日本在歐盟投資的市場潛力和定位【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Market Potential and the Location of Japanese Investment in the European Union</p><p>　　Material Source: p

2、rovided by MIT Press in its journal</p><p>　　Author: Keith Head, Thierry Mayer</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　We investigate the hypothesis that firms prefer to locat

3、e “where the markets are.” We use a theoretical model of location choice under imperfect competition to formalize this concept. The model yields a profit function incorporating a term closely connected to the market pote

4、ntial index introduced by Harris in 1954. The location decision is a function of demand in all locations weighted by accessibility to consumers. We also show how the spatial distribution of competitors should be factored

5、 int</p><p>　　“We want to build our plants where the markets are.”</p><p>　　In December 1997, Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of Toyota, used the quote above to justify Toyota’s decision to build a fact

6、ory in northern France. At that time, analysts in the press largely attributed that decision to the low market share of the Japanese car manufacturer in France (1%) and in Europe in general (3%).The Toyota example sugges

7、ts that even in the zero-tariff internal market of Europe, firms still seek locations with superior market access. The managers of Toyota apparently thought that </p><p>　　This paper connects two previously

8、disparate strands of the economic geography literature. The first strand demonstrates a statistical tendency of firms to make the same location decision as previous firms with similar attributes (such as industry and nat

9、ional origin). While such “agglomeration effects” appear regularly in empirical work, they are consistent with a variety of explanations. The second strand comprises a large number of theoretical papers that focus on a p

10、articular mechanism of ag</p><p>　　We link the two strands by showing how to derive the firm’s location choice probabilities as a function of production costs and a demand variable closely linked to the meas

11、ure of “market potential” introduced by Harris (1954). We then take the model to the data, investigating whether location choices of Japanese affiliates in Europe are driven by market-access motivations`a la Krugman or s

12、ome other form of agglomeration effect. We find the demand-pull mechanism has some explanatory power but it </p><p>　　The impact of market potential on the location of producers and the wages they pay has be

13、en the subject of several recent papers. Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003) find that production increases on a more than one-for-one basis with demand (the “home market effect”) in many industries. Like their 1999 paper,

14、we focus on how demand affects the intra-national location of production. As with their 2003 paper, we construct a market potential measure that aggregates demand from multiple locations whil</p><p>　　Hanson

15、 (2001) estimates the relationship between county-level wages in the United States and market potential. Structural estimation of this equation reveals that wages in a county are increasing in demand emanating from all A

16、merican counties with weights declining exponentially with bilateral distance. Redding and Venables (forthcoming) follow a similar line of reasoning for international data using a bilateral trade equation of a theoretica

17、l model to obtain estimates of bilateral trade costs a</p><p>　　The literature on firm location choice has not previously estimated models directly derived from the Krugman model. Prior work has, of course,

18、considered demand but typically only local demand. Knowing the size of demand in each of the districts a firm might choose is not sufficient since firms can export to nearby locations. Some studies such as Friedman etal.

19、 (1992), Henderson et al. (1995), and Head et al. (1999) consider non-local demand but not using measures derived from theory. In particu</p><p>　　The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 we derive a line

20、ar-in-logs equation that relates the profitability of a location to a prospective foreign investor to a measure of that location’s access to demand. We then show how to estimate the distance and border effects that imped

21、e market access using bilateral trade data. In section 2 we report the results from the trade equation and show how we use them to calculate market potential. We then discuss our sample of Japanese investors and the set

22、</p><p>　　1 The Model</p><p>　　Let denote expenditure in a representative industry (we omit industry subscripts for notational simplicity) in region r. Consumers (who may be firms or individual

23、s) allocate their expenditures across differentiated varieties in the representative industry. They have constant elasticity of substitution sub-utility functions for each industry. Maximizing this sub-utility function s

24、ubject to expenditure,, and the delivered prices from all R possible product origins, we obtain the demand curve for </p><p><b>　　(1)</b></p><p>　　where is the delivered price faced

25、by consumers in region j (destination) for products from region i (origin). It is the product of the mill price and the trade cost factor, . Trade costs include all transaction costs associated with moving goods across

26、space and national borders.</p><p>　　1.1 The Profit Equation for Foreign Affiliates</p><p>　　Each firm sets its mill prices to maximize profits. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), firms treat

27、the elasticity of substitution,, as if it were the price elasticity of demand (this may also be interpreted as the assumption that each firm has infinitesimal market share). The resulting mill prices are simple mark-ups

28、over marginal costs, denoted Cr: Pr = Cr (σ/ ( σ? 1)).Substituting into (1), we obtain the quantity that a firm producing in region i would deliver to each destination region j:</p><p><b>　　(2)</b&g

29、t;</p><p>　　where .The gross profit earned in each destination region j for a firm producing in region i is</p><p><b>　　(3)</b></p><p>　　This gross profit is an increasi

30、ng function of the expenditure of country j on the considered industry. The fraction multiplying depends on the costs of the representative firm relative to its competitors from all R regions. In the numerator, we see t

31、hat profits are decreasing in local (region i) production costs. Lower trade costs to reach region j, i.e. a low , also raise profits. Since the effect of trade costs is always moderated by the elasticity of substitution

32、, we introduce the notation </p><p>　　Summing the gross profits earned in each market and subtracting the fixed costs Fr necessary to establish a plant in region r, we obtain the aggregate net profit, to be

33、earned in each potential location r:</p><p><b>　　(4)</b></p><p><b>　　where </b></p><p>　　We will refer to Mr as the “Krugman market potential” since an expr

34、ession of it first appears in Krugman (1992). The profit equation suggests that firms face a trade-off between low production costs and high market potential.</p><p>　　When a firm chooses its location, the o

35、nly relevant information is the ordering of the profits. Invariant fixed costs do not affect the profit ordering of regions and can therefore be omitted. For tractability, therefore, we assume that fixed costs do not dif

36、fer across locations. As monotonic transformations also leave the ordering unchanged, we will make four of them to create a simple and intuitive expression for profitability. Namely, we add F, multiply by σ, raise to the

37、 power of </p><p>　　1 /(σ-1), and take natural logs. Denoting the result as Ur we obtain</p><p><b>　　(5)</b></p><p>　　Equation (5) expresses the profitability for a firm

38、 of locating in region r as a very simple function that is decreasing in production costs and increasing in the Krugman market potential term.</p><p>　　Considering the cost term first, let us suppose that th

39、e variable cost function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns, using labor at cost and “other inputs” (such as land and intermediates) at cost . Labor’s share is α and represents total factor productivit

40、y. Thus, log marginal costs are given by</p><p>　　(6) </p><p>　　Substituting (6) into (5) and rearranging, we have</p><p><b>　　(7)</b></p

41、><p>　　We observe wages , and will calculateusing a method described in subsection 1.2. We do not observe and and they will be captured with several proxies and a random term observed by firms but not by the

42、econometrician.</p><p>　　The Krugman market potential aggregates the expenditures of all regions while adjusting for region r’s access , and for competition from firms located in other regions, . Analyzing

43、 the function, we can determine the assumptions that were implicit in the original Harris (1954) formulation of market potential. Specifically, if we set = 1 and = 1/, reduces to , i.e. the inverse-distance weighted

44、sum of incomes. In the Krugman market potential function, , the denominator, takes into the accou</p><p>　　The competition adjustment can help explain why otherwise identical firms would not all select the

45、same location. As more firms choose one region, the market there becomes more “crowded,” lowering , until another region is more profitable. This is not the only mechanism causing dispersion, however. Firms are not ident

46、ical and will therefore differ in their views of the prospective profitability of each region. This heterogeneity is analogous to “matching” in labor markets. In the context of our </p><p>　　The Krugman mark

47、et potential has the advantage of being derived rigorously from theory. However, unlike the Harris form, its calculation requires estimates of the unknown parameters and Gi. Our strategy will be to use information from

48、 international trade flows to estimate these parameters.</p><p>　　1.2 The Trade Equation</p><p>　　We do not observe trade flows between regions and must instead rely upon trade between nations t

49、o estimate the parameters that determine trade costs. Results from Wolf’s (2000) study of intra-national trade in the United States are reassuring in this respect since he finds distance effects resembling those found us

50、ing international trade data. We reinterpret equation (2) as giving the quantity exported by a representative firm in country I to country J (we reserve the lower case i and j to denot</p><p>　　Taking natura

51、l logs and grouping variables based on subscripts, we obtain</p><p><b>　　(8)</b></p><p>　　Following Redding and Venables (forthcoming), we will estimate the first two terms using exp

52、orter and importer fixed effects, denoted and .Bilateral market access, will be estimated as a function of distance , borders ( = 1 for I≠J), the sharing a common language (= 1 if I and J share a language and I≠J and 0

53、 otherwise) and an error term, . Parameters capturing the effect of distance, borders and language on trade volumes are denoted δ, and λ respectively: . We interpret border effects as comp</p><p><b>　　

54、(9)</b></p><p>　　The estimated parameters on trade costs and importers’ fixed effects are then used to construct the market potential variable that will be included in the location choice analysis of J

55、apanese firms in Europe. Recall that the market potential of region i is , where is the accessability of market j to goods shipped from region i. The formulas for calculating inter- and intra- regional access are</p&

56、gt;<p>　　when and I≠J</p><p>　　when i and j belong to the same country,</p><p>　　for intra-regional trade.</p><p>　　2 Econometric model and data</p><p>　　We esti

57、mate a model of location choice of 452 Japanese-owned affiliates that were established in 57 regions belonging to 9 European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the U

58、nited Kingdom) during the period 1984–1995. As can be seen in equation (5), we hypothesize that market potential is a key determinant of this decision. We construct market potential for 18 industries using the parameters

59、 estimated from the trade equation (9).</p><p>　　3 Location choice results</p><p>　　We begin with an assessment of the performance of our market potential variable in a conventional specificatio

60、n used in the literature. We therefore start with the non-nested conditional logit estimation of the region choices of Japanese firms in Europe. We then turn to a nested logit specification in which we first estimate the

61、 choice of region within a given nation and then estimate the choice of nation taking into account the attractiveness of its constituent regions .</p><p>　　4 Conclusion</p><p>　　We analyze the d

62、eterminants of location choices by Japanese firms in Europe. Our work is particularly concerned with the appropriate manner to take into account the spatial distribution of demand in location decisions. We rigourously li

63、nk the optimal location choice of Japanese investors to a theoretical model of imperfect competition in a multi-location setting. The underlying profit equation incorporates a term that is closely related to the market p

64、otential index originally introduced and use</p><p>　　We find that demand does matter for location choice: A ten percent increase in our market potential term raises the chance of a region being chosen by th

65、ree to eleven percent, depending on the specification. Despite the fact that we bring theory to empirical implementation in a structural way, the “correct” measure of market potential actually underperforms the atheoreti

66、cal Harris (1954) measure. Moreover, non-structural agglomeration variables retain a robust influence. These results suggests t</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　日本在歐盟投資的市場潛力和定位</p>

67、<p>　　資料來源:麻省理工學院出版社 作者：Keith Head,Thierry Mayer</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　我們研究這個假說即企業(yè)更愿意查找“哪里有市場?！蔽覀冇靡粋€在不完全競爭市場狀態(tài)下的區(qū)位選擇的理論模型來使概念更正式化。該模型產(chǎn)生了利潤的功能并包含一個術(shù)語，且與哈里斯在1954引進的

68、市場潛力指標密切相聯(lián)系。區(qū)位的選擇是一種功能的需求，該需求是由所有地點中消費者的可取性來衡量的。我們還展示了如何將競爭者的空間分布計入?yún)^(qū)位選擇因素。然后我們有經(jīng)驗地執(zhí)行這個模型，比較我們在理論上衍生的哈里斯術(shù)語以及專案集聚變量當中關(guān)于市場潛力的措施。我們的樣本包括了日本企業(yè)在1984年和1995年間企業(yè)等級區(qū)位選擇因素，然后在我們的分析中既使用了國家選擇因素的信息，也使用了每個國家中地區(qū)選擇因素的信息。我們的結(jié)果表明市場潛力對區(qū)位選擇有

69、很大關(guān)系，但是傳統(tǒng)集聚變量在區(qū)位決定上扮演著很重要的角色。</p><p>　　“我們想要把我們的企業(yè)建立在有市場的地方”</p><p>　　1997年12月，奧田碩，豐田的董事長，用上面引述證明了豐田在法國北部興建一個工廠的決定是合乎情理的。當時，分析師在很大程度上歸因分析該決定即對于日本汽車制造商的低市場份額大體上在法國（1%）和歐洲（3%）。豐田的例子表明即使是在零關(guān)稅的歐洲內(nèi)部市

70、場，企業(yè)仍尋求有優(yōu)越市場使用權(quán)的位置。豐田的管理者顯然認為他們在英國現(xiàn)有的生產(chǎn)場地并不足以緊密地跟法國市場聯(lián)系。華爾街日報報道“豐田希望2001年在法國開設(shè)工廠后擁有其3%的市場份額?！?lt;/p><p>　　本文連接了兩個預(yù)先不相干的經(jīng)濟地理文學的兩條鏈。第一鏈證明企業(yè)運用統(tǒng)計的趨勢做相同的區(qū)位選擇決定，如同先前的企業(yè)會有相似的屬性（比如說產(chǎn)業(yè)和國家的起源）。盡管這種“集聚效應(yīng)”定時地出現(xiàn)在經(jīng)驗性的工作中，但是他

71、們與各種解釋是相一致的。第二鏈包含了大量的理論文章，這些文章側(cè)重于集聚的特殊機制：也就是說，生產(chǎn)商集中于最高的需求市場，并且通過出口為較小的市場服務(wù)。</p><p>　　我們連接兩條子鏈通過顯示如何獲得企業(yè)地點選擇的可能性，作為生產(chǎn)成本和可變需求的功能緊密地與由哈里斯（1954）介紹的市場潛力措施聯(lián)系在一起。然后，我們采用模型的數(shù)據(jù)，調(diào)查在歐洲的日本子公司的區(qū)位選擇是否源自于克魯格曼的市場準入動機驅(qū)動或者其他形

72、式的集聚效應(yīng)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)需求拉動機制有一定的解釋力，但它似乎沒有解釋整個經(jīng)驗的集聚效應(yīng)。</p><p>　　市場潛力在生廠商廠址的影響和他們的工資支付一直是最近幾個論文題目。戴維斯和溫斯坦（1999,2003）發(fā)現(xiàn)，在許多工業(yè)領(lǐng)域，生產(chǎn)增加了更多以需求（下稱“國內(nèi)市場效應(yīng)”）為基礎(chǔ)的一換一。像他們1999年的論文中，我們集中討論需求如何影響國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)地點。正如在2003年論文中，我們構(gòu)造一個市場潛力的措施，該措施聚

73、合了多個位置的需求，同時扣除距離通過使用一個參數(shù)，該參數(shù)是從使用雙邊貿(mào)易流向的一步估計中得到的。除了距離的影響，我們的措施包含了對邊界貿(mào)易的影響以及為了競爭在理論上做出的調(diào)整。</p><p>　　漢森（2001）估計了美國縣級工資和市場潛力之間的關(guān)系。這個方程結(jié)構(gòu)的估計揭露，一個縣的工資在需求上增長是源自美國所有縣和體重指數(shù)的下降以及雙邊的距離。雷丁和維納布爾斯（即將出版）遵循一個相似的國際數(shù)據(jù)推理路線通過使用

74、一個雙邊貿(mào)易方程的理論模型，從而取得雙邊貿(mào)易成本的估計以及每個國家的市場和供應(yīng)無障礙的估計。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)國際不平等是和市場準入差異緊密聯(lián)系在一起的。克羅澤（2000）使用相同的理論框架，并表明，移民流動也應(yīng)對市場的潛力。</p><p>　　文學在企業(yè)地點選擇上并沒有像原先估計模型那樣直接從克魯格曼模型中獲得。在此之前的工作，當然，通常只考慮需求，但具有代表性的僅僅是本地需求。了解在該地區(qū)的每一家企業(yè)可能選擇的需求大

75、小是不充分的，因為企業(yè)可以出口到鄰近的地點。一些研究，如弗里德曼的研究（1992），恒基（1995）和海德（1999）考慮非本地需求，但沒有使用從理論中推導(dǎo)的措施。尤其，理論認為，非本地的需求必須被優(yōu)惠根據(jù)雙邊貿(mào)易障礙。此外，當企業(yè)競爭對手進入同一市場時，大量的市場準入對利潤的貢獻就更少。我們遵循克魯格曼（1992年指標）在調(diào)整市場潛力的措施，并把競爭對手的位置考慮在內(nèi)。</p><p>　　本文收益如下。在第1

76、部分我們得出一個線性的記錄方程，關(guān)系到一個位置的盈利，并為將來可能的外國投資者到該位置測量所獲得的需求。然后，我們展示了如何估計阻礙市場準入的距離和邊界效應(yīng)通過利用雙邊的貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)。在第2部分，我們報道的結(jié)果是從貿(mào)易方程引出的，并顯示我們?nèi)绾卫盟鼈儊碛嬎愕氖袌鰸摿ΑＨ缓?，我們討論日本投資者的樣例和可能的地點的選擇集。我們的位置的選擇結(jié)果詳列于第3部分，且在第4部分作出結(jié)論并提出了在今后的工作方向。</p><p>

77、;<b>　　1　模型</b></p><p>　　設(shè)表示一個有代表性的工業(yè)支出（我們省略簡譜記譜法簡單行業(yè)中的下標區(qū))在地區(qū)r。消費者（可能是企業(yè)或個人）把他們的支出分配在不同行業(yè)中具有代表性的品種上。他們對每個行業(yè)的替代分不變彈性效用函數(shù)。最大化這個分效用函數(shù)受開支，，產(chǎn)品來源和可能的來自于所有R的交付價格的影響，我們獲得該行業(yè)的需求曲線為代表品種，正如： </p><

78、;p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　其中，表示在區(qū)域J消費者面臨的已定好的價格（目的地）是來自地區(qū)I的產(chǎn)品（來源）。這是該工廠的產(chǎn)品價格和貿(mào)易成本因素。貿(mào)易成本包括流動貨物跨越空間和國界相關(guān)聯(lián)的交易費用。</p><p>　?。保薄【惩夥种C構(gòu)利潤等式</p><p>　　每個企業(yè)設(shè)置它的工廠價格以實現(xiàn)利潤最大化。依據(jù)

79、迪克西特和斯蒂格利茨（1977），企業(yè)對待替代彈性σ，就好像它是需求的價格彈性（這也可能解釋為共享，前提是每個企業(yè)有無限小的市場）。由此產(chǎn)生的廠價格簡單加價超過邊際成本，表示為Cr: Pr = Cr(σ/( σ? 1))。代入（1），我們得到一個企業(yè)在地區(qū)i生產(chǎn)的數(shù)量將傳送給每個目的地區(qū)域j：</p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　其中 ，在

80、目的地區(qū)域j所賺取的毛利為企業(yè)在區(qū)域i生產(chǎn)的是</p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　這些毛利是國家j在考慮產(chǎn)業(yè)上的一個增大開支功能。該分數(shù)乘以依賴于所有R地區(qū)與競爭對手相關(guān)的代表公司的相對成本。在分子上，我們可以看出在當?shù)兀ǖ貐^(qū)i）生產(chǎn)成本的利潤是下降的。降低貿(mào)易成本以達到地區(qū)j，也就是一個低也可以提高利潤。由于貿(mào)易成本的影響始終是由替代彈

81、性所調(diào)節(jié)的，我們引進了記號來測量出口商進入市場j所獲得的市場因子。分母包含了競爭的供應(yīng)商相應(yīng)的特點。需要注意的是分母項乘以σ，捕捉住想法：當品種相互之間的區(qū)別更少，競爭就更激烈，因此利潤就會更少。</p><p>　　總結(jié)在每個市場賺取的毛利和減去固定成本，在地區(qū)r設(shè)立子工廠是有必要的，我們獲得凈利潤總額，是在每一個潛力地點r得到的：</p><p><b>　?。?）</

82、b></p><p><b>　　其中 ，</b></p><p>　　我們將會參考“克魯格曼的市場潛力”為，因為關(guān)于它的表達首次出現(xiàn)在克魯格曼（1992年）中。利潤方程表明，企業(yè)面臨著一個與貿(mào)易之間的低生產(chǎn)成本和高市場潛力。</p><p>　　當一家企業(yè)選擇它的位置，唯一相關(guān)的信息是利潤的驅(qū)使。不變的固定費用不影響利潤的地區(qū)排序，因此

83、可以省略。對于可追蹤性，因此，我們假設(shè)固定成本在所跨區(qū)域并不相同。由于單調(diào)的轉(zhuǎn)變也使排序不變，我們將其中4個為盈利創(chuàng)造一個簡單而直觀的表達。也就是說，我們添加F，乘以σ，提高到1 /(σ-1)，并采取自然對數(shù)。這就意指我們得到的結(jié)果為Ur </p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　方程（5）表達了對在區(qū)域r的公司定位是一個非常簡單的功能，即是降

84、低生產(chǎn)成本和增加克魯格曼潛在市場的長期盈利能力。</p><p>　　考慮到成本來說，首先讓我們假定可變成本函數(shù)被假設(shè)為與報酬不變的柯布—道格拉斯，利用勞動力成本和“其他投入”（如土地和中間體）成本。勞動力份額為，并且代表全要素生產(chǎn)率。因此，對數(shù)邊際成本可以通過</p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　把（6）代入到（5

85、）并重新安排，我們可以得到</p><p><b>　　（7）</b></p><p>　　我們觀察工資，并且將通過使用1.2小節(jié)所描述的方法計算。我們并不觀察和，他們將會被數(shù)個代理數(shù)所替代和一個由企業(yè)而不是計量經(jīng)濟學家任命的隨機指數(shù)?？唆敻衤氖袌鰸摿傆嬃怂械貐^(qū)的支出，同時為地區(qū)r的使用權(quán)和定位在其地區(qū)的公司的競爭者作了調(diào)整。分析其功能，我們可以判斷所做的假設(shè)隱

86、含在最初的哈里斯（1954年）關(guān)于市場潛力的表達方式中。更具體地說，如果我們使以及=1/，減少到，也就是逆距離加權(quán)的收入總和。在克魯格曼市場潛力的功能中，、分母、考慮到來自r地區(qū)企業(yè)的競爭，以及r地區(qū)企業(yè)面對來自其他地區(qū)的出口競爭對手的公司，為每個出口市場j的需求服務(wù)。對競爭的適應(yīng)增加了對手的數(shù)量，減少了他們的貿(mào)易量和生產(chǎn)成本。</p><p>　　對競爭的適應(yīng)調(diào)整可以解釋為什么相同的企業(yè)并不會選擇相同的位置。隨

87、著越來越多的企業(yè)選擇一個地區(qū)，那里的市場變得更加“擁擠”，更低的，直到另一個區(qū)域是更有利可圖。然而，這并不是唯一的途徑造成的地理空間分布。企業(yè)是不相同的，因此在各地區(qū)的未來盈利能力上有不同的意見。這異質(zhì)性是類似于勞動市場上“市場匹配”。在我們模型內(nèi)容中，這個異質(zhì)性可以被看作是企業(yè)特定變動的區(qū)域生產(chǎn)力。</p><p>　　在克魯格曼市場潛力的優(yōu)點是從理論中嚴密推導(dǎo)出來的。然而，并不像哈里斯的形式那樣，其計算需要對

88、未知參數(shù)和進行估計。我們的策略是使用從國際貿(mào)易流動中得到的信息來估計這些參數(shù)。</p><p><b>　　1．2　貿(mào)易方程</b></p><p>　　我們不遵守地區(qū)之間的貿(mào)易流向，相反的是，我們必須依靠國家間的貿(mào)易來估計參數(shù)，從而確定貿(mào)易成本。從Wolf（2000）關(guān)于美國國家內(nèi)部貿(mào)易的研究中得出的結(jié)果方面是令人欣慰的，因為他發(fā)現(xiàn)了距離會影響類似于那些被發(fā)現(xiàn)在使用

89、的國際貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)。我們重新解釋方程（2）通過給國家I到國家J的代表公司一定數(shù)量進行出口（我們保留小寫i和j來表示原產(chǎn)地和目的地地區(qū)）。國家I出口到國家J的總價值量，表示為XIJ，所給的數(shù)量由來自Y的一個代表性的多樣性公司出口，并乘以價格和來自J的不同品種的數(shù)量：</p><p>　　采取自然對數(shù)和基于分組的下標變量，我們得到</p><p><b>　?。?）</b>&

90、lt;/p><p>　　遵循雷丁和維納布爾斯（即將出版），我們將使用出口商和進口商的固定效應(yīng)估計前兩個條件，標記為EXI和IMJ。雙邊市場的準入，將被估計作為距離函數(shù)，邊界（BIJ=1且I≠J），共享同一種術(shù)語（LIJ=1 如果I和J共享同一種術(shù)語且I≠J但0除外）和一個誤差項，即。參數(shù)占據(jù)的距離效應(yīng)、邊界和在貿(mào)易額上的術(shù)語分別標記為δ、βJ和λ：。我們把邊界效應(yīng)理解為包括顧客的家庭消費偏好和政府采購，技術(shù)標準差，匯

91、率的不確定性，以及關(guān)于潛在貿(mào)易伙伴的不完全信息。該規(guī)范允許邊界效應(yīng)橫跨不同的進口，其中大部分是由具有經(jīng)驗性的證據(jù)所支持的（見陳，即將出版）。這估計后的方程為</p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　在貿(mào)易成本和進口商固定效應(yīng)上的估計參數(shù)被用來構(gòu)造市場潛力的變量，這些變量將被包括在日本公司在歐洲的區(qū)位選擇分析之內(nèi)?；叵胍幌?，區(qū)域i的市場潛力是，其

92、中表示市場j的可取貨物是從地區(qū)i運送的。計算區(qū)域之間和區(qū)域內(nèi)部進入的公式是</p><p><b>　　，當且I≠J。</b></p><p>　　，當i和j屬于同一個國家，</p><p><b>　　表示區(qū)域內(nèi)貿(mào)易。</b></p><p>　　2　計量經(jīng)濟模型和數(shù)據(jù)</p>&l

93、t;p>　　我們估計了452日資子公司的區(qū)位選擇模型，這些子公司在1984—1995年間被設(shè)立在57個地區(qū)，并隸屬9個歐洲國家（比利時，法國，德國，愛爾蘭，意大利，荷蘭，西班牙，葡萄牙和英國）。根據(jù)方程（5），我們假設(shè)市場潛力是該選擇的一個關(guān)鍵性決定因素。我們?yōu)?8種行業(yè)構(gòu)筑市場潛力通過使用從貿(mào)易方程（9）估計得到的參數(shù)。</p><p><b>　　3　區(qū)位選擇結(jié)果</b></

94、p><p>　　我們開始我們的市場表現(xiàn)的潛在變量的評估在使用了傳統(tǒng)的文學規(guī)范。因此，我們開始用非嵌套的有條件的羅吉特來估計日本企業(yè)在歐洲的地區(qū)選擇。然后，我們轉(zhuǎn)向一個嵌套羅吉特規(guī)范中，我們首先估計一個給定范圍內(nèi)的國家選擇的區(qū)域，然后估計該國的選擇，同時把構(gòu)成該地區(qū)的吸引力考慮在內(nèi)。</p><p><b>　　4　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　

95、我們通過日本在歐洲投資的企業(yè)分析了區(qū)位選擇的決定性因素。我們的工作特別關(guān)注用適當?shù)姆绞絹砜紤]區(qū)位決定上空間分布的要求。在多區(qū)位設(shè)置上，我們嚴格地把日本投資者最理想的區(qū)位選擇與在不完全競爭狀態(tài)下的理論模型聯(lián)系在一起。這個潛在的利潤方程包含了基本盈利術(shù)語，該術(shù)語與最初引進并被地理學家（哈里斯，1954）使用的市場潛力指標密切相關(guān)。我們的理論衍生的術(shù)語聚集了空間分布的要求，這是由貿(mào)易成本和地區(qū)潛在的競爭對手來權(quán)衡的。我們估計邊界和距離效應(yīng)決定

96、了市場準入使用的是雙邊貿(mào)易方程，暗示著同樣的模型生成利潤方程。</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)需求對于區(qū)位的選擇有很大的關(guān)系：根據(jù)詳細說明，我們的市場潛力增長百分之十提高了一個地區(qū)長期潛在被選的機會為百分之三到百分之十一。盡管事實說明我們帶來的理論用一個結(jié)構(gòu)性的方式根據(jù)經(jīng)驗實施，但是“正確的”市場潛在的措施實際效果不佳，哈里斯的措施缺乏理論基礎(chǔ)。此外，非結(jié)構(gòu)性的聚集變量保持了一個強健的影響。這些結(jié)果表明克魯格曼（1