外文翻譯---高新科技領(lǐng)域和納米技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的競爭力

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Competitiveness in High-Tech Fields and Nanotechnology </p><p>　　出 處： 2003 NRI Papers </p><p>　　作

2、 者： Naoki IKEZAWA </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　Competitiveness in High-Tech Fields and Nanotechnology</p><p>　　Naoki IKEZAWA&

3、lt;/p><p>　　During the so-called “l(fā)ost decade” of the 1990s, Japan’s competitiveness sharply declined in such representative high-tech areas as semiconductors and liquid crystal applications, accelerating a hol

4、lowing-out of core technologies. Despite various measures taken in recent years to remedy this situation, there is still a long ways to go before we will see any fruitful results in terms of industrial competitiveness. A

5、ccordingly, the realization of a new paradigm towards the acquisition of competiti</p><p>　　1.Shift Towards the Basics Began in the 1980s</p><p>　　(1) Criticizing Japan’s alleged free ride in ba

6、sic research</p><p>　　Japan began to rapidly improve its technological competitiveness in the 1970s and started to pose a major threat to leading companies in the United States and Europe, which had long bee

7、n the targets of Japan’s efforts to catch up. Indeed, the exact situation that Japan is facing, i.e., declining competitiveness and the hollowing-out of domestic industries, was taking place in Europe and, particularly,

8、in the United States. </p><p>　　The domestic measures mounted in the United States to reverse these trends included a strengthening of research and development investment in such leading-edge fields as infor

9、mation and biotechnology, where the prospects for industrialization were unclear at the time. Such measures also included the vitalization of universities and the implementation of various steps to link the results of ac

10、ademic research to industry. </p><p>　　In terms of external measures, a survey organization known as the Japanese Technology Evaluation Center (JTEC) was established in 1983 and exclusively charged with moni

11、toring developments and analyzing the background of Japan’s efforts to improve its competitiveness. This represented the classic approach of "knowing one's enemy and learning what should be learned."</p&

12、gt;<p>　　At the same time, the developing trade friction between Japan and the United States over television sets and semiconductors led to an increase in criticism since the 1970s about what the United States saw

13、 as Japan's industrial development policies. In other words, the United States regarded Japan's policies as using the full efforts of the nation to support selected industries, or so-called "targeting polici

14、es," and increased its criticism by using the term "Japan Inc". </p><p>　　This criticism became especially acrimonious over the issue of basic research, with many Western observers claiming t

15、hat Japan was taking a "free ride in basic technology". As the results of basic research are seen as the public domain of the world at large, it is a widely accepted notion that every nation should make appropr

16、iate contributions to its formation. Accordingly, the crux of the argument was that Japan was enjoying industrial success by utilizing the results of basic research (acquire</p><p>　　(2) Shift towards basic

17、research by both the government and private sector companies</p><p>　　While some doubt still remains over the validity of such criticism, there was a shift by both the government and private sector companies

18、 in Japan towards carrying out more basic research. The government moves included the steps taken in 1981 to inaugurate the Technology Research and Development Program for Next-Generation Industrial Infrastructures to re

19、place the Development Program for Large-Scale Industrial Technology (known as the “l(fā)arge projects”), which had led to major successes in catchi</p><p>　　Another move taken in 1981 was the establishment of th

20、e Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) by the Science and Technology Agency. As evidenced by the fact that projects under this program took on the names of individual researchers, the emphasis has been pl

21、aced on the ideas of the inventors and researchers involved rather than their ultimate purposes and applications. This has served to strongly orient the program towards the basics.This national policy of focusing on basi

22、c rese</p><p>　　(3) Two problems in the shift towards basic research</p><p>　　From the viewpoint of industrial competitiveness, however, this shift towards basic research has raised two problems

23、. The first relates to what many see as an excessive emphasis on basic over applied research in many areas. This has led to a significant cutback in the number of large-scale research and development projects that entail

24、 shared final objectives (e.g., high-performance mainframe computers, large-capacity memory systems, and superhigh-density LSI applications).</p><p>　　Moreover, this trend of shifting towards the basics has

25、not been limited to government efforts only. Similarly, private sector companies have seemingly responded en masse to the nation's shift towards basic research—a phenomenon that is perhaps best symbolized by the numb

26、er of basic research laboratories established by major Japanese companies. Like the boom in setting up central laboratories that occurred in the high growth era of the 1960s, a similar rush to open laboratories devoted t

27、o basic </p><p>　　While one would assume that the relative importance of basic vs. applied research is not a matter to be determined by the proximity of commercially feasible applications, some companies wer

28、e so caught in this basic research boom that they tended to neglect research and development activities in fields that were only steps away from practical realization. As a result, efforts to strengthen competitiveness i

29、n typical high-tech products such as semiconductors, magnetic memories, optical communicati</p><p>　　The second problem in the shift towards the basics by the government and the private sector was the climat

30、e of pushing forward almost blindly without fully digesting the essence of basic research or adopting a methodology for its promotion. In short, a mindset began to take hold that saw the success of basic research as &quo

31、t;wholly dependent on the skills of those conducting such research". This scenario essentially discouraged any effort to evaluate the progress of research during the process itsel</p><p>　　For example,

32、the Technology Research and Development Program for Next-Generation Industrial Infrastructures adopted an implementation period of ten years for each theme. The program divided this period into two phases, with an evalua

33、tion at the end of the first phase to determine the appropriateness of continuing the research. As it turned out, however, this evaluation system had never worked effectively when it was first adopted.</p><p&g

34、t;　　Consequently, the situation became one in which there were many small, independent basic research themes, which offered creativity but had little objective review from the outside. As a result, the system led to the

35、establishment of a plethora of what were essentially isolated outposts spread across an extensive field of basic research. While some of them housed excellent researchers, predominance among the various independent entit

36、ies could only be maintained by competition. Yet a structure tha</p><p>　　As described above, these two problems created a tendency to avoid competition in the main high-tech arenas of industrial and corpora

37、te competitiveness. And because competitiveness is fostered through competition, Japan's competitiveness in various high-tech fields inevitably started declining after the 1980s as a result of these trends. </p>

38、;<p>　　(4) The matter of Japan’s hubris</p><p>　　In addition to the shift towards the basics, another factor that should be cited as part of the background to this declining competitiveness was the bl

39、atant hubris on the part of Japan. In essence, regardless of how fierce the criticism from overseas became, the pendulum would not have swung so far away from applied research and towards basic research if this sense of

40、arrogance had not been so pronounced. </p><p>　　Indicative of the self-congratulatory tenor of the times, many of those associated with the production lines turning out semiconductor LSI devices echoed a sha

41、red belief that the "research and development divisions were useless and not really necessary, as future developments in silicon LSI applications were secure as long as the manufacturing division keeps doing what it

42、 should do." There were actually some companies in which the business division handled all silicon-related matters including r</p><p>　　2.Changing Competitiveness in the High-Tech Field</p><p

43、>　　It is important to note that this declining competitiveness in the high-tech field involved not only a shrinking market share, but also the acceleration of a more ominous hollowing-out of Japan's technological

44、capabilities in these areas. Let us examine this in greater detail by looking first at the semiconductor field with respect to the decline in market share. By 1990, Japanese companies had essentially established a domina

45、nt position in the DRAM (dynamic random access memory) chips that make</p><p>　　Indeed, despite the fact that Japanese companies had long been warned of the need to shift from DRAM production, steps to reduc

46、e their reliance on DRAM technology made only very slow progress. While the reasons for these delays were multifold, one of the factors was a shortage of effective R&D and technological development that could support

47、 such a shift. And despite the fact that various national projects related to semiconductor technology were implemented even during the 1990s, it is obvious </p><p>　　Turning next to the accelerating hollowi

48、ng-out of Japan's technological capabilities, let's look at the situation with respect to active LCDs, which are most representative of display technology. As manufacturing output in the Asian region includes LCD

49、 production under capital alliances and technology transfers involving Japanese companies, it show that it cannot be directly linked to any conclusions concerning a decline of competitiveness among Japanese companies. Ho

50、wever, the continuing hollow</p><p>　　While the government provided effective support to the semiconductor field from the initial stages as discussed previously, work in the area of liquid crystal displays h

51、as not received any such government support—mainly because Japan’s technological standards were considered to be high enough at the advent of LCDs. This meant that a high market share (for example, 91% in 1994) was garne

52、red purely on the basis of the competitive strengths marshaled by the private sector. Unlike the case with semi</p><p>　　As a matter of fact, this difference essentially overviews the advantages and disadvan

53、tages of industrial support by the government. Yet the hollowing-out of Japan's technological base is steadily moving forward even in the liquid crystal displays, a field that has been developed under the initiatives

54、 taken by the private sector. </p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Competitiveness in High-Tech Fields and Nanotechnology </p><p>　　出 處： 2003 NRI Papers

55、 </p><p>　　作 者： Naoki IKEZAWA </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　高新科技領(lǐng)域和納米技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的競爭力</p><p>　　20世紀(jì)90年代以

56、來所謂的“失去的十年”期間，在以半導(dǎo)體和液晶應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域?yàn)榇淼母咝驴萍碱I(lǐng)域內(nèi)，日本的競爭力明顯大幅下降，加速了核心技術(shù)的空洞化。盡管日本近年已經(jīng)采取了很多補(bǔ)救措施來改善這一現(xiàn)象，但是為取得在工業(yè)競爭力方面的成就還有很長的一段距離。因此，需要企業(yè)與政府之間形成一種新模式來實(shí)現(xiàn)競爭力的提升。這意味著需要公司建立新的商業(yè)模式，政府則需要調(diào)節(jié)垂直型的行政結(jié)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　1、20世紀(jì)80年代基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的轉(zhuǎn)移&l

57、t;/p><p>　?。?）對(duì)日本基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施免費(fèi)使用批判的基礎(chǔ)研究</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)70年代，日本已經(jīng)開始改善和提高國家技術(shù)競爭力，以努力趕上美國、歐洲領(lǐng)先企業(yè)為目標(biāo)，也對(duì)這些企業(yè)造成了一定的威脅。事實(shí)上，日本國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)面臨的是競爭力的不斷下降以及空洞化，這也發(fā)生在歐洲尤其是美國。</p><p>　　在產(chǎn)業(yè)化前景還不是很清楚的情況下，美國為扭轉(zhuǎn)這些趨勢所采取

58、的國內(nèi)措施包括加強(qiáng)信息和生物技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的研究和開發(fā)投資。這些措施還包括大學(xué)的不斷擴(kuò)建和行業(yè)內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)研究成果、措施的落實(shí)。</p><p>　　在外部措施方面，一個(gè)成立于1983年的調(diào)查機(jī)構(gòu)——日本技術(shù)評(píng)價(jià)中心（JTEC），專門負(fù)責(zé)預(yù)測未來的發(fā)展以及分析日本提高其競爭力的背景。這就體現(xiàn)了一句古話“知己知彼”。</p><p>　　與此同時(shí)，20世紀(jì)70年代以來，美國認(rèn)為日本的工業(yè)發(fā)展政策使得兩國

59、在電視機(jī)和半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的發(fā)展上存在著貿(mào)易摩擦，導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生了不同的意見。換而言之，美國認(rèn)為日本用國家全部的力量來支持工業(yè)行業(yè)的這一政策或所謂的“靶向政策”，并通過使用“日本公司”一詞來增加對(duì)其的批判。</p><p>　　這種批判成為了一個(gè)激烈的基礎(chǔ)研究問題，許多西方學(xué)者批判日本采取的“基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施免費(fèi)使用”的政策?；A(chǔ)研究的結(jié)果被看作是整個(gè)世界的公共領(lǐng)域，它是一個(gè)被廣泛接受的概念，每個(gè)國家應(yīng)當(dāng)適當(dāng)?shù)淖龀鲐暙I(xiàn)。因此，爭論的

60、焦點(diǎn)是，日本正在充分借鑒從美國和歐洲的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，獲得了基礎(chǔ)研究的成功，但是從國際關(guān)系來進(jìn)行基礎(chǔ)研究的成果還比較少。</p><p>　?。?）政府和私營企業(yè)的基礎(chǔ)研究的轉(zhuǎn)變</p><p>　　雖然對(duì)這種批判的有效性還存在一些疑問，日本政府和私營企業(yè)在基礎(chǔ)研究方面做出了一定的轉(zhuǎn)變。政府措施包括在1981年采取的技術(shù)研究和發(fā)展計(jì)劃，只是為下一代工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施所提出的，從而來取代傳統(tǒng)的大型工業(yè)技術(shù)（

61、被稱為“大項(xiàng)目”的），這個(gè)措施取得了重大的成功，自1996年發(fā)展的計(jì)算機(jī)行業(yè)，日本已經(jīng)能在這方面追趕上西方一些領(lǐng)先的公司。這一新計(jì)劃成立，目的是進(jìn)一步改善技術(shù)方面的大型項(xiàng)目類別的不同想法和創(chuàng)造力。自此以后，國際貿(mào)易和工業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下項(xiàng)目的基礎(chǔ)研究程度在不斷增加。</p><p>　　1981年采取的另一舉措是由科學(xué)與技術(shù)部門建立對(duì)先進(jìn)技術(shù)的探索性研究（ERATO）。事實(shí)上，這個(gè)項(xiàng)目下的研究以個(gè)別研究人員的名字命名，重點(diǎn)

62、是在于參與者和研究者的想法，而不是其最終的目的和應(yīng)用程序。這有助于基本操作程序的研究。這項(xiàng)國家政策的重點(diǎn)在于基礎(chǔ)研究對(duì)提高基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施技術(shù)建設(shè)以及各個(gè)領(lǐng)域的基礎(chǔ)知識(shí)有重大的積極影響作用。</p><p>　?。?）在基礎(chǔ)研究轉(zhuǎn)變過程中的兩個(gè)問題</p><p>　　從產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭力的角度，基礎(chǔ)研究轉(zhuǎn)變過程中出現(xiàn)了兩個(gè)問題。第一個(gè)問題是許多人認(rèn)為作為基礎(chǔ)研究，過度的注重于很多領(lǐng)域的應(yīng)用研究。這已顯著

63、削減了涉及共同最終目標(biāo)的大規(guī)模的研究與發(fā)展項(xiàng)目的數(shù)量。例如，高性能大型計(jì)算機(jī)，大容量內(nèi)存系統(tǒng)，以及超高密度集成電路的應(yīng)用。</p><p>　　此外，這種對(duì)基礎(chǔ)研究的轉(zhuǎn)變不能僅僅只是限于只有政府的努力。同樣地，私營企業(yè)認(rèn)為國家對(duì)于基礎(chǔ)研究的這一現(xiàn)象也許是好的轉(zhuǎn)變，漸漸地日本公司建立的基礎(chǔ)研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室的數(shù)量在不斷增加。在20世紀(jì)60年代高增長時(shí)期，中央實(shí)驗(yàn)室的建立，類似于基礎(chǔ)研究的實(shí)驗(yàn)室在不斷出現(xiàn)。例如，日立公司在1

64、985年成立了基礎(chǔ)研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室。</p><p>　　雖然基礎(chǔ)與應(yīng)用研究對(duì)比的相對(duì)重要性是不能由商業(yè)上可行的應(yīng)用程序所確定的，一些公司因此陷入了這個(gè)基本研究的熱潮，他們往往忽視實(shí)際的領(lǐng)域研究和開發(fā)活動(dòng)。因此，典型高科技產(chǎn)品的競爭力不斷加強(qiáng)，而半導(dǎo)體，磁存儲(chǔ)器，光通信，液體液晶顯示器的競爭力被忽略了。</p><p>　　在轉(zhuǎn)變過程中的第二個(gè)問題是沒有完全理解基礎(chǔ)研究的本質(zhì)或采用的方式方法是盲

65、目的?？傊行У幕A(chǔ)研究完全依賴于能否進(jìn)行研究的能力。在研究的過程中，一旦研究人員已經(jīng)選定，并確定他們的研究工作以及研究進(jìn)展，那么就不再需要其他工作，一切應(yīng)該等到最后階段。</p><p>　　例如，為下一代工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施而提出的技術(shù)研究和發(fā)展計(jì)劃，每一項(xiàng)都要經(jīng)過十年的時(shí)間來執(zhí)行。這一個(gè)研究計(jì)劃被分為兩個(gè)階段，在第一階段結(jié)束后對(duì)研究進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)，確定繼續(xù)研究是否適當(dāng)。事實(shí)證明了，這種評(píng)價(jià)體系從來不會(huì)有效的一次通過。&

66、lt;/p><p>　　因此，這種研究就變成了一個(gè)有許多小的，獨(dú)立的基礎(chǔ)研究課題組成，它是創(chuàng)新的，但對(duì)于外部的客觀審查較少。最終，這個(gè)系統(tǒng)分離了在廣泛領(lǐng)域運(yùn)用的基礎(chǔ)研究。雖然這其中有些優(yōu)秀的研究人員，但僅僅只可以將自己的競爭優(yōu)勢體現(xiàn)在各個(gè)獨(dú)立實(shí)體之間。然而，一個(gè)完整的系統(tǒng)結(jié)構(gòu)，不是從工業(yè)化進(jìn)程和業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展來看，而是要結(jié)合研究人員和實(shí)體的綜合實(shí)力來決定研究的成敗。</p><p>　　綜上所述，這

67、兩個(gè)問題反映了一個(gè)趨勢，避免了主要高新科技產(chǎn)業(yè)與企業(yè)間的競爭。由于通過競爭來不斷增強(qiáng)競爭力，因此，20世紀(jì)80年代之后，日本高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)各個(gè)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的競爭力在不斷下降。</p><p>　?。?）日本面臨的另一問題——自恃驕傲</p><p>　　在基礎(chǔ)研究轉(zhuǎn)變的同時(shí)，日本競爭力下降的另一因素是部分產(chǎn)業(yè)的自恃驕傲。從本質(zhì)上講，不管國外研究者對(duì)基礎(chǔ)研究的批判如何激烈，但是如果這種自恃驕傲的態(tài)度不

68、改變，那么應(yīng)用研究就將遠(yuǎn)離基礎(chǔ)研究。</p><p>　　在具有指示性標(biāo)志的時(shí)代，半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域中大規(guī)模集成電路芯片的生產(chǎn)過程與許多其他部門生產(chǎn)過程類似，即“有時(shí)研究部門和開發(fā)部門是沒用的，也不是真的有必要的，而大規(guī)模集成電路芯片應(yīng)用的未來發(fā)展與安全生產(chǎn)部門一樣，應(yīng)該一直保持著?！笔聦?shí)上，許多公司業(yè)務(wù)部門在處理有關(guān)硅研究與開發(fā)的事宜時(shí)，建立實(shí)驗(yàn)室來開展有關(guān)半導(dǎo)體化合物的研究。在當(dāng)時(shí)，對(duì)于大規(guī)模集成電路芯片的生產(chǎn)在十年

69、內(nèi)將轉(zhuǎn)移到韓國，臺(tái)灣，甚至是中國這一想法是不可實(shí)現(xiàn)的。</p><p>　　2、高科技領(lǐng)域競爭力的轉(zhuǎn)變</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，高科技領(lǐng)域競爭力的下降不僅僅只是市場份額的減少，更是使得日本在這些領(lǐng)域的技術(shù)能力加速趨向于空洞化。關(guān)于半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域方面的市場份額的下降。到1990年，日本企業(yè)已經(jīng)確立了動(dòng)態(tài)隨機(jī)存取存儲(chǔ)器芯片（DRAM）在世界上的地位，彌補(bǔ)了半導(dǎo)體通用記憶體的主導(dǎo)地位。然而，近十

70、年間，三星等韓國企業(yè)開始進(jìn)入這一領(lǐng)域。即使是曾經(jīng)開發(fā)動(dòng)態(tài)隨機(jī)存取存儲(chǔ)器芯片的英特爾公司，也慢慢的被迫退出了這一領(lǐng)域，更何況是還處于初期階段的日本企業(yè)。撤出半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域之后，英特爾公司將其重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到了微處理器領(lǐng)域，并且正在不斷提升其在這一市場的巨大競爭力。</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，盡管日本企業(yè)長期以來一直想要從動(dòng)態(tài)隨機(jī)存取存儲(chǔ)器芯片上進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)變，減少對(duì)芯片技術(shù)的依賴，但是進(jìn)程非常緩慢。雖然有很多因素導(dǎo)致轉(zhuǎn)變進(jìn)程的延

71、誤，其中一個(gè)最主要的原因是缺乏有效的研發(fā)與開發(fā)技術(shù)來支持這種轉(zhuǎn)變。20世紀(jì)90年代期間，盡管各個(gè)國家有關(guān)半導(dǎo)體技術(shù)的項(xiàng)目得到實(shí)施，但是都由于缺乏先進(jìn)的水平而沒有得到有效的實(shí)施。</p><p>　　對(duì)于日本技術(shù)的加速空洞化現(xiàn)象，下面分析一下最有代表的技術(shù)——主動(dòng)液晶顯示器領(lǐng)域。由于日本企業(yè)制成品在亞洲地區(qū)的出口包括液晶產(chǎn)品的資本投入和技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移，分析結(jié)果顯示，日本企業(yè)的競爭力在不斷下降。然而，日本基礎(chǔ)技術(shù)的持續(xù)空洞

72、化沒有明確的表示出來。</p><p>　　在前面的論述中提到，政府從初級(jí)階段就有效的支持半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展，但在液晶顯示器領(lǐng)域的工作并沒有得到政府的任何支持，主要是因?yàn)橐壕э@示器的出現(xiàn)被認(rèn)為是技術(shù)化標(biāo)準(zhǔn)水平的最高點(diǎn)。這意味著私營公司有較高的市場占有率（例如1994年的91%）是由于存在競爭優(yōu)勢。此外，不同與半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域而言，區(qū)分液晶顯示器領(lǐng)域的特征之一是產(chǎn)品更新?lián)Q代速度較快。相反地，對(duì)于半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域中的動(dòng)態(tài)隨機(jī)存取存