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1、1,A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance,Kazuto SuzukiHokkaido Universitykazutos@juris.hokudai.ac.jp,Space systems are…,Critical for socio-economic welfareIndispensable for
2、modern military systemsVulnerable to intentional and unintentional damageDifficult to defend; difficult to deter attacks uponMost effectively defended through use of non-space means to increase the costs of attack,2,V
3、ulnerabilities in Space,Domain constraints do not permit substantially meaningful physical protectionHigh velocity due to orbital speeds of approximately 28,000 kilometers per hour mean virtually any impact can kill a s
4、atelliteSpace objects, human-origin debris, intentional attacksSolar flares, electromagnetic pulses also threats,3,Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Attacks,Incentives to attack may be substantial: Space assets are valuable, scar
5、ce, vulnerableAttacks are non-lethal (hence possibly seen as less escalatory), difficult to attribute, and could accord big first-mover advantagesAttribution can be difficult due to blind spotsKinetic ASATs: create la
6、rge debris cloudsInternational condemnation of China after 2007 test,4,Non-Kinetic ASAT Attacks: Cyber Attacks on Space Systems,Taking over satellites via hacking is possibleCommand and control systems for commercial
7、and civilian satellites are relatively vulnerableTaking over a satellite can make it a space weaponRadio-frequency problem:Not enough bandwidth for encrypted transmission leads to use of open frequencies which are mor
8、e vulnerable,5,Non-Kinetic, Non-Cyber ASAT Attacks,Methods include:Jamming: Interferes with up-link/down-link communications by overpowering the signals through radiofrequency interference so as to prevent transmissions
9、 from getting throughSpoofing: Intentionally feeds false information to devices or ground-based receivers by intercepting and overriding weak signals traveling between space and earthDazzling: Temporarily or permanentl
10、y damages functions of reconnaissance satellites using directed energy (lasers)Rendezvous and docking technology (also known as: killer satellites),6,Deterrence in Space is Very Difficult,Tit-for-tat is not an attractiv
11、e option:Different degree of dependency on space for various actorsCreation of space debris if kinetic attacks employed is also unappealingDeterrence by denial is difficult:Shooting down all the ground-based kinetic
12、attacks—costly, hardProtecting all radio transmissions—very hardProtecting all sensors—very hard,7,Deterrence in Space?,Life expectancy of satellites is long, posing challenges for modernizing space asset architectures
13、Space-based assets can be decades-oldUpgrading hardware to meet new challenges almost impossibleSoftware upgrades often limited by hardware capacityAttribution problem:Knowing the real motivations for actions in sp
14、ace extremely difficultSatellite failure could be caused by malfunction, debris,8,A Tallinn Manual for Space?,Tallinn Manual 1.0:A non-binding set of rules drafted by experts from around the world for use in applying i
15、nternational laws of armed conflict to cyberspaceTallinn Manual 2.0: Updated version suggests military retaliation to cyber-attack is not legitimate unless authorized by United NationsIf attack perpetrated by non-stat
16、e actor, victim requires consent of state where non-state actor is based to retaliate MILAMOS: Tallinn Manual for space is now being drafted,9,The Role of the U.S. – Japan Alliance in Space Deterrence,Increasing transpa
17、rency and shaping norms: Space Situational Awareness (SSA)Information sharing with international communityInternational rule-makingResilience/deterrence through (a measure of) denial:Increasing interoperability for
18、replacing and recovering assetsDeterrence through punishment: Prepare and plan for military actions to convince adversaries not to take actions against our space assets,10,Conclusions,Importance and vulnerability of sp
19、ace assets needs to be better understoodEspecially in JapanAlliance plays key roles for:TransparencyResilienceDeterrence through punishmentSpace attacks cannot be deterred by space means aloneDeterrence in space r
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