管理自主權(quán)與最優(yōu)融資政策【外文翻譯】

1、原文：原文：ManagerialDiscretionOptimalFinancingPoliciesIntroductionInthispaperIinvestigatehowfinancingpoliciescanbeusedtorestrictmanagement’sabilitytopursueitsownobjectiveswhenithasinfmationthatshareholdersdonothave.Ishowthat

2、optimalfinancingpoliciesreducethecostsshareholdersbearifmanagementtendstoinvesttoomuchthatthesepoliciesdependonthedistributionofcashflowineachperiodaswellasontheirpresentvalue.Considerafirmwithatomisticshareholderswhoobs

3、erveneitherthefirm’scashflownmanagement’sinvestmentdecisions.Iassumeitiscostlyfshareholderstoactcollectivelyoncecashflowhasaccruedsotheycannotfcemanagementtopayoutcash.Themanagersvalueinvestmentbecausetheirperquisitesinc

4、reasewithinvestmentevenwhenthefirminvestsinnegativepresentvalue(NPV)projects.ConsequentlywhencashflowishightheyinvestinnegativeNPVprojectsratherthanpayoutcash.Theinfmationalasymmetrybetweenmanagersshareholdersleadstoinef

5、ficientinvestmentwhencashflowislowbecausemanagementcannotcrediblyconvinceshareholdersthatcashflowisinsufficienttotakeadvantageofallpositiveNPVopptunities.Managementalwaystellsshareholdersthatthefirmcannottakeadvantageofa

6、llitspositiveNPVopptunities.Consequentlyshareholdersneverbelievemanagement’sassertionthatcashflowistoolowbecausemanagementalwaysbenefitsfromincreasinginvestment.Debtpaymentsfcemanagerstopayoutcashflowhencereduceinvestmen

7、tinallstatesofthewld.Consequentlydebtpaymentsaffectshareholderwealthbothpositivelybyreducinginvestmentwhenitwouldotherwisebetoohighnegativelybyinhibitingadvantageousinvestmentinotherstatesofthewld.Thetradeoffbetweentheco

8、stthebenefitofdebtimpliesthatthereisadebtpaymentthatmaximizesfirmvalue.Theoptimaldebtpaymentisnegativewhenshareholdersbenefitbygivingmanagementmeresourcestodecreasetheprobabilitythatagoodthatliquidationatdate1involvesthe

9、lossofthefirm’sinvestmentopptunities.Ifthefirmdoesnotdefaultatdate1itliquidatesatdate2.TomakeitpossibletodistinguishsharplybetweenequitydebtfinancingIassumethatdefaultatdate2hasanarbitrarilysmallstrictlypositivecost.With

10、thisassumptionthefirmneverissuesdebtunlessithassomeadvantagethatatleastoffsetsthedefaultcost.TypicallyonewouldexpectmarketparticipantstohavesomeknowledgeofRImanagerialcompensationcontractstomakeuseofthatknowledgetoincrea

11、semanagerialincentivestomaximizeshareholderwealth.ThemodelIdevelopignesthesecomplicationsconsequentlyappliestofirmswherecontractingsolutionshavelimitedvaluewhereshtofliquidatingthefirmshareholdershaveconsiderableuncertai

12、ntyaboutthefirm’struevaluemanagement’sinvestmentpolicy.Managementislikelytovalueinvestmentmethanshareholdersdofnumerousreasons.Finstancemanagersoflargerfirmshavegreatervisibilityhavemeperkstodispensetotheiremployeesarebe

13、tterabletopromoteemployeeswithinthefirmsofth.RatherthanmodelthereasonfwhichmanagementvaluesinvestmentIassumethatmanagement’sutilityincreaseswiththeconsumptionofperquisitesthatthisconsumptionisafunctionofdate1investmenton

14、ly.Eachunitofinvestmentisassumedtoproduceanonstochasticpositiveamountofperquisitesthatisanincreasingfunctionoftheinvestment’sNPV.ThisassumptioninsuresthatmanagementinvestsinthepositiveNPVprojectsfirst.Itcanbemotivatedasf

15、ollows:negativeNPVprojectsconsumecpateresourcesinthefuturewhereaspositiveNPVprojectsincreasetheseresources.Consequentlymanagementthatvaluesinvestmentwouldratherinvestinprojectsthatenableittoincreasefutureinvestment.Since

16、inthismodelthefirmliquidatesatdate2makingtheperquisitespositivelyrelatedtotheNPVofprojectsisanindirectwaytoaccountfmanagement’spreferencefinvestmentinprojectsthatexpresourcesunderitscontrol.Ifmanagementdoesnotremaininpla

17、ceatdate1itconsumesnoperquisites.Withtheseassumptionsmanagementbenefitsfrombeingincontrolatdate1investsallcashflowunlessfcedtodootherwise.IassumethatmanagementreceivesafixedwagehasnostakeinthecpationimplicitlyIassumethat