外文翻譯--員工獎金制度對安全行為影響（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　4300單詞，2.4萬英文字符，7500漢字</p><p>　　出處：Mattson M, Torbiörn I, Hellgren J. Effects of staff bonus systems on safety behaviors [J]. Human Resource Management Review, 2014, 24(1):17-30.</p>&

2、lt;p>　　Effects of staff bonus systems on safety behaviors</p><p>　　M. Mattson , I. Torbiörn, J. Hellgren</p><p>　　Abstract </p><p>　　Bonus systems are a common means in try

3、ing to motivate employees to perform well. However, there is still disagreement regarding the effects of bonus systems. Some theories even suggest that such systems could cause an increase in risk- behavior. This makes f

4、urther research regarding bonus systems warranted, especially when applied in high-risk organizations. This study aims to explore potential effects on safety-related behavior associated with bonus systems currently used

5、at Swedish nuclear po</p><p>　　Keywords: Bonus Pay system Incentive Motivation Nuclear power plant Safety</p><p>　　1.Introduction</p><p>　　A large proportion of companies arou

6、nd the world are presently making use of monetary incentives in the form of so-called bonus systems in order to motivate employees to perform better (Patton, 1972). However, there are still disagreements regarding the re

7、al effect of bonuses on motivation and performance (Pfeffer, 1997). While a few studies have found indications of increased motivation and improved performance due to monetary incentives such as bonuses under some condit

8、ions (e.g. Engellandt & </p><p>　　Workplace accidents are increasingly common and one of the biggest issues facing employers today is the safety of their employees. Organizational practices that promote

9、safety are vital for organizations in general and high-risk organizations in particular. As a consequence, many high-risk organizations use bonus systems that are more or less directed towards achieving safety through im

10、proved safety-related performance among its employees. However, empirical research is scant regarding the effec</p><p>　　Given the ambiguous empirical evidence of the effects of bonus systems, organizations

11、making use of these kinds of systems take an imminent risk of obtaining unintended, and even undesirable, effects. This could be especially harmful to certain kinds of organizations, such as those dealing with operations

12、 involving high risks. Several reviews indicate that bonuses could be particularly detrimental to performance when the task is intrinsically interesting enough and when the task is complex enoug</p><p>　　The

13、 aim of the present field study was to find out whether bonus systems could compromise safety in nuclear power plants and other high-risk organizations. The main question concerned the potential effects on motivation and

14、 safety-related behavior that could be associated with the use of bonus systems by identifying factors that could possibly affect safety via changes in behavior. The data used in the study comes from in-depth interviews

15、with employees at three Swedish nuclear power plants wher</p><p>　　The study also innovates by adopting a qualitative approach using a theoretical analysis and in-depth interviews in investigating potential

16、behavioral effects. To date, qualitative approaches such as in the present study are unusual when it comes to examination of monetary rewards and safety. The more frequently used quantitative studies in the field offer v

17、aluable information about relations between different factors, such as between the application of bonus systems and particular safety outcom</p><p>　　1.1 Bonus systems</p><p>　　Almost all organi

18、zations pay their employee for the work that they do, but there are considerable differences in the extent to which the pay system is related to performance. Many organizations make use of different types of performance-

19、related pay systems, based on the general idea that employees should be motivated to work harder because they see the connection between job performance and reward. Nevertheless, the design of such systems can differ in

20、terms of who is included (on which levels),</p><p>　　Economic theory often assumes that monetary incentives drive or even improve individuals' performances while for example many psychologists argue for

21、a reverse scenario (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). In a frequently cited meta-analysis Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) concluded that tangible rewards in general had a negative impact on individuals' intrinsic motiv

22、ation. It has also been argued for that implementation of reward systems in organizations often are accompanied by increasing surveillance</p><p>　　The phenomenon that provision of extrinsic rewards can unde

23、rmine intrinsic interest and motivation to perform task activities is known among economists and is discussed in terms of motivation crowding or crowding out effects (e.g. Frey & Jegen, 2001). Still, a thorough meta-

24、analysis by Cameron and Pierce (1994) including 101 experimental studies between 1971 and 1991 contradicts the assumption that such a phenomenon may hold general relevance except for in extremely circumscribed conditions

25、. Fur</p><p>　　which 39 empirical studies from 1975 to 1996 were analyzed regarding how individual level financial incentives related to performance. Their results support the generalizability of a positive

26、relationship between incentives and quantitative performance (i.e. doing more), this regardless of the type of task to be performed (intrinsic/extrinsic). For the purpose of our study, dealing with safety behaviors that

27、are mostly about qualitative aspects of performance, it is relevant to note that this me</p><p>　　It has also been argued that bonus systems often only reward observable goals, neglecting those which are mor

28、e creative and constructive in the long run (Kerr, 1975) and that individually based rewards can reduce the incentive to cooperate (Lazear, 1989) and tend to create internal organizational conflict (Gabor, 1990). Even mu

29、ch of the traditional economical literature claiming to examine the effects of incentives is dubious due to the failure to control for a number of highly plausible alterna</p><p>　　Another distinction that c

30、an be made is to what degree the goals and rewards are individual or collective. Many researchers have focused on bonuses based on individual performance (Welbourne & Cable, 1995). However, some studies have also add

31、ressed the effects of group or organizational incentives on individual behavior and attitudes. For example, Wageman and Baker (1997) reported that task and reward interdependence had an interactive influence on group per

32、formances, other studies suggest that </p><p>　　1.2 Performance-related pay systems and safety</p><p>　　When it comes to which behaviors are affected by monetary rewards and how, several meta-an

33、alyses demonstrated positive effects in a number of areas, such as safety behaviors (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Other meta-analyses, or reviews, indicate that monetary rewards correlate positively with behavioral aspect

34、s that are quantitative (such as performing more and faster) but not with those that are qualitative (cf. Jenkins et al., 1998), and that such rewards affect performance in “dull” tasks that req</p><p>　　Pat

35、ton (1972) claims that bonus systems for managers often fail because of difficulties in measuring the behaviors fairly. When the division of bonuses is unequal between employees, especially among individuals who are simi

36、lar in some way, envy can easily arise. Envy could, in turn, lead to a desire to restore equity by hurting those who have more than they seem to deserve (Elster, 1989; Frank, 1988). Perceived unfairness and envy could al

37、so lead to counter-productive behavior among employees (C</p><p>　　Research suggests that bonus systems that reward safety behavior could result in a decreased accident frequency (Goodrum & Gangwar, 2004

38、). Others, however, claim that safety-focused bonus systems that reward employees for working injury-free over a set period of time could discourage workers from reporting injuries and illnesses. Thus, the apparent posit

39、ive results from these systems could be hiding a constant or even higher rate of accidents (Cooper, 2001; Howe, 2000; Lawrence & Flanders, 2000;</p><p>　　Something that most researchers seem to agree on

40、is that a successful safety-focused bonus system has to be part of a more overall safety strategy from the management, which would typically also include measures such as safety-related education programs, monitoring and

41、 communication. A safety program that targets one area, without addressing the others, is less likely to succeed (Glendinning, 2001; Miozza & Wyld, 2002). In addition, it is vital that different elements in the strat

42、egy do not incl</p><p>　　The purpose of this study is to explore into potential effects on motivation for safety behaviors associated with the bonus systems at use in the three Swedish nuclear plants.</p&

43、gt;<p><b>　　2 Methods</b></p><p>　　2.1 Elaboration of a theoretical framework</p><p>　　As part of the design of our study, one aim was to first establish which role monetary r

44、ewards in general might play according to a broader spectrum of theories. Hence, an elaboration of theories on motivation, organizational perspectives and previous research regarding safety-related bonus systems was perf

45、ormed. The intent with such an eclectic approach was to produce a theoretical frame of reference through the generation of different themes that were considered to be relevant for the function</p><p>　　2.2 A

46、n eclectic framework for exploring potential effects of bonus systems</p><p>　　Various types of theories on the assumed effects of rewards on motivation, performance and safety have been brought together wit

47、h the purpose of forming a broad and eclectic theoretical framework for the present study. Table 1 shows a variety of aspects of possible relevance for the effects of bonus systems as such aspects are derived from theori

48、es or empirical evidence. As the various motivational and organizational theories referred to in the table are basic and well known they are not describ</p><p>　　2.3 Setting</p><p>　　The study w

49、as carried out at all three presently active Swedish nuclear power plants. All three plants had approximately 1000–1500 employees each and were about the same physical size (3–4 reactors each). They had similar hierarchi

50、cal structures in which the service and support staffs worked directly under the CEO's. Each reactor encompassed a discrete production unit that was comprised of several subgroups (e.g., operator shift teams, mainten

51、ance teams). Today, the plants are all incorporated c</p><p>　　Table 3 shows the percentages of maximum bonus for plants A–C contingent upon economic vs. quality goals, corporate vs. plant goals, and group v

52、s. individual goals. Bonus goals related to production and economic results varied between 25 and 50% among the plants. The remaining portions of maximum bonuses were based on quality goals. The nature of these goals dif

53、fered to some extent among the three systems but mainly focused on competence and process development as well as safety-related issues. </p><p>　　The goals to be used in the systems were decided by the manag

54、ing director after consultation with executives and operational managers. Generally, other employees were not able to influence the selection of goals, except possibly through the unions. However, at plant C, individual

55、goals were set, and even evaluated, through a collaboration of the individual and his or her immediate supervisor. In this case, the individual part of the bonus was based on the manager's final evaluation of whether

56、 th</p><p>　　As can be seen in Table 3, the three systems differed in the extent to which they emphasized goal achievement at the corporate, plant, and individual levels. At plant A, all of the goals were se

57、t at the corporate and plant levels and were thus the same for all employees. The system at plant B holds, besides a major share of bonuses related to plant level results, also a share (15%) set at a lower, group level.

58、At plant C, as much as 40% of the maximum bonus was related to individual goals, but n</p><p>　　In Table 3, each bonus system has been given a denotation or keyword indicating to what degree they emphasize c

59、ollective or individual goals. The keyword does not mention the systems' design on the economic-quality goal dimension, but is only intended to facilitate the further reading by offering a short denotation of one of

60、the main characteristics of each system.</p><p>　　2.4 Sample</p><p>　　Five employees from each of the three nuclear power plants (A, B, and C) were selected to participate in the study. To obtai

61、n this sample, one of the interviewees at each plant was first selected as a contact person for the study, based on advice from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the public authority in charge of controlling the nu

62、clear plants. The contact persons in turn proposed four additional employees at their plant for participation. The contact persons had been prompted to sele</p><p>　　2.5 Data collection</p><p>　

63、　A semi-structured interview guide was the main tool for data collection. All participants received a letter with information about the aim of the study. The interviews were carried out during the informants' paid wo

64、rking day and lasted between 25 and 90 min. The interviews with the contact persons also included questions about the construction of their bonus system. These interviews were performed jointly by two of the authors, whi

65、le the other participants were interviewed individually by either</p><p>　　The descriptive information regarding the organizational structure and the designs of the bonus systems was obtained through documen

66、ts made available to us and through interviews with our contact persons at the plants. The interview guide regarding the experiences of the systems was reflecting the themes in the theoretical framework. Most of the ques

67、tions were open ended in order to prompt the participant to express their views and experiences as openly as possible (e.g. What does it mean to you</p><p>　　The interviews were audio recorded and held in an

68、 undisturbed environment, either at the employees' workplace or in especially assigned conference rooms located near the plants. At the start of the interviews, the participants were informed about the purpose of the

69、 study and how the material was to be used. They were also informed about the confidentiality of the study, and their consent to record the interview was requested.</p><p>　　2.6 Analyses</p><p>

70、　　The recordings from the interviews were transcribed in full text. A theory-led thematic analysis was used according to Hayes (2000). A thorough review of the literature within the field before the analysis has the adva

71、ntage of sensitizing the researcher to more subtle features of the data at hand (Tuckett, 2005). In an initial stage of the analysis, each transcript was read through several times in order to identify all of the stateme

72、nts which related to each of the seven themes established in t</p><p>　　員工獎金制度對安全行為影響</p><p>　　M.Mattson,I.Torbiom,J.Hellgren</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　獎金

73、系統是一個試圖激勵員工來更好的完成工作的常見的手段。然而，在獎金系統的激勵作用的問題上任然存有一些分歧。甚至一些理論表明，這樣的系統可能導致不安全行為的增加。這就需要對獎金系統做進一步的研究，特別是在高危行業(yè)。本研究旨在探討目前在瑞典核電站使用獎金系統對安全行為的潛在影響。通過與十五名員工進行的半結構化訪談，并根據激勵與組織理論得出了一個折衷地理論框架。結果并沒有顯示獎金系統對安全行為有任何負面影響，相反地，在獎金獎勵與安全績效的促進范

74、圍內，安全行為可能會被人大提高。獎金制度設計的差異似乎對安全行為也存在影響。本研究通過比較和定性的方法，通過突出那些能夠更好的激勵員工參與到安全行為中去的各類影響因素，從而得出有價值的信息。</p><p>　　關鍵詞:獎金、薪酬制度、獎勵、動機、核電站、安全</p><p><b>　　1.介紹</b></p><p>　　全世界大部分的公司

75、為了激勵員工表現得更好，目前正在使用的一種以金錢鼓勵（即所謂獎金系統）為主的形式（巴頓，1972）然而，就獎金激勵機制的實際效果與績效而言任然存在著分歧（菲費爾，1997)。然而一些研究己經有跡象表明，在一定條件下的貨幣激勵機制諸如獎金等以提供動力和改善行為行動，也有研究顯示，激勵系統甚至連負面影響都沒有。</p><p>　　工作場所發(fā)生的事故越來越普遍，其中雇主如今面臨的最大問題之一是員工的安全。組織在提高工

76、作安全上的做法對一般組織，尤其對高風險組織都顯得至關重要。因此，許多高風險組織使用獎金系統，或多或少地朝著實現提高員工安全工作的目標而努力。然而，探究這些系統影響的研究少之甚少，甚至于其研究結果也與別的研究發(fā)生了混合。一些證據表明，獎勵安全行為的獎金系統討論會降低事故頻率(Goodmrn&Gangwar，2004)。然而，其他研究表明，起初旨在獎勵員工在規(guī)定的時間內無傷病記錄的獎金制度可能會因為擔心失去獎金的員工而發(fā)生瞞報事故。

77、這可能導致持續(xù)的問題和風險.還有可能已經發(fā)生了（庫珀,2001和Miozza和活動，2002)。</p><p>　　考慮到獎金系統的影響存在模糊的經驗證據，積極利用這些系統的組織承擔意想不到，甚至是不良影響的風險。這對某些類型的組織極其不利，比如處理涉及高風險業(yè)務的組織。一些評論表明，當任務在本質上是有趣并復雜時，獎金可能對工作表現尤其不利，這時候就需要靈活的思維（麥格勞，1978)。考慮到許多高可靠性組織的環(huán)

78、境有復雜性和高技術的特性（HRO)，這些發(fā)現暗示獎金系統對安全可能構成潛在威脅。當面對及其復雜和模糊的意外情況時，獎金系統就顯得及其相關。因此凡是涉及獎金系統中能激勵員工更能促進安全行為的因素，更多的研究可以得到保證。</p><p>　　當前本領域研究的目的是找出獎金系統能否在核電站和其他高風險組織之間妥協安全保證。主要問題都關注對動機和使用獎勵系統的安全行為產生的潛在影響，同時通過識別從行為上的改變可能影響安

79、全性的因素來確定相聯系的安全行為。這項研究中使用的數據來自與瑞典員工的深度訪談，這些員工來自于目前應用獎金系統的三個核電站。三家工廠的系統應用在設計中有很大的差異，正是激勵效果的差異形成一個初步的比較分析。</p><p>　　這項研究創(chuàng)新調査方法，采用定性的方法，使用理論分析和深度訪談來調查行為的潛在影響。到目前為止，當面臨定貨幣獎勵和安全行為的檢查時，定性的方法，如應用在目前研究中的方法就顯得不尋常。在提供不

80、同因素間關系的有效信息的領域中，定量研究被不斷的頻繁使用，比如在獎金系統的應用及其帶來的特定安全結果之間，但定量研究不能給我們提供對這些關系根本原因的任何更深的理解。本研究的定量性和比較性能夠減少高風險組織在研究和實踐應用獎金制度之間的差距。這點可以通過提供有效信息來實現，強調因素和目標的類型可能會提供員工避免風險和從事安全行為的更大激勵機制。</p><p><b>　　1.1獎勵系統</b&g

81、t;</p><p>　　幾乎所有組織給他們的雇員為其所做的工作提供報酬，但基于工作表現所支付報酬的程度存在大的差異。許多組織基于一般的想法，認為員工應該在受鼓動的條件下更努力工作而采取不同類型的績效工資系統，考慮到工作表現和薪酬之間的聯系。然而設計這樣的系統在定義誰當包含在內（水平)、如何衡量工作表現、采取什么樣的激勵措施（金錢、股票等）等方面都不盡相同。使用許多不同的名稱來表示績效薪酬系統的類型，但卻無法清晰

82、的表示其之間的差異。保證員工周工資或月工資的系統，以及基于表現而獲得的獎金往往被稱為獎金系統。衡量生產力的方法要么基于個人或團體（例團隊和部門）的表現，要么基于整個組織的表現（馮汗，2008)。根據委托代理理論，委托人和代理人之間的關系對個人的行為和表現都是至關重要的。同時，該理論的重點是確定能夠控制這種關系最有效的合同，通常假設人是由利益驅動的，有限理性和風險規(guī)避(Eiscnhardt1989)。問題是,如果一個以行為為導向的關系或合

83、同為了“正確”的行為而關注獎金，那么這將是補償員工最有效的方式。</p><p>　　經濟理論通常假設貨幣激勵能驅動甚至提高個人績效，然而許多心理學家則提出相反的假設(如格尼茨&魯斯蒂奇尼，2000)。在一個經常被引用的數據分析中，Dcci&ocstncr、Ryan則認為一般的有形獎勵多個人的內在動機有負面影響。也有人認為，在組織中實施獎勵機制往往會加劇檢測盒評價之間的競爭，而這也被證實對人的內在

84、動機產生負而影響。（Dcci&yan，1985;Leppcr&Grccn，1975)。然而，在評論和重新運行Dcci(1999)的分析時，艾森伯格、皮爾斯和卡梅隆(1999)發(fā)現Dcci的研究</p><p>　　成果令人質疑，并且提出獎勵實際上能增加自主權，減少對內在動機產生的負面影響，還認為激勵動機產生的影響有賴于采取的激勵措施。在一系列可控制實驗中，Gncezy和Rustichini指出相比

85、沒拿到的金錢獎勵的受試者，拿到金錢獎勵的受試著績效來的更差。這些人也認為，如果受試者對依績效得到獎勵而產生依賴，那么更高的金錢獎勵會產生更高的績效。然而，另一個數據分析發(fā)現，有待執(zhí)行的任務的類型可以緩和獎勵績效和實際績效之間的關系，其中如果一項任務被定為無收益的，那么獎勵績效對實際工作表現會產生強有力的影響?？墒侨绻@項任務被認為是有收益的，那么這兩者之間的關系就是消極的（Wdbcl，Rost&Osterioh2009)。<

86、;/p><p>　　經濟學家都知道外在獎勵機制會破壞內在興趣和執(zhí)行任務活動的動機這一現象，并且這一現象就能否排擠動機這一方面也被熱烈討論。然而，卡梅倫和皮爾斯（1994)的一個完整的數據分析，其包含1974到1991年間101個實驗研究，與一種假定相矛盾，這種假設認為上述現象除了極端的環(huán)境條件之外擁有普遍的關聯性。在人力資源管理評論24(2014)17-30中，從1975到19%年開展的39個實證研究探討個人財務激勵

87、與績效水平的關系。他們的研究成果也證實激勵機制和定量績效之間積極關系具有普遍性（即做更多的事），無論有待實施任務的類型（內部/外部）。我們研究的目的，關于處理安全行為方面，大多是績效定性方面。需要注意的是，在少有的該領域研究領域中，該數據分析沒能發(fā)現顯著成果。</p><p>　　也有人認為，獎勵機制往往只能獎勵可觀測的目標，從而忽略了從長遠眼光看更具有創(chuàng)造性和建設性的目標（克爾，1975)，同時也認為以個人為依

88、據的獎金可以減少合作的激勵（拉齊爾，1989)，造成組織內部之間的沖突（蓋博，1990)。甚至大多聲稱要檢測激勵機制影響的傳統經濟領域現在令人費解，原因在于沒能控制好對許多研究解釋似是而非的結果。有個問題似乎是激勵影響之間的不同之處，而那些影響遵循著上升的動機和信息的影響。除了激勵工作動力，獎金系統還告訴人們在特定設置之中什么是重要的、有價值的、預期的（Pfeffer，1997)。</p><p>　　另外，他們

89、還為員工就績效和生產率提供反饋信息，從而提髙動力和改善行為影響（哈克曼、奧爾德姆，1976)。盡管認識到這一點，幾乎沒有研究成果探究獎金機制差別的影響（Pfeffer，1997)。另一個區(qū)別就在于對個人和集體的目標和獎勵能夠相差到什么程度。許多研究人員都關注基于個人績效的獎金機制（威爾伯恩、凱勃雷，1995)。然而一些研究己經成功探究出對個人行為和態(tài)度實施的團體或組織獎勵所產生的影響。比如，魏吉曼和貝克（1997)指出任務和獎勵之間相互

90、依賴的關系對團體績效產生一個互動的影響，其他的研究表明，基于團隊的獎勵對團隊成員的動力、績效、報酬滿意度和溝通具有積極作用（赫特、康拉德、奧力科斯基，2004;拉克、愛沃特、赫特、康拉德，2011)。同時也發(fā)現基于團體多組織的獎勵系統有許多缺陷（參見那內什、葛和特、帕克，2005)。</p><p>　　其中的一個原因在于主要關注針對高層管理團隊或首席執(zhí)行官的獎勵系統（例如延森&墨菲，1990;卡恩&am

91、p;舍爾，1990;巴頓，1972)。越來越多的關于獎勵員工機制的研究是必要的，以便更好的掌握獎金是如何影響組織內各級各部的態(tài)度和行為。</p><p>　　1.2以績效為依據的支付系統和安全性</p><p>　　當談及哪些行為受到獎金報酬的影響，幾個數據分析是如何顯示獎金報酬在諸如安全行為在內的許多領域產生積極影響（格哈特&里內什，2003)。其他的數據分析和評價表明，現金報

92、酬和行為方面呈正相關（如執(zhí)行更多更快的任務），但排除定性方面的行為（參見詹金斯等人，1998)，同時這樣的獎勵會影響在“平淡”任務中的工作績效，其需要應用規(guī)則，并非應用于有效益的任務中，也要求在問題種種的任務中擁有靈活的思維方式（噶那、福利斯特，2008;麥格勞，1978)。考慮到在人力資源外包的緊急情況下，潛在需要靈活思維和解決問題的能力，獎勵系統會根據這些意見，至少會產生行為產生積極的影響，如果對操作不構成威脅的話。</p&g

93、t;<p>　　巴頓（1972)認為，獎金制度會使經理經常失敗，因為在衡量行為上艱巨。當獎金在員工之間的分配出現不公平的時候，尤其在旗鼓相當的人中出現這樣的情況，嫉妒的心理就會由此產生。嫉妒，反過來可能會導致想要恢復公平的強烈欲望，往往是通過傷害那些獲得過多獎勵的人來實現的（埃爾斯特，1989;弗蘭克，1988)。察覺到的不公平感和嫉妒心理也會在員工之間產生反作用，可能會危及安全行為（科恩卡拉什&繆勒，2007)。

94、研究表明，獎勵安全行為的機制會降低事故發(fā)生的頻率（古德倫、剛格沃，2004)。然而其他人則認為以安全為中心的獎勵員工在一定期間內無工傷的機制可能會阻礙員工報告工傷。因此這些系統中顯而易見的積極效果可能會隱藏不斷發(fā)生的甚至更高頻率的事故（庫伯，2001;豪，2000;勞倫斯&弗蘭德，2000;米奧扎&懷爾德，2002)。據豪（2000)推測，這種系統只有將這些問題隱形化，偏離正確的軌道，才會降低事故發(fā)生的頻率。相反，大家都

95、建議安全獎金機制不應只關注諸如事故頻率這樣的結果，而是應該關注產生以上結果的行為。員工的安全行為會成就越安全的工作成果（庫伯，2001)。那些能夠被獎勵的與安全行為相關的例子</p><p>　　大多數研究員似乎都贊同這樣一個觀點：一個成功的以安全為重心的獎勵系統必須是一個具有代表性的從管理中總結出的比較完整的安全策略的一部分，它同時包含對策措施，比如安全教育、監(jiān)控和溝通等。一個不能解決實際問題的安全計劃是不成功

96、的（Glendinning，2001;Miozza&Wyld，2002)。此外，不同的策略中的元素不包括相互矛盾的目標，也是至關重要的(McLain&Jarell，2007)。如果安全獎金的目標和生產獎金的目標產生了沖突，有可能產生這樣一個問題：與安全行為有關的獎金將會被以生產的獎金所覆蓋掉。在企業(yè)中，這種現象尤其與落后的安全環(huán)境息息相關，領導者時常將生產目標凌駕于安全目標之上，從而更好的完成生產目標。事實上，研究表明只

97、有在一個具有良好的安全環(huán)境的企業(yè)中，使用獎勵機制的領導方式才能夠減低事故率（Zohar，2002)。在一個擁有良好的安全文化氛圍的企業(yè)中，安全管理是處于一個被優(yōu)先考慮的地位。因此，管理者應當視安全目標為正確的且需要優(yōu)先考慮的管理目標。</p><p>　　本研究的目的是探索瑞典的正在使用的三個核電站中安全激勵系統對安全行為的動機的潛在的影響。</p><p><b>　　2.方法

98、</b></p><p>　　2.1細化的理論框架</p><p>　　作為我們研究設計的一部分，首先要根據廣泛的理論來確立金錢獎勵在安全管理中的作用。因此，需要研究一些細化的理論（關于安全動機、組織機構，以及早期的關于獎金系統的研究）。這種折衷的方法的目的是通過生成與獎金系統、更確切的是安全行為相關的不同的話題來構建一個可供參考的理論框架。用來提供此次研究話題的理論模型從某種