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1、***1AC***1AC - Advantage One – Crisis Miscalculation – 1ACSpace vulnerability and instability are increasing, raising the risk of conflict. Defensive space measure can increase deterrence while avoiding a destabilizing

2、arms race. MacDonald 09, former assistant director for national security at the White House [Bruce W., “Testimony of Bruce W. MacDonald”, Council of Foreign Affairs, Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and House Ar

3、med Services Committee, March 18, http://www.cfr.org/china/space-security/p18862, Accessed July 12 2011]Our space assets are exposed and fragile. They can’t run, they can’t hide, and today they can’t defend themselves.

4、 One small object traveling at orbital speeds can destroy them. Unless we take proactive measures, all these threats will grow, and we must bear in mind that the U.S. depends more on space than our potential adversarie

5、s. If we are not careful, the way we are currently thinking, planning, and investing, our space capabilities may only be available in peacetime, or against non-peer adversaries. We could lose them just when we need them

6、 most. At a minimum, we need far greater space situational awareness and space intelligence (SSA/SI) capabilities than today. Responsible officials have been saying this for years, but SSA/SI has never received the prio

7、rity it deserves. If this fails to change, we can expect more frequent space collisions and growing instability in space. Current U.S. Space Policy Raises but Does Not Answer Key Space Stability Issues In 2006, the Bush

8、 Administration issued a revised space policy that declared for the first time that U.S. space assets are a “vital national interest,” in recognition of the extraordinary and growing U.S. military and economic dependenc

9、e on them. The phrase “vital national interest” carries much heavier national security implications than has ever been attributed to space. This policy also reserves the right to deny adversaries “the use of space capab

10、ilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” But attacking others’ space capabilities invites attacks on our own, which our policy calls a “vital national interest,” and on which we depend far more than anyone else. Evo

11、lving technology guarantees both that: 1) we will depend even more on these assets in the future; and 2) these vital assets will likely face greater threats than today. This dimension of U.S. space policy is contradict

12、ory: why would we want to threaten actions that would invite retaliation against “vital national interests,” and where we have more at stake than our adversaries? This contradiction was never explained. Such a policy c

13、ontradiction could make sense if: ? the governing U.S. space force doctrine is deterrence -- that we would have offensive capability strictly to deter attacks on our assets, and we would not initiate them – but there is

14、 no indication that this is the case; or ? the U.S. could maintain space dominance, which the policy tacitly implies, but such a posture would not be sustainable; or ? such attacks were limited and localized, i.e., tact

15、ical, not strategic, though there would be serious risks of escalation. There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defense efforts create disproportionate danger to an adversary, as with s

16、pace offense. And there is a serious risk of crisis instability in space when “going first” pays off – destroying an adversary’s satellites before he destroys yours. We don’t know what would happen in a crisis, but the

17、potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow. But our policy is silent on this. I believe the United States can and should remain pre-eminent in space, but that we are currently being incautious in some

18、 dimensions of our military space policy due to the absence of both a clearly thought-out space doctrine and a coherent national security space strategy. Many issues are begging to be addressed, including: ? How does de

19、terrence function in space? Could limited counterspace attacks remain limited, or would they inevitably escalate into all-out space conflict? ? How can countries with less to lose in space than we be deterred? Are there

20、 asymmetric means available to us for deterrence? ? Is space deterrence possible without offensive space capabilities? If so, how? If not, what kinds of capabilities are most stabilizing? 4 ? What U.S. space strategy, a

21、nd resulting acquisition strategy, in that order, would promote U.S. security interests and reduce space instability over the longer term? ? How do China, Russia and others see space stability? How will this shape Chin

22、a’s space doctrine, acquisition, strategies, and diplomacy? We don’t know the answers to these questions, and we are doing far too little to answer them. The United States needs a stabilizing space protection strategy th

23、at would: ? Focus on stability, deterrence, escalation control and transparency ? Incentivize nations to avoid destabilizing, irreversible actions in space ? Provide a U.S. military space architecture with “defense in

24、depth” and terrestrial, airborne, and other backups to assure availability of key space services in the event fo space outages from whatever causes, benign or hostile ? Reduce adversary incentives and ability to target

25、U.S. space capabilities ? Maintain “strategic ambiguity” over our responses to adversary actions ? Encourage agreements that constrain the most destabilizing dimensions of space competition and provide ground rules for

26、normal space operations; and ? Expand dialogue among U.S., China, and others to promote better understanding and reduce chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation, always dangerous in a crisis Creating a stable spac

27、e domain requires the United States to respond to space threats in a responsible manner, one that ideally does not provoke other nations to greater counter space efforts than they would otherwise pursue. The United Sta

28、tes must be careful to avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and should refrain from activities and public communications (such as an Air Force advertisement describing space as a future battleground) that invite th

29、e buildup of other nations’ counterspace capabilities. The United States should proceed cautiously with offensive counterspace initiatives. We must recognize that other nations depend less on space than we and, therefo

30、re, the destruction of their space capabilities is of lesser relative value to us as long as this is true.Chinese tests have sparked a global arms race. Our satellites are vulnerable to other countries ASATs or cyber t

31、errorists, which invites a preemptive strike Denmark 2010 - Fellow with the Center for a New American Security [By Abraham M. and Dr. James Mulvenon CNAS, Jan, Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multip

32、olar World http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested %20Commons%20Capstone_0.pdf Accessed Jun 21]In an environment where all the stray bullets, mortars and bombs do not simply fall to Earth, but