中國上市公司實際控制人掏空與支持實證分析——來自機械設(shè)備儀表行業(yè)的經(jīng)驗證據(jù).pdf

1、復(fù)旦大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文中國上市公司實際控制人掏空與支持實證分析來自機械設(shè)備儀表行業(yè)的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)姓名：肖冰申請學(xué)位級別：碩士專業(yè)：金融學(xué)指導(dǎo)教師：陳建安20080420中國上市公司實際控制人掏空與支持實證分析AbstractTobetterexplainthefinancingbehavioroflistedcompaniesinChinastockmarket，thispaperputstogether”tunneling”and’’pro

2、pping”activitiesundersurveyBasedonthemulti—perioddynamicmodelofFriedman(2003)，wetrytofigureouttheintrinsicdesicion—makingmechanismofactualcontrollersoflistedcompanies，thatis，whyandwhenwillactualcontrollerstunnelSOllrC七ou

3、tofthefirmorpropuptheirfirmsBasedonthat，accordingtospecificsituationinChinastockmarket，thepaperprovidesempiricalevidenceofthemodelconclusion，andcompareswhetherthosefactorsinfluencing’’tunneling”behavioraffect”propping”ac

4、tivitysymmetricallyEssentially”tunneling”and”propping”areinteresttransferringactionsofdifferentdirectionsthatactualcontrollerstaketomaximizetheirmultiperiodrevenueWithweakinvestorprotection，theseperationofownershipandcon

5、trolmotivatesactualcontrollertotunnelresourcesoutoffirmsInordertomaintaintheirprivilegeoftunnelinginthefuture，undersomecircumstances，actualcontrollersmaypropupfirmsusingtheirownprivateresourcesHoweverifthefirmistooterrib

6、letoberallied，actualcontrollermaylootthefirmandletitcollapseEmpiricalevidenceshowsthat”tunneling”and“propping”areactuallynotsymmetricWhenthereturnofcapitalofpublicallytradedfirmislowertheopportunitycostof”tunneling”islow

7、eraccordinglywhichencourages”tunnelling”Howeverwhenactualcontrollerdecidestopropupthefirm，asthereturnofcapitalishjghertheextentofproppingbecomesmuchmoremodestAsthegapbetweenownershipandcontrolgoeslarger”tunneling”getswor

8、seThiskindofrelationdoesnotholdinthecaseof”proppingWeakinvestorprotectionmotivates”tunneling”，whereasbetterlegalinstitutionencourgesactualcontrollertopropupthefirmSOastoattractinvestment”Tunneling”isnegativelylinkedwithd

9、ebt，whichhasnothingtodowith”propping”thou#，accordingtoempiricaltestThereisnoempiricalevidencetoshowwhohaslargermotivationtotunnelsourceoutoffirms，stateownedcompaniesorprivateones，astheyfacedifferentinstitutionalbackgroun

10、dsandbusinessconditionsTheintrinsicreasonof”tunneling”isnotDualClassequitystructure，butseperationofownershipandcontr01Therefore，Dual—ClassequitystructurereformcannoterasetunnelingproblemonitsownThekeytorestrainactualcont