反傾銷和競爭法外文翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　2180單詞，3327漢字，11400英文字符</p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Anti-dumping And Competition Law </p><p>　　出 處： The World Trade Organization: Legal, Eco

2、nomic and Political Analysis 2005, Part III pp68-72 </p><p>　　作 者： P. J. Lloyd </p><p><b>　　英文</b></p><p>　　1.Th

3、e Problems of Anti-Dumping Action in the WTO</p><p>　　It has often been observed that anti-dumping actions have risen rapidly in number since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The WTO (and be

4、fore it the GATT) Committee on Antidumping produces semi-annual reports which give data on the number of anti-dumping investigations and measures adopted by members of the organisation. Until the mid-1980s only the Unite

5、d States, Australia, New Zealand and countries that are now members of the EU took anti-dumping action regularly. In 1990 only </p><p>　　2002.1 The main new users have been Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Indi

6、a and Korea.</p><p>　　More countries are introducing legislation providing for anti-dumping duties, though there is no obligation for them to do so under WTO rules. These include developing and transition ec

7、onomies such as China.2 As of October 5, 2002, 75 countries had reported to the WTO that they had legislation providing for anti-dumping action.3 Thus anti-dumping action is becoming a standard tool of international trad

8、e policy.</p><p>　　As important as the frequency of action is the magnitude of the implicit tariffs resulting from the action. There is no systematic data on this aspect. Messerlin and Reed calculated that t

9、he protective dumping margins in the United States and EU are on average two to three times higher than the rates of regular tariffs.4 Blonigen and Prusa report that the average dumping margin in the United States over t

10、he past decade has been sixty per cent.5 Calculations of dumping duty rates in Australia pro</p><p>　　Action may take the form of a price undertaking as well as the imposition of a duty. This has an effect o

11、n the consumer/buyer that is the same as that resulting from an antidumping duty, but unlike an antidumping duty, a price undertaking also raises the landed price. Exporters or importers may raise the price before a dump

12、ing examination. I know of no empirical study in any country of the magnitude of price increases due to price undertakings. Prusa7 estimates that about 25 per cent of the case</p><p>　　But the problem is not

13、 merely that anti-dumping actions are becoming a major restraint on trade. There is concern with other characteristics of anti-dumping actions. First, the only conditions that must be satis?ed relate to proof of dumping

14、and injury and, therefore,actions can be taken unilaterally even when the substantive rates of duty are bound at a zero rate. Consequently, they breach the reciprocity involved in past tariff negotiations. Second, again

15、because of the nature of the proof of </p><p>　　There are some recent surveys of aspects of anti-dumping actions. The data is surveyed comprehensively by Miranda, Torres and Ruiz10. James calculates the nati

16、onal intensities of use (that is, the country share of de?nitive measures relative to the country share of imports) and the asymmetries of actions taken against and by individual member countries.11 The former provides a

17、 normalized measure of the frequency of use and the latter shows how a country is affected both as a user and as a subjec</p><p>　　This paper reexamines dumping from the point of view of a form of business c

18、onduct that might be subject to competition law. This point of view is relatively new but it is causing a fundamental rethinking of the economics of anti-dumping actions. Part II brie?y reviews the history of GATT and WT

19、O law on dumping. Part III considers the central question of whether dumping should be addressed by “fair trading” laws or by competition law. Part IV considers reform proposals that are based on the comp</p><

20、p>　　2. A Brief History of Anti-Dumping Action in the GATT/WTO</p><p>　　Dumping entered the set of international trade policies subject to GATT regulation from the outset in 1947. Article VI differs from o

21、ther Articles in GATT in that it is concerned with “unfair trade” whereas the other articles are concerned with trade restrictions as an aspect of the objective of ef?ciency in the world economy. Dumping (and subsidizati

22、on which is also covered by the Article) was perceived as being “unfair” to domestic competi- tors and therefore a practice which tends to undermin</p><p>　　of the product exported from one country to anothe

23、r is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country”. If there is no such domestic price, a constructed price can be calculate

24、d based on the highest comparable price for the like product in a third country or the cost of production. The difference between the “normal value” and the “export price” is called the “margin of dumping”. The duty cann

25、ot exceed </p><p>　　The Article allows members to apply anti-dumping duties on imports of a product so long as two conditions are met. The goods must be dumped, and the dumping must cause or threaten materia

26、l injury to an established domestic industry or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry. The GATT/WTO law does not seek to regulate dumping—the action of private parties—but instead regulates the use o

27、f anti-dumping measures.</p><p>　　From the time the GATT rules were introduced, there have been numerous complaints from the exporting countries subject to anti-dumping actions that the discretion available

28、to the importing countries enables them to overstate the dumping margins and the injury, and most particularly, the existence of dumping in the ?rst place. Exporting countries claim that dumping duties are often applied

29、when they should not be under the letter of the GATT law, and that anti-dumping actions are used to harass </p><p>　　An attempt was made to tighten the GATT rules in the Anti-dumping Code that was agreed to

30、in 1967 as a part of the Kennedy Round and later revised in the Tokyo Round. The Code gave greater precision to the de?nitions of Article VI relating to like products, dumping, injury and domestic industry. The Code laid

31、 down for the ?rst time procedures and rules of administration; time limits for the period of investigation and retro-activity of anti-dumping duties, the rights of interested parties to be </p><p>　　The Cod

32、e allowed a determination of dumping if the export price is less than the cost of production of the good exported only if there were no sales of the like product in the exporting country or no proper comparison can be ma

33、de between the export and the domestic price. This was a tighter de?nition. However, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand agreed in 1978 that pricing below average cost was “not in the ordinary course of

34、trade” and therefore could be determined to be dumpin</p><p>　　The Code also introduced two new measures. First, it provided a de?nition of a price undertaking as a “satisfactory voluntary undertaking from a

35、ny exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area at dumped prices so that authorities are satis?ed that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated.”14 The Code explicitly permitted a price undertak

36、ing that raised prices no more than the margin of dumping, but only allowed it to be entered into after preliminary ?ndings of dumping a</p><p>　　The Uruguay Round Agreement on the Implementation of Article

37、VI made a stronger attempt to tighten the regulation of governments’ anti-dumping actions. The Agreement sets out yet more detailed rules concerning the determination of dumping and of injury and the establishment of a c

38、ausal link between them. It also set out more detailed procedures to be followed in initiating and conducting anti-dumping investigations and clari?ed the role of dispute settlement panels in disputes concerning anti-du&

39、lt;/p><p>　　A new feature of the Agreement, compared to the earlier Article and Code, is that it allowed consideration of the combined effect of dumped imports from several supplying countries. This was called

40、“cumulation”. With the experience of six years of application of the Uruguay Round amendments, the change relating to cumulation across countries can now be seen as a change for the worse. Before the Uruguay Round Agreem

41、ent, the practice was used on a limited scale and it was doubtful that it conforme</p><p>　　In the United States, in the ten years following the introduction of the mandatory cu- mulation amendment, Prusa15

42、?nds that 75 per cent of anti-dumping cases have involved cumulation. Hansen and Prusa16 and Prusa17 verify that cumulation has had an effect on the af?rmative ?nding of injury which is “super-additive”, that is, greater

43、 than the effect predicted on the basis of the summation of the countries import shares. In the EU, cumu- lation has made it easier for the Commission to prove injur</p><p>　　66.3 per cent of all injury dete

44、rminations over the period 1980–97 were determined on the basis of the cumulation of imported market shares. Following the line of analysis of U.S. anti-dumping actions by Hansen and Prusa19, they also ?nd a super-additi

45、ve effect.</p><p>　　Under GATT and WTO rules anti-dumping actions relate solely to trade in goods. No provision for anti-dumping in services was introduced into GATS. Hoekman and Leidy examined the possibili

46、ty of introducing provision for anti-dumping action in services trade.20 They concluded that such action would make very little sense because of the different nature of services trade; services often have to be delivered

47、 in the country in which the consumers reside, and the intangibility and the bundling of serv</p><p>　　These rules have maintained the basic features of anti-dumping actions for more than ?fty years. In some

48、 respects the changes negotiated in agreements in GATT rounds have made the rules less permissive but they have also broadened the measures to in- clude pricing below average cost, price undertakings and preliminary meas

49、ures and they have become more permissive in terms of cumulation across countries. On balance, these changes to the GATT/WTO rules may have weakened rather than strengthened th</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b

50、></p><p><b>　　反傾銷和競爭法</b></p><p>　　一、WTO反傾銷措施中存在的問題</p><p>　　自從烏拉圭回合談判之后，我們可以觀察到反傾銷措施在數(shù)量上快速上升。WTO（以及之前的GATT）反傾銷委員會半年度的報(bào)告中給出了一些數(shù)據(jù)關(guān)于被世貿(mào)組織成員國接受的反傾銷調(diào)查和措施。直到1980年代中期，只有美國、

51、澳大利亞、新西蘭和歐盟的成員國經(jīng)常采取反傾銷措施。在1990一年中只有9個(gè)成員國采取了反傾銷措施。WTO報(bào)告中指出在2002年1月1日到6月30日這6個(gè)月期間，有27個(gè)成員國采取反傾銷措施，主要的使用者是墨西哥、巴西、南非、印度和韓國。</p><p>　　盡管在WTO規(guī)則下他們沒有這個(gè)義務(wù)，更多的國家將反傾銷稅引入立法。這些國家包括發(fā)展中國家和經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型國家，如中國。在2002年10月5日WTO的報(bào)告中，已經(jīng)有7

52、5個(gè)國家將反傾銷措施列入法律。從此，反傾銷措施成為一個(gè)國際貿(mào)易政策中的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)工具。</p><p>　　與措施頻率一樣重要的是由措施帶來的隱形關(guān)稅的重要性。關(guān)于這方面沒有系統(tǒng)的數(shù)據(jù)可以提供我們參考。Messerlin 和 Reed計(jì)算出美國和歐盟的有效傾銷利潤平均高出普通關(guān)稅的2～3倍。Blonigen 和Prusa指出美國在過去的幾十年中平均傾銷利潤為60%。澳大利亞的傾銷稅率也提供了相似的結(jié)果；例如一個(gè)樣本為反

53、傾銷關(guān)稅的貨物在1994年的未加權(quán)平均反傾銷稅率為35%，然而相同貨物的未加權(quán)平均關(guān)稅只有6%。</p><p>　　與實(shí)施稅率一樣，措施可以采用價(jià)格承諾的形式。對于消費(fèi)者/買方，價(jià)格承諾有與反傾銷稅相同的效果。不過不同的是，價(jià)格承諾提高了貨物的到岸價(jià)格。出口商或進(jìn)口商有可能在傾銷檢查之前就提高產(chǎn)品價(jià)格。我知道在任何一個(gè)國家沒有一個(gè)實(shí)證研究證明由于價(jià)格承諾而導(dǎo)致價(jià)格上漲的幅度多少。Prusa估計(jì)，在美國大約25%

54、的案件調(diào)查從限制出口數(shù)量的協(xié)議達(dá)成后被商務(wù)部撤回，也就是說，他們誘導(dǎo)自愿出口限制。因?yàn)檫@些“自愿”價(jià)格和數(shù)量的統(tǒng)計(jì)反應(yīng)，反傾銷活動的影響大大低估了法律。</p><p>　　但這個(gè)問題不僅僅是反傾銷措施成為一個(gè)貿(mào)易中重要的限制，還有對反傾銷措施其他特點(diǎn)的考慮。第一，唯一要滿足的條件是證明傾銷和損害的存在。當(dāng)實(shí)質(zhì)性稅率被綁在一個(gè)零率時(shí)，反傾銷措施才可以單邊地采取。因此，他們違反過去關(guān)稅談判中的互惠性。第二，由于傾銷

55、和損害的證明性質(zhì)要在規(guī)則下進(jìn)行，反傾銷措施歧視在進(jìn)口貨物原產(chǎn)地國家也要考慮。特別是，反傾銷措施主要是被工業(yè)化國家采用，進(jìn)口貨物的稅主要來自發(fā)展中國家。因此，這是將發(fā)達(dá)國家和發(fā)展中國家在WTO中區(qū)分開來的另一個(gè)問題。第三，盡管這個(gè)特點(diǎn)單獨(dú)從貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)中看不是非常明顯。當(dāng)賣方在一個(gè)國家之外是不可以控訴的，而當(dāng)賣方是國內(nèi)供應(yīng)商時(shí)，同樣的控訴是可行的。這是另一個(gè)歧視行為，明顯導(dǎo)致了經(jīng)濟(jì)的低效率。第四，反傾銷措施成為一個(gè)WTO成員國之間重要的沖突來

56、源。近幾年，不精確完善的規(guī)則導(dǎo)致了在爭端解決過程中越來越多的抱怨?？偠灾@些特點(diǎn)意味著反傾銷措施已經(jīng)成為世貿(mào)組織一個(gè)重要的問題。</p><p>　　最近有一些關(guān)于反傾銷措施方面的調(diào)查，數(shù)據(jù)是由Miranda，Torres 和Ruiz一起進(jìn)行的全面調(diào)查。James計(jì)算出國家使用強(qiáng)度（也就是，國家決定性措施的分享關(guān)系到國家進(jìn)口份額）和個(gè)人成員國不對稱措施的采取。前者提供了規(guī)范化的措施和頻繁的使用，后者展示了一個(gè)

57、國家作為一個(gè)用戶和一門學(xué)科如何被其他國家措施影響。Blonigen和Prusa對反傾銷的文獻(xiàn)調(diào)查，分成調(diào)查前、調(diào)查中、調(diào)查后三個(gè)階段的過程。</p><p>　　本文從商業(yè)行為的一種形式角度重新檢驗(yàn)傾銷有可能受競爭法律限制。這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)相對來說比較新，但是它引起了反傾銷措施經(jīng)濟(jì)的根本性反思。第二部分簡單回顧了GATT和WTO傾銷法的發(fā)展歷史。第三部分考慮了傾銷是按公平貿(mào)易法還是競爭法處理的重要問題。第四部分在傾銷競爭

58、法觀點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)上提出了改革建議。結(jié)論總結(jié)為第五部分。</p><p>　　二、GATT/WTO中反傾銷措施的簡單歷史</p><p>　　從1947年一開始，傾銷進(jìn)入國際貿(mào)易政策體系受制于關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定的規(guī)則。第六法案考慮不公平貿(mào)易，區(qū)別于GATT中其他法案考慮貿(mào)易限制作為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的方面之一。傾銷（補(bǔ)貼同樣在條例中被涉及到）被視為對國內(nèi)競爭者不公平行為，因此這種做法往往會損害國際貿(mào)易體系的權(quán)

59、威性和國家促使貿(mào)易自由化的意愿。</p><p>　　GATT第六條（1947）定義傾銷為“一項(xiàng)產(chǎn)品從一國到另一國的價(jià)格如果低于在正常貿(mào)易過程中出口國類似產(chǎn)品的可比價(jià)格”。如果沒有此類國內(nèi)價(jià)格，一個(gè)價(jià)格結(jié)構(gòu)可以以類似產(chǎn)品在第三國的最高價(jià)格或者生產(chǎn)的成本為基礎(chǔ)來計(jì)算。正常價(jià)值和出口價(jià)格之間的差距就是所謂的傾銷幅度。稅不能超過傾銷幅度。</p><p>　　條例允許成員國對進(jìn)口商品征收反傾銷稅

60、只要兩個(gè)條件都符合。貨物必須存在傾銷，同時(shí)傾銷也必須對國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)建立造成了實(shí)質(zhì)性損害或者延緩國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)建立。GATT/WTO法沒有試圖去規(guī)制傾銷—私人措施—但是替代了反傾銷措施的使用。</p><p>　　從關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定規(guī)則引入開始，就有許多出口國受制于反傾銷措施的抱怨，進(jìn)口國的自由裁量權(quán)使他們過度夸大傾銷幅度和損害的確定，最為重要前提是傾銷事實(shí)的存在。出口國聲稱傾銷稅率經(jīng)常被運(yùn)用當(dāng)他們不在關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定法律的制約下，反傾

61、銷措施被用來騷擾、阻礙廉價(jià)商品的進(jìn)口。</p><p>　　一個(gè)試圖加強(qiáng)GATT規(guī)則中反傾銷準(zhǔn)則的提議作為肯尼迪回合的一部分在1967年達(dá)成了，后來該建議在東京回合中修訂。法則給出了第6條中關(guān)于類似產(chǎn)品、傾銷、損害和國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)更精確的定義。法則首次將管理的程序規(guī)則、調(diào)查期限的限制、反傾銷稅的追溯、利益方的權(quán)利、證明證據(jù)和其他管理規(guī)則做出詳細(xì)規(guī)定。</p><p>　　法則還允許傾銷的決定，前

62、提是當(dāng)出口價(jià)格小于產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)成本，只有當(dāng)市場上沒有來自出口國同類產(chǎn)品的銷售或者沒有出口國和國內(nèi)價(jià)格的適當(dāng)比較。這是更為嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)亩x。然而，美國、加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭在1978年達(dá)成共識，定價(jià)低于平均成本不是正常的貿(mào)易過程，因此，定價(jià)可以在正常價(jià)值基礎(chǔ)上由生產(chǎn)成本加上合理的管理金額、銷售以及其他費(fèi)用和利潤計(jì)算出來。</p><p>　　同時(shí)法則也引入了兩種新的措施。首先，它提出了價(jià)格承諾的定義“進(jìn)口國調(diào)查當(dāng)局與出

63、口商或出口國政府就提高傾銷產(chǎn)品價(jià)格或停止以傾銷價(jià)格向進(jìn)口國出口以便消除損害影響而達(dá)成的一種協(xié)議。法則明確允許以提高傾銷產(chǎn)品價(jià)格形式作出的價(jià)格承諾，其價(jià)格提高不得超過經(jīng)初步裁定已確認(rèn)的傾銷幅度，但這只是在剛進(jìn)入初步傾銷和損害發(fā)現(xiàn)的階段。價(jià)格承諾這個(gè)措施是由于在肯尼迪回合談判中美國財(cái)政部（當(dāng)時(shí)負(fù)責(zé)傾銷調(diào)查）減少傾銷調(diào)查來鼓勵生產(chǎn)者給出價(jià)格承諾，盡管關(guān)稅委員會可能不會導(dǎo)致?lián)p害的確定與稅率的實(shí)施。其次，法則還介紹了初步稅率的規(guī)定。這兩種反傾銷措

64、施都被廣泛使用。</p><p>　　烏拉圭回合協(xié)議中第6條的實(shí)施加強(qiáng)了政府實(shí)施反傾銷措施的意圖。該協(xié)議制定了關(guān)于傾銷和損害確定的決定因素以及兩者之間因果關(guān)系更加詳細(xì)的規(guī)則。在實(shí)施反傾銷調(diào)查和澄清爭端解決機(jī)制中成員國反傾銷措施方面，它又制定了更多詳細(xì)的程序。協(xié)議引入了“日落條款”，要求反傾銷稅在5年內(nèi)終止征收，除非有最新到期征收反傾銷稅有可能導(dǎo)致傾銷的繼續(xù)或者傾銷和損害的再度發(fā)生。但是這個(gè)協(xié)議保留了體系的所有核心

65、特征。</p><p>　　和之前的條例法則相比，協(xié)議有一個(gè)新的特征。它考慮傾銷進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品的綜合作用。這就是“累積”。在烏拉圭回合6年的應(yīng)用經(jīng)歷和修改中，跨國累積被看作是一個(gè)更糟糕的改變。在烏拉圭回合協(xié)議之前，這個(gè)舉動是在有限的范圍內(nèi)使用的，也被懷疑是否符合關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定的法律。烏拉圭回合協(xié)議使得這個(gè)實(shí)踐合法化，也增加了抱怨的覆蓋范圍和國家使用這個(gè)規(guī)定的可能性。</p><p>　　在美國，剛引

66、入強(qiáng)制性累積修正的前10年，Prusa發(fā)現(xiàn)75%的反傾銷案件中包括了累積。Hansen 和 Prusa確認(rèn)累積對損害的確定產(chǎn)生重大影響，也就是說，在國家進(jìn)口份額的基礎(chǔ)上比預(yù)期的影響更大。在歐盟，累積使委員會更方便地證明損害，因此增加了反傾銷措施使用的頻率。Tharakan和Greenaway 發(fā)現(xiàn)在1980-1997年間66.3%的損害決定因素是在進(jìn)口市場累積占有率的基礎(chǔ)上。根據(jù)Hansen 和Prusa對美國反傾銷措施的研究路線，他們

67、也發(fā)現(xiàn)了這個(gè)效應(yīng)。</p><p>　　在GATT和WTO規(guī)則中，反傾銷措施單獨(dú)影響貿(mào)易中的貨物，沒有關(guān)于服務(wù)反傾銷的規(guī)定被引入GATT。Hoekman 和 Leidy檢驗(yàn)了將反傾銷規(guī)定引入服務(wù)貿(mào)易的可能性。他們總結(jié)出這個(gè)措施起到很小的意愿對于服務(wù)貿(mào)易的不同性質(zhì)，服務(wù)不得不到消費(fèi)者居住國，無形貿(mào)易很難建立產(chǎn)品單價(jià)。</p><p>　　這些規(guī)則保持反傾銷措施的基本特征有50多年的歷史。GA