外文翻譯--政府績效教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)

1、<p><b>　　中文4350字</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Government Performance: Lesson and Challenges</p><p>　

2、　This article concentrates on attempts by OECD countries to introduce performance-based or results-based budgeting and management. The need to enhance public sector performance has become more urgent as governments face

3、mounting demands on public expenditure, calls for higher quality services and, in some countries, a public increasingly unwilling to pay higher taxes. Performance budgeting and performance management seek to move the foc

4、us of budgeting, management and accountability away from inpu</p><p>　　A great deal of rhetoric has surrounded the introduction of performance management and budgeting. Supporters claim that it has the capac

5、ity to transform governments. However, it is important that this reform should not be seen as a panacea and that governments have realistic expectations about what it can achieve and the time needed to reach these object

6、ives.</p><p>　　Even countries that have been using this approach for over 15 years continue to struggle with issues of measurement; this is especially the case for outcomes. A key challenge for all countries

7、 is obtaining good quality information which is valid, reliable, and timely. Numerous challenges can be encountered including setting clear objectives, finding accurate measures of performance and having good systems of

8、data collection.</p><p>　　Setting objectives: For some agencies or programmes, even setting clear objectives can be a problem when there is no agreement on what the mission is, or there are diverse missions,

9、 overlapping and fragmented programmes, and stakeholders with different interests.</p><p>　　Finding accurate measures of performance: The design of measures is made difficult by finding measures for specific

10、 activities, and by relating what an agency or programme actually contributes towards achieving specific outcomes. Output and outcome measures each present a different set of challenges (OECD, 2002b). Outcomes are techni

11、cally more difficult to measure; they are complex and involve the interaction of many factors, planned and unplanned. Also, there are problems with time lag issues a</p><p>　　Establishing and maintaining sys

12、tems of data collection: To ensure quality there needs to be a process by which data collected are verified and validated. However, setting up and maintaining these systems can be both complex and costly. As discussed in

13、 Section 6, the auditing of performance information can help to improve standards and provide some legitimacy for the reported results. It is especially challenging to assure the quality of the data when agencies are dep

14、endent on third parties to p</p><p>　　Performance targets help to clarify performance expectations for an organisation for a given time period. Countries, however, continue to struggle with the issues of tar

15、get level and numbers. There are problems with setting targets too low and/or too high. Setting targets too low means that agencies are not challenged to improve performance. Setting them too high, while it can motivate

16、organisations, also creates unrealistic expectations and situations in which agencies will fail (Perrin, 2002).</p><p>　　Too many targets: There is also an issue about how many targets to have. Too many targ

17、ets create information overload and make it difficult to select priorities; too few targets create distortion effects. Again it takes time to get a realistic balance. Several countries have started out with a large numbe

18、r of targets and subsequently reduced them. For example, in the United Kingdom when performance agreements for departments were first introduced as part of the comprehensive spending review in 1</p><p>　　Avo

19、iding distorting behaviour: This is a challenge for all governments. Possible perverse effects include goal distortion – that is, organisations and managers focusing on a few specific indicators and targets, usually the

20、most achievable or “saleable”, at the expense of the overall objectives or programme. In extreme cases of goal distortion, agencies or staff, under pressure to meet targets, may deliberately present misleading informatio

21、n. </p><p>　　In many OECD countries, the objective of introducing performance into the budget process is to improve budgetary decision making and to act as an incentive for agencies to improve performance. M

22、ost countries, however, continue to struggle with this approach. As discussed above, one of the key issues is obtaining good quality and reliable performance data. Briefly, other challenges include establishing some link

23、 between financial information and performance information. This is particularly chall</p><p>　　Getting the right mix of incentives: This is particularly important when countries use performance information

24、in resource allocation. A fundamental question is whether financial rewards should be given for good performance and bad performance should be punished and, if so, how. Punishing failure by removing resources creates a c

25、lear signal to other agencies that performance is considered important. However, it does not help address the underlying causes of poor performance. Indeed in some cases</p><p>　　One of the most difficult ch

26、allenges is to create a results-based culture within organisations and throughout government. To achieve change in behaviour and culture across government requires a whole-of-government approach and the creation of the r

27、ight mix of incentives that takes account of how the actions of key actors influence each other. Most countries continue to struggle with achieving change in the behaviour of public servants and politicians; this is a lo

28、ng-term process.</p><p>　　Obtaining and maintaining the support of managers and employees within government organisations is crucial. This reform has the potential to improve the focus on organisational goal

29、s, to provide managers with better information for decision making on programmes, budgets and policies, and to improve internal reporting and controls. Gaining these benefits is challenging because it requires technical

30、as well as cultural change. In technical terms it can be difficult to measure what an agency does a</p><p>　　Within the context of a government-wide approach, if and how the performance information is used b

31、y politicians and the Ministry of Finance can create incentives which impact on how managers behave. If performance information is required but not used by leaders or managers in decision making, there is a danger of it

32、becoming a burden on organisations in terms of cost of information systems and staff time. The provision of this information, in addition to the requirements of the traditional contr</p><p>　　Obtaining and m

33、aintaining the support of politicians: As discussed in Section 7, this is a key challenge facing reformers. The support of politicians in the legislature and the executive helps to reinforce the need for change and to pu

34、sh reform, although it is particularly difficult to obtain the support of politicians in the legislature.</p><p>　　Issues of horizontal and vertical co-ordination: Many goals and outcomes cut across governme

35、nt organisations and involve the work of many agencies. While some OECD countries have established cross-governmental horizontal goals and targets, it is proving difficult to achieve co-ordination across departments and

36、to hold them accountable for results. At a vertical level there is an issue with different actors wanting the same information for diverse purposes; their informational needs are not the s</p><p>　　Managing

37、expectations: Realistic expectations are needed both about what can be achieved by this reform and how long it will take. A long-term approach and persistence are needed: it takes time to overcome the technical issues an

38、d to change the behaviour of public servants and politicians.</p><p>　　The performance of government can be improved through a focus on results in policy advice, central and departmental management processes

39、, and parliamentary and public accountability. It is important to first identify the relative priority of these areas in a particular country. What a government should do is different in each case.</p><p>　　

40、The majority of OECD countries are implementing performance management and performance budgeting, although the extent and the approaches vary widely across countries. The introduction of performance management and budget

41、ing appears to be an important and enduring innovation in public management. It is clearly a strong device for horizontal priority setting, policy alignment and cost analysis. These reforms have improved transparency thr

42、ough the provision of more information on government perform</p><p>　　Most countries continue to struggle with changing the behaviour of public servants and politicians. This is a long-term process. To achie

43、ve change in behaviour and culture across government requires a whole-of-government approach and the creation of the right mix of incentives and controls (formal and informal) and an understanding of the systems and how

44、the actions of key actors influence each other.</p><p>　　There is no clear pattern of input controls being lightened as performance indicators are strengthened. This raises issues about balancing accountabil

45、ity and flexibility. Whatever the accountability systems in place, they need to be balanced against the freedom required by managers to do their jobs. Critics of the traditional system of accountability argue that rules

46、had become ends in themselves, that accountability stressed compliance, and that hierarchical structures hindered efficiency and p</p><p>　　There are obvious dangers in relaxing input controls too soon after

47、 the introduction of output and outcome measures. However, there are also dangers in failing to relax these controls sufficiently, with the possible effect that output and outcome measures become an expensive paper exerc

48、ise, with little impact on managers’ ability to improve performance. If the system has too many restrictions and managers do not have enough freedom to improve performance, then failure to relax input controls can</p&

49、gt;<p>　　The common assumption that the performance information that is useful for the executive would also serve the legislature remains unproven. With a few exceptions, performance reporting has been neither wel

50、comed nor used by OECD member country legislatures in their oversight and decision making. Performance measures and targets are only one source of information about performance, and they are no substitute for the indepen

51、dent, in-depth qualitative examination of the impact of policies that evalua</p><p>　　The combined experiences of OECD countries highlight the importance of taking a long-term approach and having realistic e

52、xpectations about the capacity of performance management and budgeting to improve performance and accountability. A long-term approach and persistence are needed to achieve the necessary technical and behavioural changes

53、 that this lever requires.</p><p>　　Finally, from a wider perspective, the design of cross-government performance interventions needs careful analysis and consideration of options. Broadly, these interventio

54、ns are: leadership; strategic planning; performance management; the inclusion of targets and measures in the formal budgeting, management and oversight processes; and policy evaluation. Each has different strengths and l

55、imitations. There is a danger of governments becoming fixated on a particular formal solution to the problem </p><p>　　The performance orientation of public management is here to stay. It is essential for su

56、ccessful government. Societies are now too complex to be managed only by rules for input and process and a public-spirited culture. The performance movement has increased formalised planning, reporting and control across

57、 many governments. This has improved the information available to managers and policy makers. But experience shows that this can risk leading to a new form of bureaucratic sclerosis. More atte</p><p>　　Sourc

58、e：Teresa Curristine. Government Performance：Lessons and Challenges[J]. OECD Journal on budgeting，2005，5(1)：127-151.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)</p><p>　　本文將集

59、中介紹經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織國家引入的，以績效結(jié)果為基礎(chǔ)的預(yù)算編制和績效管理。在一些國家，公眾越來越不愿意支付更高的稅款，而各國政府的公共支出需求卻越來越大，因此面臨著很大的財務(wù)危機(jī)，且壓力巨大，因此需要在支出不增加的基礎(chǔ)上滿足公共服務(wù)需求是關(guān)鍵，政府績效是一種以尋求實現(xiàn)政府服務(wù)更高質(zhì)量的重要工具，可以舒緩財務(wù)危機(jī)的巨大壓力，因此必須加強公共部門的政府績效?？冃ьA(yù)算和績效管理使公眾忽略了對政府公共服務(wù)項目落成和項目開銷的關(guān)注，轉(zhuǎn)而重視預(yù)算編

60、制、管理和問責(zé)制，即追求更好的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。結(jié)合經(jīng)合組織、世界銀行的預(yù)算方式和程序數(shù)據(jù)庫編制的數(shù)據(jù)，文章探討了政府績效的發(fā)展趨勢和國家的行政手段（不同階段，不同的目標(biāo)），討論了對公眾的問責(zé)（包括審計的外在表現(xiàn)），并認(rèn)識到環(huán)境的重要性和總體的政府方針是改變關(guān)鍵行為者的行為和激勵政客利用特定的績效信息。文章也對績效預(yù)算和績效管理受到的限制和所處的緊張局勢，以及計量問題和績效信息的有效利用進(jìn)行了討論。</p><p>　　

61、績效管理和預(yù)算編制的引入已經(jīng)受到很多輿論的關(guān)注。支持者認(rèn)為政府進(jìn)行績效行為可以改變政府活動。然而，需要認(rèn)識到的是，績效行為不應(yīng)該被看作是靈丹妙藥。各國政府關(guān)于它能達(dá)到什么效果，以及達(dá)到績效目標(biāo)所需要的時間，都要切合實際，不能有過高的期望。</p><p>　　即使國家使用政府績效這種手段解決計量問題已經(jīng)持續(xù)超過了15年，但效果不彰。對于所有國家來說，關(guān)鍵的挑戰(zhàn)在于要取得良好的質(zhì)量信息（包括有效，可靠，及時）。在這

62、之中可能會遇到諸多挑戰(zhàn)：包括設(shè)定明確的目標(biāo)，尋找準(zhǔn)確的績效計量措施，并具有良好的數(shù)據(jù)收集系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　設(shè)定目標(biāo)：對于某些機(jī)構(gòu)或方案，即使是設(shè)定了明確的目標(biāo)，但當(dāng)人們沒有明確績效任務(wù)，或沒有達(dá)成一致的意見，或出現(xiàn)有不同的績效任務(wù)，或方案又有重疊或大相徑庭，或利益相關(guān)者有不同利益等許多情況下，設(shè)定目標(biāo)都無法完成。</p><p>　　尋求精確的績效措施：績效措施的設(shè)計工作難點在于

63、需要具體問題具體分析，針對不同的活動需求來設(shè)計不同的方案。比如，在實際工作中怎樣聯(lián)系相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)，具體的操作步驟該怎么做，使得最后可以得到高質(zhì)量的績效成果。這對要實現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)和成果的每項措施都提出了不同的挑戰(zhàn)（OECD，2002b）。結(jié)果在技術(shù)上是難以衡量的：它們非常復(fù)雜，涉及很多的因素，是計劃內(nèi)的、計劃外的相互作用形成的。另外，因為時間滯后的原因，以及在某些情況下績效結(jié)果是不受政府控制的。績效結(jié)果對于公眾和政界來說，會形成強烈的反響。多數(shù)國家

64、采取了生產(chǎn)和成果的相結(jié)合的方式以尋求精確的績效措施。</p><p>　　建立和維護(hù)數(shù)據(jù)收集系統(tǒng)：為了保證信息質(zhì)量，需要有一個對收集的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行驗證和確認(rèn)的過程。但是，建立和維護(hù)這些系統(tǒng)可能既昂貴又復(fù)雜。績效審計信息可以有助于提高績效標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并為立法機(jī)關(guān)提供報告結(jié)果。機(jī)構(gòu)依賴于第三方所提供的信息以保證數(shù)據(jù)的質(zhì)量，是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性的做法。尤其在聯(lián)邦制系統(tǒng)中，是一個關(guān)鍵問題(Curristine，2002)。</p

65、><p>　　績效目標(biāo)有助于證實組織在給定的時間內(nèi)的績效期望是否能夠完成。國家則繼續(xù)為目標(biāo)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)問題，比如水平和數(shù)字而尋求解決方案。對目標(biāo)的設(shè)定過高或過低都是問題。設(shè)定目標(biāo)太低意味著各機(jī)構(gòu)在提高績效時不會有挑戰(zhàn)。如果設(shè)定目標(biāo)太高，雖然可以激發(fā)組織的動力，但也會造成政府不切實際的期望，在某些情況下機(jī)構(gòu)會失敗(Perrin，2002)。因此需要花費時間去確認(rèn)績效水平，并獲得比較數(shù)據(jù)，以實現(xiàn)制定的目標(biāo)不會過高或過低。<

66、;/p><p>　　過多的目標(biāo)：目標(biāo)的多少也是一個問題。過多的目標(biāo)會造成信息過載，并難以選擇先后次序。過少的目標(biāo)會造成信息失真。同樣的，這也需要時間來平衡。有些國家一開始進(jìn)行績效時有大量的政府績效目標(biāo)，但隨后越來越少。例如，在英國，當(dāng)部門的績效協(xié)議第一次被作為1998年綜合開支審查的一部分介紹給公眾時，總共有超過600個政府績效目標(biāo)。到了2002年修訂的支出審查進(jìn)行時，這一數(shù)字已減少到130個(H.M. Treasu

67、ry，2004)。</p><p>　　避免扭曲行為：這對于所有政府來說都是挑戰(zhàn)。可能造成的負(fù)面影響包括目標(biāo)失真，即組織和管理人員要重點關(guān)注一些具體的指標(biāo)和目標(biāo)——通常是最可實現(xiàn)的或“實用”——在總體目標(biāo)或計劃上的開支。在目標(biāo)失真、機(jī)構(gòu)或工作人員、存在實現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的壓力，在極端的情況下實現(xiàn)目標(biāo)，可能會出現(xiàn)故意誤導(dǎo)的信息。</p><p>　　在許多經(jīng)合組織國家，引入績效目標(biāo)是進(jìn)入預(yù)算過程，提高

68、預(yù)算決策，作為提高績效的一種鼓勵機(jī)制。關(guān)鍵問題之一是取得有良好質(zhì)量和可靠的績效數(shù)據(jù)。而另外有的一些挑戰(zhàn)包括建立一些財政信息和績效信息之間的聯(lián)系。這是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性的成果措施。很多國家也有關(guān)于預(yù)算和會計結(jié)構(gòu)的問題。財政預(yù)算往往是按照體制和職能界限構(gòu)建的，而不是按結(jié)果類別。此外，如果沒有成本記錄系統(tǒng)，它是很難講清真正的成本與成果的。</p><p>　　獲得獎勵的正確組合：當(dāng)國家在資源配置中使用績效信息時，這是特別重

69、要的。一個根本的問題是，是否應(yīng)對好的績效給予經(jīng)濟(jì)回報，對壞的績效進(jìn)行處罰。如果真的這么做了，應(yīng)該怎么做？通過沒收資源來懲治失敗的績效，制造了一個明確的信號給其他機(jī)構(gòu)，讓它們認(rèn)識到績效的重要性。但是，它并不能幫助解決質(zhì)量較差的績效的根本原因。事實上，在某些情況下，未能達(dá)到目標(biāo)，可能是因為資金或其他資源的缺乏。同時，獎勵良好的績效是直觀的表現(xiàn)，但它沒有考慮到成本問題以及政府的優(yōu)先事項。在節(jié)約預(yù)算的大氣候下，有一個問題是：是否能提供額外資金給

70、進(jìn)行績效的機(jī)構(gòu)，尤其當(dāng)這不是一個政府的優(yōu)先事項的情況下。而在同個大氣候下，總有一種危險，就是讓財政資源與結(jié)果掛鉤，激勵措施可能會造成提供信息的歪曲和欺騙。</p><p>　　最困難的一個挑戰(zhàn)是通過政府和組織建立一個以績效結(jié)果為基礎(chǔ)的風(fēng)氣。為了達(dá)到行為和文化的改變，通過政府尋求政府整體方式，該獎勵的正確組合結(jié)果需要考慮關(guān)鍵人員會怎么行動來互相影響。大多數(shù)國家不斷的在解決這個對于達(dá)到公務(wù)員和政治家的行為的變化問題—

71、—這是一個長期的過程。</p><p>　　獲取和保持管理者和人員在政府內(nèi)部組織的支持是至關(guān)重要的。這項改革有可能提高對組織目標(biāo)的重視，向管理者做出方案，預(yù)算和政策，提供更好的決策信息，并改善內(nèi)部報告和內(nèi)部控制。但獲得這些好處是不容易的，因為它需要技術(shù)和文化的變革。在技術(shù)方面可能很難衡量一個機(jī)構(gòu)做什么，并銜接組織目標(biāo)到個人目標(biāo)。重要的是要取得一線人員的認(rèn)同，為此，可以通過正式和非正式的激勵和控制權(quán)的組合來實現(xiàn)。獲

72、取組織領(lǐng)導(dǎo)和管理人員的強力支持，可通過給他們提供必要的便利和靈活性來實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。如果沒有這種靈活性，管理人員將沒有意愿和責(zé)任實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，畢竟沒有人愿意被追究責(zé)任且受到他人的控制。</p><p>　　在一個政府性的行為范圍內(nèi)，如果績效信息被政治家和財政部的專家以任何方式利用，都可以建立激勵機(jī)制，影響管理人員的表現(xiàn)。如果績效信息是必需的，但不是由領(lǐng)導(dǎo)或管理人員在決策中使用，它將成為組織在信息系統(tǒng)和時間成本方面的

73、負(fù)擔(dān)，這樣非常危險?？冃畔⒌奶峁擞绊憘鹘y(tǒng)的控制機(jī)制要求之外，也可能會讓原本要做的工作受到干擾。如果發(fā)生了，績效管理和預(yù)算就會變成一個錯亂、扭曲或昂貴的紙上談兵，而不是改變機(jī)構(gòu)的一種手段，也無法成為一個良好管理的重要組成部分。</p><p>　　獲取和保持政治家的支持：這是一個面臨改革者的關(guān)鍵挑戰(zhàn)。在立法機(jī)關(guān)的政治家的支持和執(zhí)行，有助于加強變革的需要并且推動改革。即使要獲取在立法機(jī)關(guān)的政治家的支持是非常困

74、難的，也必須得到他們的支持。</p><p>　　問題的橫向和縱向的協(xié)調(diào)：許多目標(biāo)和成果貫穿于政府機(jī)構(gòu)，也涉及到很多其他機(jī)構(gòu)的工作。一些經(jīng)合組織國家設(shè)立了跨政府的橫向目標(biāo)和預(yù)算，但事實證明，很難實現(xiàn)跨部門協(xié)調(diào)。在一個垂直的水平上，問題就是不同的人員想要同樣的信息用于不同的設(shè)想；他們對信息的需要，其實是不一樣。</p><p>　　管理的期望：現(xiàn)實的期望是需要知道通過改革會達(dá)到什么目標(biāo)，要花

75、費多長的時間。這是一個需要長期堅持的方針：它需要時間來克服技術(shù)問題和改變公務(wù)員和政治家的行為。</p><p>　　政府績效的提高可以重點通過政策咨詢的結(jié)果，中央和部門的管理流程，議會和公眾的問責(zé)制來實現(xiàn)。重要的是首先要確定一個國家在這些領(lǐng)域相對優(yōu)先的特點是什么？什么才是在每個不同情況下政府應(yīng)該做的？</p><p>　　多數(shù)經(jīng)合組織國家正在實施績效管理和績效預(yù)算，即便各個國家的程度和方式

76、存在巨大差異。對于績效管理和績效預(yù)算的采用似乎是公共管理領(lǐng)域一個重要而持久的創(chuàng)新。這顯然是一個用于水平的優(yōu)先級設(shè)置，政策調(diào)整和成本分析強大的工具。這些改革通過向公眾提供更多的規(guī)定信息從而改善了政府績效的透明度。然而，一些初步的期望已經(jīng)顯得太過雄心勃勃了。</p><p>　　大多數(shù)的國家仍然繼續(xù)在改變公務(wù)員和政治家的行為上努力。這是一個漫長的過程。要達(dá)到跨政府的行為和文化上的改變，需要通過整體政府的形式，激勵和控

77、制權(quán)（正式和非正式的）結(jié)構(gòu)的創(chuàng)建，對一整個系統(tǒng)的理解，以及怎樣行動才能使關(guān)鍵行動者們相互影響。</p><p>　　沒有一個清楚的模式，可以像績效指標(biāo)一樣有力的減輕外來控制。這便有了如何去平衡問責(zé)性和靈活性的問題。無論問責(zé)制在哪里，他們需要權(quán)衡管理人員做好本職工作的自由要求。傳統(tǒng)問責(zé)制的批評者認(rèn)為那些問責(zé)制強調(diào)要遵守的，并且阻礙了效率的績效分層結(jié)構(gòu)規(guī)定，已在他們身上結(jié)束了。因此，批評者強調(diào)了放松外來控制的需求。&

78、lt;/p><p>　　在引入投入產(chǎn)出政策后，過快的放寬投入的控制明顯是很危險的。然而，不能充分放寬這些控制也是很危險的，結(jié)果可能是投入和產(chǎn)出措施成為一次昂貴的紙上談兵，這對管理者提高績效的要求不會產(chǎn)生多大的作用。如果該系統(tǒng)有太多的限制，導(dǎo)致管理者沒有足夠的資源提高績效，那么放寬投入控制的失敗會導(dǎo)致績效結(jié)果效率下降。</p><p>　　常見的假設(shè)是績效信息對行政機(jī)關(guān)有用又能服務(wù)于立法機(jī)關(guān)，但

79、這還未得到證實。除了少數(shù)例外，對于經(jīng)合組織成員國的立法機(jī)關(guān)在做監(jiān)督和決策時，績效報告是不受歡迎且沒有用的?？冃Т胧┖湍繕?biāo)只有一個有關(guān)績效的信息源，他們無法提供獨立的，對有價值的政治影響力進(jìn)行深入定性研究的替代品。</p><p>　　綜合經(jīng)合組織國家強調(diào)的必須采取長遠(yuǎn)辦法的重要性的經(jīng)驗，對于提高績效和問責(zé)制的績效管理和績效預(yù)算能力，我有了一些比較實際的想法。堅持一個長期的方針是達(dá)到必要的技術(shù)和行為的變化的杠桿需求

80、。</p><p>　　最后，從更廣泛的角度來看，跨政府績效干預(yù)設(shè)計需要仔細(xì)分析和考慮選項。從廣義上講，這些措施包括：領(lǐng)導(dǎo)；戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃；績效管理；將正式預(yù)算編制，管理和監(jiān)督程序列入目標(biāo)和措施；政策評估。每一項都有不同的優(yōu)點和局限性。各國政府過度沉迷于用一種特定的正式解決方法來解決提高績效的問題是危險的行為。</p><p>　　公共管理績效的方向停留在此。它對政府的成功至關(guān)重要?，F(xiàn)代社會通常

81、運用政策和規(guī)劃來進(jìn)行公共事業(yè)，比較復(fù)雜。績效運動增加了正式的規(guī)劃，報告和許多跨政府的控制。這提高了管理人員和政策制定者對信息的使用。但經(jīng)驗表明，這種風(fēng)險可能會呈現(xiàn)官僚僵化的新趨勢。需要對交易成本持續(xù)進(jìn)行績效檢查，并給予更多的關(guān)注，使績效預(yù)算和績效管理在社會的內(nèi)在的激勵和控制得到最佳的利用。</p><p>　　資料來源：特雷莎·克里斯汀. 政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)[J]. 經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織預(yù)算期刊，200