外文翻譯--社會保障和雙職工家庭（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3050字,1790單詞，9900英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Kaygusuz R. Social Security and Two-Earner Households[C]// 2007 Meeting Papers. Society for Economic Dynamics, 2007.</p><p><b>　　一、英文</b&g

2、t;</p><p>　　Social security and two-earner households</p><p>　　Remzi Kaygusuz</p><p>　　1.Introduction</p><p>　　Due to aging of US population, reforming its social secur

3、ity system has been a hot topic for policy makers as well as academic economists in the past decades.1 Many reform proposals, including elimination of the current pay-as-you-go system, have been widely discussed and stud

4、ied. Most of the discussions overlook the fact that elimination of the current system will also eliminate the intragenerational redistribution that is built into the system. Implications of eliminating major redistributi

5、ve </p><p>　　Current workers face a flat payroll tax rate up to a cap level of earnings. Monthly benefit entitlement of a retiree, i.e, Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is a function of average past earnings.

6、 The overall system is generally thought to be progressive since this function replaces a larger fraction of past earnings for lower earners than higher earners. However, spousal and survivor's benefit provisions may

7、 break this relation between one's past earnings and retirement income.</p><p>　　Existing system gives a married retiree the right to collect the higher of own PIA and the spousal benefit, a provision th

8、at is equal to 50% of the spouse's PIA. Hence, the system pays retirement income to some individuals who never pay payroll taxes. For instance, a lifelong single-earner married household collects 150% of the PIA of t

9、he breadwinner every month upon retirement.3 In addition, a survivor gets the higher of own PIA and the survivor's benefit, a provision that amounts to 100% of th</p><p>　　The earnings cap is another red

10、istributive policy of the social security. Workers do not pay social security taxes for their earnings in excess of the earnings cap, hence, high earners face a lower marginal tax rate than the others. This policy makes

11、the social security more regressive.</p><p>　　This paper contributes to the literature by addressing the following quantitative questions. What are the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of eliminating t

12、hese policies, while keeping the pay-as-you go system intact? How much labor supply of different households, in particular, labor supply of married females, respond to this policy reform? Who gains, who loses, and by how

13、 much? What kind of an intragenerational redistribution is eliminated? Would a majority of households support such a po</p><p>　　With these questions in mind, I build and calibrate a general equilibrium over

14、lapping generations model with capital and heterogenous agents. Agents start out as married or single, and their marital status do not change over the life-cycle. After retirement, each agent faces a gender and age depen

15、dent mortality risk. Agents have certain education levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend on agents' education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on labor supply of i</p>&l

16、t;p>　　Eliminating the spousal and survivor's benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits, and the earnings cap all at once raises output by 1.2%, while raising capital by 2.1%, and, labor by 0.7%. Only sourc

17、e of the rise in labor is a 5.5% rise in the labor force participation of married females. Labor supply of workers along intensive margin decreases at a negligible amount. At the same time, aggregate welfare increases by

18、 about 0.4%, while a majority of households experience positive welfare g</p><p>　　There are substantial changes in labor force participation rate of married females. The changes range between 2% and 10.7%.

19、A larger fraction of relatively low skilled married females respond to the policy reform by starting to participate in the labor market.</p><p>　　A substantial amount of redistribution from married household

20、s with high skilled spouses to married households with low skilled spouses is eliminated. On average, retirement benefits of married households composed of spouses with less than high school degree decrease by 22.4%, whe

21、reas retirement benefits of married households composed of spouses with more than college education increase by 23.2%.</p><p>　　Even though the married households with lowest skilled spouses experience the b

22、iggest decline in retirement income, they are not the biggest losers of this policy reform. Married households composed of relatively low skilled females and high skilled males, who are mostly single-earners, incur large

23、r welfare losses (as much as 1.1%). On the other hand the ones with relatively high skilled females, who are mostly two-earners, experience substantial welfare gains (as much as 1.9%). Among single ind</p><p&g

24、t;　　To see where these overall effects are coming form, I evaluate the consequences of eliminating each of the redistributive policies one by one.</p><p>　　The substantial rise in female labor force particip

25、ation is due to the elimination of the spousal and survivor's benefits. This provision discourages many married females from work at young ages by increasing value of non-participation.</p><p>　　The gain

26、s in aggregate welfare are largely due to the elimination of the spousal and survivor's benefits. Elimination of the progressive calculation contributes negatively to the aggregate welfare, while elimination of the e

27、arnings cap slightly increases the aggregate welfare.</p><p>　　Elimination of the spousal and survivor's benefits is the reason why single-earner married households, the ones with high skilled males and

28、low skilled females, experience the larger losses in welfare. Married households with two-earners, the ones with high skilled members, experience large welfare gains because of the elimination of both the progressive cal

29、culation of benefits and the spousal and survivor's benefits. Elimination of the latter policy benefits these households due to a general eq</p><p>　　Related literature: Liebman (2002) is the first paper

30、 that attempts to measure the intragenerational redistribution due to the rules of social security. It is a microsimulation exercise that is able to capture all of the heterogeneity available in the data. However, this s

31、tudy fails to account for the behavioral and general equilibrium implications of counter-factual changes in social security rules. Moreover, it is silent about welfare effects of such changes. As I discuss below, elimina

32、ting th</p><p>　　Nishiyama (2010) studies implications of eliminating spousal and survivor's benefit provisions using a general equilibrium model with uninsurable wage shocks. Main differences betw

33、een this paper and Nishiyama (2010) are (i) it does not model female labor force participation explicitly, (ii) it does not study implications of progressivity of benefit calculations and earnings cap and hence does not

34、evaluate all redistributive aspects of social security, (iii) it only considers married househ</p><p>　　Distributional consequences of reforming US Social Security have been previously studied by Huggett and

35、 Ventura (1999) and Conesa and Krueger (1999). None of these papers focus on distributional aspects of social security that affect mainly two-earner households. They focus on heterogeneous single-earner agents, hence, ca

36、nnot capture consequences of eliminating spousal and survivor' benefits. However, this paper shows that eliminating these provisions implies a substantial intragenerational redi</p><p>　　Finally, the mod

37、el economy detailed below has many common elements with Kaygusuz (2010) and Guner et al. (2012a,b). Additionally, current paper has a better representation of US Social Security, which is critical for the questions posed

38、 by this paper.</p><p>　　Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details specifics of the model. Section 3 describes the parameterization of the benchmark economy. Section 4 has a detailed descr

39、iption of the reforms that I study together with the findings. Section 5 concludes.</p><p>　　A life-cycle model with two-earner households</p><p>　　In this section I lay out the details of a sta

40、tionary general equilibrium life-cycle model populated with single and married households.</p><p>　　Demographics: The economy is populated by overlapping generations that consists of a continuum of males and

41、 a continuum of females. Every period a new generation of individuals is born. The population growth rate is given with n. Agents in this economy live at most J periods. They begin life as workers and retire after the ma

42、ndatory retirement age jR. Starting with the last period of working life, an agent faces a positive mortality risk at the end of each period. In particular a</p><p>　　person with gender i, with I, i∈｛m,f｝, f

43、aces a survival probability of ρij from age j to age j +1. Each agent enters economic life as married or single. I assume that a constant fraction ? of the newborns are married and the rest are single. There is no divorc

44、e or marriage over the life-cycle.</p><p><b>　　二、譯文</b></p><p>　　社會保障和雙職工家庭</p><p>　　Remzi Kaygusuz</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　由于美

45、國人口的老齡化，社會保障制度改革在過去幾十年一直是一個為政策制定者和搞學(xué)術(shù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家討論和研究的熱門話題。許多改革建議，像取消當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付制度，已被廣泛地討論和研究。大部分的討論忽略一個事實(shí)，那就是:取消當(dāng)前制度也將取消該制度的一個組成部分---代內(nèi)重新分配。主要社會保障再分配政策的取消對勞動力供給和福利的影響，在宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動態(tài)平衡分析和公共財(cái)政的文獻(xiàn)中尚未研究。本文填補(bǔ)了這一空白。</p><p>　　當(dāng)前工

46、人面臨著固定工資稅率達(dá)到收益的上限水平的問題。一位退休人員的月福利津貼，也就是說，基本保險金額(PIA)，是過去平均收入的函數(shù)。通常，人們認(rèn)為整個制度是進(jìn)步的，因?yàn)檫@個函數(shù)所取代的較低收入人群過去收入的部分比較高收入者的要高。然而，配偶和幸存者的利益條款會打破過去收益和退休收入之間的這種關(guān)系。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)有制度下，已婚的退休人員有權(quán)獲取比自己PIA更高的金額以及配偶利益，即規(guī)定相當(dāng)于配偶PIA的50%

47、。因此，該制度為那些從來沒有交過工資稅的人提供退休收入。例如，終生單職工婚姻家庭中的職工一經(jīng)退休，該家庭每月則會享有該職工PIA的150%的津貼。此外，幸存者獲得比自己PIA更高的金額以及享有幸存者的利益，該條款規(guī)定金額為配偶PIA的100%。盡管這些規(guī)定能夠?yàn)樵S多婚姻家庭提供援助，但它們可能會無形中提高非就業(yè)價值，從而減少年輕次要收入者進(jìn)入勞動力市場的數(shù)量。此外，這些規(guī)定使該制度產(chǎn)生了一種重要的代內(nèi)再分配制度。該制度可能會面向許多有資

48、格享受這些規(guī)定的單職工婚姻家庭和雙職工家庭進(jìn)行重新分配。此外，盡管更大一部分低收入者婚姻家庭能夠享有配偶和幸存者的利益，但這些規(guī)定并不一定具有進(jìn)步意義。由于配偶和幸存者利益是隨該家庭中主要收入者過去的平均收入而增加的，因此這些規(guī)定對那些受益者們來說是退步的。</p><p>　　收益上限是另一個社會保障再分配政策。對收入超過收益上限的部分，工人不需繳納社保稅。因此，高收入者比其他人的邊際稅率要低。這一政策使得社會

49、保障更加退步。</p><p>　　本文通過解決以下定量問題，促成了該文獻(xiàn)。消除這些政策的同時保持即付系統(tǒng)正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，從宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和福利角度來講有什么后果？有多少不同家庭的勞動力供給，尤其是已婚女性的勞動力供給會因此項(xiàng)政策改革而發(fā)生變化？誰收益？誰虧損？收益多少錢？虧損多少錢？取消一種什么類型的代內(nèi)再分配？這項(xiàng)政策改革會得到大多數(shù)家庭的支持嗎?</p><p>　　帶著這些問題，我構(gòu)建和校準(zhǔn)

50、了世代交疊模型的一般均衡，模型有資本和當(dāng)事人。當(dāng)事人是已婚還是單身，開始就已確定，他們的婚姻狀況終生不會改變。退休后，每個當(dāng)事人面臨著性別和年齡相關(guān)的死亡風(fēng)險。當(dāng)事人有一定的教育水平和工資概況，而工資則取決于當(dāng)事人的教育水平和性別。家庭是決策者，決定著其家庭成員的勞動力供給和儲蓄。已婚家庭的勞動供給決策是聯(lián)合決定，涉及女性勞動力市場的參與。有兩個收入者的家庭承擔(dān)額外的固定效用成本，而成本因家庭而異。除了收入和資本稅，工人還繳納社會保障稅

51、。在當(dāng)前制度中，一位退休員工的PIA由一個分段線性凹函數(shù)決定。符合條件的已婚家庭享受配偶利益條款，而符合條件的幸存者享有生存利益條款。校準(zhǔn)模型經(jīng)濟(jì)與2000美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的特征非常相似?；鶞?zhǔn)經(jīng)濟(jì)與對性別引起的工資差距、工資溢價以及不同受教育水平的已婚女性勞動力參與度以及婚姻的排序結(jié)構(gòu)的觀測結(jié)果是一致的。稅收的結(jié)構(gòu)與2000年支付所得稅非常相似。</p><p>　　、漸進(jìn)計(jì)算效益以及收益上限后，總產(chǎn)量增加1.2%，資本

52、增加2.1%，勞動力增加0.7%。只有參加勞動的已婚女性中勞動力起增點(diǎn)為5.5%。高利潤勞動力的供應(yīng)量已稍微下降。 同時，總福利增加了約0.4%，大部分家庭擁有良好的福利收益。</p><p>　　已婚女性的勞動力參與率發(fā)生了巨大的變化，該變化處于2%與10.7%之間。只有一小部分技術(shù)相對較低的已婚女性對政策改革做出了反應(yīng)，他們開始進(jìn)入勞動力市場。</p><p>　　從高技術(shù)婚配家庭到低

53、技術(shù)婚配家庭，大量重新分配已經(jīng)被取消。高中一下學(xué)歷的婚配家庭，其退休恤金平局降低了22.4%，而大學(xué)以上婚配家庭，其退休恤金平均增加了23.2%。</p><p>　　雖然技術(shù)最低的婚配家庭的退休收入下降最多，但他們并不是這場政策改革最慘的輸家。女方技術(shù)水平相對較低，男方技術(shù)水平相對較高，且雙方多是單一收入人群，這樣組成的家庭福利受損最嚴(yán)重（約1.1%）另一方面，那些女方相對技術(shù)水平更高且多是雙職工的家庭，其福利

54、增長就很樂觀（約1.9%）在單身人群中，高技術(shù)的單身人士福利增加（約2.7%），而很低技術(shù)的女職工福利則下降（1.2%）</p><p>　　為了找出這些影響由何而來，我將一一分析取消每個重新分配政策的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　由于取消了遺屬恤金，參加勞動的女性急劇增加。通過增加不參加勞動的人們的價值，使得很多年輕的已婚女性不愿意參加工作。</p><p>　　總

55、福利的增加很大程度上也因?yàn)槎a(chǎn)生。取消漸進(jìn)計(jì)算效益對總福利有消極影響，而稍微取消收入上限則增加了總福利。</p><p>　　對于男性技術(shù)較高，女性技術(shù)較低的單一收入的婚配家庭而言，使得他們的福利受損最嚴(yán)重。對于雙雙都是高技術(shù)人員的婚配家庭而言，正是因?yàn)槿∠藵u進(jìn)計(jì)算收益和遺屬恤金才獲得大量福利收入。由于對退休恤金的影響力度較平衡，因此有益于這些家庭。另一方面，取消收入收入上限后，高收入人群的繳納的稅金增加。因此

56、，取消收入上限對于有高收入男性的婚配家庭的福利而言有一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)負(fù)面影響。</p><p>　　相關(guān)文獻(xiàn): Liebman (2002)是第一篇試圖測量基于社會保障規(guī)則進(jìn)行的代內(nèi)再分配的論文。這是一個微觀模擬實(shí)踐，其能夠捕獲數(shù)據(jù)中所有的異質(zhì)性。然而，這項(xiàng)研究沒有解釋社會安全規(guī)則中反事實(shí)的變化對行為和一般均衡的影響。此外，這種變化產(chǎn)生的福利效應(yīng)也沒有在該論文中提及。在下文中我會討論取消這些規(guī)則會對家庭儲蓄，勞動力供給決策

57、以及福利有重大影響。</p><p>　　Nishiyama (2010)利用具有不能保險的工資沖擊的一般均衡模型研究了取消配偶和幸存者利益條款能產(chǎn)生的影響。本文和Nishiyama (2010)主要有以下幾點(diǎn)差異： (i)它沒有明確地模擬女性勞動力的參與；(2)它沒有對收益計(jì)算累進(jìn)和收益上限的影響進(jìn)行研究，因此沒有評估社會保障再分配的所有方面，(iii)，它只考慮已婚家庭，因此高估了取消條款的一般均衡的結(jié)果。B

58、lau (1997)也調(diào)查了配偶利益條款對已婚女性勞動力參與度的影響。為了克服估計(jì)問題，他假定家庭的儲蓄決策和勞動力供給決策，時間邊際、收益累進(jìn)計(jì)算和取消該條款的一般均衡的影響。</p><p>　　Huggett 和Ventura兩人 以及Conesa 和Krueger兩人在1999年曾研究過美國社會保障改革對分配的影響。這些論文都沒有關(guān)注社會保障主要對雙職工家庭產(chǎn)生影響的那些分配方面。他們研究的重點(diǎn)是異構(gòu)單職

59、工當(dāng)事人，因此，不能得到取消配偶和幸存者利益條款的相關(guān)結(jié)果。然而，本文表明，取消這些條款會造成大量代內(nèi)再分配，并對女性勞動供給和福利產(chǎn)生很大的影響。</p><p>　　最后，下文詳細(xì)描述的經(jīng)濟(jì)模型和Kaygusuz (2010)以及Guner 等人 (2012a，b)的論文中有許多相同點(diǎn)。此外，本文能夠更好地呈現(xiàn)美國社會保障，這是解答本文中所提出的問題的關(guān)鍵。 </p><p>　　本文

60、其它部分結(jié)構(gòu)如下：第二部分詳細(xì)描寫了本模型的具體細(xì)節(jié)。第三部分解釋基準(zhǔn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的參數(shù)化。第四部分詳細(xì)介紹了我研究的一項(xiàng)項(xiàng)改革以及相應(yīng)的發(fā)現(xiàn)。第五部分為結(jié)論。</p><p>　　雙職工家庭的生命周期模型</p><p>　　在該部分中，我詳細(xì)建構(gòu)了一個固定不變的一般均衡生命周期模型，包括單身者和已婚家庭。</p><p>　　人口統(tǒng)計(jì)資料：經(jīng)濟(jì)人口是跨代分布的，其中包括

61、男性連續(xù)統(tǒng)一體和女性連續(xù)統(tǒng)一體。每隔一段時間，新的一代群體就會出生。人口增長率由n表示。該經(jīng)濟(jì)中的當(dāng)事人集中分布在J階段。他們生來就是工人，并在法定退休年齡jR后退休。始于工作生活最后一階段的當(dāng)事人，在每一階段末尾都會有一個正的死亡風(fēng)險率。在特定的性別的一個人群i，i屬于｛m,f｝, 從年齡j歲到j(luò)+1歲面臨著的生存概率為Pij。案例中每個人在生活中是已婚或者單身。我假設(shè)一個常數(shù)分?jǐn)?shù)￠代表之前的新生兒都結(jié)婚了,剩下的都是單身。 <