中國(guó)上市公司管理者的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為外文翻譯

1、<p>　　Managers’ Bad Accounting Behaviors of Listed Companies in China</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Managers’ unintentional or intentional bad accounting behaviors will resu

2、lt in poor quality of accounting information of listed companies, making a great extent to interfere with investors, causing confusion in the capital market, is not conducive to reflect the performance management respons

3、ibility. Research on Managers bad accounting behaviors of listed companies is of great significance to improve management, optimize the allocation of social resources. This paper respectively discusses the m</p>&

4、lt;p>　　Key words: Bad accounting behaviors; Managers; Listed companies; the quality of accounting information</p><p>　　INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　Accounting behaviors refer to the course of conduc

5、t highly relevant to accounting information generation, processing and transmission. Accounting behaviors have a significant impact on budgeting, performance evaluation, cost control and decision-making (Hopwood, 1974).

6、From the micro view, accounting behaviors include accounting organization, business accounting, and internal accounting controls. In the accounting process, managers who master business decision-making power and control

7、are import</p><p>　　Managers are usually referred to the human capital owners who join in a business contracts with their management talent and really own the residual rights of control (XIE, 2005). Managers

8、 are responsible for determining organizational goals, formulate strategies</p><p>　　to achieve stated objectives, monitor and explain the external environmental condition, and make decisions on issues affec

9、ting the entire organization. General speaking, managers of Chinese listed companies cover president, vice president, department managers, chief financial officer, chief engineer and so on.</p><p>　　The resu

10、lt of accounting behaviors is to produce accounting information, thus accounting practices and accounting information has a direct causal relationship. Standard accounting practices provide true and full accounting infor

11、mation and meet various needs. Nonstandard accounting behaviors will produce false, incomplete accounting information, which ultimately disturbs or even misleads those in need of accounting information to use. Such irreg

12、ularities may be due to two aspects, one is deviatio</p><p>　　This paper discusses the specific manifestations of managers’ unintentional and intentional bad accounting behaviors respectively, analyzes their

13、 causes and proposes recommendations against these two types of managers’ bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China, which is to promote listed companies to improve management level and accounting information

14、 quality.</p><p>　　1. THE MANIFESTATION AND CAUSES OF MANAGERS’ UNINTENTIONAL BAD ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES</p><p>　　1.1 The Manifestation of Managers’ Unintentional Bad A

15、ccounting Behaviors</p><p>　　The performance of manager’ unintentional bad accounting can be divided into the following three aspects:</p><p>　　First, the accounting organization is less rigorou

16、s. Accounting organization is the basis of accounting. From the micro view, it mainly covers the development and implementation of enterprise accounting system, setting up accounting body, arrangement of accounting perso

17、nnel and selecting accounting methods, which is to ensure the rational and effective for accounting work.</p><p>　　But in fact some listed companies’ accounting basic work has weak links, the most prominent

18、are: the quality of some company’s accounting staff is not high, resulting in accounting arbitrary, unclear procedures, serious errors, accounting data missing; some company’s accounting staff is not equipped well, accou

19、nting methods are not suitable for the unit, making accounting disorder and inefficient.</p><p>　　Second, the accounting process is less standardized Mainly include: managers' unintentional choices of ac

20、counting policies are not applicable, resulting in accounting information has less relevant to information users need for economic decision-making; the content of cross-company accounts imputation, books set confusion, a

21、ccounting treatment was not standardized, leading to mismatch of financial reporting and financial activities, accounting information is not a true reflection of the company o</p><p>　　Third, the internal ac

22、counting control is a mere formality. The main internal accounting controls include internal accounting management system, accounting personnel, job responsibility system, the financial processing system, the internal co

23、ntainment system, audit system, quota management system, measurement inspection system, and property inventory system, the financial revenue and expenditure approval system, cost accounting system , financial analysis, r

24、isk early warning system. However, som</p><p>　　1.2 The Causes of Managers’ Unintentional Bad Accounting Behaviors</p><p>　　Person’s rational behavior is limited rational behavior but not fully

25、rational behavior (Simon, 1947). The root cause of unintentional bad accounting lies in managers’ limited rationality. On the one hand, various managers own different intelligence, ability, personality, temperament, atti

26、tudes, values, and different degree in understanding accounting theory and methods; on the other hand, it’s impossible for managers to fully master and comprehensively apply accounting knowledge, while accounti</p>

27、<p>　　In the organization of accounting work, many factors should be considered when managers design the accounting organization forms. They should appraise company size, business conditions, related accounting re

28、quirements, the number and the ability of accounting personnel; they strive to simplify accounting procedures, deliver accounting information timely and correctly, and save human and material resources while ensure the q

29、uality of accounting; they should make relevant departments cooperate to </p><p>　　As to accounting, appropriate accounting policies and reasonable recognition, measurement and reporting accounting elements

30、require that managers should be familiar with the current financial regulations and accounting standards, has a wealth of practical experience, a positive sense of innovation, keen vision and adequate professional abilit

31、y to judge. For the existence of bounded rationality which create limitations in managers’ knowledge, ability and experience, continuous development of acco</p><p>　　Speaking of internal accounting controls,

32、 managers do not pay attention to the internal accounting control system enables the production of accounting information process get out of control, ultimately affect the quality of accounting information. Since bounded

33、 rationality exists, there are omissions of the internal control system designed by managers, or corporate internal control system which is no longer meet the new environment has not been revised and improved in time, or

34、 the sound internal</p><p>　　2. THE MANIFESTATION AND CAUSES OF MANAGERS’ INTENTIONAL BAD ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES</p><p>　　2.1 The Manifestation of Managers’ Intentional

35、 Bad Accounting Behaviors</p><p>　　The feature of managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors is the managers’ bad intent or purpose. It includes accounting fraud and earnings management. Earnings managem

36、ent contains accounting policy choice, the way of it is to disclosure companies’ earnings for outsider, the final object of it is accounting data, its concrete operation is ultimately reflected in accounting fraud (LIU,

37、2009). Following studies take accounting fraud as a typical case of managers’ intentional bad accounting beh</p><p>　　According to China Securities Regulatory Commission penalty notice, there are 41 listed c

38、ompanies are punished for untrue disclosure, incomplete or late accounting information from January 2008 to January 2011. Table 1 shows specific tools and the frequency of accounting fraud.</p><p>　　Tracing

39、the reasons why these companies are punished, we can find various means and a huge amount are involved in managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors.</p><p>　　Firstly, various means are involved in manag

40、ers’ deliberately bad accounting behaviors. From Table 1 we can find, 41 listed companies reached 7 categories 127 kinds of fraud means as much, in average, every punished company adopts more than three kinds of accounti

41、ng fraud method. Table 1 also indicates that the most important category of accounting fraud is the seventh one (concealment, late or improper disclosure of material matters), up to 66 cases, accounting for 51.96% of the

42、 total samples.1</p><p>　　Secondly, a huge amount of money is involved in managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors of listed companies. For example: six companies cumulatively fabricate ￥2.23 billion o

43、perating revenue. Of which Jinli Technology has reported fictitious revenues for two times and has been punished twice by SEC. Specific circumstances is shown in Table 2. </p><p>　　The distorted accounting i

44、nformation generated by accounting fraud makes serious consequences: on one hand, it may result in financial virtual income, the excessive distribution of national income, inflation of consumption, distortion of economic

45、 facts, covering up some contradictions in the economy, and make the country’s macro-supervision and regulation lose foundation, leading to significant financial, economic decision-making mistakes; on the other hand, cre

46、ditors and investors may be led to</p><p>　　2.2 The Causes of Managers’ Intentional Bad Accounting Behaviors</p><p>　　Overall, as the agent of listed companies managers’ objective function is in

47、consistent with shareholders’ who is the principal, the relation between managers and stakeholders is also complex. Because managers get far more and earlier corporate information than other accounting information users,

48、 and the outsiders such as the shareholders, creditors weakly supervise the insiders -the managers which allows managers to actually control the enterprise, when conflict between various parts interests h</p><

49、p>　　3. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT MANAGERS’ BAD ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS I N CHINA’ S LISTED COMPANIES</p><p>　　Actually, it is not easy to distinguish unintentional managers’ bad accounting behaviors from in

50、tentional ones in practice. But managers can do this themselves. To awaken managers’ social awareness of consciously reducing bad accounting behaviors, suggestions followed are respectively proposed in terms of two types

51、 of managers’ bad accounting behaviors.</p><p>　　3.1 Suggestions on Keeping away from Managers’ Unintentional Bad Accounting Behaviors</p><p>　　3.1.2 Strengthen the Continuing Education on Manag

52、ement</p><p>　　Through a variety of job training, study tours outside the listed companies, further education and teaching-himself, we can expand the manager’s professional knowledge and skills, develop thei

53、r good habits of thinking and behavior, promote them to keep up with the developments of accounting theory, accounting standards and accounting laws and regulations, attach great importance to the construction of basic a

54、ccounting work, continuously improve the company’s rules and regulations, strengthen the</p><p>　　3.1.2 Perfect the System of Internal Accounting Controls and Strictly Implement it</p><p>　　The

55、priority to sound system of internal accounting controls and strict implementation of it is to make managers pay more attention to internal accounting controls, then consciously strengthen the internal audit system which

56、 includes these actions: setting up the internal audit institution led by the board of supervisors and audit the daily operations of accounting, guaranteeing a high degree of independence of supervisory staff; ensuring s

57、eparation of incompatible duties, such as: authorization</p><p>　　3.2 Precautionary Measures to Managers’ Intentional Bad Accounting Behaviors</p><p>　　3.2.1 Improve Corporate Governance</p&g

58、t;<p>　　The quality of accounting information relies on the corporate governance, it is the result of struggle among relative parties of corporate governance. Balancing the strength of variety parties can effectiv

59、ely prevent the managers’ bad accounting behaviors and truly improve the quality of accounting information (XU, 2011). Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic (2007) considered that more stringent corporate governance practices ca

60、n help investors overcome the weaknesses of the legal protection terms in E</p><p>　　First of all, the managerial ownership should be properly handled and appropriate management incentives should be establis

61、hed to avoid short-term behavior of managers. Secondly, the structure of the board members and the independence of the Board must be improved so as to effectively bind the managers’ financial reporting fraud. So, we shou

62、ld not only increase the proportion of independent directors in the Board and continue to improve the independent director system, but also prevent the chairm</p><p>　　As to “Dandong Chemical Fiber”, the pro

63、portion of independent directors was 33.33% from 2003 to 2005, it is 25% in 2006 and increased to 42.86% in 2007. According to China Securities Regulatory Commission administrative penalty notice, Dandong Chemical Fiber

64、were involved in violations of accounting information disclosure from 2003 to 2006 but were not in 2007, indicating a high proportion of independent directors of listed companies had some restraining effect on executives

65、 accounting fraud.</p><p>　　3.2.2 Strengthen the External Oversight</p><p>　　We should improve the social supervision system and steady the comprehensive and authoritative supervision of account

66、ing. First, inspect companies’ accounting practices relying on social forces as CPA and strengthen the supervision of certified public accountants as well as accounting firms, promoting them to increase ethical standards

67、 and professional quality. Clear the legal liability of CPA to review and verify accounting information, develop and strictly enforce specific penalties for irresp</p><p>　　Therefore, the internal audit depa

68、rtment, accounting firms, regulatory authorities and other relevant agencies can focus on items listed in Table 1 from corporate income statement, balance sheet and the notes as censoring and inspecting accounting inform

69、ation of list companies</p><p>　　3.2.3 Mature the Accounting Regulations System</p><p>　　On one hand, we should build a scientific, rigorous, coordinated and uniform system of accounting regulat

70、ions after overall planning the system and content of different accounting laws or rules, on the other hand, we should complement and revise the accounting standard in time to avoid leaving vacuum for the innovation busi

71、ness so that minimize the manipulation opportunity by accounting policy choice. At the same time, we need to improve the feedback process of accounting standards. For accounti</p><p>　　In particular, the vie

72、ws and suggestions fed back from accounting practitioners should be closely concerned, which enable accounting regulations to be timely revised and improved and accommodate themselves to developed economy.</p><

73、;p>　　3.2.4 Promote the Healthy Development of Financial Markets</p><p>　　As the advanced form of modern enterprises, listed companies are essentially different from private companies, which are closely re

74、lated with the financial markets, especially the stock markets. Financial markets are important channels for listed companies and investors and also the occasion of optimal allocation of resources in society as a whole.

75、Darrough and Stoughton (1990) analyzed incentives of voluntary disclosure and found that corporate disclosure of proprietary information would help f</p><p>　　CONCLUSION</p><p>　　This paper brea

76、ks the routine that managers’ bad accounting behaviors just means accounting fraud, divides managers’ bad accounting behaviors into intentional bad accounting behaviors and unintentional ones. Then, it discusses respecti

77、vely the manifestation and the causes of the both. It concludes that the managers’ unintentional bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China mainly reflect in less rigorous accounting basis, nonstandardized acc

78、ounting process, formalized internal accounti</p><p>　　Managers’ unintentional bad accounting behavior is an objective reality and can not be completely avoided, but it would be reduced through sound continu

79、ing education on managers and improvement of the company’s internal accounting system. As a typical of managers’ intentionally bad accounting behaviors, accounting fraud includes such seven categories as false revenue, f

80、alse investment income, inflated assets and concealment of important matters and so on. The causes of them contain defective cor</p><p>　　中國(guó)上市公司管理者的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為</p><p><b>　　摘 要</b></p&

81、gt;<p>　　管理者有意或無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為將導(dǎo)致上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量差，從而在很大程度上干擾投資者，造成資本市場(chǎng)混亂，不利于反映績(jī)效管理責(zé)任。研究中國(guó)上市公司管理者的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為具有重要意義，即改善管理，優(yōu)化社會(huì)資源的分配。本文分別討論了管理者無(wú)意和有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的表現(xiàn)形式和原因。它也提出了防止中國(guó)上市公司管理者的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的建議，通過(guò)提高工作效率和上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量，來(lái)維護(hù)利益相關(guān)者的利益，并為資本市場(chǎng)提供

82、良好的環(huán)。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：不良會(huì)計(jì)行為；管理者；上市公司；會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量</p><p><b>　　引 言</b></p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)行為是指提供高度相關(guān)的會(huì)計(jì)信息的行為，即會(huì)計(jì)信息的生成、處理和傳輸?shù)倪^(guò)程。會(huì)計(jì)行為會(huì)對(duì)預(yù)算，績(jī)效評(píng)估，成本控制和決策產(chǎn)生重大影響。從微觀角度看，會(huì)計(jì)行為包括會(huì)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)，會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)，內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制。

83、在核算過(guò)程中，掌握經(jīng)營(yíng)決策和控制權(quán)的管理者是選擇會(huì)計(jì)政策和重大會(huì)計(jì)問(wèn)題的決策的重要參與者。因此，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量在很大程度上取決于管理者的行為。我們把企業(yè)中，管理者參與會(huì)計(jì)的行動(dòng)和表現(xiàn)稱為管理者會(huì)計(jì)行為。</p><p>　　管理者通常被稱為與管理人才簽訂業(yè)務(wù)合同和真正擁有剩余控制權(quán)利的人力資本所有者。管理者負(fù)責(zé)確定組織的目標(biāo)，制訂策略，實(shí)現(xiàn)既定目標(biāo)，監(jiān)測(cè)和解釋外部環(huán)境條件，對(duì)影響整個(gè)組織的問(wèn)題做出決定。一般

84、來(lái)講，中國(guó)上市公司的管理人員包括總裁，副總裁，部門經(jīng)理，財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)，總工程師等。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)行為的結(jié)果是產(chǎn)生會(huì)計(jì)信息，會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)信息有直接的因果關(guān)系。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)提供真實(shí)和完整的會(huì)計(jì)信息，滿足各種需求。不規(guī)范的會(huì)計(jì)行為，會(huì)產(chǎn)生虛假和不完整的會(huì)計(jì)信息，最終擾亂甚至誤導(dǎo)那些會(huì)計(jì)信息的使用者。這些違規(guī)行為，可能是由于兩個(gè)方面的原因，一個(gè)是由于人的有限理性，造成會(huì)計(jì)目標(biāo)的偏差或目標(biāo)的丟失，稱為非主觀不良

85、會(huì)計(jì)行為。另一種是為了某些不良意圖或目的，對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息的生成和披露造成負(fù)面影響，因此可稱為有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為。因此，管理會(huì)計(jì)的做法也可以被分為兩類：一個(gè)是管理者非主觀的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為，在會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)踐過(guò)程中所涉及的管理者沒(méi)有任何不良意圖，但有限理性的約束，從而導(dǎo)致低質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)信息，它是沒(méi)有惡意的，因此可稱為管理者無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為，另一種是管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為，這意味著管理者的參與，只是為自己的利益或某些不良目的的會(huì)計(jì)行為。分析表明，管理者是

86、財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的最根本的主體，是財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的真正根源。</p><p>　　本文分別討論了管理者無(wú)意和有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的具體表現(xiàn)，分析其原因，并提出建議，提高上市公司管理水平和會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量。</p><p>　　第1章 中國(guó)上市公司管理者無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的表現(xiàn)形式及其原因</p><p>　　1.1 管理者無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的表現(xiàn)形式</p>&l

87、t;p>　　管理者無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為可分為以下三個(gè)方面：</p><p>　　首先，會(huì)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)是不那么嚴(yán)格的。會(huì)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)是會(huì)計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)。從微觀的角度分析，它的主要內(nèi)容包括企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)制度的制定和實(shí)施，設(shè)立會(huì)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)，安排會(huì)計(jì)人員和選擇會(huì)計(jì)方法，這是為了確保會(huì)計(jì)核算工作的合理和有效。但事實(shí)上，一些上市公司會(huì)計(jì)基礎(chǔ)工作仍有薄弱環(huán)節(jié)，最突出的是：一些公司的會(huì)計(jì)人員素質(zhì)不高，導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)任意，程序不清楚，錯(cuò)誤嚴(yán)重，會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)丟失；一

88、些公司的會(huì)計(jì)人員也沒(méi)有配備齊全，會(huì)計(jì)處理方法也不適合單位，造成會(huì)計(jì)的阻礙和低效。</p><p>　　然后，會(huì)計(jì)過(guò)程不規(guī)范，主要包括：管理者無(wú)意的選擇不適用的會(huì)計(jì)政策，造成賬目混亂，會(huì)計(jì)處理不規(guī)范，導(dǎo)致不匹配的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和財(cái)務(wù)活動(dòng)，因?yàn)橛嘘P(guān)信息使用者的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策需要會(huì)計(jì)信息是不是真實(shí)地反映了公司的運(yùn)作。中國(guó)證券報(bào)，審計(jì)署于2011年5月20日?qǐng)?bào)道說(shuō)，中國(guó)鋁業(yè)公司的賬目不規(guī)范，雖然它收購(gòu)各種企業(yè)，但是其一體化的情況仍是

89、不能令人滿意。</p><p>　　最后，內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制流于形式。主要的內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制包括內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)管理制度，會(huì)計(jì)人員崗位責(zé)任制，財(cái)務(wù)處理系統(tǒng)，內(nèi)部牽制制度，審計(jì)制度，配額管理制度，計(jì)量檢測(cè)體系，財(cái)產(chǎn)清查制度，財(cái)政收入和支出的審批系統(tǒng)，成本會(huì)計(jì)制度，財(cái)務(wù)分析，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)。然而，一些管理者的財(cái)政收入和支出的審批權(quán)限和審批程序的設(shè)計(jì)不合理，導(dǎo)致虛假會(huì)計(jì)信息；在一些企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)憑證的傳遞過(guò)程是不科學(xué)的，導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)效率低下。工作

90、中的一些公司的職責(zé)分離是不明確的，造成會(huì)計(jì)人員歪曲會(huì)計(jì)信息，一些公司的內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制制度是照搬別人的設(shè)計(jì)，并不適用于他們進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)和管理的特點(diǎn)和要求，一些企業(yè)對(duì)外商投資的可行性研究是不夠的，企業(yè)決策失誤，導(dǎo)致風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提高和金融形勢(shì)嚴(yán)峻。新世紀(jì)周刊報(bào)道，國(guó)家審計(jì)署于2010年8月審核后聲稱：中鋼集團(tuán)財(cái)務(wù)管理混亂和其他重大問(wèn)題，如高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資，巨額債務(wù)。因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)自身有著內(nèi)部控制缺陷，導(dǎo)致以上問(wèn)題，所以要加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制，內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制有著顯著地意義。

91、</p><p>　　1.2 管理者無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的原因</p><p>　　人的理性行為是有限理性的行為，即不完全理性的行為。無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的根本原因在于管理者的有限理性。一方面，各類管理人員擁有不同的智力、能力、性格、氣質(zhì)、態(tài)度、價(jià)值觀，以及對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)理論和方法的不同程度的了解；另一方面，它不可能為管理者充分掌握和綜合應(yīng)用會(huì)計(jì)知識(shí)，同時(shí)會(huì)計(jì)理論是一個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)的發(fā)展過(guò)程，各種會(huì)計(jì)守則的行

92、為和金融法規(guī)隨著社會(huì)的進(jìn)步不斷的在改變。通過(guò)上述3種表現(xiàn)形式，我們分析了管理者無(wú)意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的如下原因：</p><p>　　在會(huì)計(jì)核算工作的組織中，當(dāng)經(jīng)理設(shè)計(jì)會(huì)計(jì)組織形式，應(yīng)考慮諸多因素。他們應(yīng)該評(píng)價(jià)公司規(guī)模、經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況、有關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)制度規(guī)定的數(shù)量和會(huì)計(jì)人員的能力；他們努力簡(jiǎn)化會(huì)計(jì)程序，保證會(huì)計(jì)信息的及時(shí)，準(zhǔn)確，節(jié)省人力和物力資源，同時(shí)確保會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量；應(yīng)有關(guān)部門的合作，以提供一致的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)。目前還沒(méi)有固定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，以

93、評(píng)估這些因素，管理者的主觀判斷是必要的。但是管理者的意識(shí)和能力是有限的，不一定是科學(xué)合理的企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)組織設(shè)計(jì)。</p><p>　　至于會(huì)計(jì)，要選擇適當(dāng)?shù)臅?huì)計(jì)政策和合理的識(shí)別、計(jì)量和報(bào)告會(huì)計(jì)要素，就要求管理者應(yīng)該熟悉當(dāng)前的金融法規(guī)和會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則，具有豐富的實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)，積極創(chuàng)新意識(shí)，敏銳的眼光和足夠的專業(yè)能力判斷。因?yàn)橛邢蘩硇缘拇嬖?，在管理者的知識(shí)、能力和經(jīng)驗(yàn)存在局限性。隨著會(huì)計(jì)理論和有關(guān)法律法規(guī)的不斷發(fā)展，管理者不能完全

94、及時(shí)掌握會(huì)計(jì)知識(shí)及相關(guān)法律法規(guī)知識(shí)，也不可能為他們自己的知識(shí)付諸實(shí)踐。此外，由于有限的時(shí)間和精力，重新學(xué)習(xí)會(huì)計(jì)知識(shí)是很難的。</p><p>　　說(shuō)到內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制，管理者不重視內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制制度，使會(huì)計(jì)信息的生產(chǎn)過(guò)程失控，最終影響了會(huì)計(jì)信息的質(zhì)量。由于有限理性的存在，管理者設(shè)計(jì)的企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制制度不再符合新的環(huán)境并且沒(méi)有被及時(shí)修改和改進(jìn)，或是內(nèi)部控制制度不落實(shí)，以及內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)設(shè)計(jì)的疏漏。所有這些都直接影響到對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信

95、息質(zhì)量。</p><p>　　第2章 中國(guó)上市公司管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的表現(xiàn)形式及其成因</p><p>　　2.1 管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的表現(xiàn)形式</p><p>　　管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的特征是管理者的不良意圖或目的。它包括會(huì)計(jì)欺詐和盈余管理。盈余管理包含會(huì)計(jì)政策的選擇，它的方式是向外界披露公司的盈利，它的最終目標(biāo)是會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，其具體操作的最終反映是會(huì)

96、計(jì)欺詐（劉，2009）。以下采取會(huì)計(jì)欺詐作為研究一個(gè)管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為的典型案例。</p><p>　　首先，管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為涉及各種手段。從表1我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，41家上市公司達(dá)到了7大類127種欺詐手段之多，平均每處罰的公司采用3種以上會(huì)計(jì)造假方法。表1還表明，會(huì)計(jì)欺詐的最重要的一類是隱瞞，不及時(shí)或披露的重大事項(xiàng)不當(dāng)，有66例，占51.96％，其中有低估負(fù)債的，占52.63％。有16例虛增資產(chǎn)的，第

97、三類和第四類（虛假收入）13例，分別占樣本總數(shù)的12.60％和10.24％。這些會(huì)計(jì)造假方法嚴(yán)重歪曲公司的資產(chǎn)，負(fù)債和利潤(rùn)。</p><p>　　其次，上市公司管理者有意的不良會(huì)計(jì)行為涉及金額巨大。例如：六公司累計(jì)制造營(yíng)業(yè)收入為22.3億日元。其中金利科技報(bào)道兩次虛構(gòu)收入，并已通過(guò)SEC處罰兩次。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)欺詐產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重后果，及會(huì)計(jì)信息失真：一方面，它可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致虛擬的財(cái)政收入