bank safety and liquidity provision 銀行安全和

1、Bank Safety and Liquidity Provision銀行安全性和流動性供應Philip H. Dybvig大頑童Washington University in Saint Louis and SWUFE華盛頓大學.圣路易斯、西南財大,Chengdu June 29, 2012 成都 2012年6月29日,Overview主要內容,What do banks do?銀行的

2、職能 Bank regulation pre-Basel巴塞爾協議之前的銀行監(jiān)管Regulation under Basel巴塞爾協議下的銀行監(jiān)管 Shadow banking影子銀行Financial crisis金融危機 Current regulation當前監(jiān)管Suggestions looking forward對未來的建議,What Banks Do　銀行的職能,Asset Side Services

3、 (e.g., originating and servicing loans)資產方服務（例如,提供貸款與維護貸款服務） Liability Side Services (e.g., accepting deposits and providing cash)負債方服務（例如,吸收存款與提供現金）Transformation Services (creation of liquidity)轉換服務（創(chuàng)造流動性）Diamo

4、nd and Dybvig (1983): liquidity creation by banks　 Diamond and Dybvig (1983):銀行流動性創(chuàng)造,Traditional Bank Regulation傳統銀行監(jiān)管,Bank Examiners銀行的審查者– examined the loan documentation and lending practices審查貸款文件與貸款業(yè)務– formed an

5、opinion of the safety and soundness of the bank對銀行的安全穩(wěn)健性做出判斷 Glass-Steagall格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案– separated investment banking from commercial and mortgage banking將投資銀行從商業(yè)與抵押銀行系統中分離出來– limited deposit insurance umbrella to a sho

6、rt list of activities存款保險的作用受限,Regulation under Basel巴塞爾協議下的監(jiān)管,Designed to create a level playing field 試圖設計創(chuàng)造出一個“公平的競爭環(huán)境” Capital requirements based on coarse aggregates基于粗糙總量的資本需求– based on punishment in a repeated g

7、ame以重復博弈中的懲罰為基礎– game not repeated if the bank blows up!如果銀行倒閉，博弈停止No Glass-Steagall: government insures hedge funds etc.廢除了格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案，政府得承擔保護對沖基金的責任,Shadow Banking影子銀行,Huge unregulated repo market巨大的監(jiān)管空白下的回購市場Some

8、possible causes可能的原因– regulatory arbitrage監(jiān)管套利– limits on deposit insurance對存款保險的限制– restrictive regulation under Basel巴塞爾協議下有限的監(jiān)管,Financial Crisis (simplified and partial view)金融危機（簡化與部分觀點）,Collapse of shadow banking

9、影子銀行崩潰US real estate small compared to shadow banking美國房地產業(yè)與影子銀行業(yè)相比規(guī)模較小Bank commercial paper, MMFs, too big to fail, etc.銀行擁有商業(yè)票據、貨幣市場基金，大而不倒Basel regulation failed巴塞爾監(jiān)管失敗– simultaneous bank failures in many countrie

10、s許多國家的銀行在同一時期倒閉– coarse risk measures easy to game粗略的風險評價讓銀行容易鉆空子,A Surprisingly Accurate Quote from 1986早在1986年做出的令人驚訝的正確預測,Proposals to move toward 100% reserve banking would prevent banks from fulfilling their prima

11、ry function of creating liquidity. Since banks are an important part of the infrastructure in the economy, this is at best a risky move and at worst could reduce stability because new firms that move in to fill the vacuu

12、m left by banks may inherit the problem of runs.邁向全儲備銀行的建議，將妨礙銀行創(chuàng)造流動性這一主要功能。銀行是經濟基礎設施的重要組成部分，這一建議充其量是一次冒險，最壞的結果是降低經濟的穩(wěn)定性，因為新的公司將填補銀行職能的空白，但是他們同樣會面臨擠兌的問題．Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig, 1986, Banking Theory,

13、Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation, Journal of Business 59,How to Eliminate Bank Failures Completely怎樣完全消除銀行倒閉,If we want to avoid the problem of banks blowing up, it is simple: just make banking illegal.　如果想避免銀行倒閉的問

14、題：最簡單的是宣布銀行業(yè)不合法。Of course, this destroys whatever benefits we get from banks.但是，這樣也湮滅了銀行給我們帶來的所有益處,Big Questions幾大問題,Is liquidity provided by banks important?銀行提供的流動性重要嗎？Is liquidity provided by shadow banks important

15、?影子銀行提供的流動性重要嗎？Will increasing deposit insurance limits and regulation shrink shadow banks?提高存款保險的限制和監(jiān)管力度能否遏制住影子銀行？Will Basel start becoming effective in controlling risk? (I doubt it.)巴塞爾協議能否有效的控制風險？（我很懷疑）,My Recom

16、mendations我的建議,Eliminate Basel and bring back the bank examiners.取消巴塞爾協議，重回傳統銀行審查Reinstate Glass-Steagall.恢復格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法Eliminate the limits on deposit insurance (in process?).取消存款保險限制（正在進行？）Move towards narrow banking i

17、f bank liquidity provision can be shown to be surplus (doubtful at this point).如果能證明銀行提供流動性是多余的（這一點也值得懷疑），則應該重回狹義銀行的方向。,Thanks! 謝謝！,These slides and a lot of other current papers can be found at:http://phildybvig.com/s