法學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯6

1、<p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)資料</b></p><p>　　THE SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM FOUNDATION, RESPONDENT, v. MRS. JULES LUBELL, APPELLANT. (THIRD & FOURTH-PARTY ACTIONS.)77 N.Y.2d 311, 569 N.E.2d 426, 567 N.Y.S.2

2、d 623 (1991).February 14, 1991</p><p><b>　　1 No. 3</b></p><p>　　Decided February 14, 1991</p><p>　　This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publicatio

3、n in the New York Reports.</p><p>　　Jeffrey Barist, F. Ellen Zeifer and Glenn M. Kurtz, NY City, for Appellant. Norman A. Senior, Harry Torczyner and Gary B. Friedman, NY City, for Respondent.

4、 Janis Ettinger, NY City, for International Foundation for Art Research, amicus curiae. </p><p>　　WACHTLER, Ch.J.: </p><p>　　The backdrop for this replevin action (see, CPLR art. 71) is the New

5、York City art market, where masterpieces command extraordinary prices at auction and illicit dealing in stolen merchandise is an industry all its own. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, which operates the Guggenheim M

6、useum in New York City, is seeking to recover a Chagall gouache worth an estimated $200,000. The Guggenheim believes that the gouache was stolen from its premises by a mailroom employee sometime in the late 1960</p>

7、;<p>　　On this appeal, we must decide if the museum's failure to take certain steps to locate the gouache is relevant to the appellant's statute of limitations defense. In effect, the appellant argues that

8、 the museum had a duty to use reasonable diligence to recover the gouache, that it did not do so, and that its cause of action in replevin is consequently barred by the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reje

9、cted the appellant's argument. We agree with the Appellate Division that the timin</p><p>　　The gouache, known alternately as "Menageries" or "Le Marchand de Bestiaux" ("The Catt

10、le Dealer"), was painted by Marc Chagall in 1912, in preparation for an oil painting also entitled "Le Marchand de Bestiaux." It was donated to the museum in 1937 by Solomon R. Guggenheim. </p><

11、p>　　The museum keeps track of its collection through the use of "accession cards," which indicate when individual pieces leave the museum on loan, when they are returned and when they are transferred between

12、 the museum and storage. The museum lent the painting to a number of other art museums over the years. The last such loan occurred in 1961-62. The accession card for the painting indicates that it was seen in the museum

13、on April 2, 1965. The next notation on the accession card is undated and indi</p><p>　　Precisely when the museum first learned that the gouache had been stolen is a matter of some dispute. The museum acknowl

14、edges that it discovered that the painting was not where it should be sometime in the late 1960s, but claims that it did not know that the painting had in fact been stolen until it undertook a complete inventory of the m

15、useum collection beginning in 1969 and ending in 1970. According to the museum, such an inventory was typically taken about once every ten years. The appellant,</p><p>　　Mr. and Mrs. Lubell had purchased the

16、 painting from the Robert Elkon Gallery for $17,000 in May of 1967. The invoice and receipt indicated that the gouache had been in the collection of a named individual, who later turned out to be the museum mailroom empl

17、oyee suspected of the theft. They exhibited the painting twice, in 1967 and in 1981, both times at the Elkon Gallery. In 1985, a private art dealer brought a transparency of the painting to Sotheby's for an auction e

18、stimate. The person to whom</p><p>　　In her answer, the appellant raised as affirmative defenses the statute of limitations, her status as a good faith purchaser for value, adverse possession, laches, and th

19、e museum's culpable conduct. The museum moved to compel discovery and inspection of the gouache and the defendant cross-moved for summary judgment. In her summary judgment papers, the appellant argued that the replev

20、in action to compel the return of the painting was barred by the three year statute of limitations because the mus</p><p>　　The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the statute of limitations defense and

21、denying the appellant's cross motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division held that the trial court had erred in concluding that "delay alone can make a replevin action untimely" (153 AD2d 143, 149)

22、. The court stated that the appellant's lack of diligence argument was more in the nature of laches than the statute of limitations and that as a result, the appellant needed to show that she had been prejudiced</

23、p><p>　　New York case law has long protected the right of the owner whose property has been stolen to recover that property, even if it is in the possession of a good faith purchaser for value (see, Saltus v Ev

24、erett, 20 Wend. [NY] 267, 282). There is a three year statute of limitations for recovery of a chattel (CPLR 214 [3]). The rule in this state is that a cause of action for replevin against the good faith purchaser of a s

25、tolen chattel accrues when the true owner makes demand for return of the chatt</p><p>　　In DeWeerth v Baldinger (supra), which the trial court in this case relied upon in granting Mrs. Lubell's summary j

26、udgment motion, the Second Circuit took note of the fact that New York case law treats thieves and good faith purchasers differently and looked to that difference as a basis for imposing a reasonable diligence requiremen

27、t on the owners of stolen art. Although the court acknowledged that the question posed by the case was an open one, it declined to certify it to this Court (see, 22 </p><p>　　While the demand and refusal rul

28、e is not the only possible method of measuring the accrual of replevin claims, it does appear to be the rule that affords the most protection to the true owners of stolen property. Less protective measures would include

29、running the three year statutory period from the time of the theft even where a good faith purchaser is in possession of the stolen chattel, or, alternatively, calculating the statutory period from the time that the good

30、 faith purchaser obtains pos</p><p>　　New York has already considered -- and rejected -- adoption of a discovery rule. In 1986, both houses of the New York State Legislature passed Assembly Bill 11462-A (Sen

31、ate Bill 3274-B), which would have modified the demand and refusal rule and instituted a discovery rule in actions for recovery of art objects brought against certain not-for-profit institutions. This bill provided that

32、the three year statute of limitations would run from the time these institutions gave notice, in a manner speci</p><p>　　The history of this bill and the concerns expressed by the Governor in vetoing it, whe

33、n considered together with the abundant case law spelling out the demand and refusal rule, convince us that that rule remains the law in New York and that there is no reason to obscure its straightforward protection of t

34、rue owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence. Our case law already recognizes that the true owner, having discovered the location of its lost property, cannot unreasonably delay making </p><p>　　Fur

35、ther, the facts of this case reveal how difficult it would be to specify the type of conduct that would be required for a showing of reasonable diligence. Here, the parties hotly contest whether publicizing the theft wou

36、ld have turned up the gouache. According to the museum, some members of the art community believe that publicizing a theft exposes gaps in security and can lead to more thefts; the museum also argues that publicity often

37、 pushes a missing painting further underground. In light </p><p>　　Further, our decision today is in part influenced by our recognition that New York enjoys a worldwide reputation as a preeminent cultural ce

38、nter. To place the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner and to foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its property if the burden is not met would, we believe, encourage illicit trafficking in stolen

39、 art. Three years after the theft, any purchaser, good faith or not, would be able to hold onto stolen art work unless the true owner was ab</p><p>　　Despite our conclusion that the imposition of a reasonabl

40、e diligence requirement on the museum would be inappropriate for purposes of the statute of limitations, our holding today should not be seen as either sanctioning the museum's conduct or suggesting that the museum&#

41、39;s conduct is no longer an issue in this case. We agree with the Appellate Division that the arguments raised in the appellant's summary judgment papers are directed at the conscience of the court and its ability t

42、o bring equitab</p><p>　　We agree with the Appellate Division, for the reasons stated by that court, that the burden of proving that the painting was not stolen properly rests with the appellant Mrs. Lubell.

43、 We have considered her remaining arguments, and we find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative.

44、* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * </p><p>　　Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in the affirmative. Opinon by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock and

45、 Bellacosa concur.<& /nyctap/inclusions/footer.htm &> </p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯稿</b></p><p>　　所羅門R.古根海姆基金會(huì)訴盧貝爾</p><p>　?。ㄔV訟第三和第四部分）</p><p>　　77 N.Y.

46、2d 311, 569 N.E.2d 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1991).</p><p>　　1991年2月14日判決</p><p>　　Jeffrey Barist，F(xiàn). Ellen Zeifer 和Glenn M. Kurtz，紐約市, 作為上訴人。Norman A. Senior，Harry Torczyner 和 Gary B. Friedman， 紐約

47、市，作為答辯人。Janis Ettinger， 紐約市， 來自國(guó)際藝術(shù)研究基金會(huì)，作為法官顧問。</p><p>　　WACHTLER 主審法官</p><p>　　此返還物的訴訟的背景（見CPLR藝術(shù)。71）是紐約市的藝術(shù)市場(chǎng)，以不尋常的價(jià)格拍賣和控制名作被盜商品的非法交易。古根海姆基金會(huì)，經(jīng)營(yíng)著紐約市的古根海姆博物館，正在尋求回復(fù)一副價(jià)值約200,000元夏加爾水粉畫。古根海姆博物館

48、認(rèn)為，在20世紀(jì)60年代末的某個(gè)時(shí)候，該水粉畫被收發(fā)室員工從它的倉(cāng)庫(kù)偷走。上訴人Lubell雷切爾和她的丈夫（現(xiàn)已去世），于1967年麥迪遜大街一個(gè)著名的畫廊買了這幅畫，并顯示在其家超過20年。夫人Lubell聲稱，之前古根海姆博物館在1986年要求返還，但她沒有理由相信，這幅畫是被人偷走的。</p><p>　　在這起訴訟中，我們必須確定博物館未能采取一定措施找到該畫是否與雷切爾盧貝爾關(guān)于失效的抗辯有關(guān)。雷切爾

49、盧貝爾主張博物館有義務(wù)以合理勤勉找回該畫，但博物館未能如此做，因此，它取得該畫所有權(quán)的訴訟請(qǐng)求由于時(shí)效已過，不得主張。上訴法院拒絕上訴人的觀點(diǎn)。我們同意上訴法院關(guān)于對(duì)水粉畫進(jìn)行估價(jià)，從而依據(jù)限令進(jìn)行辯護(hù)的做法。我們看不到我們看不出有什么依據(jù)削弱了雕刻出一個(gè)地方要返回的動(dòng)產(chǎn)是一塊異常珍貴的藝術(shù)品的明確性和可預(yù)見性此規(guī)則的理由。上訴人積極的懈怠抗辯仍然可行，然而，她對(duì)于聲稱博物館未承擔(dān)合理的努力去搜尋遺失的油畫的觀點(diǎn)使初審法院對(duì)于該種辯護(hù)的

50、法律依據(jù)進(jìn)行評(píng)估。因此，該上訴庭所做的決定應(yīng)該得到肯定。</p><p>　　這幅水粉畫，被稱為"Menageries" 或者 "Le Marchand de Bestiaux"是由Marc Chagall于1912年創(chuàng)作，由于是水粉畫，所以也被冠以"Le Marchand de Bestiaux."的名稱。在1937年由所羅門R古根海姆于1937年捐贈(zèng)

51、給博物館。</p><p>　　博物館使用登記卡對(duì)其館藏藝術(shù)品保持記錄。登記卡顯示單件藝術(shù)品被出借的時(shí)間，歸還的時(shí)間及在博物館和倉(cāng)庫(kù)之間轉(zhuǎn)移的時(shí)間。博物館將這些年來本案涉及的畫借給過很多藝術(shù)博物館。最近一次是1961至1962年。該畫的登記卡顯示，1965年4月2 日該畫還在博物館。登記卡的下一條記錄是最新的，這條記錄表明該畫未找到。</p><p>　　關(guān)于博物館何時(shí)獲悉該畫被盜尚有爭(zhēng)議

52、。博物館承認(rèn)其在20世紀(jì)60年代晚期發(fā)現(xiàn)該畫已不在原處，但聲稱其在1969到1970年對(duì)館藏藝術(shù)品全面清點(diǎn)時(shí)才發(fā)現(xiàn)的。據(jù)博物館稱，這種清點(diǎn)每十年一次。雷切爾.盧貝爾則聲稱博物館早在1965年就知道該畫被盜。沒有爭(zhēng)議的事實(shí)是，古根海姆博物館沒有將該畫遺失的事實(shí)告知其他博物館，畫廊或藝術(shù)組織，也沒有通知紐約市警察局，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局，國(guó)際刑警組織或其他任何法律執(zhí)行機(jī)關(guān)。博物館稱如此作為是出于策略考慮，如將該畫遺失的事實(shí)公之于眾，則只可能使該畫的持

53、有者隱藏的更加隱秘，導(dǎo)致追回的可能性大大縮小。 </p><p>　　盧貝爾夫婦于1967年5月從羅伯特?艾肯爾畫廊以1.7萬美元的價(jià)格購(gòu)得該畫，該畫的發(fā)牌和收據(jù)表明該畫曾為標(biāo)明姓名的某人收藏此人后來被證實(shí)是被懷疑盜取該畫的博物館雇員。盧貝爾夫婦于1967和1981年兩次展出該畫，都在羅伯特艾肯爾畫廊。1985年一個(gè)私人藝術(shù)品交易商將該畫的幻燈片拿到拍賣行估價(jià)。該估價(jià)人員曾經(jīng)是古根海姆博物館的工作人員，認(rèn)出該畫是

54、該博物館丟失的一幅畫，就通知了博物館，1986年1月9日，博物館館長(zhǎng)Thomas Messer寫信要求被告返還該畫。盧貝爾夫人拒絕歸還，并稱將為獲取該畫所有權(quán)立即采取訴訟，或者于1987年9月28日前支付其20萬美元的對(duì)價(jià)。</p><p>　　在她的回復(fù)中，上訴人提出訴訟時(shí)效作為積極抗辯理由，包括其作為作為付出價(jià)值善意購(gòu)買人的身份，他人的侵害占有，博物館的懈怠及不周的行為。博物館在搬遷時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)水粉畫丟失一事，辯護(hù)

55、人要求適用簡(jiǎn)易判決。在她的簡(jiǎn)易判決中，上訴人認(rèn)為要求歸還水粉畫的法令受到三年時(shí)效限制規(guī)定的制約。因?yàn)椴┪镳^在遺失該畫到偶然發(fā)現(xiàn)該畫為盧貝爾夫人所有的二十多年間，并沒有做出相應(yīng)行動(dòng)去尋找該畫。初審法院根據(jù)美國(guó)第二巡回區(qū)聯(lián)邦上訴法院德維斯訴鮑丁格案的觀點(diǎn)，同意了盧貝爾夫人要求簡(jiǎn)易判決的訴求。初審法院引用了紐約州的案例，這些案例認(rèn)定，返還被不法侵占的財(cái)產(chǎn)不應(yīng)當(dāng)不合理的拖延，財(cái)產(chǎn)的所有者有義務(wù)盡到合理的努力去尋找丟失財(cái)物。由于本案中博物館除了在

56、20年中不斷在館內(nèi)尋找該畫，沒有采取任何行動(dòng)，初審法院認(rèn)為其在法律上是不合理的。因此，初審法院給予博物館的訴訟請(qǐng)求超過訴訟時(shí)效而不的主張，準(zhǔn)許了Lubell夫人簡(jiǎn)易判決的申請(qǐng)。</p><p>　　該上訴庭修改，駁回了上訴人關(guān)于時(shí)效的辯護(hù)和要求進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)易判決的訴求。該上訴庭認(rèn)為，原審法院曾錯(cuò)誤地得出這樣的結(jié)論，“以不適當(dāng)或不合理的時(shí)間作出決定將會(huì)造成不合時(shí)宜的財(cái)產(chǎn)返還之訴。”（153 AD2d143，149）。法院

57、指出，上訴人缺乏有關(guān)時(shí)效方面博物館對(duì)于尋畫的努力懈怠多于勤勉的證據(jù)，同時(shí)結(jié)果上，上訴人需要表明她因?yàn)椴┪镳^由于要求返還該畫的拖延行為而蒙受了損失（ID的上訴人）。法院還認(rèn)為，簡(jiǎn)易判決是不合適的，因?yàn)槭聦?shí)若干問題存在，包括博物館對(duì)于盜竊的反應(yīng)是否是不合理的？博物館何時(shí)第一次意識(shí)到水粉畫失蹤？博物館認(rèn)識(shí)到該畫遺失但在意識(shí)到該畫是被偷走之前的一系列步驟是否不合理？（id.藏學(xué)博物館，在151-52）。上訴司準(zhǔn)予這個(gè)法庭，證明了以下問題：“這個(gè)

58、法院的法令，是否是修改了最高法院的命令并且是合適的？“我們證明這個(gè)問題的答案是肯定的</p><p>　　紐約判例法長(zhǎng)期以來保護(hù)了所有人的產(chǎn)權(quán)，即使它在一對(duì)價(jià)值善意購(gòu)買他已被盜竊的財(cái)產(chǎn)，也應(yīng)該收回（見索爾特斯v埃弗里特，20蜿蜒。[紐約]藏有267，282）。有一個(gè)恢復(fù)的動(dòng)產(chǎn)所有權(quán)的三年的時(shí)效的限制（CPLR214[3]）。在這種規(guī)則下的目的是動(dòng)產(chǎn)真正的持有者要求持有者歸還財(cái)產(chǎn)而持有人拒絕，為了對(duì)抗善意購(gòu)買被盜財(cái)

59、產(chǎn)的持有人而設(shè)立的（見，例如，古德溫 訴 韋特海默，紐約州99149153;科恩 訴 米科澤爾公司，AC 246277）。直到需求提出并遭到拒絕，占有被視為被偷竊財(cái)產(chǎn)（見，例如，吉萊訴羅伯茨，紐約57月28，30-31;門澤爾訴 李斯特，49個(gè)雜項(xiàng)二維300，304 -05，以損害修改，28 AD2d516，以修改rev'd，24 NY2d91）。雖然看似反常，不同規(guī)則的適用對(duì)象時(shí)偷來的在藏有小偷。在這種情況下，時(shí)效運(yùn)行從盜竊（

60、見斯波恩 訴 馬華唱片公司，58 NY2d482，487-88）甚至業(yè)主可能沒有意識(shí)到（見，瓦爾加 訴 瑞士信用，5 AD2d289，292-93，aff'd，5 NY2d865）。</p><p>　　在初審法院依據(jù)的德維斯訴鮑丁格案中，美國(guó)第二巡回區(qū)聯(lián)邦上訴法院注意到紐約州的案例法對(duì)待盜賊和善意取得者是不同的，基于此區(qū)別，該案法庭要求被盜藝術(shù)品的所有者到合理的勤勉。該案法庭也承認(rèn)，該案提出的問題沒有定

61、論。該案判決后的三年內(nèi)，該案提出的問題，包括本案在內(nèi)又多次出現(xiàn)。我們研究了紐約州的相關(guān)案例，認(rèn)為第二巡回區(qū)聯(lián)邦上訴法院不應(yīng)為時(shí)效的目的要求被盜藝術(shù)品的所有者盡勤勉義務(wù)。</p><p>　　雖然要求和拒絕規(guī)則，不是有關(guān)返還被不法侵占動(dòng)產(chǎn)所有權(quán)的案件的唯一原則，但它似乎是能給被竊財(cái)產(chǎn)真正的所有者予以保護(hù)的最好規(guī)則。其他提供較少保護(hù)保護(hù)的規(guī)則包括從財(cái)產(chǎn)被竊取3年的計(jì)算時(shí)效，無論是否有善意購(gòu)買者占有該動(dòng)產(chǎn)；從善意購(gòu)買占

62、有該財(cái)產(chǎn)之日起計(jì)算3年時(shí)效。就這個(gè)問題作出判決的其他州適用了“發(fā)現(xiàn)規(guī)則”，即時(shí)效自藝術(shù)品所有人發(fā)現(xiàn)或應(yīng)該發(fā)現(xiàn)被盜藝術(shù)品的下落時(shí)起計(jì)算。</p><p>　　紐約州對(duì)發(fā)現(xiàn)規(guī)則進(jìn)行考察并拒絕適用發(fā)現(xiàn)規(guī)則，1986年紐約州議會(huì)兩院通過法案，該法案將對(duì)一些非營(yíng)利性機(jī)構(gòu)提起的要求歸還藝術(shù)品的訴訟在時(shí)效問題上意圖以發(fā)現(xiàn)原則代替要求和拒絕原則。該法案規(guī)定3年時(shí)效應(yīng)從這些機(jī)構(gòu)依法案規(guī)定的方式就其占有某個(gè)特定藝術(shù)品給出通知時(shí)起算。

63、州長(zhǎng)對(duì)此進(jìn)行了否決。這項(xiàng)議案未能給個(gè)人或外國(guó)政府合理的機(jī)會(huì)，使他們收到某博物館購(gòu)得該藝術(shù)品的通知，并使他們?cè)跈?quán)利喪失前提起訴訟，要求歸還該藝術(shù)品州長(zhǎng)同時(shí)表明這樣的觀點(diǎn)：如果該法案生效，由于該法案對(duì)提出要求歸還藝術(shù)品訴訟的時(shí)間限制，很多來源于國(guó)外的，通過盜竊而得來的藝術(shù)品將無法追回?！皩脮r(shí)，紐約將成為從外國(guó)盜取文化財(cái)產(chǎn)的天堂?！?lt;/p><p>　　這一法案的歷史，州長(zhǎng)在否決該法案時(shí)所闡述的擔(dān)憂，以及大量適用要求和

64、拒絕原則的案例，使我們確信在紐約州仍然需要適用要求和拒絕原則，通過增加合理的勤勉的義務(wù)從而削弱該規(guī)則對(duì)真正所有者直接保護(hù)這一說法是沒有理由的（見所羅門R古根海姆基金會(huì) 訴 盧貝爾, 153 AD2d, at 147; 門澤爾 訴 李斯特, 22 AD2d 647; 比照, CPLR 206 [當(dāng)一個(gè)人開始進(jìn)行某種作為時(shí)，必須要求該行為在開始時(shí)所依據(jù)的權(quán)利是完整的。]）案例法已經(jīng)確認(rèn)，真正的所有者在發(fā)現(xiàn)其丟失的財(cái)產(chǎn)的下落后，不得不合理的遲

65、延向占有財(cái)產(chǎn)人提出該歸還的要求。</p><p>　　另外，明確合理的勤勉需要何種行為證明是非常困難的。在本案中，雙方當(dāng)事人就將該畫被盜的事實(shí)公諸于眾，是否會(huì)使該畫被找到進(jìn)行激烈的辯論。根據(jù)該博物館的說法，藝術(shù)圈的一些人認(rèn)為，如果將藝術(shù)品被盜的事實(shí)公之于眾，就會(huì)暴露保安方面的缺陷，從而導(dǎo)致更多的偷盜的事實(shí)公之于眾，只會(huì)使該畫的持有者更加隱蔽。鑒于藝術(shù)圈人士就追回被盜物品的最好方式意見不一，法院專斷的規(guī)定被盜藝術(shù)品

66、的真正持有者要保留其提起歸還被不法侵占的藝術(shù)品訴訟的權(quán)利必須嚴(yán)格遵循的行為股則顯然是非常不合適的，被盜財(cái)產(chǎn)的所有者不應(yīng)被要求以同樣的方式行事，其行為也不應(yīng)被同樣的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量。被盜參禪的價(jià)值、財(cái)產(chǎn)被盜的方式，以及被盜財(cái)產(chǎn)的機(jī)構(gòu)類型都會(huì)影響到財(cái)產(chǎn)真正所有者尋找丟失財(cái)產(chǎn)的方式。我們認(rèn)為，設(shè)計(jì)出考慮所有這些變量，并且不會(huì)給真正所有者造成不合理負(fù)擔(dān)的合理勤勉要求是非常困難的。</p><p>　　此外，關(guān)于紐約是譽(yù)滿全球的文

67、化中心的觀點(diǎn)也部分影響了我們的判決。我們認(rèn)為，由真正所有者承擔(dān)尋找被盜藝術(shù)品的義務(wù)，并在其沒有履行該義務(wù)的情況下剝奪其要求歸還該藝術(shù)品的權(quán)利，這將鼓勵(lì)被盜藝術(shù)品的非法交易。因?yàn)椋谒囆g(shù)品被盜的三年之后，除非真正的所有者證明其對(duì)被盜藝術(shù)品進(jìn)行了合理的尋找，否則善意或非善意的購(gòu)買者都可以取得對(duì)被盜藝術(shù)品的所有權(quán)。這種義務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移到被侵害的所有者身上將是極不合適的。我們認(rèn)為，更好的規(guī)則是將調(diào)查藝術(shù)品來源的義務(wù)由潛在購(gòu)買者承擔(dān)，為所有者提供相對(duì)更多

68、的保護(hù)。</p><p>　　盡管我們關(guān)于要求增加博物館盡合理的努力的結(jié)論將與限令的目的不一致，我們今天進(jìn)行的判決，不應(yīng)被視為任何制裁博物館的行為或關(guān)于博物館的行為在此案中不在視為交付的建議。我們同意上訴庭關(guān)于在上訴人的簡(jiǎn)易判決文件所提出的論點(diǎn)，這是法院基于良知，它盡力的公平考慮到雙方當(dāng)事人對(duì)畫最終產(chǎn)權(quán)處置。如上所述，雖然上訴人對(duì)時(shí)效的主張未被采納，她的論點(diǎn)在于，即博物館不行使合理的努力去找回該幅畫，主審法官在整

69、個(gè)案情來龍去脈中考慮到該點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為其辯護(hù)尚有欠缺。上訴人及博物館雙方將有關(guān)任何本案在審級(jí)辯護(hù)代價(jià)任何有關(guān)的，正如上訴庭指出，對(duì)產(chǎn)權(quán)的損害也需要考慮到（153為149 AD2d）。在我們之前的有限的紀(jì)錄沒有跡象表明資產(chǎn)傾向任一方。Lubell先生及夫人在購(gòu)買該幅畫之前，由接觸過藝術(shù)家和他的兒子女婿直接調(diào)查該畫的出處。Lubell一家表示該畫在他們家展示超過20年，沒有理由懷疑他們對(duì)該畫的占有是不合理的。這些事實(shí)無疑會(huì)在最后有一些關(guān)于上訴人的

70、懈怠辯護(hù)決策的影響。因?yàn)樗遣豢赡茉谠摪钢械贸鲞@樣的結(jié)論，從這一案件的事實(shí)，博物館的行為在法律被認(rèn)為是不合理的，但是， Lubell夫人簡(jiǎn)易判決的交叉動(dòng)議遭到拒絕是恰當(dāng)?shù)摹?lt;/p><p>　　我們同意上訴庭的意見，因?yàn)樵摲ㄔ宏愂龅睦碛桑醋C明此畫是不恰當(dāng)?shù)呢?fù)擔(dān)被盜上訴人Lubell夫人。我們認(rèn)為她其他的辯論意見，是沒有法律依據(jù)的。因此，該上訴庭法官簽發(fā)的指令，在訴訟費(fèi)用，以及確定的質(zhì)問與回答方面是可以肯定的。&