企業(yè)融資法一般原則與歐盟法的第一卷現(xiàn)金流，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，中介代理，信息【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯原文：原文：TheLawofCpateFinance:GeneralPrinciplesEULawVolumeI:CashFlowRiskAgencyInfmationInfmationInfmationEconomicsBefethe1960sitwasassumedintraditionalmicroeconomictheythateconomicagentswereperfectlyinfmed.Infmationhada

2、relativelypassivefunction.Inthe1960sStiglerintroducedtheideaofanoptimalsearchfinfmation.Theoptimalsearchfinfmationdependsonthemarginalcostsmarginalbenefitsofadditionalinfmation.Thisledtomoderninfmationeconomics.Moderninf

3、mationeconomicshasdevelopedtheiesabouttheconsequencesofimperfectinfmationinfmationasymmetries.Theiessuchasoptimalsearchsignalingscreeningadverseionmalhazardprincipalagentproblemsbelongtothebroadresearchprogrammeinthisfie

4、ld.In2001GegeAkerlofMichaelSpenceJosephStiglitzreceivedtheNobelPrizeftheiranalysesofmarketswithasymmetricinfmation.Problemsfmarketeconomies.Basicallyonecanidentifythreeclassesofproblemsthatinfmationcreatesfmarketeconomie

5、s:(1)problemsofinducingthesociallyoptimalamountofinvestmentinnewvaluableinfmation(2)problemsofinducinginfmationrevelationasapartofmarkettransactions(3)problemsthatindividualsgroupshaveinaccuratelyappropriatelytakinginfma

6、tionintoaccountintheirdecisionmaking.Thereisaconnectionbetweeninfmationrationalchoicebyindividuals.Thesetofalternativesfromwhichindividualschoosedependsontheirknowledgeabouttheactionstheycanchoosethepayoffsthatfollowfrom

7、them.Theirdecisionscanonlybesubjectivelyrationalbecausetheycanonlychoosetherelativelybestoptionwithinthelimitsoftheirsubjectiveknowledgeinfmation.Thelackoffalseinfmationcanleadtowrongdecisionswithnegativewealthimplicatio

8、ns.。MarketflemonsaccdingtoAkerlof.Nowinfmationisnotlikeothergoods.ThiscanbeillustratedwithwhatAkerlofcallsthemarketflemons.AccdingtoAkerloftherearegoodcarsbadcars(“l(fā)emons”).Buyersofnewcarsdonotknowinadvancewhetherthecarw

9、illbegoodalemon.SellersofGrossmanStiglitzwrote:(1)themeindividualswhoareinfmedthemeinfmativeisthepricesystem(2)thehigherthecostofinfmationthesmallerwillbetheproptionofindividualswhoareinfmed(3)thegreaterthemagnitudeofnoi

10、sethelargertheproptionofinfmedindividuals(4)whenthereisnonoisepricesconveyallinfmationthereisnoincentivetopurchaseinfmation.Fifthinfmationistransmittedbyvariouskindsofintermediaries.Infmationisaddedtobyindividualeconomic

11、agentsintermediaries.Sixthdifferentagentsengagedintransactionswitheachotherhavedifferentinfmationsetsagentsononesideofthemarketcanhavemuchbetterinfmationthanthoseontheotherside(theyofasymmetricinfmation).Theotheragentcan

12、possesshiddeninfmation.Fexamplebrowerstendtoknowmethanthelenderabouttheirownrepaymentprospects.Theotheragentcanalsotakehiddenactionaftercontracting.Fexamplethelenderdoesnotalwaysknowwhatbrowersdowiththemoney.Infmationala

13、symmetriescangiverisetoadverseiononmarketsthe“marketflemons”(Akerlof).Seventhsomegoodsare“searchgoods”“experiencegoods”“credencegoods”.Onecandeterminethequalityof“searchgoods”bysearchingthequalityof“experiencegoods”byexp

14、eriencingthem(Nelson).“Credencegoods”constituteacategyfwhichthenonexpertcannotverifythequalityattributesofthegoods(DarbyKarni).Theproblemofcredencegoodsarisesbecauseitissometimesdifficultfconsumerstodiscoverhowmuchoftheg

15、oodtheyactuallyneedthequalityofthegoodtheyweresupplied.Theyturntosellersofthegoodwhoactasexperts.Thismeansthatsellersnotonlyprovidethegoodsbuttheyalsoactasexpertsdetermininghowmuchofthegoodtheconsumersactuallyneed.Withsu

16、chcredencegoodsitisdifficultfconsumerstodiscoverhowmuchofthegoodtheyactuallyneedthequalityofthegoodtheyweresupplied.Theasymmetryininfmationthecostofverifyingtheexpert’sopinionisprohibitivelyhightherefecreatesthepossibili

17、tyofopptunisticbehavionthepartoftheexpert.Fexampleitisoftenimpossiblefthebuyertoverifytheexpert’sopinioninmedicallegalfinancialadviceservicesaswellasawidevarietyofrepairprofessions.DealingwithInfmationProblemsInthelighto