檸檬市場(chǎng)：質(zhì)量的不確定性和市場(chǎng)機(jī)制(中英對(duì)照)

1、The Markets for “Lemons”: Quality uncertainty and The Market Mechanism檸檬市場(chǎng)：質(zhì)量的不確定性和市場(chǎng)機(jī)制Geogre A. Akerlof 阿克洛夫一、引言This paper relates quality and uncertainty. The existence of goods of many grades poses interesting and i

2、mportant problems for the theory of markets.（本文論述的是質(zhì)量和不確定性問(wèn)題?，F(xiàn)實(shí)中存在大量多種檔次的物品給市場(chǎng)理論提出 了饒有趣味而十分重大的難題）On the one hand, the interaction of quality differences and uncertainty may explain important institutions of the labor ma

3、rket.（一方面，質(zhì)量差異和不確定性的相互作用可以解釋勞動(dòng)力的重要機(jī)制）On the other hand, this paper presents a struggling attempt to give structure to the statement: “Business in under-developed countries is difficult“; in particular, a structure is gi

4、ven for determining the economic costs of dishonesty.（另一方面，本文試圖通過(guò)討論獲得這樣的結(jié)論：在不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，商業(yè)交易是困難的，其中， 特別論及了欺騙性交易的經(jīng)濟(jì)成本）Additional applications of the theory include comments on the structure of money markets, on the notion of “

5、insurability,“ on the liquidity of durables, and on brand-name goods.（本文的理論還可以用來(lái)研究貨幣市場(chǎng)、保險(xiǎn)可行性、耐用品的流動(dòng)性和名牌商品等問(wèn)題）There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases.

6、（在許多市場(chǎng)中，買者利用市場(chǎng)的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)判斷他們將要購(gòu)買的商品的質(zhì)量）In this case there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather

7、 than to the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a reduction in the average quality of goods and also in the size of the market.（在這種情況下，賣者有動(dòng)力提供低質(zhì)量商品，因?yàn)槟撤N商品的價(jià)格主要取決于所有同類商品質(zhì)量的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)而非該商品 的實(shí)際質(zhì)量。結(jié)果，商品的平均質(zhì)量將趨于下降，市場(chǎng)規(guī)

8、模將不斷縮小）It should also be perceived that in these markets social and private returns differ, and therefore, in some cases, governmental intervention may increase the welfare of all parties. Or private institutions may a

9、rise to take advantage of the potential increases in welfare which can accrue to all parties.（我們還可以觀察到在這種市場(chǎng)上，對(duì)個(gè) 人和社會(huì)有不同的回報(bào)，因此，某種情況下，政府的干預(yù)可以增進(jìn)社會(huì)的總體福利水平?；蛘哒f(shuō)，私人組織利用了整個(gè)社會(huì)福利水平潛在的增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)而使自 己獲利）By nature, however, these instituti

10、ons are nonatomistic, and therefore concentrations of power- with ill consequences of their own-can develop.（實(shí)際上，這些私人組織的行動(dòng)所產(chǎn)生的影響并非可以忽略不計(jì)，因此，盡管集權(quán)本身有 許多負(fù)面影響，但是，一定程度上的集權(quán)可以保證經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展）The automobile market is used as a finger

11、 exercise to illustrate and develop these thoughts. It should be emphasized that this market is chosen for its concreteness and ease in understanding rather than for its importance or realism.（下面，我們用汽車owner of a good ma

12、chine must be locked in. Not only is it true that he cannot receive the true value of his car, but he cannot even obtain the expected value of a new car.（這樣，高質(zhì)量車的擁有者將不會(huì)賣出汽車，因?yàn)槿绻u出汽車他不僅無(wú)法得 到汽車的真實(shí)價(jià)值，也無(wú)法獲得一輛新車的期望價(jià)值）Gresham&

13、#39;s law has made a modified reappearance. For most cars traded will be the “l(fā)emons,“ and good cars may not be traded at all. The “bad“ cars tend to drive out the good (in much the same way that bad money drives out the

14、 good).（這里出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)修正后的格萊欣定律。當(dāng)“檸檬”充斥汽車市場(chǎng)時(shí)，高質(zhì)量車根本不會(huì)成交，于是，如同劣幣驅(qū)逐良幣一樣，低質(zhì)量車將高質(zhì)量車逐 出市場(chǎng)）But the analogy with Gresham's law is not quite complete: bad cars drive out the good because they sell at the same price as good cars; s

15、imilarly, bad money drives out good because the exchange rate is even.（然而，該結(jié)果與格萊欣定律并不完全一樣：低質(zhì)量車驅(qū)逐高質(zhì)量車是因?yàn)榈唾|(zhì)量車和高質(zhì)量車在相同的價(jià)格 水平上出售。相似地，劣幣驅(qū)逐良幣是因?yàn)閮烧叩慕粨Q利率相同）But the bad cars sell at the same price as good cars since it is imposs

16、ible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bad car; only the seller knows. In Gresham's law, however, presumably both buyer and seller can tell the difference between good and bad money. So the anal

17、ogy is instructive, but not complete.（但是低質(zhì)量車之所以 與高質(zhì)量以同一個(gè)價(jià)格出售是因?yàn)橘I主無(wú)法區(qū)分一輛車到底是低質(zhì)量的還是高質(zhì)量的，這只有賣主才知道的信息。在格萊欣定律中，買主和賣主大概否可以區(qū)分劣幣和良幣。所以說(shuō)，這個(gè)類比具有啟發(fā)性，但非完全相同）（二）非對(duì)稱信息It has been seen that the good cars may be driven out of the market

18、 by the lemons. But in a more continuous case with different grades of goods, even worse pathologies can exist.（我們已經(jīng)看到質(zhì)量好的汽車會(huì)被“檸檬”逐出市場(chǎng)。但是，在不同質(zhì)量等級(jí)的產(chǎn)品連續(xù)分布的情形下，更糟糕的情況也會(huì)發(fā)生）For it is quite possible to have the bad driving ou

19、t the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.（質(zhì)量最差的汽車在將質(zhì)量最好的汽車逐出市場(chǎng)后，會(huì)繼續(xù)將質(zhì)量較好、質(zhì)量中等和質(zhì)量稍差的汽車依次逐出市場(chǎng)，從而導(dǎo) 致二手車交易市場(chǎng)根本無(wú)法存在）On

20、e can assume that the demand for used automobiles depends most strongly upon two variables - the price of the automobile p and the average quality of used cars traded, μ, or Qd = D（p, μ）.（假設(shè)對(duì)二手車的需求主要取決于兩個(gè)變量——二 手車的價(jià)格 p 和

21、進(jìn)入交易的二手車的平均質(zhì)量 μ，即 Qd = D（p, μ） ）Both the supply of used cars and also the average quality μ will depend upon the price, or μ=μ(p) and S=S(p).（而二手車的供給和平均質(zhì)量 μ 都取決于二手車的價(jià)格，即 μ=μ(p) 和 S=S(p)）And in equilibrium the supply mus

22、t equal the demand for the given average quality, or S(p) = D (p, μ(p)). As the price falls, normally the quality will also fall. And it is quite possible that no goods will be traded at any price level.（在均衡狀態(tài)下對(duì)于給定的平均質(zhì)量