外文翻譯---國有企業(yè)高管準備迎接股權(quán)激勵計劃

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　學 院： 商學院 </p><p>　　專 業(yè)： 會計系 </p><p>　　學生姓名： </p><p>　　學 號： 0711206342 </p>&l

2、t;p>　　指導教師： </p><p>　　2011 年 6 月</p><p>　　SOE Execs: Get Ready For Stock Incentives</p><p><b>　　TAN WEI</b></p><p>　　Stock option incentive p

3、lan will soon be available to state-owned enterprise executives, but will it lead to greater prosperity or new problems? </p><p>　　A trailblazing new scheme to infuse state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with ince

4、ntive stock options is under way. It’s a plan that may bolster company performance, but it’s not without risks.</p><p>　　On August 15, Li Rongrong, Minister of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administ

5、ration Commission (SASAC), disclosed that after careful study, a stock option incentive trial plan will be carried out in the listed SOEs. </p><p>　　According to the trial plan, about 102 A-share listed SOEs

6、 are expected to be the trial companies. The short list of some of those expecting to participate includes: China Unicom, Citic Group, Kweichow Moutai, China Merchants Bank and Beijing Financial Street Holding Co. </p

7、><p>　　Stock option incentive plan is designed to entice executives to work hard for the long - term development of their companies. As stocks rise based on company performance, they too gain through this profi

8、ts haring arrangement. This kind of incentive plan is popular in foreign countries, especially in the United States, where stock options can account for as high as 70 percent of a CEO’s income. Further, many economists b

9、elieve the stock option incentive plan optimizes corporate governance structu</p><p>　　On the other hand, after the Measure s on the Administration of Stock Incentive Plans of Listed Companies was issued ear

10、ly this ye a r, some of the companies turned out to have misused the incentive stock options. The result was insider dealings, performance manipulation as well as a manipulation of the company stock price. </p>&l

11、t;p>　　“Although the stock option incentive scheme is a frequently used tool to encourage top management, it could also be a double - edged sword especially in an immature market economy,” Li said. The SASAC is therefo

12、re taking a cautious approach, placing explicit requirements on corporate governance, the target and extent of the incentive measures, Li added. </p><p>　　Li stated that the overseas-listed SOEs would be the

13、 first few companies that will implement the mechanism because of their sound management structure and law-abiding nature. Then the domestic listed SOEs will have the chance to embrace incentive stock options, which woul

14、d be promoted if the trial results were good. </p><p>　　Executive face-lift</p><p>　　As for more than 900 listed SOEs, the personnel structure of the boards of directors will pro b ably face sub

15、stantial change. That’s because the plan states that if the s t o ck option incentive mechanism is going to be implemented in listed SOEs, external directors should account for half of the board of directors. </p>

16、<p>　　The trial plan introduced the concept of external directors for the first time. The external director should be legally recommended by directors of listed SOEs, and should not be working in the listed SOEs or

17、 in a holding company, said the plan. However, currently, most of boards of directors of listed SOEs are not in compliance with the requirement. They have to readjust the structure of board of directors to fit in with th

18、e new mechanism. </p><p>　　“For most of the SOEs which are listed in the A-share market, their boards of directors are made up of non-external directors and independent directors, which means that apart from

19、 independent directors, members of board of directors are all working for the listed company or for the large shareholder,” said Zhu Yongmin, an economist with the Central University of Finance and Economics. “If the sto

20、ck option incentive mechanism is to be carried out in those companies, a large-scale restructuring o</p><p>　　China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) stipulates that an independent director is one who

21、doesn’t hold another office beyond his job as a director, and has no such relations with major share holder that would interfere with the exercise of independent and objective judgment. </p><p>　　“Currently,

22、 the independent directors of listed companies can be categorized as external directors,” Zhu said. “However, the definition of external director is much broader than independent director. Those who work for a company wh

23、ich has business ties with a listed company, though they do not meet the requirements of being an independent director, but can be considered an external director.”</p><p>　　Additionally, the trial plan also

24、 stipulates that the salary committee of listed SOEs that exercise the stock option incentive mechanism should be composed of external directors. However, for most of the listed companies, there are still non - external

25、directors. As a result, a considerable number of listed SOEs need to transform their salary committee to fulfill the prerequisites of the stock option incentive mechanism. </p><p>　　Avoiding over-compensatio

26、n</p><p>　　Over- compensation is something that the trial stock plan is trying to avoid as well. </p><p>　　Therefore, the trial plan states that domestic listed SOEs’ executives should receive n

27、o more than 30 percent of their total salary (including options and dividends). But as for the overseas-listed SOEs, the maximum incentive is 40 percent of the target salary. </p><p>　　The trial plan also fi

28、xes the volume of incentive stock options. </p><p>　　The trial plan states that the volume of incentive stock options should be fixed in accordance with the scale of the listed company and the number of ince

29、ntive objectives. The number of share allocated may not exceed 10 percent of the company’s total share capital and no less than 0.1 percent. </p><p>　　In fact, Beijing Review was informed by the CSRC that so

30、me 20 listed SOEs also began exploring stock option incentive schemes in the first half of this year. But none of them received approval from the CSRC because their schemes revealed sharp contrast with the trial plan in

31、terms of the scale of incentive stock options offered. </p><p>　　Results-oriented</p><p>　　Under the trial plan, better performance is a must to obtain stock privileges. </p><p>　　T

32、he number of incentive stock options that senior executives in listed SOEs can get depends on their annual performance. If they cannot fulfill the targeted objective s , the listed company may have the right to take back

33、 the incentive the stock options or purchase them back at the price at which they we re sold to the executives . </p><p>　　Zhu Yongmin noted that the stock option incentive plan is not invariable. The direct

34、ors of listed companies, senior executives, and core technological and management personnel may not get the target stock options if they fail to achieve a satisfactory performance. </p><p>　　No freebies</

35、p><p>　　For sure, state stocks won’t be given to executives for free, under the trial plan. </p><p>　　“The state stocks have prices,” Zheng said. “If they we re paid to senior executives for free i

36、n the name of incentive stocks, it is equal to a loss of state assets. To elaborate, the incentive stocks should be the increment of stocks that are earned by the executives for listed SOEs after the implementation of th

37、e trial plan, and should not be previous stock inventory. In short, the past is past. Only future stock increases can be used as incentive stocks.” </p><p>　　Further, “The incentive stocks should not be paid

38、 only by the SASAC, which is the largest shareholder of all the central SOEs,” said Zheng Peimin, Chairman of Shanghai Realize Investment Consulting Co., who took part in drafting the trial plan,. “ The incentive plan sh

39、ould be a joint action of all share holders of a company and they should shoulder the same responsibility and enjoy equal benefit .” </p><p>　　Already, share holders pay for salaries of directors, senior exe

40、cutives and technology management staff. </p><p>　　“The incentive stocks should also be paid by all shareholders.” Zheng said. “For instance, if the government, or a state owned enterprise, holds 60 percent

41、of a listed SOE, they should only pay 60 percent of the incentive stocks and 40 percent should be paid by other share holders.” </p><p>　　國有企業(yè)高管：準備迎接股權(quán)激勵計劃</p><p><b>　　譚衛(wèi)</b></p&g

42、t;<p>　　股票期權(quán)激勵計劃將很快應用于國有企業(yè)管理人員，但這會帶來更大的繁榮，還是新的問題？</p><p>　　一個開創(chuàng)性的計劃正被引入——國有企業(yè)正在實施股票期權(quán)激勵計劃，它可能會增強公司業(yè)績，但它并非沒有風險。</p><p>　　8月15日，國資委部長李蓉蓉透露，經(jīng)過仔細研究，股票期權(quán)激勵計劃將要在上市國有企業(yè)試行。</p><p>　　

43、根據(jù)計劃，約有102家A股上市國有企業(yè)將要參與此計劃，包括：中國聯(lián)通，中信集團，貴州茅臺，中國招商銀行和北京金融街控股股份有限公司。</p><p>　　期權(quán)激勵計劃致力于吸引企業(yè)管理人員專注于他們公司的長遠發(fā)展。由于股票價格是在公司業(yè)績提高的基礎上上升的，他們也通過此來做工作安排。這種激勵計劃在國外很受歡迎，特別是在美國，那里的股票期權(quán)可以占到首席執(zhí)行官的收入的高達百分之七十之多。此外，許多經(jīng)濟學家認為，股??

44、票期權(quán)激勵計劃有助于優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，提高管理效率，增強公司的競爭力。</p><p>　　另一方面，在實施上市公司股權(quán)激勵計劃管理的初期，竟然發(fā)現(xiàn)一些公司誤用激勵股票期權(quán)。其結(jié)果導致內(nèi)幕交易，惡意操縱該公司的股票價格。</p><p>　　“雖然股票期權(quán)激勵計劃是一個經(jīng)常使用的工具，但是它亦可以被稱為一把雙刃劍，尤其是在一個不成熟的市場經(jīng)濟體制之下?！崩钊厝卣f。因此，國資委采取謹慎的態(tài)度

45、，對于實施股權(quán)激勵計劃的企業(yè)，在企業(yè)管治，目標和獎懲措施的范圍等方面提出了明確的要求，李蓉蓉補充說。</p><p>　　李指出，因為海外上市的國有企業(yè)有可靠的管理體制和健全的法律機制，所以他們將是為數(shù)不多的幾家將實現(xiàn)此股權(quán)激勵機制的公司，這一現(xiàn)象也遵從了自然規(guī)律。其后，如果他們的試行被證明是有效地，在國內(nèi)上市的國有企業(yè)將有機會實施期權(quán)激勵。</p><p><b>　　整頓管理

46、層</b></p><p>　　對于上市的900多個國有企業(yè)，董事局的人員結(jié)構(gòu)可能將要面臨實質(zhì)的變化。這是因為該計劃規(guī)定，如果上市公司預期實施期權(quán)激勵機制，外部董事應當占上市國有企業(yè)董事會全部董事人數(shù)的一半。</p><p>　　在該次計劃的試行中，首次引入了外部董事這一概念。該計劃規(guī)定，外部董事應當由上市國有企業(yè)的董事通過合法程序推薦，而不應在上市國有企業(yè)或控股公司工作。但是

47、目前，大多數(shù)上市國有企業(yè)的董事會并不符合規(guī)定。他們必須重新調(diào)整董事會結(jié)構(gòu)，以適應新的機制要求。</p><p>　　“對于大多數(shù)在A股市場上市的國有企業(yè)，其董事會都是由非外部董事和獨立董事組成，這意味著，除了獨立董事，董事會成員都為上市公司工作，并且持股比例很大?！?中央財經(jīng)大學的經(jīng)濟學家朱永敏說。 “如果股票期權(quán)激勵機制在這些公司中實施，大規(guī)模改組董事會是不可避免的，外部董事必須加入其中?！?lt;/p>

48、<p>　　中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會（證監(jiān)會）規(guī)定，獨立董事是指，不在上市公司擔任除董事外的其他職務，并與其所受聘的上市公司及其主要股東不存在可能妨礙其進行獨立客觀判斷關系的董事。 </p><p>　　“目前，上市公司的獨立董事可歸類為外部董事，”朱永敏說，“然而，外部董事的定義比獨立董事更廣泛。有些董事為某其他公司工作，而且此公司與上市公司存在業(yè)務聯(lián)系，雖然他們不符合作為一個獨立董事的要求，但可視

49、為外部董事。</p><p>　　此外，該試行計劃還規(guī)定，在上市的國有企業(yè)中，運作股權(quán)激勵機制的薪酬委員會應由外部董事組成。然而，對于大多數(shù)的上市公司而言，還沒有外部董事。因此，有相當數(shù)量的上市國有企業(yè)需要改造其薪酬委員會，以滿足履行股票期權(quán)激勵機制的必要條件。</p><p><b>　　避免超額補償</b></p><p>　　超額補償在股

50、權(quán)激勵機制的試行階段也應當避免發(fā)生。</p><p>　　因此，該試行計劃指出，國內(nèi)上市的國有企業(yè)管理人員應該接受的補償不超過工資總額的百分之三十（包括期權(quán)和股息）。但對于海外上市的國有企業(yè)，最高獎勵為目標底薪的百分之四十。</p><p>　　該試行計劃還規(guī)定了股票期權(quán)激勵數(shù)量。</p><p>　　該試行計劃指出，股票期權(quán)激勵數(shù)量應按照上市公司的規(guī)模和激勵目標的

51、數(shù)量而固定。分配股份的數(shù)量不得超過公司的總資本的百分之十，也不得低于百分之零點一。</p><p>　　事實上，北京周報從證監(jiān)會獲悉，在上半年，大約有二十家上市國有企業(yè)也開始探索實施股票期權(quán)激勵計劃，但他們沒有得到證監(jiān)會批準，因為他們在試行計劃中透露出的規(guī)模而言，與股票期權(quán)激勵計劃所提供的審訊形成強烈的對比</p><p><b>　　結(jié)果導向 </b></p

52、><p>　　試驗計劃下，更好的表現(xiàn)必然會獲得更多的股票特權(quán)。在上市國有企業(yè)的高層管理人員能得到多少股票期權(quán)激勵，取決于其年度業(yè)績。如果他們不能完成預期目標，上市公司可能有權(quán)收回獎勵或用之前公司賣給高管的股票期權(quán)的價格回購。</p><p>　　朱永敏指出，股票期權(quán)激勵計劃不是一成不變的。如果上市公司的董事會、高級管理人員、核心技術(shù)和管理人員不能達到令人滿意的表現(xiàn)，則不得獲取預期的股票期權(quán)。&

53、lt;/p><p><b>　　無贈品</b></p><p>　　當然，在試行計劃中，國有股將不會免費給予高管。</p><p>　　“國有股有價格，”鄭培民說，“如果我們以激勵股票的名義免費給予他們，那等同于國有資產(chǎn)流失。要精心策劃，激勵股票應該是在計劃執(zhí)行期結(jié)束后，管理人員為其上市國有企業(yè)賺取得股票增值，而不應是以前的存貨?？傊^去的已經(jīng)過

54、去，只有未來股價上升，才可以被用來作為激勵股票?！?lt;/p><p>　　“此外，雖然國資委是所有核心國有企業(yè)的最大股東，激勵股票的支付也不應只由國資委支付。”鄭培民主席說。上海實現(xiàn)投資咨詢有限公司的總裁，它負責起草部分試行計劃?！凹钣媱潙撌且粋€企業(yè)的所有股份持有人的聯(lián)合行動，他們應該承擔同樣的責任并享受平等的利益?！?lt;/p><p>　　目前，股份持有人支付董事，高級管理人員和技術(shù)管理