風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　外文資料翻譯</b></p><p>　　Why the Mindset Matters More Than the Model.</p><p>　　Peter Bernstein</p><p>　　Forecasting used to be straightforward. Over the years,

2、by the end of the first quarter, managers usually had a fairly reliable sense of how the business was shaping up and whether targets would be met, missed or exceeded. Confidence in quarterly and annual predictions was so

3、 high that coming in above or below by even the smallest amount was considered a surprise and set off moves in stock prices. This year, however, things have changed. Companies like Unilever, Union Pacific and Visteon are

4、 dec</p><p>　　According to company reports, the problem is not that these firms are reluctant to provide a gloomy outlook. Instead, the companies say they just don't know which way the markets will go; i

5、t seems the global economy is so shaky that executives have little confidence in their projections. This means that more and more managers are growing unwilling, at least temporarily, to make judgments about the future a

6、nd then to act on those beliefs. The danger is that these businesses will become paralyzed </p><p>　　The fundamental issue, of course, is understanding and managing risk. Any time a merger is considered, a n

7、ew product concept funded or an investment made, success is never guaranteed. Over the years, business has become increasingly sophisticated in developing tools that can help in this analysis, especially in financial mat

8、ters. Complex mathematical models were created to analyze potential outcomes and probabilities, based on past performance. Yet, as has been widely reported in the media, many</p><p>　　At the same time, exper

9、ts at Wharton and elsewhere argue that too much blame is being placed on the risk management model and other tools of the trade, in banking and beyond. The models are not necessarily broken, but instead are only as good

10、as the decisions that get made based on them, they say. As a result, the current crisis may represent an opportunity for companies to re-visit and re-think historical approaches to risk management. When it comes to plann

11、ing for the future, the new thinking </p><p>　　"I think we've learned a lot recently about the limitations of models," says Richard J. Herring, a professor of international banking and co-direc

12、tor of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. "We've also seen that the governance of risk is not as good as it ought to be." Herring notes that top managers in many companies need to understand what ca

13、n happen when the assumptions that drive a model change, and then subsequently communicate these scenarios to their boards. </p><p>　　Internal audit risks include the inherent risks and control risks. The in

14、herent risks is the assumption that has nothing to do with internal accounting controls, the units being audited financial statements and the overall balance of the account of a business or the possibility of a major err

15、or, that is caused by the audit unit economic characteristics of business and accounting work itself the formation of the lack of audit risk. Some enterprises such as the lack of due attention to the account</p>&

16、lt;p>　　Re-defining Risk</p><p>　　The first step is to get a fuller picture of risk. Most recent coverage of the global economic crisis and its origins, particularly from a risk perspective, has focused on

17、 the financial industry; the problems with identifying and measuring the risk in this sector kicked off the chain of events that brought the global economy to a near standstill. Some banks were dramatically more exposed

18、to risks than they thought they were. Most others simply did not know; they could not assess with any confide</p><p>　　But there is more than one kind of risk. U.S. food giant Cargill, for example, earlier t

19、his month suffered a blow related to what is typically called "sovereign risk." Accusing the company of having failed to lower food prices, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez stunned Cargill by ordering the seizu

20、re of one of its rice plants in the country. </p><p>　　Another category of risk that companies face -- which is even more common -- is operational. The delays Airbus encountered in the development of its 380

21、 super-size jetliner are a perfect example. Over the course of 2005 and 2006, Airbus pushed back the launch of the new aircraft three times, ultimately leading to the departure of its CEO and a projected earnings shortfa

22、ll of more than 4 billion euros. Iridium, a company backed by Motorola, experienced an infamous failure related to operational r</p><p>　　These stories illustrate some key points about risk from a manager

23、9;s perspective. The first is that traders, economists and academics think about risk very differently than do most business managers. For the former, the key issue in risk is variance -- the expected spread of possible

24、outcomes. But that is not how managers think about it. For them, the biggest issue in risk is the potential for loss. As a result, they ask, "What's the downside?" If the risk is too high -- or even unknown

25、 -- compa</p><p>　　The second point is that risk management has no silver bullet. As a result, many companies need to develop a more integrated view of risk. "We have seen a tendency to separate risks i

26、nto rigid silos -- operational risk, market risk, credit risk and so on," says Wharton's Herring. "But what we have found is that major shocks and problems do not come that way. For instance, in the financi

27、al world, you would see trading desks staffed with people who were experts in market risk, but they were tradin</p><p>　　Nevertheless, risk taking remains what managing is all about, and not just in financia

28、l services but in every industry. Indeed, from an economic perspective, all firms fundamentally are in the business of taking risks based on their core capabilities. For the manager, then, the basic objective is simple:

29、As one executive noted in Zur Shapira's 1995 book, Risk Taking: A Managerial Perspective: "You have to be a risk taker. But you have to win more than you lose." The catch is that managers are al</p>

30、<p>　　Constructing a New 'Risk Architecture'</p><p>　　Given recent events, "What I see now is a new risk architecture emerging for organizations," says Erwann Michel-Kerjan, managing d

31、irector of Wharton's Risk Management and Decision Processes Center. "Whatever industry you consider, it is always the same pattern. Things are getting faster, and therefore we need to make decisions faster, but

32、based on information that we often don't have. Of course, we would like to have time to get all the information, but the reality is that managers have to make </p><p>　　To overcome the problem, Michel-Ke

33、rjan sees some companies moving beyond traditional risk management practices, which have largely been internally focused. Call it "Risk Management 1.0" -- essentially, looking at a company's existing positi

34、on or investments and analyzing what could go wrong.  However, organizations need to look beyond the boundaries of the firm and consider what is happening elsewhere. In recent years, businesses around the globe have

35、 become increasingly interdependent, which br</p><p>　　"We were trained to solve problems with clear questions and clear scientific knowledge," says Michel-Kerjan. "Knowing the historic risk p

36、rofile, we made investment decisions. But historic data does not shape the future anymore, given how rapidly the world is changing. We usually look at the known issues and make a nice diagram with probability on one axis

37、 and impact on the other. That's Risk Management 1.0. Risk Management 2.0 is [going] beyond the known issues to look at the links and interdepe</p><p>　　The key, Michel-Kerjan adds, is to have knowledgea

38、ble people in the organization who are looking broadly and challenging assumptions about the future. "Form a team of people and mandate that they come back with two or three major links that the company has not yet

39、thought about," he suggests. "Not 25 links -- three links that they believe are important but not fully visible. And then bring some data about that to prove to you that it is something the company has to think

40、 about." </p><p>　　In addition, new techniques and technologies are now coming into the picture. For instance, so called "track-and-trace" technologies, integrating software and advanced scann

41、ing and identification technologies, are improving visibility across companies' supply chains, so they can precisely identify which components are coming from whom and where. Similarly, Michel-Kerjan is working on a

42、project to identify the "DNA" of financial products, in an effort to provide more visibility into the component</p><p>　　As the need of audit quality to the all social sectors have become more and

43、more ,the audit risk has become higher and higher. Just under this background ，modern audit method made new headway and came to a new audit model——risk-oriented audit. Risk-oriented auditing has many typical characterist

44、ics and rigorous audit procedure. It is also beneficial to assign audit resources and improve effectiveness and efficiency of audit. This article mainly elaborated the risk-oriented audit production, deve</p><

45、p>　　Philippe Hellich, vice president of risks, control and audit at Danone, is already moving to the new model. "We use very few mathematical models," he says, although the organization is working on a small

46、 set of new ones for certain risks. "Instead, we rely much more on interviews and benchmarking with peers outside the group and between our subsidiaries around the world. Our approach is based on listening and chall

47、enging the operational management, common sense analysis, sound judgment and good </p><p>　　Looking ahead, Hellich sees even more focus on risk from Danone's leadership, a consequence of the increasing v

48、olatility in markets and the potential severity of impact. "Top managers are convinced of the necessity to use enterprise risk management. We now have an effective working session with part of the executive committe

49、e twice a year. And we continue to rely on yearly updates of the risk maps of all major business units worldwide."</p><p>　　reduce the risk of internal audit ways Strengthen the internal audit of the l

50、egal system Improve and perfect the legal system for the audit of internal audit is the basis of risk control measures. Audit norms, the audit staff code of conduct and guidelines, not only to control and reduce aud

51、it risk, but also to measure auditors liability standards. China's internal audit late start compared with Western countries in the relevant system-building there are many imperfections. In order to ada</p>&l

52、t;p>　　In the last pages of the 1996 bestseller on risk, Against the Gods, Peter Bernstein anticipated the challenge many companies are facing today. "Nothing is more soothing or more persuasive than the computer

53、screen, with its imposing arrays of numbers, glowing colors and elegantly structured graphs," he wrote. "As we stare at the passing show, we become so absorbed we tend to forget that the computer only answers q

54、uestions; it does not ask them.... Those who live only by the numbers may find that </p><p>　　Phil Rosenzweig, professor of strategy and international business at IMD in Switzerland and author of The Halo Ef

55、fect and Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, agrees. "I would caution executives not to rely on models that are appealing for their apparent sophistication. They may delude us into thinking we'

56、ve understood the underlying factors, when really we've done nothing of the kind. It's what I call the Delusion of Rigorous Research -- if the quantity of data is impressive, w</p><p>　　On the other

57、hand, well-designed efforts to look ahead even three to five years can be stunningly prescient. Consider the annual Global Risks Report, published by the World Economic Forum in cooperation with Citigroup, Marsh & Mc

58、Lennan Companies, Swiss Re, the Wharton School's Risk Management and Decision Processes Center and Zurich Financial Services, which is based on a qualitative assessment of global risks, workshops and input from busin

59、ess leaders and experts around the world. In the 2007 r</p><p>　　Also effective are company-specific assessments, if done right. Michael Hession, senior vice president at Woodside Energy, Australia's lar

60、gest energy company, offers an example based his experiences both at company headquarters and in running local operations in diverse places like Algeria, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Lybia and Vietnam. In these settings, risk

61、has a much more tangible profile, which Hession says taught him many lessons. </p><p>　　First and foremost, Hession notes, "You have to be proactive. Understand the risks as well as the environment you

62、are operating in. In entering a new country, we would put considerable effort into understanding the full risk picture for the business. Each of the risks was analysed and then mitigation strategies were put in place. Ve

63、ry importantly, input to this process was not just from within the company. We sought advice from many external sources, including the authorities and peer companies.</p><p>　　IMD's Rosenzweig adds that

64、companies also need to think about what level of risk-taking is required to win in their specific industry. "The great unspoken issue is about payoffs, and the degree to which payoffs are skewed in an industry,"

65、; he says. "In an industry with many players, low barriers to entry and where only a small number will make a lot of money, the payoffs are highly skewed. If this is the case, you cannot afford to take a conservativ

66、e approach. So winning is not about limiting the</p><p>　　Ultimately, then, the new thinking about risk management is becoming much more a strategic discussion, turning risk managers into strategists and vic

67、e versa. "Strategy is making choices under conditions of uncertainty," says Rosenzweig. "And you cannot make the right strategic choices without understanding your industry and how much risk you need to ta

68、ke on." </p><p>　　As a result, risk management promises to become an even more central part of managing any business. In Danone's case, for instance, Hellich says risk considerations are now embedde

69、d at multiple stages during the course of business -- at the strategic planning stage, the budgeting stage, etc. -- and should be discussed more often during quarterly reviews and whenever there are major changes or new

70、projects. "Again, it relies pragmatically on common sense and business judgment, shared with peers a</p><p>　　Wharton's Michel-Kerjan shares the sentiment. "We have to be careful -- not all the

71、 models were bad. What we are really seeing now is a need to integrate decision-making processes into the evaluation. These things are not at the margin; they are central. You can assess the risks very carefully with the

72、 best experts, but if you don't think about [them] and integrate [them] with the strategic decision process, you don't get anywhere."</p><p>　　以前，預(yù)測(cè)往往是直截了當(dāng)?shù)?。過(guò)去數(shù)年來(lái)，每到第一個(gè)季度結(jié)束的時(shí)候，通常情況下，公司的經(jīng)理都能對(duì)企業(yè)的運(yùn)

73、營(yíng)態(tài)勢(shì)如何，企業(yè)的目標(biāo)是已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)、未能實(shí)現(xiàn)還是超額完成，擁有非常切實(shí)的感覺(jué)。因?yàn)樗麄儗?duì)企業(yè)季度表現(xiàn)和年度表現(xiàn)的預(yù)測(cè)充滿信心，所以，即便超出或者低于預(yù)測(cè)的數(shù)量微乎其微，也會(huì)令人驚訝，從而會(huì)引發(fā)股票價(jià)格的動(dòng)蕩。然而，今年的情況卻發(fā)生了改變。就未來(lái)幾個(gè)月的業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)，聯(lián)合利華公司、聯(lián)合太平洋公司和偉世通公司等企業(yè)拒絕做出任何預(yù)測(cè)。換句話說(shuō)，一切預(yù)測(cè)都是徒勞的。</p><p>　　根據(jù)公司的報(bào)告來(lái)看，問(wèn)題并不在于這些企業(yè)

74、不愿意推出一個(gè)令人沮喪的展望，相反，這些公司聲稱，它們確實(shí)不知道市場(chǎng)將會(huì)走向何方，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)看起來(lái)如此之不穩(wěn)定，以至于高管們對(duì)自己的預(yù)測(cè)毫無(wú)信心可言。這就意味著有越來(lái)越多的經(jīng)理不愿意就企業(yè)的未來(lái)做出判斷并據(jù)此付諸行動(dòng)了，至少暫時(shí)如此。危險(xiǎn)在于，這些企業(yè)會(huì)陷于癱瘓——并進(jìn)而殃及全球經(jīng)濟(jì)。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，基本的問(wèn)題是要認(rèn)識(shí)和管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。無(wú)論何時(shí)，當(dāng)人們考慮一樁購(gòu)并、為某個(gè)新產(chǎn)品概念提供資金或者進(jìn)行一項(xiàng)投資時(shí)，

75、成功從來(lái)都不是萬(wàn)無(wú)一失的。過(guò)去數(shù)年來(lái)，企業(yè)在開發(fā)有助于自己進(jìn)行這類分析——尤其是進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)分析——的工具方面，已經(jīng)變得越來(lái)越老練了。為了分析潛在的結(jié)果和可能性，人們根據(jù)既往的表現(xiàn)情況開發(fā)出了復(fù)雜的數(shù)學(xué)模型。然而，正如媒體廣泛披露的，其中的很多模型并沒(méi)能準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測(cè)到目前這場(chǎng)全球性經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)，也沒(méi)能讓公司為這場(chǎng)危機(jī)做好準(zhǔn)備，現(xiàn)在，華爾街正在為完善這些系統(tǒng)付出巨大的努力。</p><p>　　與此同時(shí)，沃頓商學(xué)院和其他地方的

76、專家們認(rèn)為，人們對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理模型以及其他交易工具的指責(zé)過(guò)多了，他們認(rèn)為，實(shí)際上，那些模型并不一定那么蹩腳，只不過(guò)和基于它們的決策彼此相當(dāng)而已。因此，對(duì)公司來(lái)說(shuō)，目前這場(chǎng)危機(jī)也提供了對(duì)過(guò)去的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理手段重新考察的機(jī)會(huì)。至于說(shuō)到未來(lái)規(guī)劃問(wèn)題，這一新思想認(rèn)為，重要的并不是模型本身，而是人們的思想傾向。</p><p>　　“我想，就模型的局限性問(wèn)題，我們最近已經(jīng)得到了很多教訓(xùn)?！?沃頓金融學(xué)院國(guó)際銀行學(xué)教授、沃頓金融學(xué)院

77、研究中心聯(lián)席主任理查德·賀林說(shuō)?！按送?，我們也看到，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理并沒(méi)有取得應(yīng)有的效果?！辟R林談到，在很多公司中，高管都需要明白，當(dāng)驅(qū)動(dòng)某一模型運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的假定條件發(fā)生變化以后會(huì)發(fā)生什么情況，隨后，應(yīng)該將這些可能出現(xiàn)的情況告知董事會(huì)。</p><p>　　內(nèi)部審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)包括固有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。固有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指在假定與內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制無(wú)關(guān)的情況下，被審計(jì)單位整體財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表和各賬戶余額或某項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)生重大差錯(cuò)的可能性，即由于被審計(jì)單

78、位經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)務(wù)的特點(diǎn)和會(huì)計(jì)核算工作本身的不足而形成的審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如某些企業(yè)缺乏對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)制度應(yīng)有的重視，賬戶體系龐雜、會(huì)計(jì)信息明晰性降低，報(bào)表利用困難，成本、費(fèi)用缺乏成本核算概念等?？刂骑L(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指由于被審單位內(nèi)部控制制度不夠健全完善，內(nèi)部控制行為不力，不能及時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)和糾正某個(gè)賬戶或某種業(yè)務(wù)中的重大錯(cuò)誤而形成的審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。有時(shí)即使審計(jì)人員確認(rèn)被審計(jì)單位的內(nèi)部控制制度不合理或在關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)上失控，其提出的修正建議能否真正適合被審計(jì)單位的經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)，也會(huì)形成一種修

79、正風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p><b>　　對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重新定義</b></p><p>　　第一步就是獲得更完整的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)全景。最近，對(duì)這場(chǎng)全球性經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)及其起源的大部分報(bào)道，都專注于金融業(yè)——尤其是從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)角度，都專注于辨識(shí)和測(cè)算這一領(lǐng)域中所存在問(wèn)題——這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)激發(fā)出了讓全球經(jīng)濟(jì)陷于幾近停滯的連鎖事件。有些銀行面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)比它們自己想象的要大得多，而其他大部分銀行則根本不清楚自己面

80、臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)如何，它們無(wú)法自信地評(píng)估自己以及其他機(jī)構(gòu)的金融資產(chǎn)狀況。</p><p>　　但是，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并不僅限于一種。比如，本月早些時(shí)候，美國(guó)的食品業(yè)巨頭嘉吉公司就遭受了人們通常稱之為 “主權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”（也稱為“國(guó)家主權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”，指一個(gè)國(guó)家的政府由于政策改變而不能履行合約的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)?！g者注）的沖擊。該公司被指未能降低食品價(jià)格，為此，委內(nèi)瑞拉總統(tǒng)查韋斯下令沒(méi)收了該公司設(shè)在委內(nèi)瑞拉的一家大米加工廠，此舉讓嘉吉公司大感震驚。<

81、;/p><p>　　公司面臨的另一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而且也是更常見(jiàn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，就是運(yùn)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。空中客車公在開發(fā)其380型巨型飛機(jī)過(guò)程中所遭遇的延誤就是個(gè)經(jīng)典例證。在2005年到2006年期間，空中客車公司三次推遲了這一新機(jī)型的推出時(shí)間，最終導(dǎo)致公司的首席執(zhí)行官黯然離去，同時(shí)，給公司的預(yù)期收入減少了40億歐元。另一個(gè)例子是，得到摩托羅拉公司支持的銥星系統(tǒng)公司（摩托羅拉公司于1987年提出的低軌全球個(gè)人衛(wèi)星移動(dòng)通信系統(tǒng)，與現(xiàn)有通信網(wǎng)結(jié)合

82、，可實(shí)現(xiàn)全球數(shù)字化個(gè)人通信?！g者注），也因?yàn)檫\(yùn)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而經(jīng)歷了聲名狼藉的失敗。這個(gè)備受矚目的衛(wèi)星電話機(jī)構(gòu)成立于1998年年末，媒體給予了連篇累牘的報(bào)道，然而，還不到一年，這個(gè)公司就失敗了。公司因?yàn)闆](méi)有能力將足夠多的衛(wèi)星以足夠快的速度送入軌道，從而，造成了客戶對(duì)這一系統(tǒng)的需求遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于預(yù)期水平。</p><p>　　從一位經(jīng)理人的角度來(lái)看，這些案例都表明了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理中的某些關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)。第一個(gè)關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)就是股票交易者、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家

83、和學(xué)者與大部分企業(yè)經(jīng)理人考慮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的方式具有顯著的差異。對(duì)前者來(lái)說(shuō)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理中的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是變化——即結(jié)果可能出現(xiàn)的變化。但是，這并不是企業(yè)經(jīng)理人思考風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的方式。對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)，最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是損失。因此，他們會(huì)問(wèn)：“不好的那一面會(huì)如何？”如果風(fēng)險(xiǎn)過(guò)高，或者根本不知道風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況如何，那么，公司通常都會(huì)撤退。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)在于，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理并沒(méi)有靈丹妙藥。因此，很多公司都應(yīng)該對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)擁有更完整的判斷?！拔覀円呀?jīng)看到

84、了這樣一種傾向：將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)劃分為界限分明的不同部分——運(yùn)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，等等?！蔽诸D商學(xué)院的賀林談到。“但是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)的實(shí)際情況是，重大的動(dòng)蕩和重大的問(wèn)題并不是以這種方式出現(xiàn)的。比如，在金融領(lǐng)域，你會(huì)看到，坐在交易臺(tái)后面的人都是市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)專家，但是，他們正在交易的產(chǎn)品卻頗具信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。周全考慮每一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的技能都各不相同，但是除非你對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)擁有全面認(rèn)識(shí)的能力，否則，你就會(huì)遇到大麻煩?！?lt;/p><p>　　盡管如

85、此，承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)卻一直都是管理的目標(biāo)，而且不僅限于金融服務(wù)領(lǐng)域，所有行業(yè)都是如此。的確，從經(jīng)濟(jì)角度而言，所有企業(yè)從根本上說(shuō)都在根據(jù)自己的核心能力承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。所以，經(jīng)理人的基本目標(biāo)很簡(jiǎn)單：那就是祖爾?沙皮拉在其1995年的著作《從管理的視角談風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)中引述的一位總經(jīng)理的觀點(diǎn)：“你必須承受風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是，你一定要?jiǎng)俣嘭?fù)少?！笨蓡?wèn)題在于，經(jīng)理人總是在還沒(méi)有確定哪些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是“好風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”，哪些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是“壞風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”的情況下，就試圖勝多負(fù)少。</p>&

86、lt;p>　　建立一種全新的“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理架構(gòu)”</p><p>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理與決策過(guò)程研究中心的主任艾萬(wàn)?米歇爾-克嘉談到，考慮到最近發(fā)生的諸多事件，“我現(xiàn)在看到的是，一種全新的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理架構(gòu)正在企業(yè)中顯露出來(lái)?！彼f(shuō)：“無(wú)論你考察哪個(gè)行業(yè)，情況都是一樣的。因?yàn)榍闆r變化得越來(lái)越快了，所以，我們也需要更快做出決定，但是，往往沒(méi)有可供我們依據(jù)的信息。我們當(dāng)然希望擁有獲取所有信息的從容時(shí)間，不過(guò)，現(xiàn)實(shí)情況則是，經(jīng)理人

87、必須在沒(méi)有把握的情況下，甚至在對(duì)情況一無(wú)所知的情況下做出決策?！?lt;/p><p>　　為了解決這一難題，米歇爾-克嘉看到，有些公司已經(jīng)超越了傳統(tǒng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理策略，那些策略主要專注于內(nèi)部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這種管理方式可稱為“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理1.0版”，從本質(zhì)上說(shuō)，它關(guān)注公司的現(xiàn)有地位或者現(xiàn)有的投資，并對(duì)可能出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行分析。然而，組織還需要放眼其邊界以外，并仔細(xì)考慮其他地方正在發(fā)生的情況。近年來(lái)，全球企業(yè)的相互依賴性已經(jīng)變得越來(lái)強(qiáng)烈了

88、，這種變化使企業(yè)的效率和創(chuàng)新受益匪淺，但是，同時(shí)也使公司面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)日益增多——在很多情況下，公司甚至根本不知道風(fēng)險(xiǎn)到底是什么。的確，正是目前這場(chǎng)危機(jī)的系統(tǒng)性特點(diǎn)，以及影響的廣泛性，讓人深感震驚。</p><p>　　“我們受到的訓(xùn)練是，面對(duì)清楚的問(wèn)題，用清楚的科學(xué)知識(shí)來(lái)解決問(wèn)題?！泵仔獱?克嘉談到?！耙?yàn)橹里L(fēng)險(xiǎn)的歷史狀況，所以，我們會(huì)據(jù)此做出投資決策。但是，考慮到這個(gè)世界變化得如此之快，歷史數(shù)據(jù)已經(jīng)不能對(duì)未來(lái)產(chǎn)

89、生決定性作用了。通常情況下，我們會(huì)關(guān)注已知的結(jié)果，之后，以事件發(fā)生的可能性為一個(gè)軸，以事件所產(chǎn)生的影響為另一個(gè)軸，做出一個(gè)完美的圖表，這就是‘風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理1.0版本’。而‘風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理2.0版’則會(huì)超越已知的結(jié)果，去關(guān)注各個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的聯(lián)系和相互依存。你不能再孤立地審視每個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)了?！?lt;/p><p>　　米歇爾-克嘉補(bǔ)充說(shuō)，關(guān)鍵在于要將見(jiàn)多識(shí)廣的人員安排在企業(yè)中，讓他們負(fù)責(zé)眼觀六路、耳聽八方，并對(duì)有關(guān)未來(lái)的假設(shè)提出質(zhì)疑。“

90、組建一個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)，并要求他們發(fā)現(xiàn)2-3個(gè)公司尚未想到的重要環(huán)節(jié)?！彼ㄗh說(shuō)。“不是25個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)，而是他們認(rèn)為很重要但公司尚未察覺(jué)的三個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)。之后，提供有關(guān)那些環(huán)節(jié)的數(shù)據(jù)向你證明，公司必須要認(rèn)真思考這些問(wèn)題。”</p><p>　　此外，新技術(shù)和新工藝現(xiàn)在正在不斷涌現(xiàn)。比如，將軟件和先進(jìn)的掃描技術(shù)和識(shí)別技術(shù)整合到一起的所謂“軌跡追蹤”技術(shù)，就能提升公司整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的“可見(jiàn)度”。公司可以據(jù)此準(zhǔn)確識(shí)別哪些部件出自何人、來(lái)自何處

91、。同樣地，米歇爾-克嘉現(xiàn)在正在從事一個(gè)識(shí)別金融產(chǎn)品“DNA”的項(xiàng)目，該項(xiàng)目旨在使金融產(chǎn)品中各個(gè)組件的“可見(jiàn)度”更高，并為金融產(chǎn)品的審計(jì)提供更有效的工具。就公司所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題，咨詢顧問(wèn)機(jī)構(gòu)也正在為它們加緊提供更全面、更多維的觀點(diǎn)。甚至連“商業(yè)智慧”的定義，也從專注于公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)表現(xiàn)，擴(kuò)展到了更大的范疇——越來(lái)越多地將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)測(cè)囊括進(jìn)來(lái)，而監(jiān)測(cè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)既包括企業(yè)內(nèi)的，也包括企業(yè)外的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　達(dá)能公司負(fù)責(zé)

92、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、控制和審計(jì)的副總裁菲利普·海利奇已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)向了全新的模式。他談到，盡管企業(yè)仍在利用規(guī)模很小的一組模型評(píng)估某些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，不過(guò)，“我們很少使用數(shù)學(xué)模型。”他說(shuō)：“相反，我們更多地倚重訪談結(jié)果，我們會(huì)將自己的情況以集團(tuán)之外的同行為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行檢查，并在公司全球各地的子公司之間進(jìn)行比較。我們采用的行動(dòng)步驟基于傾聽和對(duì)運(yùn)營(yíng)管理的質(zhì)疑，基于常識(shí)性的分析、客觀的判斷以及高層的出色管理?！?lt;/p><p>　　瞻望未來(lái)，

93、海利奇認(rèn)為，達(dá)能公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層會(huì)更加專注于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理，這是市場(chǎng)變化日益無(wú)常以及由此產(chǎn)生的潛在影響日益增加的結(jié)果?！案吖軐?duì)采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的必要性如今篤信不疑。現(xiàn)在，我們每年要與總裁委員會(huì)舉辦兩次卓有成效的工作會(huì)議。同時(shí)，我們將繼續(xù)依靠全球所有重要企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況的年度更新數(shù)據(jù)?！?lt;/p><p>　　降低內(nèi)部審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的途徑 加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部審計(jì)的法制建設(shè) 完善和健全審計(jì)法規(guī)體系是內(nèi)部審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的基礎(chǔ)措施。審計(jì)規(guī)范是

94、審計(jì)人員的行為規(guī)范和工作準(zhǔn)則，不僅可以控制和減少審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而且也是衡量審計(jì)人員法律責(zé)任的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。我國(guó)內(nèi)部審計(jì)起步較晚，與西方國(guó)家相比，在相關(guān)制度建設(shè)上存在著許多不完善的地方。為了適應(yīng)現(xiàn)代內(nèi)部審計(jì)不斷發(fā)展的要求，就必須加強(qiáng)審計(jì)工作法制化、規(guī)范化建設(shè)，盡量減少審計(jì)工作的盲目性和隨意性。 保證內(nèi)部審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性 獨(dú)立性可以使內(nèi)部審計(jì)師提出公正的和不偏不倚的專業(yè)判斷，這對(duì)審計(jì)工作的恰當(dāng)開展是必不可少的。內(nèi)部審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)獨(dú)立性的內(nèi)涵應(yīng)主要表現(xiàn)

95、為形式上的獨(dú)立和實(shí)質(zhì)上的獨(dú)立兩方面。形式上的獨(dú)立要求內(nèi)部審計(jì)在組織內(nèi)具有較高的組織地位，內(nèi)部審計(jì)師的工作應(yīng)能夠獲得高級(jí)管理層和董事會(huì)的支持。實(shí)質(zhì)上的獨(dú)立是指內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員在精神上必須保持必要的獨(dú)立性，應(yīng)以公正的態(tài)度，避免利益沖突，在開展內(nèi)部審計(jì)工作時(shí)，保持誠(chéng)實(shí)的信念，遵守職業(yè)道德準(zhǔn)則，在整個(gè)審計(jì)過(guò)程中不做出重大的妥協(xié)。</p><p><b>　　做出更出色的決策</b></p>

96、<p>　　在其1996年有關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的暢銷書《與天為敵：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)探索傳奇》的最后幾頁(yè)，彼得·伯恩斯坦預(yù)測(cè)了很多公司今天所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。“沒(méi)有什么比羅列著令人難忘的系列數(shù)字、光彩奪目的顏色以及設(shè)計(jì)優(yōu)雅的圖表的計(jì)算機(jī)屏幕更能使人感到安慰、更具說(shuō)服力的了?！彼麑懙?。“當(dāng)我們盯著不斷閃現(xiàn)著數(shù)據(jù)的屏幕時(shí)，我們會(huì)全神貫注，而忘了計(jì)算機(jī)只能回答問(wèn)題，它并不能提出問(wèn)題……那些以數(shù)字為生的人可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，計(jì)算機(jī)完全取代了‘神諭’，在古代，

97、人們常常靠神諭為自己的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理和決策提供指導(dǎo)?！?lt;/p><p>　　瑞士國(guó)際管理發(fā)展學(xué)院（IMD）、《光環(huán)效應(yīng)以及騙過(guò)管理人員的其他八個(gè)商業(yè)幻覺(jué)》的作者費(fèi)爾·羅森茲維格對(duì)此表示贊同?！拔乙嬲]公司高管們，不要仰賴因其外表頗具迷惑性而極具吸引力的模型。它們會(huì)盅惑我們，讓我們自以為弄清了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的潛在因素所在，可實(shí)際上，我們根本沒(méi)有做過(guò)探究工作。這就是我稱之為‘規(guī)范化研究的幻覺(jué)’的現(xiàn)象——如果數(shù)據(jù)的數(shù)量給人以

98、深刻的印象，那么，我們就會(huì)忘記，它們的潛在質(zhì)量可能很糟糕?！?lt;/p><p>　　但從另一方面來(lái)說(shuō)，那些甚至能展望三年到五年以后狀況的設(shè)計(jì)精良的預(yù)測(cè)，其先見(jiàn)之明則令人震驚。不妨考慮一下《全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)報(bào)告》的情形，這是一份由世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇與花旗集團(tuán)、威達(dá)信集團(tuán)公司、瑞士再保險(xiǎn)公司、沃頓商學(xué)院風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理與決策過(guò)程研究中心和蘇黎世金融服務(wù)集團(tuán)聯(lián)合出版的報(bào)告，該報(bào)告基于對(duì)全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、研討會(huì)以及來(lái)自全球的企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和專家意見(jiàn)的定性評(píng)