績效管理的大問題為什么經(jīng)理使用績效信息？【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　The Big Question for Performance Management: Why Do Managers Use Performance Information?</p><p>　　Materia

2、l Source: University of Wisconsin–Madison Author: Donald P. Moynihan, Sanjay K. Pandey </p><p>　　The most widespread governmental reform in recent decades has been the requirement for agencies to track and

3、 measure strategic goals, targets, and achievements (Brudney, Hebert and Wright 1999; Moynihan 2008). Within our growing state of agents, performance goals underpin contractual forms of accountability, the means by which

4、 webs of connected principals and agents allocate responsibility. Citizens, elected officials, and public managers have more performance information now than ever. Every ye</p><p>　　A MODEL OF PERFORMANCE IN

5、FORMATION USE</p><p>　　Previous Research</p><p>　　There are a number of empirical pieces on performance information use in the public sector, and the majority of such research is recent. Heinric

6、h (1999) noted that most empirical evidence came from the private sector. Her study of performance standards in job training found that data were used but much depended upon the design of the overall performance system a

7、nd that there was little to guide designers beyond neoclassical economic arguments for financial incentives.</p><p>　　Since then, more research has emerged to offer alternatives to neoclassical models, usual

8、ly relying on self-reported survey data. It appears fair to assert that this previous work has not resulted in a common or overarching theory of performance information 850 Journal of Public Administration Research and T

9、heory use. De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) theorized a basic distinction between rational/technocratic and political/cultural factors. Other research has focused more on explicitly politic</p><p>　　Concep

10、tualizing Performance Information Use as Organizational Behavior</p><p>　　We conceptualize performance information use as a form of organizational behavior. Like other forms of organizational behavior, emplo

11、yees have discretion about whether and the degree to which they engage in it but are influenced by the social context and formal systems in which they work. We test categories of variables consistent with this conceptual

12、ization, incorporating individual beliefs, job attributes, organizational factors, and environmental influences.</p><p>　　Our model draws up on some of the variables used in previous research, although we se

13、ek to use alternative measures of the underlying concept. For example, rather than measure leadership support for performance management, we measure whether the leader is in a generalist of specialist position. Rather th

14、an measure public participation in performance management routines, we measure if more general forms of participation matter. The model also includes variables whose relationship with the depende</p><p>　　In

15、dividual Beliefs</p><p>　　There has, thus far, been surprisingly little investigation into how PSM might affect organizational decision making. There are two reasons to assume that PSM might foster performan

16、ce information use. First, performance information use involves costs for the employees. Performance information use is a behavior that imposes costs on the employee. It displaces traditional modes of decision making and

17、 heuristics, while adding another decision criterion, making decision processes more rather than le</p><p>　　Job Attributes</p><p>　　Job attributes represent the interplay between the individual

18、 and organizational level (Wright 2001). In contrast to the intrinsic approach represented by PSM, other approaches assume self-interest. From this perspective, extrinsic motivators and incentives may foster performance

19、information use. Organizations do not reward performance information use but do reward individualized performance to varying degrees. If individuals perceive that their organization links pay and promotion with goal ach&

20、lt;/p><p>　　Another factor that affects the types of decisions individuals make, and by extension their tendency to use performance data, is their organizational role. Previous research tends to treat role diff

21、erences in terms of membership of different organizations and of seniority or hierarchical level. Both qualitative (Radon 2006) and quantitative (A skim, Johnson, and Christophersen 2008; Dull 2009) research report that

22、variation in the use of performance data depends upon the type of program an emplo</p><p>　　A final role factor is the amount of experience that an individual has with a specific position. Organizational lea

23、rning theory points to the importance of task knowledge to learning (Moynihan 2005). Managers rarely learn directly from quantitative numbers, but from interpreting these numbers, making sense of what they mean given the

24、ir knowledge of the context in which they work. Individuals with a deep knowledge of task are therefore advantaged in the ability to apply performance data. Lewis (2</p><p>　　Organizational Factors</p>

25、<p>　　All levels of government have devoted considerable effort into creating and disseminating performance information. This effort reflects a supply-side approach to performance information, assuming that provis

26、ion of performance data is the key to its use (Jennings and Heist 2006). There is some research support for this view. Various measures that track the availability of performance information have been found to be positiv

27、ely associated with use (Boudreaux and Chicot 2008; de Lancer Jules and H</p><p>　　Performance management systems, reflecting a doctrinal connection with the New Public Management, were often presented as pa

28、rt of a package of reforms that also included the provision of greater autonomy to managers, in particular greater discretion with financial and human resources (Moynihan 2008). For example, Schick (2001) argues that per

29、formance measurement should be presaged by wider organizational changes, including greater managerial flexibility, if it is to succeed. Studies have found t</p><p>　　EXTERNAL FACTORS</p><p>　　To

30、 examine the role of external factors, we test how the influence of citizens and external professional organizations affects performance information use. It is possible that the use of performance information is a form o

31、f bureaucratic behavior that is disconnected from the public. Managers may believe that the public may evince strong support for performance but actually care little about the details. On the other hand, results-based re

32、forms draw from popular sentiment that governments were no</p><p>　　RESULTS AND DISCUSSION</p><p>　　In terms of our individual-level variable, we find that PSM is positively correlated with repo

33、rted performance information use. A one-unit increases on the 30-point PSM scale results in a .04 increase in the 6-point performance information use scale. The finding also contributes additional circumstantial evidence

34、 to the question of whether PSM fosters higher performance. Brewer (2008, 146) notes ‘‘there is little empirical evidence on the PSM—performance relationship.’’ The results here find tha</p><p>　　The finding

35、s on external factors are not definitive. Both professional influence and participation are positively related to performance information use but are significant only at the 10% level. The findings therefore do not imply

36、 a clear rejection of these variables but instead suggest the need for additional testing and imply the need for additional specification of environmental variables that might affect performance information use. Although

37、 none of the controls proved significant, there a</p><p>　　CONCLUSION</p><p>　　This article argues for examining performance information use as a key variable if we are to develop systematic kno

38、wledge about contemporary governance. The usual caveats and flaws of cross-sectional survey data apply. In particular, the potential that common source bias inflates the relationship between independent variables and the

39、 dependent variable cannot be dismissed. But in testing such relationships, capturing a large number of comparable individual responses on items that are difficult t</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p>

40、<p>　　績效管理的大問題：為什么經(jīng)理使用績效信息？</p><p>　　資料來源：威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校 作者：桑杰潘迪</p><p>　　最近幾十年來，政府在廣泛的改革中已經(jīng)要求各機(jī)構(gòu)跟蹤和衡量其戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)、對象和成就（伯尼、赫伯特、賴特，1999；莫伊尼漢，2008）。隨著代理人的增長，以合同形式鞏固績效目標(biāo)問責(zé)制產(chǎn)生，用這種方式連接主要的

41、代理責(zé)任分配網(wǎng)。公民、民選官員和公共管理者比以往任何時(shí)候使用更多的績效信息。就如每一年新的江河入海流量一樣，這些趨勢不太可能逆轉(zhuǎn)?？冃Ч芾聿煌谥皦劢K正寢的管理，是新的公共管理，被繼續(xù)看作未來管理的中心政策（凱特、凱爾曼，2007）。</p><p><b>　　績效信息使用模型</b></p><p><b>　　以往的研究</b></

42、p><p>　　有一組表現(xiàn)公共部門使用績效信息的實(shí)證研究數(shù)據(jù)，多數(shù)是最近的研究。海因里希（1999）指出，大多數(shù)實(shí)證研究證據(jù)來自私營部門。她在工作績效標(biāo)準(zhǔn)培訓(xùn)的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，使用的數(shù)據(jù)很大程度上取決于該系統(tǒng)的設(shè)計(jì)和整體性能，很少有引導(dǎo)設(shè)計(jì)師超越新古典主義的經(jīng)濟(jì)論點(diǎn)的財(cái)務(wù)激勵(lì)。</p><p>　　從那時(shí)起，更多可以提供替代新古典模型的研究應(yīng)運(yùn)而生，這通常依賴自我報(bào)告的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)。公平而言，以前的研究

43、并沒有得出關(guān)于使用績效信息的總體理論。德藍(lán)瑟朱尼斯和霍爾澤（2001）理論化地劃分技術(shù)專家、政治及文化因素的基本區(qū)別。其他的研究更專注于明確的政治變量。包德留克斯和奇科特（2008）研究了績效信息在政府職能、立法機(jī)關(guān)和國家政治中的作用。馬克和威洛比（2005）對群體的特性、答辯人的特點(diǎn)、組織文化、績效評(píng)估的特點(diǎn)和條件進(jìn)行歸類。莫伊尼漢、英格拉哈姆（2004）和杜爾（2009）都立足于中央領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用研究績效管理。阿脫脂，約翰遜和克里斯托弗（

44、2008）研究挪威市政網(wǎng)絡(luò)基準(zhǔn)的特點(diǎn)、行政因素、政治因素、任務(wù)特點(diǎn)和歷史關(guān)系。莫伊尼漢，朗迪（2009）認(rèn)為績效信息的使用特點(diǎn)表現(xiàn)為組織學(xué)習(xí)元素，并確定了結(jié)構(gòu)和文化的變量來預(yù)測這種信息的使用。</p><p>　　組織行為學(xué)績效信息使用的概念化表現(xiàn)</p><p>　　我們將績效信息的使用作為一個(gè)概念化表現(xiàn)形式的組織行為。其他形式的組織行為，員工除了受社會(huì)環(huán)境和工作制度的影響，可自行決定是

45、否且在何種程度上使用績效信息。我們將與此概念相一致的變量進(jìn)行測試，納入個(gè)人信仰、工作屬性、組織因素，受環(huán)境的影響。</p><p>　　我們的模式借鑒了以往的研究中所使用的一些變量，雖然我們設(shè)法利用基本概念替代。例如，比起衡量領(lǐng)導(dǎo)支持的績效管理，我們衡量的是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者是否能全面實(shí)施績效管理。比起衡量公眾參與績效管理程序，我們更關(guān)注的是公眾參與度。該模型還包括之前未經(jīng)測試的因變量，包括公共服務(wù)的動(dòng)力系統(tǒng)（PSM）、獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)

46、的期望、角色清晰度、任務(wù)具體經(jīng)驗(yàn)、預(yù)算官員的作用，以及專業(yè)組織的影響力。</p><p><b>　　個(gè)人信仰</b></p><p>　　迄今為止，關(guān)于PSM影響組織決策的小調(diào)差的結(jié)果令人驚訝。PSM的表現(xiàn)可能會(huì)促進(jìn)績效信息的使用有兩個(gè)原因。首先，績效信息的使用涉及員工費(fèi)用?？冃畔⒌氖褂檬且环N加強(qiáng)員工費(fèi)用有效使用的行為。它的決策和傳統(tǒng)模式相比，同時(shí)加入另一個(gè)決策準(zhǔn)

47、則，決策過程會(huì)更加復(fù)雜，而不是更少。雖然使用績效數(shù)據(jù)可能出現(xiàn)組織利益和個(gè)人利益不可能或不確定能達(dá)成一致的現(xiàn)象。它類似于一個(gè)額外角色的行為方式獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)員工為企業(yè)付出的時(shí)間和努力，無需單獨(dú)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。這很可能是由社會(huì)或利他主義的動(dòng)機(jī)驅(qū)使員工付出。第二，高PSM和關(guān)懷員工、關(guān)心組織目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)是合理的。有人提出，PSM可以培養(yǎng)較高的個(gè)人和組織績效，雖然沒有確切的證據(jù)（布魯爾，2008）。如果高PSM的員工看到績效信息的使用作為一種實(shí)現(xiàn)組織目標(biāo)的手段，也可

48、看到它作為一種手段來實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的愿望。</p><p><b>　　作業(yè)屬性</b></p><p>　　作業(yè)屬性代表個(gè)人和組織層次之間的相互作用（賴特，2001）。與此相反的內(nèi)在辦法以PSM為代表。從這個(gè)角度來看，外在的激勵(lì)和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施可以促進(jìn)績效信息的使用。組織不獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)績效信息的使用，除了獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)不同程度的個(gè)性化績效信息。如果個(gè)人覺得他們的薪酬和晉升與組織目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)和成果的

49、推廣有聯(lián)系，員工就會(huì)有一個(gè)外在的動(dòng)力去使用績效信息（詹寧斯、海斯特，2006）。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)因素是影響個(gè)人做出決定的類型。組織促使他們的員工傾向于使用績效數(shù)據(jù)。以往的研究往往區(qū)別對待不同組織和資歷水平方面有差異的成員，既有定性（雷丁，2006）和定量（阿脫脂、約翰遜、克里斯托弗，2008；杜爾，2009)的研究報(bào)告，使用績效數(shù)據(jù)變化后的雇員工作標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和其他研究試驗(yàn)的影響，和工齡沒有關(guān)系（德藍(lán)瑟朱、霍

50、爾澤，2001；杜爾，2009）或成正關(guān)系（莫伊尼漢、朗迪，2009）。</p><p>　　最后一個(gè)主要因素是特定職位上的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的積累。組織學(xué)習(xí)理論指出了學(xué)習(xí)知識(shí)和學(xué)習(xí)任務(wù)的重要性 (莫伊尼漢，2005)。管理者很少直接從量變分析數(shù)字，但是會(huì)利用工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析這些數(shù)字并做出決策。淵博的個(gè)人知識(shí)及經(jīng)驗(yàn)使其具備得天獨(dú)厚的應(yīng)用績效數(shù)據(jù)的能力。劉易斯（2008）發(fā)現(xiàn)，具體經(jīng)驗(yàn)預(yù)示了為什么有些經(jīng)理人比其他人獲得較高的方案評(píng)價(jià)

51、分?jǐn)?shù)，具體表現(xiàn)是知識(shí)在某個(gè)時(shí)間用在特定的位置。</p><p><b>　　組織因素</b></p><p>　　各級(jí)政府都投入了大量的精力在創(chuàng)造和傳播績效信息上。假設(shè)提供的績效數(shù)據(jù)是其使用的關(guān)鍵，這方面的努力反映了供應(yīng)績效信息的方法（詹寧斯、海斯特，2006）。有一些研究支持這種看法，跟蹤績效信息使用情況的多種措施被認(rèn)為是積極的（包德留克斯、奇科特，2008；德藍(lán)瑟

52、，哈利，2001；莫伊尼漢、英格拉哈姆，2004；莫伊尼漢、朗迪，2009）。相比之下，馬克、威洛比（2005）發(fā)現(xiàn)，預(yù)算措施提供的文件實(shí)際上減少了在預(yù)算過程中這些措施的影響和建議，這可能是信息過載的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　績效管理體系，往往表現(xiàn)為一種反映與新公共管理理論聯(lián)系的改革，也包括向管理人員提供更大的自主權(quán)，特別是有財(cái)政和人力資源（莫伊尼漢，2008）計(jì)劃的一部分自主權(quán)。例如，?？耍?001）認(rèn)為，如

53、果績效測量要成功，預(yù)示著要有更廣泛的組織變革，包括更大靈活性管理。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)要集中組織學(xué)習(xí)靈活(莫伊尼漢、朗迪，2001）和全面地使用績效信息（威利斯、馬斯特、韋斯伯格，2007）。</p><p><b>　　外部因素</b></p><p>　　我們檢查外部因素作用的測試發(fā)現(xiàn)，公民和外部專業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)對績效信息的使用具有影響力。這可能是績效信息與公眾分離的一種專業(yè)使用形式

54、。管理者可能認(rèn)為公眾可以表示出強(qiáng)烈的支持，但對績效細(xì)節(jié)真正關(guān)心的很少。另一方面，各國政府沒有有效的改革是因?yàn)樗麄儧]有借鑒民心。有大量證據(jù)表明認(rèn)知表現(xiàn)為績效管理流程方便使用容易得到市民的支持。研究表明，應(yīng)當(dāng)鼓勵(lì)公民的自覺使用以問責(zé)為基礎(chǔ)的績效信息（莫伊尼漢、英格拉哈姆，2004；包斯特、斯特波，1999）。德藍(lán)瑟朱和霍爾澤(2001)發(fā)現(xiàn)，各外部利益集團(tuán)的支持（民選官員/公民形式），可以促進(jìn)績效管理的實(shí)施。謝揚(yáng)（2006）發(fā)現(xiàn)，利益相關(guān)者

55、的參與是認(rèn)知績效措施有效性的實(shí)證預(yù)測。外里斯宏（2006）發(fā)現(xiàn)，績效評(píng)估中公民參與的做法增加了民選官員眼中有用的認(rèn)知數(shù)據(jù)。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)果和討論</b></p><p>　　在個(gè)體層次變量上我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，PSM的積極性與績效信息的使用成正相關(guān)。在30點(diǎn)的PSM規(guī)模上，每增加一人，績效信息的使用規(guī)模增加6點(diǎn)。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)還有助于其他間接證據(jù)表明PSM是否能培養(yǎng)

56、更高的績效問題。布魯爾(2008)指出很少有PSM的績效關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究。這項(xiàng)研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，PSM是一個(gè)積極的、個(gè)人和組織績效的貢獻(xiàn)都較高的、合乎邏輯的行為方式。</p><p>　　外部因素的研究結(jié)果并不明確?？冃畔⒌氖褂脽o論是專業(yè)的影響力還是參與度的影響都是正相關(guān)的，但重要的只顯示在10％的水平以上。因此，研究結(jié)果并不意味著對這些變量明確否認(rèn)，而是意味著有額外測試的需要，意味著環(huán)境的變化可能會(huì)影響性能的其他規(guī)

57、范信息的使用需要。雖然都被證明是顯著的控制，但還有其他環(huán)境因素缺乏合適的數(shù)據(jù)，如社會(huì)資本，對績效信息的使用有似是而非的影響（戴維，2006）。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　如果我們要發(fā)展當(dāng)代管理的系統(tǒng)知識(shí)，本文主張將檢查績效的使用作為一個(gè)關(guān)鍵變量。通常適用解釋橫向調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)的缺陷，潛在的共同的源偏置膨脹之間的自變量和因變量的關(guān)系不能被解