[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]---外文翻譯--人民幣的國(guó)際化新起點(diǎn)，新躍變，新臨界點(diǎn)（節(jié)選）

1、2750 單詞， 單詞，1.5 萬(wàn)英文字符， 萬(wàn)英文字符，4700 漢字 漢字出處： 出處：Batten J A, Szilagyi P G. The internationalisation of the RMB: New starts, jumps and tipping points[J]. Emerging Markets Review 28 (2016) 221–238The internationalisation of

2、the RMB: New starts, jumps and tipping pointsJonathan A. Batten, Peter G. SzilagyiAbstractWe investigate the process of currency internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB). Aggregated cross-border data provided

3、 by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) allows better measurement of the role played by a currency in trade and settlement. RMB transactions are significant and increasing but remai

4、n concentrated in key financial centres. Analysis using an asset pricing framework shows that the footprint of Chinese corporations in international markets has at times been significant, with the size of these transa

5、ctions prompting many to reassess the likely pace of RMB internationalisation and its usage as an alternate vehicle currency.Keywords: Currency Internationalisation, Financial market development Renminbi, RMB, Society

6、for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)1.IntroductionCurrency internationalisation provides significant economic benefits to a country's residents (Kenen, 2009; Cohen, 2012, McCauley, 2015; Liao

7、 and McDowell, 2016; Zhang, and Tao, 2016). However, what makes a currency international and how should one measure internationalisation? The simple answer to the first question is to consider its role in cross- border

8、 transactions, both trade and capital account, and as a reserve currency (Krugman, 1980; Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Goldberg, 2005; Gray, 2011). The economic size of a home country, the flexibility of its exchange rate a

9、nd the stability of its economic and political institutions are also important determinates in the scale and scope of currency usage. We will also show that wide usage is also characteristic of an internationalised cur

10、rency. In other words, in order for a currency to be international it must be used by everyone and accepted everywhere to transact cross-border business.The answer to the second question is more complex in that researc

11、hers have been limited to traditional sources of macroeconomic statistics, typically the quarterly international banking, trade and currency statis- tics, collected by international organisations such as the Internati

12、onal Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In this paper, we approach the measurement of currency internationalisation by considering the single most important component of international

13、isation: its role in international trade and capital account settlement. More specifically, we use monthly aggregated data provided by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to investig

14、ate the degree of internationalisation of the currency of the People's Republic of China (henceforth simply China) termed the renminbi (RMB).We are able to utilise a host of RMB financial variables: usage in foreig

15、n exchange, international fixed income and money markets, as well as for trade settlement, previously unavailable to earlier researchers. Importantly, the currency usage in international trade and finance suggested by

16、 the SWIFT variables is consistent with bench- mark surveys by institutions such as the BIS (e.g. BIS, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2016), while the SWIFT data have the advantage of being available at a higher frequency and wit

17、h greater cross-border detail.Much attention has been directed towards the economic rise of China, whose economy has shown stellar growth in the recent past and momentum that analysts agree will likely centres (e.g. Gar

18、cia- Herrero, Tsai and Le, 2012; BIS, 2013a; and He, Korhonen, Guo and Liu, 2016). Not surprising is our finding that RMB transactions are mostly undertaken where one counterparty is located in the financial centres of

19、 first Hong Kong, then Macau and Singapore and to some extent Taipei, where cultural and social links place them at an advantage to those counterparties undertaken in Europe. However, transactions in RMB where both co

20、unterparties are non-residents (as currently occurs in the USD Eurobond markets) are increasingly undertaken in the financial centres of London and New York, especially for foreign exchange trading and inter- national

21、money market transactions. Recall that London and New York are the world's primary and secondary centres for foreign exchange trading. Our findings confirm that the value of London based RMB foreign ex- change tra

22、ding now exceeds transactions undertaken in Hong Kong and Singapore, which is consistent with London's pre-eminent role as the world's centre for derivatives and foreign exchange trading (BIS, 2010, 2013a, 2016

23、).For now the results from this analysis show that the momentum of RMB internationalisation has stabilised, suggesting that China's path to RMB internationalisation will remain slow. This conclusion is consistent w

24、ith many other studies, including Hua (2010), Tung et al. (2012), Eichengreen and Kawai (2014), and Shu, He and Cheng (2015). Ultimately reform initiatives must be maintained to ensure that China is able to fully capi

25、talise upon the opportunities that are now unfolding as the international economic and political landscape shifts more towards its favour. (e.g. Taylor, 2013; He, Luk and Zhang, 2016; Tsuchiya, 2016; Yelery, 2016; and

26、Zhang and Tao, 2016).The paper is set out as follows: next we provide further background on the recent literature on currency internationalisation and China's footprint and role in international financial markets;

27、then we explain the SWIFT data and method used in the study. Our results are presented in two stages: first we provide analysis of single measures of internationalisation based on the SWIFT variables; then we present t

28、he results using a covariance based measure. The final section offers conclusions and recommendations.2.BackgroundIn the post Bretton–Woods international environment the U.S. dollar (USD) has been the preferred currenc

29、y for reserve denomination and the settling of international trade and capital transactions (Lee, 2010; Maziad et al., 2011; He and Yu, 2016). In all aspects, the USD remains pre-eminent despite an expected reversal in

30、 its fortunes due to the introduction of the euro and a perceived decline in US political and economic hegemony (see Chinn and Frankel, 2005). More recently there was hope that the new economic giant of China, might at

31、- tempt to better position its currency, the RMB, in international markets.Recent discussions investigating the role that the RMB now plays in international markets2 invariably compare China's recent experience wit

32、h the earlier experience of Japan (e.g. Kawai and Takagi, 2011). Two decades ago, Japan failed to fully internationalise its currency, the Japanese yen (JPY), despite having a commanding position in international trad

33、e and investment (Oi, Otani and Shirota, 2004; and Zhang, Makin and Bai, 2016). This remains the case today, based on evidence from the SWIFT message database.Earlier theoretical work by Krugman (1980) argued that econo

34、mically dominant countries should take on the role of a vehicle currency for international trade, settlement and financing both internationally or region- ally. The later work by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) also

35、highlighted the importance of economic size and dominance stating that the higher the market share of an exporting country in an industry, and the more differentiated its goods, the more likely would its exporters pric

36、e in the home currency. One possible explanation for the failure for other currencies to develop lies in the lack of a critical level of liquidity, in both relative and absolute terms, in foreign exchange, (e.g. Tchang

37、, 2011) and money markets, which would minimise transactions costs, especially for non-residents.Greenspan (2001) made this point when commenting on the likely role of the euro, following its introduction, suggesting t