團(tuán)隊(duì)生產(chǎn)中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、監(jiān)督與契約設(shè)計(jì)研究.pdf

1、南京航空航天大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文團(tuán)隊(duì)生產(chǎn)中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、監(jiān)督與契約設(shè)計(jì)研究姓名：黃國(guó)華申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別：碩士專(zhuān)業(yè)：管理科學(xué)與工程指導(dǎo)教師：李幫義20060101團(tuán)隊(duì)生產(chǎn)中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、監(jiān)督與契約設(shè)計(jì)研究IIAbstractWhileteamwkhasbeenbecomingonemodernscientificproductivewayithasalotofnewownproblemnamelyunobservablityofeverymembe’

2、sefftdistributionoffinaloutput.Inrealityoutputofthewholeteamisobservablewhileeverymember’sefftisn’twhichcausesdoublesidemalhazardinteamwk.Additionallydistributionofteamoutputisoneofteamresearchhighlights.Duetomalhazardis

3、sueofdistributioninteamwkunstabilityfailureisresultedinteamfinally.Firstlythepaperillustratesteamwkasamodernproductionwaypointsitscauseadvantageanalyzesitsnewactersindicatesitsinbnproblemmeasureofinputdistributionofoutpu

4、t.Secondlymalhazardinteamwkisexpoundedwhichisthenprovedtobeexistedbydifferentquantificationalmethodsthusexplingitseffectfacts.Additionallythreewaysareusedtosolvemalhazardinteamwkdrawingdifferentconclusions.Finallyassolvi

5、ngdistributionofteamoutputthepaperdesignsoptimalcontractsseparatelyshowingthatteam’sinterestisn’tharmoniouswitheverymember’soptimalcontractsarealsowhicharen’tselfenfcing.Thepaper’stheeticalvalueistoenrichmalhazardcontrac