外文翻譯---從管理視角下再談股利政策

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy </p>

2、<p>　　We survey managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy,the relationship between dividend policy and value,and four common explanations for paying

3、 dividends.The evidence shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and widely agree that changes in dividends affect firm value.Managers give the strongest support to a signaling explana

4、tion for paying dividends,weak to little support to the tax-preference </p><p>　　One of the more puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a compelling and

5、 widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capital markets. Many years later, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of the “soft spots in the curr

6、ent body of theory.” So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do investors care? Black (1976) once described this issue as a dividend “puzzle” with “</p><p>　　To help explain this puzzle, financial econ

7、omists developed various theories—signaling, taxpreference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang (1987, p. 55) to observe, “Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough

8、good reasons to explain why dividends are paid to one of too many.” Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why in

9、vestors like divi</p><p>　　One way to enhance our understanding of why corporations pay dividends is to examine the views of managers who are responsible for making such decisions. Past fieldwork and surveys

10、 have provided important insights into how managers determine their firm’s dividend payouts and their views about various dividend policy issues. For example, Lintner (1956) conducted the seminal field study about the de

11、termination of dividend policy. Other researchers including Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985) and </p><p>　　Our study examines how managers view dividend policy but uses a different data set to extend and

12、refine the scope of previous survey research. Specifically, we survey corporate managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between divid

13、end policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividends—signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Our motivation for conducting this stu</p><p>　　In this study,

14、 we do not focus on the views about dividend policy of managers from the“typical” Nasdaq firm because most Nasdaq firms either pay no dividends or pay dividends on an irregular basis. Instead, we investigate the views of

15、 a subset of Nasdaq firms, namely, those that consistently pay cash dividends. The fact that most Nasdaq firms do not pay dividends is not surprising given their characteristics. As Damodaran (1999) notes, a firm’s divid

16、end policy tends to follow the firm’s life cyc</p><p>　　Our study differs from previous research on dividend policy in several ways. First, unlike prior fieldwork and surveys that focus only on NYSE-listed f

17、irms from a few industries, we study managers from dividend-paying Nasdaq firms from numerous industries. Michel (1979) and Baker(1988) present evidence that dividend policies vary across industries. Our rationale for ex

18、amining Nasdaq firms rests on the belief that the views of Nasdaq managers may differ from those of NYSE-listed firms because of </p><p>　　The finance literature contains four standard explanations for payin

19、g dividends—signaling,tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand. The signaling, or asymmetric information,models for paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and R

20、ock (1985), suggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels and dividend increases to signal private information to investors. Managers have an incentive to signal this private information to the</p&g

21、t;<p>　　A second explanation for paying dividends is tax-preference theory. Favorable tax treatment on capital gains (lower capital gains tax rate and deferral of capital gains tax) should cause investors to prefe

22、r nondividend-paying stocks. Tests of this tax-preference explanation for paying or not paying dividends take two forms. According to Brennan’s (1970) version of the capital asset pricing model, dividend-paying stocks mu

23、st offer higher pre-tax returns than nondividendpaying stocks, all else equ</p><p>　　Other studies examine the ex-dividend date price drop. Favorable capital gains tax treatment could cause the price drop to

24、 be less than the dividend payment and cause investors to prefer nondividend-paying stocks. Empirical evidence on this matter is also inconclusive. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970) find an ex-dividend date price drop

25、 that is less than the dividend amount, but Michaely (1991) finds an ex-dividend date price drop equal to the dividend payment.</p><p>　　Another explanation for why firms might pay dividends is based on agen

26、cy relationships between various claimholders of the firm. Easterbrook (1984) argues that firms pay dividends to help reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. By paying dividends,

27、managers must raise funds more frequently in the capital markets where they are subjected to scrutiny and the disciplining effects of investment professionals. Jensen (1986) makes a similar agency-theory argume</p>

28、<p>　　Finally, the bird-in-the-hand explanation asserts that paying higher dividends increases firm value because dividends represent a “sure thing” while future share price appreciation is uncertain. Miller and M

29、odigliani (1961) refer to this as the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. Bhattacharya (1979) correctly argues that the riskiness of a project’s cash flows determines a firm’s risk and an increase in dividend payout today will sim

30、ply result in an equivalent drop in the stock’s ex-dividend price. Thus, </p><p>　　We address three major research questions in this study. First, what views do asdaq managers from dividend-paying firms have

31、 on the dividend-setting process?We expect that our survey respondents strongly agree with statements involving Lintner’s (1956) model on dividend policy. Lintner’s famous investigation of dividend policy stresses that f

32、irms only increase dividends when management believes that earnings have permanently increased. As previously discussed, much support exists for Lintner’s d</p><p>　　Second, do corporate managers of dividend

33、-paying Nasdaq firms believe a firm’s dividend payout can affect firm value? Based on a set of highly restrictive assumptions, Miller and Modigliani (1961) contend that dividend policy has no effect on either the price o

34、f a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. We expect that managers generally believe that dividend policy matters because they operate in a world in which market imperfections can make dividend policy relevant. Therefore,

35、we expect to observ</p><p>　　Third, what explanations for paying dividends do Nasdaq managers tend to favor? As previously discussed, researchers have conducted many studies involving various explanations of

36、 why companies pay dividends. The empirical evidence is generally consistent with several hypotheses generated by the dividend-signaling and agency-cost models, and inconsistent with tax preference theory. As indicated e

37、arlier, there is virtually no empirical evidence supporting the bird-in-the-hand theory. Because our d</p><p>　　We survey managers of dividend-paying Nasdaq firms to learn their beliefs about the dividend se

38、tting process, whether dividend policy affects firm value, and four common explanations for paying dividends. Some evidence tends to confirm what we already know from earlier surveys of NYSE firms and other empirical res

39、earch. This evidence is still important because it reinforces some earlier findings while not supporting others using a new dataset and time period.</p><p>　　First, our results show that respondents from div

40、idend-paying Nasdaq firms strongly agree with statements supporting Lintner’s (1956) findings. In particular, respondents stress the importance of dividend continuity. An implication of this finding is that managers gene

41、rally perceive that firms today set dividend payments in a manner consistent with that described by Lintner more than four decades ago.</p><p>　　Second, Nasdaq managers widely support statements consistent w

42、ith the concept that a firm’s dividend policy matters. They agree that an optimal dividend policy strikes a balance between current dividends and future growth that maximizes stock price, and that a firm should formulate

43、 its dividend policy to produce maximum value for shareholders. An implication of this finding is that market imperfections lead to the relevance of dividend policy.</p><p>　　Third, managers give the stronge

44、st support to a signaling explanation for paying dividends.Again, this finding is not surprising because much empirical evidence is consistent with hypotheses generated by dividend signaling models. An implication of thi

45、s finding is that managers who are concerned about dividend continuity should be careful of the signals conveyed to the market by changes in dividends. However, managers offer little or no support for the tax preference

46、and agency cost explanations</p><p>　　This study also provides some additional insights about several dividend policy issues. For example, most responding managers are aware of historical patterns relating t

47、o dividends and earnings. Such awareness may influence their dividend policy decisions. Our study also provides some support for the concept of a dividend life cycle set forth by Damodaran (1999) and Leaseetal. (2000). M

48、ixed support exists about issues relating to residual dividend policy, a common concept in the dividend literat</p><p>　　Because we confine our examination to Nasdaq firms with established patterns of paying

49、 cash dividends, other datasets may provide new insights about dividend policy. As an avenue for future investigation, researchers may want to survey nondividend-paying Nasdaq firms or those firms with irregular patterns

50、 of cash dividends. Comparing the view of managers from firms with different dividend policies or patterns could result in substantially different responses than those contained in the current s</p><p>　　Sou

51、rce:H.Kent Baker,Gary E.Powell,E.Theodore Veit. “Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy “.Journal of Economics and Finance,2002(Fall),pp.267-271.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><

52、;p>　　從管理視角下再談股利政策</p><p>　　我們調(diào)查納斯達(dá)克公司的經(jīng)理，穩(wěn)定的現(xiàn)金股利決定他們對股利政策、股利政策與價值之間的關(guān)系，以及四種一般的股利政策的觀點。證據(jù)表明，經(jīng)理強調(diào)維持股利的連續(xù)性的重要性，并且股利變化會影響公司價值這一觀點得到一致認(rèn)可。經(jīng)理大力支持了支付股利信號理論的觀點，不支持稅收理論、代理成本理論和一鳥在手理論。該論文提出經(jīng)理對股利生命周期和剩余股利政策的觀點和新的論證。&

53、lt;/p><p>　　在公司財務(wù)方面一個更加令人迷惑的問題是股利問題。米勒和莫迪利安尼(1961)提出一個具有普遍說服力的觀點——在完全的資本市場下，股利政策對公司價值沒有影響，即股利無關(guān)論。幾年之后，米勒在1986年認(rèn)識到當(dāng)今理論存在的缺陷是對現(xiàn)金股利的偏好問題。為什么公司要發(fā)放股利，為什么投資者關(guān)心股利發(fā)放？布萊克在1976年將這個問題稱作“股利之謎”，再合適不過了。</p><p>　

54、　為了解決這個股利之謎，金融經(jīng)濟學(xué)家做出了各種解釋——信號傳遞理論、稅收偏好理論、代理成本理論和一鳥在手理論。這些豐富的理論使安在1987年觀察到，“因此，我們已經(jīng)從沒有合理理由解釋公司發(fā)放股利的原因的位置上升到擁有很多支持者”。行為金融學(xué)者，比如金融學(xué)家謝夫林和斯特曼在1984年解釋了期望理論和心理過程概念，在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了一個解釋投資者為何偏好現(xiàn)金股利的模型。斯特曼（1997）認(rèn)為如果忽略正常模式投資者行為，不可能解決股利之謎。當(dāng)今

55、，企業(yè)經(jīng)理們?nèi)該碛写罅康某３Ｏ鄾_突部分的股息研究。</p><p>　　我們的研究調(diào)查管理者關(guān)于股利政策的看法使用了一個不同的數(shù)據(jù)集和改進(jìn)延長以前的調(diào)查研究范圍。具體地說,我們調(diào)查公司的管理層納斯達(dá)克的公司總是分配現(xiàn)金股利去決定他們的看法,公司價值與股利政策之間的關(guān)系,和股利政策的四種常見的理論,信號傳遞理論，稅收偏好理論，代理成本和一鳥在手理論。我們進(jìn)行此項研究的動機在于確定股利政策是否僅僅改變我們已經(jīng)知道或提

56、供了新的觀點。這項研究及時證實了法馬和富安斯的研究，降低股利支付率，這不僅反映了納稅人的股息變化特點,而且傾向于低支付股息。</p><p>　　在此項研究中，我們不關(guān)注來自于典型的“納斯達(dá)克公司”的經(jīng)理們對股利政策的看法，因為大多數(shù)納斯達(dá)克公司要么支付不分配紅利或支付紅利。相反,我們研究的一個子集的觀點,即納斯達(dá)克公司總是支付現(xiàn)金股息。這一事實,大多數(shù)納斯達(dá)克公司無法支付股利的能力并不奇怪，因為考慮到他們的特性

57、。在1999年達(dá)摩達(dá)蘭提到，公司的股利政策遵循公司的生命周期。在引進(jìn)或快速發(fā)展階段，公司通常無需支付股利或只需要支付極低的股利。大部分納斯達(dá)克公司存在這樣的公司特征。</p><p>　　我們的研究不同于以前的研究在股利政策有幾個方面。首先,之前的調(diào)查,實地考察僅僅聚焦于企業(yè)為數(shù)不多的行業(yè),我們研究的納斯達(dá)克公司股利的經(jīng)理們從事眾多的行業(yè)。貝克(1979年)和米歇爾(1988)的研究為說明紅利政策變化在整個行業(yè)中

58、提供了證據(jù)說明。我們?yōu)闄z驗理論基礎(chǔ)之上那斯達(dá)克公司認(rèn)為，納斯達(dá)克的經(jīng)理觀點的不同可能在于公司行業(yè)不同性質(zhì)的基礎(chǔ)上。第二，我們調(diào)查了之前的調(diào)查研究中沒有涉及到的幾個區(qū)域，比如歷史股利模型、股利生命周期和剩余股利政策。最后，與絕大多數(shù)研究不同的是，大多數(shù)研究重點在于單一的解釋公司為什么分紅，而我們運用多個理論來解釋。以這種方法，我們可以用它評估我們可以用它來評估相對重要性的效用的不同理由，基于一致或者不一致的財務(wù)報表涉及的每一個理論。<

59、;/p><p>　　一種提高增強我們了解公司為什么發(fā)放股利的方法是，用負(fù)責(zé)做出股利決定的經(jīng)理的觀點來檢查。過去的實地考察,提供了重要的啟示--調(diào)查管理者如何決定他們的公司支付的股息以及他們對各種股利問題的看法。例如，1956年林特納, 對制定股利政策進(jìn)行了開創(chuàng)性的研究，其他研究人員包括貝克、法拉利,埃德爾曼(1985年)和貝克和鮑威爾(1999)調(diào)查經(jīng)理并獲得他們對股利政策的看法。這樣的研究補充其他類型的實證研究股利

60、政策。</p><p>　　我們此論文重點解決三個主要研究問題。首先，對納斯達(dá)克公司的經(jīng)理在股利政策過程中的看法。我們希望我們的受訪者同意林特納 (1956)模型的關(guān)于股息的觀點。林特納的著名的關(guān)于股利政策的調(diào)查強調(diào)，只有增加股息時，管理層才認(rèn)為收入只是增長下去。如前面所描述的，很多存在的事實支持了林特納模型的觀點，描述企業(yè)如何設(shè)置他們的股息支付。我們預(yù)計公司在納斯達(dá)克的研究，所有這些都建立了分紅方式，持有類似的

61、看法。</p><p>　　其次，作為納斯達(dá)克公司的合作管理者認(rèn)為一個公司的股利政策是否可能會影響公司的價值？在一個高度限制性的假設(shè)成立的基礎(chǔ)上，米勒和莫迪里阿尼（1961）強調(diào)說，股利政策不會對任何一個公司的股票或資本成本價格產(chǎn)生影響。我們預(yù)期，管理者普遍認(rèn)為分紅股利政策問題，因為他們在這個市場上，可以使市場不完善的股息政策有關(guān)操作。因此，我們希望通過觀察斯達(dá)克克有關(guān)股利政策之間的關(guān)系和價值陳述參與研究公司的經(jīng)

62、理普遍同意。由林特納研究（1956），貝克，法雷利和愛德曼（1985），以及其他報告，經(jīng)理認(rèn)為穩(wěn)定的股利政策是可取的。如果這一立場是正確的，投資者應(yīng)首選股票，付出更多可預(yù)測的股息，那些在支付股息的長遠(yuǎn)同樣數(shù)額的方式更不穩(wěn)定。</p><p>　　第三，斯達(dá)克經(jīng)理傾向于贊成什么股息支付政策？ 如前文提到的，研究人員已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了許多涉及公司為什么支付股利的各種解釋。實證證據(jù)基本一致與股利信號和代理成本的模型產(chǎn)生了若干假

63、說，理論和稅收優(yōu)惠不一致。如前文所述，幾乎沒有實施經(jīng)驗支持一鳥在手理論。因為我們的數(shù)據(jù)集組成的公司支付現(xiàn)金股利與建立的模式，我們預(yù)期這些公司的經(jīng)理是敏感的信號，它們可能通過改變這種模式傳達(dá)給市場。因此，我們期望發(fā)現(xiàn)，納斯達(dá)克公司的經(jīng)理同意有關(guān)支付比其他的解釋聲明關(guān)于股息信息不對稱理論更加強烈。</p><p>　　財務(wù)文獻(xiàn)中包含四個關(guān)于股利分紅理論，分別是信號傳遞，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本，一鳥在手理論的解釋。信號傳遞

64、，或股利政策的不對稱信息，是被巴恰塔亞(1979)，約翰和威廉姆斯（1985年），米勒和羅克（1985）業(yè)內(nèi)人士建議而建立起來的，用于各級管理人員選擇股息和紅利增加的信號傳遞給投資者。當(dāng)經(jīng)理人相信他們的公司的股票的當(dāng)前市場價值低于其內(nèi)在價值，他們將刺激的信號傳遞給公眾投資者。股息的增加提供了一個可信的信號，當(dāng)其他公司不具備良好的內(nèi)部信息不能模仿，而不會過度增加后承擔(dān)削減股息紅利的機會增加。強有力的支持存在的股利信號理論的包括阿哈諾尼和斯

65、瓦瑞（1980），阿斯奎斯和馬林斯（1983），凱萊與拉瑪斯沃（1986），希利和佩普（1988），瓦克寧和謝夫（2001）的研究。</p><p>　　第二種股利政策的解釋是稅收優(yōu)惠的理論。資本利得（低資本收益稅率和資本收益稅延遲）的稅收優(yōu)惠應(yīng)引起投資者選擇沒有股利支付的股票。測試這種稅收優(yōu)惠理論是否支付股利可以采取兩種形式。根據(jù)布倫南的（1970）的資本資產(chǎn)定價模型版本，紅利支付股票必須提供比無股利分配的股票

66、更高的稅前收益，其他相等。布倫南實證檢驗，但好壞參半。此外，布萊克和斯科爾斯（1974）發(fā)現(xiàn)沒有證據(jù)證明這項稅收的影響，而利茲伯格和拉瑪斯沃（1979）和凱萊和邁克利（1993）發(fā)現(xiàn)的證據(jù)表明，稅前收益與股息率有著密切關(guān)系。</p><p>　　其他研究探討除息日價格下降。有利的資本收益稅收待遇可能會導(dǎo)致價格下降到派發(fā)股息更少，并導(dǎo)致投資者選擇無股利支付的股票。在這個問題上的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)也沒有定論。例如，埃爾頓和格魯

67、伯（1970）發(fā)現(xiàn)一除息日價格下降，比分紅金額較小，但邁克利（1991）發(fā)現(xiàn)一除息日價格下降等于股息。</p><p>　　另一種解釋公司為什么在代理公司與機構(gòu)內(nèi)部各種關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上派發(fā)股利。伊斯特布魯克（1984）認(rèn)為公司支付股利，幫助降低代理成本與所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離有關(guān)。通過支付股息，管理者必須更頻繁地籌集資金，在資本市場，他們受到審查和投資專業(yè)人士的影響。詹森（1986）進(jìn)行了類似代理理論的論證，以減少管理人

68、員支付股息公司的現(xiàn)金流，酌情可用于次優(yōu)投資基金的管理者，但有利于減少股東財富。羅澤夫（1982年），朗和李茲森伯格（1989），阿格拉瓦和賈亞拉曼（1994），詹森，索伯格和佐恩（1992年）為這代理理論支付股利的解釋實證支持。</p><p>　　最后，一鳥在手理論，聲稱支付更高的股息紅利增加公司的價值，因為股利代表了“肯定的事情“，而未來股價升值是不確定的。米勒和莫迪利亞尼（1961），指出一鳥在手理論是謬誤

69、。巴特查亞（1979）正確地認(rèn)為，一個項目的現(xiàn)金流量的風(fēng)險決定了公司的風(fēng)險和在今天的派息增加只會導(dǎo)致該股票的除權(quán)價格相當(dāng)于下降。因此，增加股息今天不會通過減少未來現(xiàn)金流量的風(fēng)險一家公司的價值。雖然幾乎沒有經(jīng)驗支持支付股息一鳥在手理論，我們想確定管理者的意見是否與以前的理論和實證研究相一致。</p><p>　　我們調(diào)查斯達(dá)克公司的經(jīng)理股利分紅的觀念，去學(xué)習(xí)他們股利政策制定過程,無論是股利政策是否影響公司價值和四種

70、常見的股利理論。一些證據(jù)傾向于確認(rèn)我們已經(jīng)知道早期紐約證券交易所的調(diào)查公司和其他的實證研究。這證據(jù)仍然是重要的,因為它加強了一些早期的研究結(jié)果支持別人而不使用了新的數(shù)據(jù)和時期。</p><p>　　第一,我們的調(diào)查結(jié)果表明,納斯達(dá)克公司分紅的受訪者強烈支持林特納的(1956)的發(fā)現(xiàn)。特別是,受訪者強調(diào)股利的連續(xù)性。此次調(diào)查的啟示是,這一特性,經(jīng)理們普遍認(rèn)為公司今天制定穩(wěn)定的股利政策與40多年前林特納描述的一致。&

71、lt;/p><p>　　第二,那斯達(dá)克經(jīng)理廣泛支持同意公司報表這一股利政策問題。他們同意一個最優(yōu)的股利政策是在當(dāng)前股息、未來發(fā)展,最高股票價格之間平衡的,公司應(yīng)該制定公司股利政策來產(chǎn)生最大的價值為股東分紅。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)的啟示是,市場的不完善導(dǎo)致有關(guān)的股利政策。</p><p>　　第三,經(jīng)理給的強烈支持股利政策的信號傳遞理論。再次,這一發(fā)現(xiàn)并不令人驚訝,因為許多經(jīng)驗證據(jù)表明,與假設(shè)股息所產(chǎn)生的信號

72、模型是一致的。該發(fā)現(xiàn)的啟示是,管理者關(guān)心股利連續(xù)性的信號應(yīng)該通過改變股利向市場傳遞信號。然而,經(jīng)理很少支持稅收理論和代理成本的理論。稅收和代理成本理論的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)是令人驚訝的,特別是考慮到其他實證研究結(jié)果與監(jiān)督機構(gòu)法下的股利時一致的。并非出乎意料,大多數(shù)受訪者不同意支持關(guān)于股利政策的“一鳥在手”理論。通過進(jìn)一步的試驗解釋了在不同的管理者如何觀點對股利政策時，行業(yè)分類(金融與非財務(wù)公司)有一點影響。</p><p>

73、　　此次研究也提供了一些額外的關(guān)于幾個股利政策問題的見解。例如,大多數(shù)有響應(yīng)的經(jīng)理意識到歷史模式關(guān)系到股息和收入。這方面的意識可能會影響上市公司股利政策的決策。我們的研究也提供一些支持達(dá)蒙德里（1999）和萊斯特（2000）提出的股利生命周期理論的證據(jù)。一些也同樣支持存在剩余股利政策的相關(guān)問題,這是一個在股利作品中常見的理論。 </p><p>　　因為我們把檢驗?zāi)Ｊ浇⒃诩{斯達(dá)克公司的支付現(xiàn)金股利的公司,其他數(shù)

74、據(jù)集可以提供新的關(guān)于股利政策觀點。作為為進(jìn)一步調(diào)查的大方向,研究人員可能要調(diào)查這些公司納斯達(dá)克公司不支付股利或這些公司的不規(guī)則股利。通過管理者的角度比較不同企業(yè)紅利政策或模式,可能導(dǎo)致完全不同的意義要遠(yuǎn)大于目前的研究內(nèi)容。</p><p>　　出處: [英]H.肯特.貝克，加理.E.鮑威爾，E.希奧多爾.威特，《從管理視角下再談股利政策》，經(jīng)濟學(xué)和財政學(xué)雜志，(2002秋):P267-271.</p>