1990年--外文原文及譯文--論當代國際法中的主權(quán)和人權(quán)

1、<p>　　中文3016字，1860單詞,10369英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Reisman W M. Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1990: 866-876.</p><p>　　SOV

2、EREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW</p><p>　　W. Michael Reisman</p><p><b>　　I.</b></p><p>　　Since Aristotle, the term "sovereignty" has

3、 had a long and varied history during which it has been given different meanings, hues and tones, depending on the context and the objectives of those using the word.1 Bodin and Hobbes shaped the term to serve their perc

4、eption of an urgent need for internal order. Their conception influenced several centuries of international politics and law2 and also became a convenient supplementary secular slogan for the various absolute monarchies

5、of the time. Sove</p><p>　　The public law of Europe, the system of international law established by the assorted monarchs of the continent to serve their common purposes, reflected and reinforced this concep

6、tion by insulating from legal scrutiny and competence a broad category of events that were later enshrined as "matters solely within the domestic jurisdiction." 4 If another political power entered the territor

7、y of the sovereign (whatever the reason) without his permission, his sovereignty was violated. In such matters</p><p>　　With the words "We the People,"5 the American Revolution inaugurated the conc

8、ept of the popular will as the theoretical and operational source of political authority. On its heels, the French Revolution and the advent of subsequent democratic governments confirmed the concept. Political legitimac

9、y henceforth was to derive from popular support; governmental authority was based on the consent of the people in the territory in which a government purported to exercise power. At first only for those </p><p

10、>　　It took the formal international legal system time to register these profound changes. Another century beset by imperialism, colonialism and fascism was to pass, but by the end of the Second World War, popular sove

11、reignty was firmly rooted as one of the fundamental postulates of political legitimacy. Article 1 of the UN Charter established as one of the purposes of the United Nations, to develop friendly relations between states,

12、not on any terms, but "based on respect for the principles of equa</p><p>　　Unlike certain other grand statements of international law, the concept of popular sovereignty was not to remain mere pious as

13、piration. The international lawmaking system proceeded to prescribe criteria for appraising the conformity of internal governance with international standards of democracy.8 Thanks to a happy historical conjunction, mode

14、rn communications technology has made it possible to verify that conformity rapidly and economically and to broadcast it widely. International and regiona</p><p><b>　　II.</b></p><p>

15、　　Although the venerable term "sovereignty" continues to be used in international legal practice, its referent in modern international law is quite different. International law still protects sovereignty, but?n

16、ot surprisingly?it is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty. Under the old concept, even scrutiny of international human rights without the permission of the sovereign could arguably co

17、nstitute a violation of sovereignty by its "invasion" of the sovereign's domaine</p><p>　　This contemporary change in content of the term "sovereignty" also changes the cast of charac

18、ters who can violate that sovereignty. Of course, popular sovereignty is violated when an outside force invades and imposes its will on the people. One thinks of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 or of Kuwait in 1990.1

19、2 But what happens to sovereignty, in its modern sense, when it is not an outsider but some homegrown specialist in violence who seizes and purports to wield the authority of the governme</p><p>　　Under the

20、old international law, the internal usurper was so entitled, for the standard was de facto control: the only test was the effective power of the claimant. In the Tinoco case,13 Costa Rica sought to defend itself by claim

21、ing a violation of its popular sovereignty. Tinoco, the erstwhile Minister of War, had seized power in violation of the Constitution. Therefore, the subsequent restorationist Costa Rican Government contended, his actions

22、 could not be deemed to have bound Costa Rica. But</p><p>　　The Tinoco decision was consistent with the law of its time. Were it applied strictly now, it would be anachronistic, for it stands in stark contra

23、diction to the new constitutive, human rights-based conception of popular sovereignty. To be sure, there were policy reasons for Tinoco, which may still have some cogency, but the important point is that there was then n

24、o countervailing constitutive policy of international human rights and its conception of popular sovereignty.</p><p>　　Caudillos and their like appear to be susceptible to a megalomania that identifies their

25、 corporeal selves with the symbols of the nation and the state. They invoke a "'sovereignty' so grandiose and capricious ... it might be supposed to be a deliberate caricature, save for the intensity of the

26、sentiments that are mobilized around the symbol itself."14 Happily, the international legal system in which declamations such as "l'etat, c'est moi" were coherent has long since been consigned to h

27、istory's</p><p><b>　　III.</b></p><p>　　The consequences of these changes are far-reaching. Some are clearly beneficial to the new values of the international system. Some hold th

28、e potential for destabilizing the system. On the credit side, international human rights puts current and erstwhile tyrants on notice that monarchical and elitist conceptions of national sovereignty cannot be invoked to

29、immunize them from the writ of international law. Some have already grasped the implications of this development. Haiti, in July 1990, asked </p><p>　　The most satisfactory solution to this problem is the cr

30、eation of centralized institutions, equipped with decision-making authority and the capacity to make it effective. But in the immediate future, that solution remains unlikely, and to make it a condition of lawful decisio

31、n now only evades addressing the policies that the notion of popular sovereignty encapsulates. The given of contemporary international decision making is the absence of such institutions and the need to focus on regulati

32、ng u</p><p>　　It is no longer politically feasible or morally acceptable to suspend the operation of human rights norms until every constitutive problem is solved. In the interim, new criteria for unilateral

33、 human rights actions must be established. In addition, more refined techniques for their legal appraisal and more effective means for their condemnation when such actions are themselves unlawful must be developed. One c

34、ontribution of our profession should be to develop methods for assessing popular will a</p><p>　　The violation of sovereignty has heretofore largely been treated with passive strategies: absorbing those who

35、have been obliged to flee their own countries. With the increasing refinement of transportation, domestic human rights pathologies now generate larger and larger numbers of refugees. But the welfare democracies of the wo

36、rld, which are the preferred refuge of those fleeing human rights violations in their own countries, have begun to reach the limits of their absorptive capacities. The pa</p><p><b>　　IV.</b></

37、p><p>　　Because human rights considerations introduce so many more variables into the determination of lawfulness, an even heavier burden of deliberation devolves upon international lawyers in assessing the law

38、fulness of actions. Matters become more complex and uncertain than they were in an international legal system that was composed of a few binary rules applied to a checkerboard of monarchical states and, most particularly

39、, that lacked an international code of human rights. One can no longer simply </p><p>　　No one is entitled to complain that things are getting too complicated. If complexity of decision is the price for incr

40、eased human dignity on the planet, it is worth it. Those who yearn for "the good old days" and continue to trumpet terms like "sovereignty" without relating them to the human rights conditions within

41、the states under discussion do more than commit an anachronism. They undermine human rights.</p><p>　　Reisman W M. Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law[J]. American Journal of Inter

42、national Law, 1990: 866-876.</p><p><b>　　二、譯文</b></p><p>　　論當代國際法中的主權(quán)和人權(quán)</p><p><b>　　一</b></p><p>　　自亞里士多德以來，“主權(quán)”這個詞有很長的歷史，在這期間根據(jù)這個詞的上下文和目標被賦予各種

43、意義、色彩和語調(diào)。【1】博丹和霍布斯塑造這個術(shù)語是因為他們對內(nèi)部秩序的迫切需要。他們的觀念對國際政治和法律有長達幾個世紀的影響，【2】而且也成為當時各種絕對君主的一個方便補充的世俗口號。主權(quán)經(jīng)常是一個強大個體的特質(zhì)，即其領(lǐng)土合法性（通常被稱為他的領(lǐng)域，甚至以他定義）停留在直接宣布所有權(quán)或委托神民或歷史的權(quán)威，但肯定不是經(jīng)人民同意的霍布斯的眾多契約【3】。</p><p>　　歐洲的公法是各種大陸的君主為他們的共同

44、目的建立的國際法律制度，通過法律審查和廣泛類別事件的權(quán)限，后來被奉為“僅僅在國內(nèi)管轄范圍內(nèi)重要?！眮矸从澈图訌娺@個概念?！?】最高統(tǒng)治者的意愿是唯一一個法律相關(guān)的。</p><p>　　隨著“我們是人民”這句話，【5】美國革命開始出現(xiàn)民意的概念來作為理論和操作政治權(quán)威的來源。緊接著，法國革命和后來的民主政府證實了這一概念的出現(xiàn)。自此以后，政治合法性是來自民眾的支持；政府權(quán)力特別是政府聲稱領(lǐng)土行使權(quán)力是在領(lǐng)土上人民

45、同意的基礎(chǔ)上。起初，只有奉行現(xiàn)代政治先鋒的那些國家這么做，后來越來越多的國家君主的主權(quán)成為人民主權(quán)：民眾主權(quán)。</p><p>　　正式的國際法律系統(tǒng)發(fā)生的這些深刻變化花費了一些時間。剩余然受到帝國主義、殖民主義和法西斯主義的困擾整整一個世紀，但在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)結(jié)束時，人民主權(quán)成為了根深蒂固的政治合法性的基本要求。《聯(lián)合國憲章》的第一條是建立聯(lián)合國的目的之一，國家之間發(fā)展友好關(guān)系，沒有任何條件，而是“基于尊重人民

46、的平等權(quán)利和民族自決的原則?！?lt;/p><p>　　不像某些其他關(guān)于國際法的宏偉說法，人民主權(quán)的概念并不是僅僅保持虔誠的愿望。國際立法體系是用于規(guī)定評價內(nèi)部治理與民主國際一致性的標準。【8】由于和歷史結(jié)合，現(xiàn)代通信技術(shù)已經(jīng)使人們有可能迅速確認一致性并經(jīng)濟的廣泛傳播?，F(xiàn)在國際和地區(qū)組織的監(jiān)控在關(guān)鍵的全國選舉使用新技術(shù)，以確保他們是自由和公平的。【9】這樣的選舉結(jié)果是人民主權(quán)的體現(xiàn)，也成為國際認可的民選政府的基礎(chǔ)?！?/p>

47、10】在功能術(shù)語中，這個過程組成了一種新的國際認可的形式。拒絕承認忽略或壓制人民意志的決定，這就進入到下一階段，逐漸出現(xiàn)了宗旨是允許或促進民意實現(xiàn)的國際項目。【11】</p><p><b>　　二</b></p><p>　　雖然 “主權(quán)” 這個古老的術(shù)語仍然繼續(xù)用于國際法律實踐中，其在現(xiàn)代國際法中的定義是截然不同的。國際法仍然保護主權(quán)，但卻是保護人民的主權(quán)，而不是

48、君主的主權(quán)。在原來的概念下，沒有君主的允許，甚至對國際人權(quán)進行選票復查可能因為“入侵”君主的主權(quán)構(gòu)成違反主權(quán)罪。盡管《聯(lián)合國憲章》采用“國內(nèi)管轄權(quán)-國際關(guān)注”二分法，但沒有學者仍然支持內(nèi)部人權(quán)是“基本上在國內(nèi)管轄范圍內(nèi)的任何國家”，因此不受國際法約束的論點。</p><p>　　術(shù)語“主權(quán)”在當代內(nèi)容的變化也改變了侵犯主權(quán)者。當然，當外力入侵并把自己的意志強加給人民時，違反了人民主權(quán)。例如1979年阿富汗的入侵或

49、1990年科威特的入侵?！?2】但主權(quán)在現(xiàn)代意義上代表什么？什么時候不是一個局外人，而是一些本土暴力方面的專家，理解并聲稱行使政府的權(quán)威對抗人民的意愿？他們通過赤裸裸的權(quán)力、通過叛亂或政變、通過篡奪選舉或者通過那些選舉過程的系統(tǒng)性錯誤，其中據(jù)稱近100%的選民投票支持現(xiàn)任的名單（通常是唯一的選擇）。這樣的奪取權(quán)力者有濫用國際法律術(shù)語“國家主權(quán)”來建立或加強他自己在國際政治位置的資格嗎？</p><p>　　在曾經(jīng)

50、的國際法中，因為內(nèi)部篡位者擁有實際控制權(quán)，所以有資格：只取決于聲稱者的有效權(quán)利。在蒂諾科案例中，【13】為了自衛(wèi)，哥斯達黎加聲稱人民主權(quán)受到侵犯。戰(zhàn)爭的前部長蒂諾科掌權(quán)違反憲法。因此，隨后復辟者哥斯達黎加政府聲稱，他的行為不能代表哥斯達黎加。但是首席大法官塔夫特認為由于他的有效控制，只要他保持控制，蒂諾科就代表合法政府。</p><p>　　對于蒂諾科的決定符合當時的法律。但考慮到法律會過時，因為它形成了鮮明的矛

51、盾到新的要素，基于人類維權(quán)的人民主權(quán)概念，現(xiàn)在應(yīng)用嚴格?？梢钥隙ǖ氖?，蒂諾科案例存在政策原因可能還有一些中肯，但重要的一點是，當時沒有關(guān)于國際人權(quán)政策和人民主權(quán)的概念。</p><p>　　領(lǐng)袖和他們長像似乎容易受到狂妄自大的影響，表明他們?nèi)怏w的自我與民族和國家的象征。他們行使“‘主權(quán)’如此宏大和反復無?！讼笳鞅旧碚{(diào)動情緒的強度，也許是故意諷刺。”【14】令人高興的是，國際法律制度高談闊論“朕即國家”的情況

52、早已被丟進歷史的垃圾堆。在我們這個時代，這樣的聲明至少對觀眾是具有喜劇效果的。如果不是賦予自己主權(quán)額獨裁者總是造成人類邊界領(lǐng)土無盡的痛苦，他們有時候是為了制造歡喜的場合，甚至在那些仍在上演的國家。</p><p><b>　　三</b></p><p>　　這些變化結(jié)果有著影響深遠的。一些顯然是有利于國際體系的新價值。一些則對系統(tǒng)存在潛在的不穩(wěn)定因素。在信用方面，國際

53、人權(quán)密切注意當前和昔日的暴君，君主和精英關(guān)于國家主權(quán)的觀念也需要遵循國際法律文書。一些已經(jīng)抓住這一發(fā)展的意義。1990年7月，海地要求聯(lián)合國提供三百位文職官員監(jiān)督其即將到來的選舉和四十位軍官的任命，以確保當?shù)匚溲b力量是解決方案的一部分而不是問題的一部分。【28】海地的臨時外交部長科施勒?克萊蒙特說這樣一個團隊將是“一個強大的先例”，由聯(lián)合國監(jiān)測第三世界選舉“來證明他們的合法性?！薄?9】七分之三的安理會成員反對這項請求?！?0】首領(lǐng)可能

54、不喜歡這一點，但對生活在專制和獨裁統(tǒng)治下的人民，他們渴望發(fā)展的承諾，至少來自國際法對其主權(quán)的侵犯和可能性的譴責，可能是不確定的補救。</p><p>　　該問題最滿意的解決方法是建立集中的機構(gòu)，配備決策權(quán)和有效率的能力。但在不久的將來，這個解決方案仍不太可能，使它成為合法決定的條件現(xiàn)在只有躲避解決政策，人民主權(quán)的概念被壓縮。由于當代的國際決策沒有這樣的機構(gòu)，需要關(guān)注調(diào)節(jié)單方面決策。因為無法補救的權(quán)利就不是權(quán)利了，

55、所以禁止在清楚權(quán)利被侵犯的情況下，無法獲得多邊可能性時，單方面證實無罪就幾乎是終止這些權(quán)利。</p><p>　　暫停人權(quán)規(guī)范的操作直到每一個機構(gòu)問題被解決，不再是政治上可行或道德上可以接受的了。在此期間，單邊人權(quán)行為的新標準必須建立。此外，必須采用更精煉的技術(shù)進行法律評價，使用更有效手段譴責這樣的行為本身就是非法的。我們的貢獻之一應(yīng)該是為評估人們的意愿和判斷分歧尋找合適的方法。</p><p

56、>　　至今為止，侵犯主權(quán)基本上是采用被動的策略進行處理：接受那些被迫逃離自己祖國的人。隨著交通的日益改進，國內(nèi)人權(quán)問題現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)生出越來越多的難民。但是世界上福利民主的國家，成為了自己國家侵犯人權(quán)逃離尋找避難所的難民的首選，現(xiàn)在這些國家已經(jīng)快到他們接受難民的極限了。而處理侵犯主權(quán)的被動策略將不再有用。所以我們需要從實際上解決并從現(xiàn)代主權(quán)的概念出發(fā)來解決該問題本質(zhì)的積極策略。</p><p><b>　

57、　四</b></p><p>　　因為考慮人權(quán)時把那么多變量引入到合法性的確定，一個更重要的考慮是國際律師在評估行為的合法性。相比處在由一些二進制的規(guī)則組成的，應(yīng)用于君主制國家，特別是缺乏人權(quán)國際標準的國家國際法律體系，問題變得更加復雜和不確定?？梢圆辉僦皇亲l責外部驅(qū)使的行動，這些行動旨在消除不受歡迎的政府和允許磋商或?qū)嵤]有詢問是否和在什么條件下會被鎮(zhèn)壓，本身是侵犯主權(quán)的民意，以及和外部行為如何影響

58、表達和人民主權(quán)的實現(xiàn)。但清楚的定義什么是“外部驅(qū)使的行動”本身就是日益艱巨的任務(wù)。</p><p>　　沒有人有權(quán)抱怨事情變得很復雜。如果決定的復雜性增加了地球上人類的尊嚴，這個代價就是值得的。那些渴望“過去的好時光”，并繼續(xù)鼓吹“主權(quán)”而沒有把他們州內(nèi)的人權(quán)狀況聯(lián)系在一起的討論是不合時宜。他們破壞了人權(quán)。</p><p>　　賴斯曼?W?M. 論當代國際法中的主權(quán)和人權(quán)[J]. 美國國際