2011年外文翻譯--理解中國銀行業(yè)的高盈利能力（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　2800英文單詞，15500英文字符，4500漢字</p><p>　　文獻出處：Löchel H, Li H X. Understanding the high profitability of Chinese banks[J]. Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, 2011.</p><p>　　Unders

2、tanding the high profitability of Chinese banks</p><p>　　Löchel, Horst; Li, Helena Xiang</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　The big Chinese state-owned banks came as

3、 winners out of the global financial crisis. According to the Banker ranking, Chinese banks led the global banking profitability ranking through the years from 2008 to 2010 and contributed one fifth of global banking pro

4、fits in 2010. The Chinese banking sector, which was deemed as wholly insolvent ten years ago, was reborn like a phoenix from the fire of the Asian financial crisis and the current financial crisis. The banking reform in

5、the last decade wit</p><p>　　However, the low efficiency in Chinese banks is still persistent, as evident in many empirical studies (e.g. Feyzio?lu, (2009)). The contradiction of high profitability and low e

6、fficiency causes great confusion in understanding banking in China. Our paper aims to reveal the real sources of the high profitability of the big Chinese banks. We compare their profitability pattern with peer banks fro

7、m Asia, Europe and North America.</p><p>　　We first test the hypothesis that the average asset return of the “big five” Chinese banks will fall below the international comparative level if the current high n

8、et interest margin given by the managed interest system in China falls to the international peer average level. Surprisingly, the hypothesis has to be rejected. Instead, our results show that the profitability of Chinese

9、 banks stays at international comparative level, despite the high inefficiency in Chinese banks.</p><p>　　We therefore test a second hypothesis stating that the profitability of Chinese banks will fall- belo

10、w their international peers if staff costs increase by 30 percent in average to reach the international level, with the joint condition of margin decrease. This hypothesis can be proved, which means that the “big five” C

11、hinese banks compensate its inefficiency by a combination of a non-competitive high interest margin and unsustainable lower labor cost.</p><p>　　The above results of course raise the question how the big Chi

12、nese banks can stay competitive if China continues to liberalize its interest rate system and labor cost increases. In our concluding remarks, we discuss the possibility that Chinese banks change their business model tow

13、ards universal banking with additional non-interest income to compensate the drop in interest margin.</p><p>　　Key words: China; Banks; Finance; Banking business model; Universal banking</p><p>

14、　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　In sharp contrast to the large-scale government bail-outs in Western banking world, Chinese banks withstood the crisis without noteworthy write-offs and have even occupied the lead

15、 position of the global banking profitability ranking through the crisis years. According to The Banker, 101 Chinese banks are included in the Top 1000 World Banks ranking for 2010 and Chinese banks contribute to 21% of

16、the global banking profits1. Fully confident with the good performance in equity strength, asset qua</p><p>　　The great success of China’s banking reform surprised many with the fear of a crisis resulting fr

17、om the heavy bad loan burden of projected 35% only ten years ago4. The fact is that the whole banking sector withstood well the thunderstorms of both the Asian financial crisis in the late 90s and the current global fina

18、ncial crisis, thanks to gradual but consistent reform steps especially in the last decade, with capital injections and asset carve-outs totally costing an estimated over 20% of 2004’s</p><p>　　Despite the gr

19、eat reform success in the last thirty years, the banking sector still struggles with many problems unsolved: the dominance of state-ownership and the related inefficiency, policy intervention in lending, limited access o

20、f private firms for bank financing, financial repression and foreign currency and interest rate controls12. What confuses many outsider observers of the Chinese banking sector is the coexistence of high profitability and

21、 persistent low efficiency evident in many emp</p><p>　　In our study, we try to find explanation for this contradiction by investigating the profitability patter of Chinese banks compared with international

22、peers. Using financial data of 1,000 banks from ASEAN, China, EU 15 countries and North America, we examine which factors are decisive in leading to the high asset return in Chinese banks compared to peer banks. To our b

23、est knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically engage with the profitability model of Chinese banks in an international co</p><p>　　We notice further that the personnel expenses in Chinese banks are 3

24、0% less than the international average. We combine the lowering of the lending margin to the international peer level with a simultaneous increase of personnel expenses ratio by 30% in the stressed scenario to test the a

25、sset return resilience. Under this scenario, the asset return of Chinese banks drops sharply from the current 0.81% to a mere 0.34%, compared to the international average of 0.41%. The outperformance in profitabi</p&g

26、t;<p>　　Thus, the current outperformance of Chinese banks is rooted on the one hand in the higher margin given by the managed interest rate system, and on the other hand in the low labor costs.</p><p>

27、;　　To catch up the international profitability level in a more liberalized operating enviroment, Chinese banks should close the gap in business diversification, besides increase operational efficiency continuously. Our s

28、imulation shows that the doubling of non-interest income ratio can fully compensate the profitability drop in the stressed scenario.</p><p>　　Our findings are of special relevance in the light of the challen

29、ges from the dynamic changes in the operating environment for Chinese banks in the next years. In addition to the fulfillment of new regulatory rules introduced by Basel III, the interest rate and foreign currency libera

30、lization will put pressure on margin and the development of the corporate bond market will challenge bank’s dominant role in corporate financing and accelerate the disintermediation in China. The change from the exp</

31、p><p>　　This paper is structured in the following way: Part II provides the background of the current emerging operating environment of Chinese banks. Part III compares the key financials of Chinese banks espec

32、ially the largest “big five” banks with international peer banks for hypothesis building. Part IV examines the profitability determinants of Chinese banks in comparison to international peers and simulates the impact of

33、possible changes in those determinates in the next years. Part V summarizes th</p><p>　　Current emerging operating environment for Chinese banks</p><p>　　Quite in contrast to the “big bang” fina

34、ncial sector reform in other transition countries, China fellows the gradual way of reform in its transformation from the centrally planned to market- based economy. Till today, the deposit and lending rates still lie u

35、nder the partial control of the central bank: the People’s Bank of China (PBC) sets a mandatory depositing rate cap of currently 3.50% and a lending rate floor of 6.56%, thus guarantees a net interest margin of 3.06% for

36、 one-year maturity, </p><p>　　The guaranteed high margin and the lasting credit boom in course of the rapid economic development provide banks “windfall” profits and little incentive for operational efficien

37、cy improvement and business innovation. It is especially problematic with the persistent negative real interest rate over years, which leads to overinvestment and helps in constructing the current investment- and export-

38、lead instead of consumption-lead growth model in China.</p><p>　　However, the interest rate regime is written in the reform agenda. The gradual interest rate liberalization starting in 1996 follows the princ

39、iple: “foreign currency rates first, followed by local currency rates; lending rates first, followed by deposit rates; and large amount and long-term deposit rates first, followed by small amount and short-term deposit r

40、ates”. In 1996 and in 1997, the interbank lending rates and the interbank repo rates were liberalized respectively. In 1998, the interest </p><p>　　The interest rate reform is closely related with the loosen

41、ing of foreign capital control in China. In contrast to the rapid capital account liberalization in other countries, the flows of foreign currencies in the capital account are nowadays still controlled by the State Admin

42、istration of Foreign Exchanges (SAFE) in China, although the current account was liberalized in 1996. The control of capital accounts avoids the foreign capital flows into China and the alignment of interest rates level

43、t</p><p>　　Besides the interest rate and foreign currency control, the banking market is characterized with an oligopolistic market structure. Due to historical path of the big four SOCBs and their dominant

44、 role in financing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the current banking market land- scape is dominated by the “big five” banks with a market share measured by total assets of about 50%, whereas the majority of banks – 2,

45、646 rural credit cooperatives – share together only 6.7% of the total banking assets</p><p>　　Summarizing the above description, Chinese banks still operate in the protective environment with margin guarante

46、e and isolation from the competition in international financial markets due to foreign currency control. The margin protection aims above all to maintain the system stability in course of the transition and reform. As th

47、e operation of the largest listed Chinese banks has been gradually upgraded to international level, the “windfall” profits is expected to be gradually diminished in co</p><p>　　Conclusion and Outlook</p&g

48、t;<p>　　Summarizing our findings, we document the great reform success of the last decade in China’s banking sector in improved capital level and loan quality up to internationally comparative level. The high prof

49、itability of Chinese banks is however rooted in large extent in the guaranteed high net interest margin and lower personnel costs advantage. In the current emerging operating environment of margin guarantee, capital flow

50、 control and restrictive market competition through entry barrier and busin</p><p>　　The gradual interest rate liberalization and the subsequent decrease in margin as well as the projected salary increase in

51、 the next years would diminish the current outperformance in profitability of the “big five” Chinese banks. Business diversification to increase non-interest income revenues by increasing product variety and promoting in

52、novation and expansion in high value-added wealth management, advisory and insurance services can leverage the current customer base and explore the cross-sel</p><p>　　Currently, business diversification is

53、indeed put with high priority as the next cornerstone of banking reform in China. As recognized by a Chinese financial expert, business diversification is deemed to be the next big reform wave after the first wave of ban

54、king reform, restructuring and IPO. The regulatory reform to loosen banking business scope restriction is already under way. Since 2005, selected banks are allowed on the pilot trial basis to set up fund management subsi

55、diaries. Since 2009, </p><p>　　理解中國銀行業(yè)的高盈利能力</p><p>　　Löchel, Horst; Li, Helena Xiang</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　中國大型國有銀行是全球金融危機的贏家。依據(jù)在2008年到2010年間銀行家

56、的排名，中國銀行業(yè)在全球銀行業(yè)盈利能力排行中名列前茅，并且在2010年的 時候貢獻了全球銀行業(yè)利潤的五分之一。中國的銀行業(yè)，曾在十年前被視為已經(jīng) 處于完全破產(chǎn)的狀態(tài)，在經(jīng)歷了亞洲金融危機和現(xiàn)在全球性的金融危機之后，卻像個鳳凰涅槃似的重生了。在過去十年間中國銀行業(yè)進行了大規(guī)模的資金注入、 資產(chǎn)分拆、重組以及上市取得了極大成功。</p><p>　　然而,中國銀行業(yè)的低效率仍然一直存在，在許多實證研究中我們都可以找到

57、相 關(guān)的數(shù)據(jù)（e.g. Feyzioglu, (2009))。中國銀行業(yè)的高盈利能力和低效之間的矛盾導(dǎo)致了認(rèn)識中國的銀行方面很大的混亂。我們的論文主要目的是揭示中國銀行業(yè)的 高盈利能力的真正來源。在本文中我們將比較中國銀行業(yè)和來自亞洲、歐洲以及 北美的銀行同業(yè)的盈利能力樣式。</p><p>　　我們首先測試了假設(shè)如果目前的中國管制的利率制度導(dǎo)致的高凈利率低于國際 同行的平均水平的話，中國銀行業(yè)“五大行”平均資產(chǎn)

58、收益率將會低于國際同行水平。令人驚訝的是,假設(shè)并不成立。相反的，我們的測試結(jié)果顯示盡管中國銀行 業(yè)的工作效率低下，但是中國銀行業(yè)的盈利能力與國外同行的水平相當(dāng)。</p><p>　　因此我們測試了第二種假設(shè)，指出如果員工支出費用增加了 30%到國家平均水平 的話，隨著利率降低，中國銀行業(yè)的盈利能力將會低于國際同行水平。這種假 設(shè)被證明是正確的，這意味著中國銀行業(yè)的“五大行”通過非競爭性的高利率和 不可持續(xù)的低勞動

59、力成本來彌補其不足。</p><p>　　上述結(jié)果，引發(fā)了人們的疑問：如果繼續(xù)放開其利率體系以及勞動力成本不斷上 升的話，中國銀行業(yè)將如何盈利？在我們的結(jié)論中，我們討論了中國銀行業(yè)改變 其業(yè)務(wù)模式的可能性。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：中國；銀行；融資；銀行的業(yè)務(wù)模式；全能型銀行</p><p><b>　　1.簡介</b></p>

60、<p>　　與西方銀行業(yè)的大規(guī)模的政府救助計劃中形成了鮮明的對比，中國銀行業(yè)經(jīng)受了危機，也沒有形成大量的呆賬，并且甚至在國際金融危機期間占據(jù)全球銀行盈利能力居領(lǐng)先地位。按照銀行家提供的數(shù)據(jù)，2010年全球前1000名 銀行排名中有101家中國銀行上榜。中國銀行業(yè)貢獻了全球21%的利潤。由于中國銀行業(yè)對自身股本實力、資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量、流動性和盈利能力良好表現(xiàn)充滿信心，中國銀行業(yè)視此次危機為海外擴張的黃金機遇。</p>

61、<p>　　按照稅前利潤排名的2007-2010年間全球十大銀行 中國銀行業(yè)改革所取得的極大成功震驚了那些十年前擔(dān)心中國銀行預(yù)計35%的 沉重的不良貸款負(fù)擔(dān)的人。事實上，整個銀行業(yè)也都經(jīng)受住了上世紀(jì)90年代末 期的亞洲金融危機的風(fēng)暴以及當(dāng)前的全球金融危機，感謝過去十年間的漸進改革, 中國銀行業(yè)的資本注入和資產(chǎn)分拆達(dá)到了 20%的2004年的GDP，通過引入國外 少數(shù)股東成為董事會成員、采用國際風(fēng)險管理、公司治理與上市的最佳實踐

62、，這 次改革使得國有股權(quán)銀行改革成了股權(quán)銀行。</p><p>　　除了在過去三十年間中國取得的巨大改革成效，中國的銀行業(yè)還存在著大量未解決的問題：公有制仍然占主導(dǎo)地位 并且效率低下、貸款政策方面的干預(yù)、民營企業(yè)只能獲得有限的銀行融資、金融 抑制與外匯利率管制。在許多實證研究中的中國銀行業(yè)的高盈利能力和持續(xù)效率低下共存的現(xiàn)象使得很多的外部觀察者感到困惑。Feyzioglii (2009)和 Garcfa-Herr

63、ero，GaviM和Santabdibara (2009)就在他們的研究中爭辯說中國銀行 業(yè)的高盈利是與效率能力突出表現(xiàn)完全不相關(guān)的。相反，F(xiàn)eyzbglu (2009)則在研究中提出高利率與市場集中度高才是上述矛盾的可能解釋。</p><p>　　在我們的研究中,我們試圖通過調(diào)查與國際同行相比的中國銀行業(yè)的盈利能力樣式，來解釋上述矛盾。通過使用ASEAN中有關(guān)來自中國、歐盟15國以及北美的1000家銀行的金融數(shù)

64、據(jù)，我們檢查了與銀行同業(yè)相比，哪些因素在中國銀 行業(yè)高資產(chǎn)回報方面起著決定性的作用。據(jù)我們所知，我們的論文是首次在國際 背景上對中國銀行業(yè)的盈利能力模型進行實證分析。我們的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)中國銀行業(yè) 在盈利能力的突出表現(xiàn)確實依賴于高利潤-幾乎是國際同行的雙倍-大多數(shù)是得益于當(dāng)前的保證保證金制度。然而，我們進行的模擬還顯示當(dāng)資產(chǎn)的利潤率削減 到目前水平的一半的時候，中國銀行業(yè)仍然處于國際同行的平均水平。效率低下并沒有導(dǎo)致中國銀行業(yè)的資產(chǎn)回報低于國

65、際平均水平。</p><p>　　此外，我們還注意到中國銀行業(yè)的人事費用要比國際平均水平低30%。我們在壓力測試場景中將中國銀行的貸款利率降低到國際同行水平并將人事費用增加 30%來測試資產(chǎn)收益能力。在此場景下，中國銀行業(yè)的資產(chǎn)回報率從當(dāng)前的 0.81%下降到約0.34%，而國際同行的資產(chǎn)回報率為0.41%。中國銀行業(yè)“五大行”的盈利能力突出表現(xiàn)完全消失了。</p><p>　　因此，中國

66、銀行業(yè)當(dāng)前的突出表現(xiàn)是由受管制的利率體系以及低人工成本造成的。</p><p>　　為了在一個更加開放的操作環(huán)境趕上國際盈利能力水平，中國銀行業(yè)應(yīng)該彌補業(yè)務(wù)多元化上面的差距，除此之外還需不斷提高運營效率。我們的模擬結(jié)果還顯示出雙倍非利息收入率能完全補償壓力測試場景中的盈利能力下降。</p><p>　　我們的研究對于中國銀行業(yè)面對將來的挑戰(zhàn)時具有特殊的意義。除了滿足Basel III引入的

67、新規(guī)范，利率和外匯市場化將會給中國銀行業(yè)帶來盈利方面的壓力，并且企業(yè)債券市場的發(fā)展將會挑戰(zhàn)銀行在公司融資方面的主要作用以及加速中 國的非居間化。出口導(dǎo)向到消費導(dǎo)向的經(jīng)濟模型變化將會消除銀行公司借貸方面 的增長以及盈利能力。銀行業(yè)務(wù)范圍的限制放開將會給中國銀行業(yè)提供從商品貸 款價值鏈向高附加值的咨詢和資本市場的金融服務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移的寶貴機會。處于當(dāng)前“盈利能力陷阱”以及不愿進行商業(yè)模式轉(zhuǎn)型的中國銀行業(yè)在一個更加開放的操作環(huán)境中，將會失去他們的競爭

68、優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　本文的組織結(jié)構(gòu)如下：部分會提供當(dāng)前出現(xiàn)的中國銀行業(yè)操作環(huán)境的背景描述。部分則會比較中國銀行業(yè)的關(guān)鍵金融指標(biāo)，尤其是最大的“五大行”和國際銀行同業(yè)在場景建設(shè)方面的比較。部分IV則會檢查與國際同行相比，中國銀行業(yè)盈利能力的決定因素，并模擬接下來幾年中這些決定因素變化所造成的影響。部分V則會總結(jié)結(jié)論并提供相關(guān)研究展望。</p><p>　　2.目前出現(xiàn)的中國銀行業(yè)操作

69、環(huán)境</p><p>　　與其他轉(zhuǎn)型國家“大爆炸”似的金融部門改革恰恰相反，中國采用了漸進式的改革方法。直到今天，存貸款利率仍然是央行控制下的部分:中國人民銀行（PBC) 設(shè)定一個強制性的最高存款利率（當(dāng)前3.50%)以及最高貸款利率（6.56%)，從而保證了一年期的凈息3.06%，貸款方面國際利率比較高。</p><p>　　受到保證的高利潤率以及快速經(jīng)濟發(fā)展導(dǎo)致的持續(xù)的信貸繁榮都給銀行

70、帶來了 暴利以及導(dǎo)致了銀行在提高工作效率和業(yè)務(wù)創(chuàng)新方面缺乏激勵。持續(xù)存在的負(fù)利 率是特別有問題的，這導(dǎo)致了過度投資以及幫助構(gòu)建了當(dāng)前的投資和出口導(dǎo)向的 增長模式（而不是消費導(dǎo)向的增長模式）。</p><p>　　然而，利率制度是寫在政府的改革議程上的。始于1996年的漸進式的利率市場化遵循了下述原則：“外幣利率是第一位的，其次是當(dāng)?shù)刎泿艆R率；貸款利率是第一位的，其次是存款利率；大量和長期存款利率是第一位的，其次是

71、小額、短期存款利率”。在1996和1997年里，同業(yè)拆借利率和銀行間回購利率分別放開。在1998年的時候，放開了金融債券的銀行同業(yè)拆借市場，并在1999年的時候開放了政府債券。對于外國貨幣而言，在2000年的時候貸款利率已經(jīng)放開。大量的人民幣存款以及國外貨幣的利率部分自由化則分別是在1999年和2000實現(xiàn)。商業(yè)銀行針對PBC規(guī)定利率的貸款利率浮動范圍則在0.9到1.7之間浮動，到了2004年的時候，農(nóng)村合作社的利率浮動則到了0.9和2

72、.0之間。2007年和2008年的時候私人抵押貸款利率進一步分別擴大到了0.85和0.7。在2007年里，建立了上海銀行間同業(yè)拆借利率，這對于一個市場化的利率體系的實現(xiàn)是一個里程碑的事件。除此之外，商業(yè)銀行業(yè)被允許提供即將到來的財富管理產(chǎn)品?？梢灶A(yù)見正在進行的利率市場化將會加速進行，“穩(wěn)定的進行利率市場化改革的推進”作為中國政府未來五年的金融改革的主要目</p><p>　　利率改革是與中國不斷松動的外國資本控制

73、密切相關(guān)的。盡管活期存款帳戶在 1996年的時候?qū)崿F(xiàn)了自由化，但是與其他國家的資本賬戶快速自由化完全相反， 中國資本項目外匯的流動現(xiàn)在還是由中國國家外匯管理局（SAFE)控制著。Ma 和McCauley (2007)在他們的研究中識別出了一個高達(dá)300個基準(zhǔn)點的三個月期 限的離岸在岸利率收益差距，這意味著資本賬戶防止人民幣的跨境資本流動的控 制效果。然而，在2001年3月建立的B-股市場則給中國的外資進行股權(quán)投資的機會，這是因為B股使得

74、國外的投資者能夠以國外貨幣購買中國公司的股票(在上海USD,在Shenzhen是HKD)。2002年的時候中國政府引入了合格境外機 構(gòu)投資者(QFII)項目，允許外國投資者在獲得外管局審批的前提下進行股票和 債券投資。人民幣自由化就是人民幣的自由兌換，以及以人民幣為計量單位的資本項目的自由兌換。</p><p>　　除了利率和外匯管制，金融市場還具有寡頭壟斷的市場結(jié)構(gòu)。由于四大銀行SOCBs以及他們在國有企業(yè)融資

75、方面（SOEs)所占據(jù)的絕對作用，目前銀行業(yè)市場格局是由“五大行”銀行主宰的，衡量的市場份額占到了總資產(chǎn)的50%，其中大部分的銀行2,646家農(nóng)村信用合作社只占有6.7%的銀行資產(chǎn)。此外，許多農(nóng)村金融機構(gòu)中并沒有現(xiàn)代化的銀行管理機制的存在。所有的“四大行”SOCBs都己經(jīng)完成了重組，最大的銀行甚至開始通過設(shè)置自己的農(nóng)村銀行支行來擴張農(nóng)村銀行業(yè)務(wù)。外國銀行的股權(quán)只有2%。寡頭壟斷的市場結(jié)構(gòu)給最大的中國銀行業(yè)貢獻了高盈利能力。此外，由于中國

76、證監(jiān)會(CSRC)設(shè)置的高上市門檻，導(dǎo)致了銀行貸款在企業(yè)融資中發(fā)揮著主導(dǎo)作用，尤其是那些大型企業(yè)。因此，無論是寡頭壟斷的市場結(jié)構(gòu)還是與銀行談判力量的薄弱都有助于銀行保持一個相對高的貸款利率。然而，股份制商業(yè)銀行（JSCBs)正在不斷的挑戰(zhàn)SOCBs的市場份額，這是因為民營JSCBs通常是基于商業(yè)基礎(chǔ)進行運作的，所以在效率、產(chǎn)品種類以及服務(wù)質(zhì)量方面具有更好的業(yè)務(wù)表現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　對上述觀點進行總結(jié)，中國銀

77、行業(yè)仍然處于相對保護的市場環(huán)境中。利潤保護的 目的是維持轉(zhuǎn)型和改革的過程中系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性。隨著最大上市的中國銀行業(yè)不 斷融入國際層面，暴利的時代將有望終結(jié)。銀行如果無法降低它們在貸款利率上 的依賴以及進行相應(yīng)的商業(yè)模式調(diào)整，那么就會在目前的“盈利能力陷阱”中摔倒。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論與展望</b></p><p>　　對我們的研究結(jié)果進行總結(jié)，我們記錄了過

78、去十年間中國銀行業(yè)所取得的巨大改革成果。中國銀行業(yè)的高盈利能力在根本上是由高凈利率以及較低的人事費用優(yōu)勢保證的。在當(dāng)前新興的融資融券擔(dān)保、資金流的控制和限制市場競爭的進入壁壘和經(jīng)營范圍限制的經(jīng)營環(huán)境中，中國銀行業(yè)仍然在享受暴利時代。</p><p>　　接下來幾年漸進式的利率市場化和利率隨之降低以及預(yù)計工資增長將會減少中國銀行業(yè)“五大行”在盈利能力方面的突出表現(xiàn)?？梢岳矛F(xiàn)有的客戶基礎(chǔ)進行業(yè)務(wù)多元化增加非利息收入

79、的收入、促進創(chuàng)新和高附加值的財富管理業(yè)務(wù)、開發(fā)咨詢和保險服務(wù)，從而在降低利息收入的時候增加收入。從目前的純商業(yè)銀行模式逐步轉(zhuǎn)型至全能型銀行模式是中國銀行系統(tǒng)改造未來的基石。對于整個銀行業(yè)而言，“五大行”銀行成功的改革路徑能夠加強資本基礎(chǔ)，隨后城市和農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行也應(yīng)完善信用風(fēng)險管理以及公司治理。</p><p>　　當(dāng)前，多元化經(jīng)營是中國銀行改革浪潮中的下一個基石。由于得到了中國金融專家的認(rèn)可，多元化經(jīng)營被認(rèn)為是下

80、一個大的改革浪潮。放寬銀行經(jīng)營范圍限制的監(jiān)管改革己在進行中。從2005年開始，試點銀行允許設(shè)立基金管理公司。從2009年開始，試點銀行能組建保險子公司。中國跨部門的金融服務(wù)業(yè)的快速發(fā)展給銀行和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)提出了新的挑戰(zhàn)和機遇。當(dāng)信用風(fēng)險管理能力還在發(fā)展中的時候，中國銀行業(yè)是否能夠處理在資本市場相關(guān)風(fēng)險的復(fù)雜性？如何使目前的行業(yè)監(jiān)管結(jié)構(gòu)滿足跨行業(yè)金融服務(wù)的需要?金融系統(tǒng)中金融集團內(nèi)潛在的風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)移是否仍然缺乏顯性存款保險？中國仍然在進行探索綜合