資本結(jié)構(gòu)與控制報(bào)酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Capital Structure and the Control of Managerial Incentives</p><p>　　Material Source:Encyclopedia of Busine

2、ss Author: Alan V.S.Douglas</p><p>　　The theory of corporate capital structure has advanced significantly following Modigliani and Miller(1958).The effects of taxes and(direct)bankruptcy costs,tho

3、ugh well developed theoretically, appear to play a minor role empirically.The major empirical determinants of capital structure appear to information and agency problems Titman and Wessels(1988),Barclay and Smith 1998).T

4、he pioneering theoreticalstudies of these problems include Jensen and Meckling (1976),Myers(1977),Ross(1977)and Myers and</p><p>　　The importance of incentives in each of these theories encouraged other rese

5、archers to further distinguish between the managers and owners of large corporations,and to focus on the firm’s ability todesign managerial incentives that mitigate the agency and information problems associated with dif

6、ferent capital structures.For example,Dybvig and Zender(1990)employ a principle-agent setting and showthat capital structure is again irrelevant if the owners can provide incentives(compensation)that are </p><

7、p>　　One reason,as advanced by Persons(1994),is that the managerial incentives underlying the irrelevance results may not be dynamically consistent.The effective incentives faced by the manager reflect the shareholders

8、’ability to alter the manager’s incentives ex-post(at the beginning of a subsequent period),so that agency costs depend on the dynamically consistent influence over the manager’s incentives.Another reason is that a basic

9、 tenet of the principal-agent setting,that the owners maintain full</p><p>　　In this paper we study capital structure under the premise that managerial actions reflect endogenous incentives,and explicitly in

10、corporate the dynamically consistent control over the incentive-setting process.Consistent with the empirical evidence in Bertrand and Mullainathan(2000),Core, Holthausen,and Larcker(1999),Newman and Moses(1999),Murphy(1

11、998),Berger,Ofek and Yermack(1997),Berokohvitch,Brunarski and Parrino(1997)and Yermack(1997),we allow for the possibilitythat managers,at least partia</p><p>　　The analysis illustrates how capital structure

12、can optimally control deviations from value maximization that arise from managerial control over the incentive setting process and the ex-post wealth expropriation incentives of shareholders.The optimal capital structure

13、 is determined by the interactions between the different agency conflicts stemming from the‘primitive’objectives of shareholders,bondholders and managers.</p><p>　　The optimal capital structure depends not o

14、nly on the conflict of interest between debt holders and shareholders,but also on the conflict of interest between the manager and owners.In particular,themanager’s information advantages(hidden actions and hidden knowle

15、dge)imply that optimal incentive contracts provide the manager with rents(utility in excess of his reservation level).These rents reflect a trade-off between investor returns in high and low states.Specifically,the optim

16、al contract trade</p><p>　　The result that firms can increase value by exploiting the interactions between shareholder- bondholder and owner-manager agency conflicts is similar to Hirshleifer and Thakor(1992

17、)and John and John(1993).Hirshleifer and Thakor illustrate an alignment between managers and debt holders when outcomes are not contractible,so that the manager’s payoffs are determined solely by his perceived ability in

18、 the labor market.This alignment reduces the manager’s incentive to benefit shareholders by taking r</p><p>　　Our analysis is related to a large empirical literature investigating incentive problems and corp

19、orate governance.The effects of managerial influence on compensation contracts are consistent withthe findings of Core,Holthausen,and Larcker(1999)and Bertrand and Mullainathan(2000),who proxy managerial influence with b

20、oard and ownership variables(board size and composition,presence of large shareholders,CEO ownership and tenure).The relationship between managerial influence and compensation is also</p><p>　　We also consid

21、er the difference in the capital structure preferences of managers and shareholders In particular,the manager prefers either lower debt levels or similar debt levels accompanied by higher levels of bondholder protection.

22、The manager’s preference for lower debt levels reflects the higher rents discussed above,and is consistent with the negative correlation between leverage and managerial entrenchment found by Berger,Ofek and Yermack(1997)

23、,and between leverage and the strength of anti</p><p>　　The interactions between the different incentive conflicts also allow the analysis to illustrate how different results in the empirical literature can

24、be reconciled or extended.For example,the aligned under-investment incentives of managers and bondholders can reconcile the negative association between leverage and entrenchment with the aligned voting of managers and b

25、ondholders on antitakeover amendments(Brickley,Smith and Lease(1988)).Further,the analysis illustrates how the findings of studie</p><p>　　Finally,the analysis implies that optimal capital structure must acc

26、ount for the effects of performance on the influence of each party.When managerial influence is positively related to performance(because poor performance heightens the directors’concern with shareholder lawsuits(Kesner

27、and Johnson(1990)),decreases capital requirements for a takeover(Grossman and Hart 1982)), or decreases manager-specific value),the optimal level of debt holder influence is negatively related to performance.This</p&g

28、t;<p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)與控制報(bào)酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制</p><p>　　資料來源: 商業(yè)百科全書 作者：Alan V.S.Douglas</p><p>　　企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論擁有先進(jìn)的明顯證明莫迪里亞尼和米勒的影響(1958年),稅收和直接破產(chǎn)成本的,盡管發(fā)

29、達(dá)理論上,扮演一個(gè)次要角色來實(shí)證某些行業(yè)企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)出現(xiàn)信息和代理問題,Titman姚德芬((1988),巴克萊和史密斯,1998年)創(chuàng)業(yè)的理論研究這些問題有延森和麥克林(1976年),指出,羅斯(1977年)和·梅爾斯和Maj luf(1984). 延森和麥克林(1976)顯示一個(gè)企業(yè)家的企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)到最低的成本下做激勵(lì)股權(quán)融資和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)-以(資產(chǎn)替代)激勵(lì)債務(wù)融資.邁爾斯 (1977年)表明,債務(wù)提供了為了鼓勵(lì)股東在價(jià)值

30、的投資下習(xí)得債券持有人.羅絲(1977年)指出,一個(gè)經(jīng)理的個(gè)人損失在破產(chǎn)時(shí)用債務(wù)水平來傳達(dá)里面的信息, 邁爾斯和Majluf(1984)表明,激勵(lì)股東的時(shí)候在投資下給出信號(hào)是困難的,會(huì)使證券是錯(cuò)價(jià)。</p><p>　　激勵(lì)的重要性是每一個(gè)這些理論鼓勵(lì)其他研究者進(jìn)一步區(qū)分經(jīng)理及業(yè)主在大公司中,并將重點(diǎn)放在公司的能力設(shè)計(jì)管理的成因,減少機(jī)構(gòu)和信息不同相關(guān)的問題資本結(jié)構(gòu)。例如,澤德爾(1990)采用的委托-代理設(shè)置和

31、顯示再次,資本結(jié)構(gòu)是不相干的如果所有者可以提供誘因(補(bǔ)償)獨(dú)立于資本結(jié)構(gòu)。雖然管理在措施的前提下,內(nèi)生反映激勵(lì)契約是非?，F(xiàn)實(shí)的,有很多原因,澤德爾的結(jié)果可能不來舉行。</p><p>　　一個(gè)原因,先進(jìn)的人(1994),潛在的報(bào)酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制結(jié)果也許不可毫不相干的動(dòng)態(tài)一致的所面臨的有效激勵(lì)經(jīng)理股東負(fù)債反映經(jīng)理的激勵(lì)事后(在開始以后的時(shí)間),這樣的代理成本取決于動(dòng)態(tài)的一致影響經(jīng)理的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。另一個(gè)原因是一個(gè)基本原則委讬代理

32、設(shè)置,球隊(duì)老板維護(hù)全部的力量在經(jīng)理的刺激(使有關(guān)的設(shè)計(jì)原意是最大限度地業(yè)主財(cái)),可能是不切實(shí)際的。這樣的宗旨要求董事會(huì)來作為一個(gè)完美的信托股東,卻有大量的研究對(duì)此質(zhì)疑：如見杰森(1993)、施福萊.確實(shí),許多分析認(rèn)為另一個(gè)極端,假設(shè),管理者有充分的董事會(huì)控制資本結(jié)構(gòu),那么激勵(lì)有可能在事實(shí)上選擇最大限度地經(jīng)理的效用(葛勞斯曼和Hart(1982)、Novaes和Zingales(1995),Zwiebel(1996年)),現(xiàn)實(shí)可能是兩個(gè)極

33、端之間,因此,這一激勵(lì)計(jì)劃實(shí)施既反映經(jīng)理和老板的目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　本文研究的前提之下,資本結(jié)構(gòu)管理措施的體現(xiàn)內(nèi)源性激勵(lì),明確將動(dòng)態(tài)一致的控制激勵(lì)-設(shè)置過程。在實(shí)證結(jié)果一致貝特蘭德和Mullainathan(2000),核心,Holthausen,Larcker(1999),紐曼摩西(1999),墨菲(1998),Ofek和Yermac伯格(1997),Berokohvitch,Brunarski和Par

34、rino(1997)和Yermack(1997),我們?cè)试S這種可能性至少部分的經(jīng)理,控制激勵(lì)設(shè)置過程。我們也允許通過獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)來實(shí)現(xiàn),反映了股東和債務(wù)持有人的影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)因?yàn)閯?dòng)態(tài)一致決定債務(wù)持有人的影響對(duì)公司的債務(wù)contrac臺(tái)灣分析說明了資本結(jié)構(gòu)可以優(yōu)化控制的偏離價(jià)值最大化從管理控制所產(chǎn)生的激勵(lì)設(shè)置過程和事后財(cái)富動(dòng)機(jī)的股東。最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)之間的相互作用所決定的不同的代理沖突'原因出于最初股東大會(huì)、公司債券存根簿上載明經(jīng)理。<

35、;/p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)的定義包括水平的債務(wù)和保護(hù)水平反對(duì)的理由財(cái)富征收:這方面的保護(hù)提供公司債券存根簿上載明能力的保證報(bào)酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制并非旨在引起財(cái)富剝奪行動(dòng):水平的力量可以通過選擇的組成與私人彌漫性債務(wù)舉行債券市場(chǎng)具體的債務(wù)契約(投資限制,會(huì)計(jì)要求,董事會(huì)代表權(quán))。舉例說明了資本結(jié)構(gòu)的最近研究得出結(jié)論說,負(fù)債程度,獨(dú)自一個(gè)不完整的規(guī)格的資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇例如,達(dá)吉爾松和華納(1998)發(fā)現(xiàn)淘汰率調(diào)整他們的債務(wù)組成債務(wù)

36、持有人的影響,Beneish發(fā)現(xiàn)債務(wù)持有人的影響取決于具體會(huì)計(jì)約束,及展位熟食店(1999)說明債權(quán)的影響表現(xiàn)在黑板上。</p><p>　　最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)不僅取決于債務(wù)持有人的利益沖突,而且還與股東的利益沖突經(jīng)理和業(yè)主特別的有關(guān),經(jīng)理的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)(隱藏的行動(dòng)和隱性知識(shí))暗示最佳激勵(lì)合同提供經(jīng)理(實(shí)用租金超過預(yù)約了高度)反映了這些租金在投資者的回報(bào)之間的協(xié)調(diào)高、低。具體地說,兩種模型的最優(yōu)合約交易了高管理成果(租金)

37、沒有有效的合理的結(jié)果。更大結(jié)果行為壞的管理控制補(bǔ)償設(shè)置過程導(dǎo)致一種激勵(lì)契約的減少效率低狀態(tài),以增加經(jīng)理的租金國(guó)家高這增加這個(gè)成本所有者經(jīng)理的沖突,因?yàn)楦邫C(jī)構(gòu)管理租金降低股東預(yù)期回報(bào)。這對(duì)預(yù)備意味著股東的事后激勵(lì)時(shí)收益邁爾斯在公司債券存根簿上載明多大(1977年),也可以作為獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)來減少管理水平租金。因此,當(dāng)管理效率低下的租金水平高,危險(xiǎn)的債務(wù)創(chuàng)造股東從公司債券存根簿上載明激勵(lì)廢除實(shí)際上增加企業(yè)的價(jià)值為了要這么做,公司的債務(wù)合約提供債務(wù)持有

38、人有事后水平的影響,當(dāng)結(jié)合經(jīng)理的影響,導(dǎo)致更有效率的管理激勵(lì)。</p><p>　　結(jié)果能增加價(jià)值,公司以開發(fā)投資人——之間的相互作用代理沖突:所有者經(jīng)理,類似于Hirshleifer和Thakor(1992)、約翰(1993).Hirshleifer和Thakor闡明了一個(gè)對(duì)管理者和債務(wù)持有人之間關(guān)系,不確定經(jīng)理的利潤(rùn)被完全是由能力在勞務(wù)市場(chǎng)工作。這對(duì)預(yù)備降低了經(jīng)理的激勵(lì)受益股東的利益考慮高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資(資產(chǎn)替代

39、),這一降低代理成本的債務(wù),以便該公司增加稅收利益的債務(wù)同時(shí),約翰和約翰表明,管理的點(diǎn)球,破產(chǎn)可以排成一排對(duì)經(jīng)理和債務(wù)持有人,又減少了經(jīng)理的激勵(lì)受益股東能通過資產(chǎn)替代和減少債務(wù)的代理成本盡管雙方的論文認(rèn)出重要性事后影響其分析管理創(chuàng)新、抽象的概念從這個(gè)問題。約翰考慮激勵(lì)契約在臺(tái)灣Dybvig和Zender(1990年),表明南北債務(wù)合約應(yīng)提供債務(wù)持有人及表現(xiàn)形式出現(xiàn)在黑板如果激勵(lì)契約的能力被改變摘要從Hirshleifer和Thakor問

40、題假設(shè)唯一的動(dòng)態(tài)一致的管理激勵(lì)是來提高他的知覺能力。在他們的分析中,經(jīng)理的動(dòng)機(jī)股東利益針鋒相對(duì)的斗爭(zhēng)通過提高的成因,不同假設(shè)(因?yàn)楸还蓶|債券持有者能沖突沒有直接的影響的看法對(duì)勞工市場(chǎng)),分析具有暗示激勵(lì)合同對(duì)效能管理者和股東,就</p><p>　　我們的分析是一個(gè)涉及到大激勵(lì)問題帶來的實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)調(diào)查公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。管理的影響是一致的薪酬契約與研究,Larcker核心,Holthausen(1999)及貝特蘭德和Mu

41、llainathan(2000),代理管理影響與所有權(quán)變量(董事會(huì)規(guī)模和組成、有無(wú)大型股東所有權(quán)、首席執(zhí)行官(CEO),和任期管理影響和關(guān)系補(bǔ)償與積極的一致的反收購(gòu)的修改和之間的相關(guān)。</p><p>　　我們同樣考慮不同的資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)經(jīng)理和股東。特別是,經(jīng)理喜歡可以降低債務(wù)水平或相似的債務(wù)水平伴之以較高的水平的場(chǎng)所的保護(hù)。經(jīng)理的偏好降低債務(wù)水平反映了更高的租金通過以上討論,并符合負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,利用和管理Ofek伯格

42、壕溝發(fā)現(xiàn),(1997)和《旅游馬克之間的強(qiáng)度和杠桿和Hanka法律發(fā)現(xiàn)(1999),經(jīng)理的偏愛債務(wù)合約防止滯后(在更高的債務(wù)水平以上討論)是受到潛能失去控制 (類似于Zwiebel 1996年)).在條件不變時(shí),更大管理控制應(yīng)以更強(qiáng)的條款有關(guān)限制滯后和資產(chǎn)維護(hù)的選擇(史密斯和華納》(1979年)、陳、魏(1993)、Beneish和按下(1993)),或外部威脅(e.g.poison限制研究把契約》(1991)克拉布,戴維森地盤(199

43、9)。</p><p>　　對(duì)不同的激勵(lì)沖突也允許分析來說明不同的結(jié)果在實(shí)證文學(xué)可以和解或者擴(kuò)展之間是相互作用例如,對(duì)齊在-投資刺激的管理者和負(fù)面關(guān)聯(lián)公司債券存根簿上載明可協(xié)調(diào)之間對(duì)齊的壕溝的杠桿作用,在公司債券存根簿上載明經(jīng)理人和表決antitakeover改善(Brickley,史密斯及租賃(1988).Further，分析闡述了研究結(jié)果相關(guān)的研究，補(bǔ)償控制Brunarski和Parrino(1997),核心

44、Holthausen,Larcker(1999),貝特蘭德和Mullainathan(2000),省略資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響)結(jié)合相關(guān)的研究手段,控制(省略補(bǔ)償效果)，比如控制信息的問題,較低的債務(wù)水平或更高的債務(wù)水平伴之以較高的防止滯后收購(gòu),應(yīng)該是伴隨著更高的管理補(bǔ)償。</p><p>　　最后,分析表明,最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響,必須考量到性能的影響,每一方當(dāng)管理影響正相關(guān)嗎(因?yàn)楸憩F(xiàn)不佳性能提高了關(guān)注同股東訴訟董事Kes