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1、外文翻譯ThefinancingstructureofnonlistedfirmsMaterialSource:googleAuth:SuzanHolNicoVanDerWijstINTRODUCTIONOnlyaverysmallminityofEuropeanfirmsislistedonastockexchange.InNwayfexamplesome200250(231onJuly6th2006)ofthemethan10000
2、0limitedliabilityfirmsarequotedonOsloStockExchange.Inspiteoftheiroverwhelmingnumericalmajityunlistedfirmsreceivelittleattentioninempiricalstudiesoffinancialstructure.Sincepublicationrequirementsfunlistedfirmsusuallyaremi
3、nimalabsentthenonavailabilityofdatacanpartlyexplainthislackofattention.InNwayhoweveralllimitedliabilityfirmsarerequiredbylawtodeposittheirannualfinancialstatementsinacentralregisterwhichisopentoresearchers.Giventhedivers
4、itywithinthebusinesscommunitythevarietyofcapitalstructuretheiesanalyzingthewayfirmsarefinancedcanclearlybenefitfromusingalargedatabasecoveringtheentirepopulation.Usingthisuniquedatabasethispaperstudiesthefinancialstructu
5、reofnonlistedfirms.ThiscanbeanimptantadditiontotheliteraturesincetheempiricalevidenceonthedeterminantsoffinancingdecisionspredominantlyreferstothesinglealbeitlargeenvironmentofAmericanlistedfirms.Testingtheempiricalimpli
6、cationsofcapitalstructuretheiesonunlistedfirmsthatoperateinadifferentfinancialenvironmentcontributestotheempiricalevidencemaybroadeninsightintothecapitalstructurechoice.FewstudiesofthecapitalstructureofEuropeancompaniesh
7、avebeenpublished(e.g.CarlsenNilsen1993DemirgKuntMaksimovic1999Ozkan2002)evenfewerofnonlistedcompanies(e.g.ScherrHulburt2001).Thescarcityofempiricalevidencefnonlistedfirmsisthemotivationfthispaper.Mespecificallytheobjecti
8、veofthispaperistosupplementtheexistingliteraturewithananalysisofthefactsdeterminingthefinancialstructureofnonlistedfirmsinNway.Thisisdonebyempiricallytestingtheiesofcapitalstructuredebtmaturityusingpaneldatafnonfinancial
9、firms.AdatasetthatincludesallunlistedfirmsinNwayf19952000isused.ScherrHulburtvarietyofsignalingdevicessuchasdebt(leverage)dividendpaymentsthematuritystructureofdebt.Inthepresenceofinfmationasymmetryfirmshaveanincentiveto
10、signaltheirqualitycredibilitybytakingonmedebtshteningtheirdebtmaturity.Ahigherleverageespeciallymeshttermdebtsignalsfavableinsideinfmationtothemarketbecauseitoffersthepossibilitytorenegotiatetermsinthefuturewhenmeinfmati
11、onhasbecomeavailable.Longtermdebtentailslargerinfmationcoststhanshttermdebtbecausethemarketexpectsahigherdeteriationofqualitythaninsidersdo.Firmswithalowlevelofinfmationasymmetryaretherefemelikelytoissuelongtermdebt(Flan
12、nery1986).InfmationasymmetryishigherffirmswithlargeR&Dactivities(AlamWalton1995).Inadditionacomplexlegalstructure(e.g.aholdingcompanylargecrossinvestmentsindaughtercompanies)willmakeafirmlesstransparentthusgiverisetoahig
13、herlevelofinfmationasymmetry.ArivalingcapitalstructuretheyisMyers’peckingderthey.Thistheyisbasedoninfmationasymmetrywhichcausesoutsidefinancingtobemeexpensivethaninternalfinancing.ThisinfmationasymmetryismodelledbyMyers(
14、1984)MyersMajluf(1984).Theyarguethatasymmetricinfmationlowersthepricethatinvestsarewillingtopayfissuedshares.Therefefirmspreferinternaltoexternalfinancingtofundinvestmentsdebttoequityifexternalfinancingisused.Ifnonotenou
15、ghretainedearningsareavailableinthefirmdebtwillbeissued.Debtislessmispricedthanequitysinceithasapriclaimtoequity.Issuingnewequityisthelastchoiceoffirmsraisingcapital.InthispeckingdertheyasMyerscallsitobserveddebtratioswi
16、llreflectthecumulativerequirementfexternalfinancingwhichisinverselyrelatedtothecumulativeprofitability(Myers1984).Shttermdebtislesssensitivetomispricingthanlongtermdebt.Therefeshttermdebtshouldbeexhaustedbefethefirmissue
17、slongtermdebt.ItshouldbenotedhoweverthatJensen’s(1986)freecashflowtheywhichisbasedonconflictsofinterestbetweenmanagementstockholderspredictstheoppositei.e.apositiverelationbetweenprofitabilitydebtratio.Freecashflowcanbed
18、efinedascashflowinexcessofthefundsrequiredtofinancepositivepresentvalueprojects.Whenprofitlevelsarehighmanagementmaybeenticedtousethefreecashflowonperquisitesnegativepresentvalueinvestments.Anincreaseinthelevelofdebtfces
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