[雙語翻譯]銀行風(fēng)險外文翻譯--存款保險制度對銀行風(fēng)險的影響（英文）

1、How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis qDeniz Anginer a,?, Asli Demirguc-Kunt b, Min Zhu c,1a Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, Falls Church, VA 22043, United States b Worl

2、d Bank, 1818 H. St. MC 3-445, Washington, DC 20433, United States c City University of Hong Kong, AC3-13-247 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Konga r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:Available online 8 October 2013JEL c

3、lassification:G21G24G28Keywords:Bank riskSystemic riskDeposit insuranceBank supervision and regulationFinancial crisisa b s t r a c tDeposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial sys

4、tem safety net topromote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive ofdepositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation betweendepos

5、it insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recentfinancial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility inthe years leadin

6、g up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and sys-temic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the‘‘moral hazard effect’’ of

7、 deposit insurance dominates in good times while the ‘‘stabilization effect’’ ofdeposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sam-ple we study remains negative sinc

8、e the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitudecompared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervi-sion can alleviate the unintended consequence

9、s of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during goodtimes, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuringsystemic stability.? 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. In

10、troductionIn response to the global financial crisis, a number of countries substantially increased the coverage of their financial safety nets in order to restore market confidence and to avert potential conta- gious ru

11、ns on their banking sectors. This has rekindled the debate on the impact of deposit insurance on banking sector stability and performance. While previous studies suggest that deposit insur- ance exacerbates moral hazard

12、problems in bank lending and is associated with higher likelihood of banking crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002), to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that examines the impact of deposit insurance on

13、bank risk and systemic stability during a period of global financial instability. This is an important gap in the literature since economic theoriessuggest that deposit insurance brings both benefits and costs that are l

14、ikely to vary with economic conditions. That is, while deposit insurance can increase moral hazard and make financial systems more vulnerable to crises during good times, it can also enhance depositor confidence and redu

15、ce the likelihood of contagious bank runs during turbulent periods such as the recent global financial crisis. The net effect of deposit insurance on bank risk and stability, therefore, depends on whether the benefits of

16、 deposit insurance can outweigh its costs.In this paper, we take advantage of the global financial crisis and study whether deposit insurance schemes have a stabilizing effect during financially turbulent periods. Specif

17、ically, using a sample of 4109 publicly traded banks in 96 countries, we examine the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk and systemic stability separately for the crisis period from 2007 to 2009, as well as the 3 ye

18、ars from 2004 to 2006 leading up to the global financial crisis. We use z-score and stock return volatility to measure standalone risk of an individual bank, and the marginal expected shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2

19、012) to measure the risk posed by an individual bank to the banking system as a whole. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and reduce sys- temic stability in non-crisis years. However, bank ris

20、k is lower and systemic stability is greater during the global financial crisis0378-4266/$ - see front matter ? 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.013q This project was ma

21、de possible through the support of grants from the WorldBank. This paper’s findings, interpretations and conclusions are entirely those of theauthors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, theirExe

22、cutive Directors, or the countries they represent. ? Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 9174002951.E-mail addresses: danginer@vt.edu (D. Anginer), ademirguckunt@worldbank.org(A. Demirguc-Kunt), minzhu@cityu.edu.hk (M. Zhu).1