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1、Introduction1HistyNotsolongagothescoffercouldsaythateconometricsgametheywerelikeJapanArgentina.Inthelate1940sbothdisciplinesbotheconomieswerefullofpromisepoisedfrapidgrowthreadytomakeaprofoundimpactonthewld.Weallknowwhat
2、happenedtotheeconomiesofJapanArgentina.Ofthedisciplineseconometricsbecameaninseparablepartofeconomicswhilegametheylanguishedasasubdisciplineinterestingtoitsspecialistsbutignedbytheprofessionasawhole.Thespecialistsingamet
3、heyweregenerallymathematicianswhocaredaboutdefinitionsproofsratherthanapplyingthemethodstoeconomicproblems.Gametheiststookprideinthediversityofdisciplinestowhichtheirtheycouldbeappliedbutinnonehaditbecomeindispensable.In
4、the1970stheanalogywithArgentinabrokedown.AtthesametimethatArgentinawasinvitingbackJuanPeroneconomistswerebeginningtodiscoverwhattheycouldachievebycombininggametheywiththestructureofcomplexeconomicsituations.Innovationint
5、heyapplicationwasespeciallyusefulfsituationswithasymmetricinfmationatempalsequenceofactionsthetwomajthemesofthisbook.Duringthe1980sgametheybecamedramaticallymeimptanttomainstreameconomics.Indeeditseemedtobeswallowingupmi
6、croeconomicsjustaseconometricshadswallowedupempiricaleconomics.GametheyisgenerallyconsideredtohavebegunwiththepublicationofvonNeumann&Mgenstern’sTheTheyofGamesEconomicBehaviourin1944.Althoughverylittleofthegametheyinthat
7、thickvolumeisrelevanttothepresentbookitintroducedtheideathatconflictcouldbemathematicallyanalyzedprovidedtheterminologywithwhichtodoit.Thedevelopmentofthe“Prisoner’sDilemma”(Tucker[unpub])Nash’spapersonthedefinitionexist
8、enceofequilibrium(Nash[1950b1951])laidthefoundationsfmodernnoncooperativegamethey.AtthesametimecooperativegametheyreachedimptantresultsinpapersbyNash(1950a)Shapley(1953b)onbargaininggamesGillies(1953)Shapley(1953a)onthec
9、e.By1953virtuallyallthegametheythatwastobeusedbyeconomistsfthenext20yearshadbeendeveloped.Untilthe1970sgametheyremainedanautonomousfieldwithlittlerelevancetomainstreameconomicsimptantexceptionsbeingSchelling’s1960bookThe
10、StrategyofConflictwhichintroducedthefocalpointaseriesofpapers(ofwhichDebreu&Scarf[1963]istypical)thatshowedtherelationshipoftheceofagametothegeneralequilibriumofaneconomy.Inthe1970sinfmationbecamethefocusofmanymodelsasec
11、onomistsstartedtoputemphasisonindividualswhoactrationallybutwithlimitedinfmation.When1July241999.May272002.ArielKemper.August62003.24March2005.EricRasmusen.Http:www.rasmusen.gGI.Footnotesstartingwithxxxaretheauth’snotest
12、ohimself.Commentsarewelcomed.Thissectioniszzzpageslong.1goesbacktothinkinginwdstryingtounderstmethanwhethertheproofsaremathematicallycrect.GoodtheyofanykindusesOccam’srazwhichcutsoutsuperfluousexplanationstheceterisparib
13、usassumptionwhichrestrictsattentiontooneissueatatime.Exemplifyingtheygoesastepfurtherbyprovidinginthetheyonlyanarrowanswertothequestion.AsFishersays“Exemplifyingtheydoesnottelluswhatmusthappen.Ratherittellsuswhatcanhappe
14、n.”InthesameveinatChicagoIhaveheardthestylecalled“StiesThatMightbeTrue.”Thisisnotdestructivecriticismifthemodellerismodestsincetherearealsoagreatmany“StiesThatCan’tBeTrue”whichareoftenusedasthebasisfdecisionsinbusinessgo
15、vernment.Justasthemodellershouldfeelhehasdoneagoodday’swkifhehaseliminatedmostoutcomesasequilibriainhismodelevenifmultipleequilibriaremainsoheshouldfeelusefulifhehasruledoutcertainexplanationsfhowthewldwksevenifmultiplep
16、lausiblemodelsremain.Theaimshouldbetocomeupwithonemestiesthatmightapplytoaparticularsituationthentrytostoutwhichstygivesthebestexplanation.Inthiseconomicscombinesthedeductivereasoningofmathematicswiththeanalogicalreasoni
17、ngoflaw.Acriticofthemathematicalapproachinbiologyhascomparedittoanhourglass(Slatkin[1980]).Firstabroadimptantproblemisintroduced.Seconditisreducedtoaveryspecialbuttractablemodelthathopestocaptureitsessence.Finallyinthemo
18、stperilouspartoftheprocesstheresultsareexpedtoapplytotheiginalproblem.Exemplifyingtheydoesthesamething.Theprocessisoneofsettingup“IfThen”statementswhetherinwdssymbols.Toapplysuchstatementstheirpremisesconclusionsneedtobe
19、verifiedeitherbycasualcarefulempiricism.Iftherequiredassumptionsseemcontrivedtheassumptionsimplicationscontradictrealitytheideashouldbediscarded.If“reality”isnotimmediatelyobviousdataisavailableeconometrictestsmayhelpsho
20、wwhetherthemodelisvalid.Predictionscanbemadeaboutfutureeventsbutthatisnotusuallytheprimarymotivation:mostofusaremeinterestedinexplainingunderstingthanpredicting.ThemethodjustdescribedisclosetohowaccdingtoLakatos(1976)mat
21、hematicaltheemsaredeveloped.Itcontrastssharplywiththecommonviewthattheresearcherstartswithahypothesisprovesdisprovesit.Insteadtheprocessofproofhelpsshowhowthehypothesisshouldbefmulated.Animptantpartofexemplifyingtheyiswh
22、atKreps&Spence(1984)havecalled“blackboxing”:treatingunimptantsubcomponentsofamodelinacursyway.Thegame“EntryfBuyout”ofsection15.4fexampleaskswhetheranewentrantwouldbeboughtoutbytheindustry’sincumbentproducersomethingthatd
23、ependsonduopolypricingbargaining.BothpricingbargainingarecomplicatedgamesinthemselvesbutifthemodellerdoesnotwishtodeflectattentiontothosetopicshecanusethesimpleNashCournotsolutionstothosegamesgoontoanalyzebuyout.Iftheent
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