shuō)，在右邊的平衡公式，預(yù)計(jì)在未來(lái)數(shù)十年顯著增加。最近的預(yù)測(cè)從2000——2050年間顯示公共年齡相關(guān)性支出占國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分比，可能平均上升約7點(diǎn)。特別是，公共退休養(yǎng)老金和提前退休計(jì)劃為代表的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的比例預(yù)計(jì)在挪威將增加近10％，西班牙和

52、韓國(guó)有8%,德國(guó)占5%，法國(guó)近4％。</p><p>　　對(duì)于歐洲聯(lián)盟，歐盟財(cái)政經(jīng)濟(jì)部長(zhǎng)計(jì)劃總共（稅前）增加公共支出占2.3%養(yǎng)老金和2.2%的GDP，分別為歐盟15國(guó)和歐盟25國(guó)。這意味著，到2050年，歐盟15國(guó)將花費(fèi)近13％的GDP來(lái)資助公共養(yǎng)老金，而歐盟25國(guó)將斥資12.8％的GDP。</p><p>　　預(yù)計(jì)壽命的增加和提前退休的結(jié)合，是退休養(yǎng)老金支出預(yù)期增加的主要原因。與此同時(shí)

53、，預(yù)計(jì)養(yǎng)老金捐款預(yù)計(jì)將下降，因?yàn)樯实南陆?。事?shí)上，低生育率往往導(dǎo)致勞動(dòng)人口減少，而根據(jù)關(guān)于生產(chǎn)力合理的假設(shè)，只有國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的適度擴(kuò)張。因此，鑒于目前的公共養(yǎng)老金計(jì)算公式，養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)將出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重的財(cái)政不平衡。</p><p>　　公共與私人養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃</p><p>　　本節(jié)討論在當(dāng)前老齡化存在的情況如何增加基金養(yǎng)老計(jì)劃的作用去幫助維持財(cái)政的可持續(xù)性。還詳細(xì)闡述了對(duì)私人養(yǎng)老金，儲(chǔ)蓄和增長(zhǎng)，

54、金融市場(chǎng)和個(gè)人的保護(hù)去抵抗各種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，必要時(shí)與現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制比較。</p><p>　　基金允許制度在面臨的人口老齡化時(shí)保持財(cái)政上的平衡。在一個(gè)完全的基金制度中，每一個(gè)特定的一代人，把它稱作'一代A'，在她的工作生活中建立她自己的“經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)積累”。退休時(shí)，累積的活動(dòng)轉(zhuǎn)化為養(yǎng)老年金，它的實(shí)際價(jià)值恰好等于每個(gè)人積累的資產(chǎn)的價(jià)值。在人口老齡化的情況下，在“一代A”退休期間的勞動(dòng)人口將減少。然而，“一代A”的每

55、一個(gè)人已經(jīng)積累了他退休前的養(yǎng)老基金。因此，養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)必須計(jì)劃足夠的“錢”去支付A的養(yǎng)老金。這種說(shuō)法對(duì)每一代人都是有效的，從而意味著基金養(yǎng)老制與現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制相背離，在人口老齡化的情況下仍然財(cái)政平衡。</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，基金制保持財(cái)政平衡并不意味著真實(shí)的養(yǎng)老年金在目前老齡化下保持不變。工作人口的減少意味著產(chǎn)值的減少。因此，當(dāng)“一代A”的退休人員用他們的養(yǎng)老金去購(gòu)買商品和服務(wù)時(shí)，可能出現(xiàn)供過(guò)于求，導(dǎo)致了通貨膨脹的

56、過(guò)程，降低了A的養(yǎng)老年金的實(shí)際價(jià)值。</p><p>　　雖然這種說(shuō)法是正確的，但是有點(diǎn)小問(wèn)題。首先，名義上基金養(yǎng)老制仍然保持平衡。最重要的是，金融不平衡可能導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)崩潰。二，這個(gè)說(shuō)法基本上是對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。這是缺乏經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，由于勞動(dòng)人口，從而降低實(shí)際退休金減少。但經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)是一個(gè)普遍的問(wèn)題，影響到現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付和年金制度，以及整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)。即使不知道是否有年金制度總是比現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制在預(yù)測(cè)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)上有效，現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制和年金制度在缺乏

57、經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的情況下都是脆弱的，但是年金制度至少保持了財(cái)政平衡。</p><p>　　對(duì)私人養(yǎng)老金：政府監(jiān)管</p><p>　　本節(jié)討論金融市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管，并確定一些具體的干預(yù)指導(dǎo)。本文的立場(chǎng)不是要求一對(duì)'多'監(jiān)管。相反，它主張?jiān)谝粋€(gè)方向上對(duì)現(xiàn)行法規(guī)的修訂并解釋退休金計(jì)劃的特殊性質(zhì)。</p><p>　　首先，從合同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保護(hù)消費(fèi)者是最重要的。一個(gè)正確的監(jiān)管體

58、系應(yīng)該避免消費(fèi)者承擔(dān)“太多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”的情況，特別是他們經(jīng)常無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)的價(jià)值類型，而不是作為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移給中介機(jī)構(gòu)或金融機(jī)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　監(jiān)管可能減輕私人養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃的兩個(gè)共同方面。養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃的流動(dòng)程度是不公平的，由于監(jiān)管制度，可以被增加。一個(gè)例子就是抵押貸款合同，這在有些國(guó)家，可以在合理的成本重新談判最近的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃，也可能包括重新談判的可能性，轉(zhuǎn)換基金和他們的供應(yīng)商。顯然，這將要求對(duì)退休金計(jì)劃的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化程度

59、相當(dāng)高。在高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的方向行政干預(yù)也可能有助于提高個(gè)人的養(yǎng)老金產(chǎn)品的知識(shí)，從而減少其不確定性。</p><p><b>　　總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　本文謹(jǐn)慎地采取了在當(dāng)前的養(yǎng)老體系中讓私營(yíng)部門廣泛參與的立場(chǎng)。本文認(rèn)為這可能是一個(gè)成功的戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)型因?yàn)槠涮峁┝私?jīng)過(guò)深思熟慮的政策，促進(jìn)金融監(jiān)管。目前不需要更多的規(guī)章，而是一個(gè)有利于修訂的指導(dǎo)性條例。</p>