外文翻譯---拉美的教育、民主和發(fā)展

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA</p><p>　　Abstract - The educati

2、on first brought to America by Europeans was hardly more than ornamental culture, literacy was generally unimportant, and African slaves were not educated at all. Only in this century did industrialization cause some gov

3、ernments to provide economic and technological support through training and education. In the last decade, the debt crisis curtailed spending, while numbers of students and teachers continued to rise. A comparison betwee

4、n Latin America and South Korea illust</p><p>　　Inward-oriented industrialisation has its problems. In Latin American countries,</p><p>　　these included modest levels of competitiveness and bala

5、nce of payment problems. The intimate relationships of companies with the State led to the constitution of a complicated network of connections with official bureaucracies. These often resulted in ambiguous control and s

6、upport relationships.</p><p>　　Moreover, while foreign economic life changed rapidly, that of Latin American</p><p>　　countries generally did not. And while international credit helped in the sh

7、ort term to finance some admirable growth, the ensuing problem of foreign debt became a nightmare. As is well known, the position in most Latin American countries then reversed as they became net capital exporters. Durin

8、g the last decade, the continent has remitted approximately US $200 billion to its creditors abroad. In these circumstances, economies were forced to depend upon domestic savings. Investment capacity was </p><

9、p>　　Furthermore, although educational expenditure decreased, enrolment increased, mainly at second and third levels of education (Table 2). In other words, the number of students, particularly the most expensive ones,

10、 increased at an inverse rate to the size of the financial cake available to meet their needs. Curiously, in some cases, the pupil/teacher ratio improved, especially at the first level of education. The number of teacher

11、s grew faster than the number of pupils, though the opposite would </p><p>　　In contrast, in the Eighties, developed countries not only increased their public expenditure on education, despite their modest p

12、opulation growth, but also improved their educational conditions (Table 3). Universalisation reached not only the first but also the second levels of education. The third level also expanded notably, in spite of the econ

13、omic obstacles of the last decade.</p><p>　　Elsewhere, the Republic of Korea, often compared to Latin America in the "lost decade", offers an alternative example. Based on an outward-oriented model

14、 of industrialisation, this country invested heavily in education (Table4). Its public expenditure almost quadrupled in nine years and enrolment in higher education increased enormously. This expansion, however, was not

15、made at the expense of basic education. On the contrary, current expenditure on pre-primary and first level education per pupil</p><p>　　These comparisons remind us that when we advocate rationalisation of r

16、esource use, we need to ask what kinds of rationalisation are being proposed. The state is a cluster of competing groups with different goals and means. Thus, rationality has different meanings depending upon the particu

17、lar elements of the power elite or other major groups of society involved. What rationality means for most educators and economists may mean irrationality for a political group whose purpose it is to reach or a</p>

18、<p>　　It is a matter of verifiable fact, that economic crises defeated many authoritarian</p><p>　　regimes in Latin America. The fragile democracies which often emerged as a result generally did so in

19、 association with populism and corporatism, interests which can only be protected on the basis of peculiar criteria of resource allocation. Democratic rule of this kind does not necessarily bring about the structural cha

20、nges of social participation which its electors might have expected. Yet, at least the illusion of change is essential to populism. There is, therefore, a sort of hide-and-seek ga</p><p>　　decisions and hidi

21、ng structural problems.</p><p>　　The portrait of Latin American education in such contexts cannot be considered a mere result of mismanagement, and of bad administration of available means. To understand it,

22、 we need to take account of ends as well as means. In most countries there are both technical capacity and financial resources for deeper educational change than actually takes place. On the one hand, money is wasted on

23、personnel and other forms of expenditure. On the other, those employed in education are in general unhappy</p><p>　　In spite of all this, existing relationships between political forces and education keep th

24、e status quo almost untouched. Governments deal easily with such matters as enrolment expansion, school building and reform, school lunch programmes, etc. At the same time, however, they leave curricula, evaluation.teach

25、er education, productivity and equity virtually untouched. As a result,real educational change in Latin America cannot hope to occur until serious political interest, backed by popular supp</p><p>　　Hope com

26、es from the educational pre-requisites of the need for economic</p><p>　　modernisation. The demand for basic skills and capacity to deal creatively with the problems of social interaction may at least stimul

27、ate pressure for the universalisation and substantial improvement of basic education. The unprecedented concern for basic education, recently evidenced in Brazil, seems to derive from this kind of stimulation. Thus; desp

28、ite their economic problems, both central government and government at state level have concentrated their efforts on social projects for lower in</p><p>　　Prospects for the future</p><p>　　What

29、 are Latin America's horizons for the future? The reply to this question</p><p>　　relates to both internal and external prospects. From the internal standpoints of the different countries, much will cont

30、inue to depend upon the intentions of those who wield power. There is, of course, no clear answer about how these will behave. The application of neo-liberal and orthodox prescriptions for economic adjustment have shown

31、themselves to have high social costs. The state has generally been too large, too restrictive and too inefficient to be successful in their application. Reform</p><p>　　privileged groups. Consequently, natio

32、nalism, popular unrest, military unrest, and an increase of delinquency in almost all age groups, amount in some countries to a sort of undeclared civil war. In at least one case, this has become overt. Young democracies

33、 are faced with severe tests, some of which appear insoluble.</p><p>　　Such internal perspectives offer little justification for optimism. What, then, are the prospects on the international scale? The most p

34、essimistic views of the "after Cold-war" world regard Latin America as a disregarded region. Even the cheap availability of manpower does not help in this era of declining national economies. We should not be s

35、urprised at this. Even in North American ghettos there are plenty of underqualified labourers who cannot find a job in an advanced "third wave" economy, w</p><p>　　age (Rufin 1991).</p><

36、p>　　On the other hand, a more optimistic alternative scenario suggests that the military spending decrease resulting from the end of the cold war could be positive for everybody. Competition among industrialised natio

37、ns will be good for Latin America, a region with a favourable ratio of population to national resources, having plenty of water, agricultural land and minerals. On this hypothesis, the drainage of capital which took plac

38、e in the "lost decade" was only feasible in an international system</p><p>　　Whatever may be the next chapter in the continent's history, export strategies and those based on inward-oriented ec

39、onomic growth are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The best models of the newly industrialised Asian countries perhaps show us a way forward. In the past, national development plans in Latin America actually led to fa

40、ilure to the extent that the import substitution models adopted simply did not work. However, the East Asian model,though very important, could not be generalised, </p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　

41、State reform in Latin America is absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, economic reforms depend on State effectiveness in the planning, implementing and evaluating of its policies. Education is one of the fields where such

42、a governmental action is particularly important. As already explained, education is faced in Latin America with many technical, managerial and financial problems.However, its greatest problem is of a political nature. An

43、y analysis or approach which ignores the role of politics ca</p><p>　　Following Europe's "invention" of America, colonisation and development differentiated it into Anglo-Saxon and Latin sphere

44、s. After the Second World War, a new tripartite division arose: advanced capitalist societies in the First World, socialist societies in the Second World and underdeveloped societies in the Third World. The concept of Ti

45、ers Monde, perhaps inspired by the French Revolution, implies both the idea of struggle and the hope of equality. Now that the Second World has largely colla</p><p>　　After the Cancun Conference (1981), deve

46、lopment problems seemed to disappear from the international agenda. Perhaps this was a result of frustration and disappointment. The North has expressed its concern with drug production, pollution and explosive demograph

47、ic expansion in the South. Meanwhile, these problems find their counterparts in the North in the form of drug abuse, derived from serious psycho-social problems, complex ecological threats and conspicuous consumption. It

48、 is absolutely unpro</p><p>　　Candido Gomes.San Jose Mercury News (CA)1991. O</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　拉美的教育、民主和發(fā)展</p><p>　　摘 要：第一次歐洲人帶入美洲的文化不僅僅是觀賞文化，素

49、養(yǎng)普遍不重要，非洲奴隸沒有受過一點(diǎn)教育。只是本世紀(jì)工業(yè)化促使政府通過培訓(xùn)教育提供經(jīng)濟(jì)和技術(shù)支持。在過去的十年中，債務(wù)危機(jī)削減開支，然而老師和學(xué)生的數(shù)量卻在不斷上升。拉美和韓國(guó)之間做的比較說明了前者的投資相對(duì)下降。民粹主義和社團(tuán)主義國(guó)家的出現(xiàn)并沒有緩解這種局面，雖然現(xiàn)在確實(shí)有一些為貧困兒童提供基礎(chǔ)教育的方案。隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)方案的調(diào)整，很少有人為那些有著沉重負(fù)擔(dān)的人們做過什么，貧困和技術(shù)陳舊依然沒有明顯的解決方案。一個(gè)國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)的重大改革，包括對(duì)教

50、育的承諾，經(jīng)濟(jì)模式的改變，以及全球認(rèn)可的相互依存關(guān)系。</p><p><b>　　拉丁美洲的教育危機(jī)</b></p><p>　　內(nèi)向型工業(yè)化有它自身的問題。在拉美國(guó)家，問題主要包括提高競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和支付付款。公司與國(guó)家的密切關(guān)系導(dǎo)致了憲法與官僚機(jī)構(gòu)的復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)關(guān)系。這些往往導(dǎo)致模糊了控制和支持之間的關(guān)系。此外，雖然對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)生活發(fā)生了迅速的變化，拉美國(guó)家發(fā)生的變化卻不大。盡

51、管在短期內(nèi)國(guó)際借貸能夠促進(jìn)融資，但隨之而來的外債問題是一場(chǎng)噩夢(mèng)。眾所周知，大多數(shù)拉美國(guó)家的立場(chǎng)則相反，它們成為資本凈出口國(guó)。在過去的十年中，拉美國(guó)家已經(jīng)向其債權(quán)國(guó)輸出2000億美元。在這種情況下，經(jīng)濟(jì)被迫依賴在國(guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄。投資能力也相對(duì)減少，教育支出同其他形式一般支出一樣，大幅下跌。</p><p>　　此外，雖然教育支出減少，但是招生增加，主要集中在第二和第三級(jí)教育。換而言之，學(xué)生紛紛去追求這塊金融蛋糕的大小來滿

52、足他們的需求。奇快的是，在教育的第一層次上，學(xué)生或者教師的比例有所提高。教師的數(shù)量增長(zhǎng)快于學(xué)生的數(shù)量增長(zhǎng)，雖然在經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中預(yù)期相反。政府的教育開支越少，相對(duì)的，他們會(huì)越多的把開支放在人員上。這意味著薪金貶值，使教育系統(tǒng)在招募和挑選工作人員中存在困難，其他運(yùn)行開支也相應(yīng)減少。主管部門沒有采取有效行動(dòng)，去提高生產(chǎn)力。負(fù)面影響產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重的管理問題，影響效率，質(zhì)量和公平性。財(cái)政危機(jī)沒有導(dǎo)致任何教育支出的合理性。相反，資源配置一般不符合預(yù)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)和

53、財(cái)務(wù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。</p><p>　　與此相反，在八十年代，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在人口適度增長(zhǎng)的情況下，不僅增長(zhǎng)了公共教育支出，而且使教育狀況也有所改善。達(dá)到普遍化不僅是教育的第一級(jí)別，也是教育的第二級(jí)別的目標(biāo)。在過去的十年中，盡管經(jīng)濟(jì)存在障礙，第三級(jí)別也在不斷擴(kuò)大和發(fā)展。</p><p>　　在其他地方，比如經(jīng)常與拉丁美洲比較的韓國(guó)，提供了另外的一種例子?；谕庀蛐凸I(yè)化模式，韓國(guó)在教育方面投入巨資。九年

54、中，其公共開支幾乎翻了兩番，高等教育也增加了不少。對(duì)提高學(xué)前教育學(xué)生的水平和一流的教育經(jīng)常性支出，在1980年和1988年增幅最高。</p><p>　　這些比較提醒我們，當(dāng)我們提倡合理化利用資源時(shí)，我們要問什么樣的措施和方案是合理的。國(guó)家是一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與不同的目標(biāo)和手段組群。因此，要采取合理性的措施，需要建立在權(quán)利精英或社會(huì)其他主要群體共同參與討論的基礎(chǔ)上。理性對(duì)于教育家和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家意味著什么，可能意味著非理性對(duì)于一

55、個(gè)政治群體，其目的是在犧牲一些人的利益上，達(dá)到或者增加自身實(shí)力和威望這一目的。</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)打敗許多獨(dú)裁政權(quán)在拉丁美洲是事實(shí)。因此，這時(shí)候出現(xiàn)的脆弱的民主國(guó)家一般都在與民粹主義和社團(tuán)聯(lián)合，在建立資源配置標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的基礎(chǔ)上，達(dá)到保護(hù)特殊利益的目的。這種民主規(guī)則并不是其選民所期望的社會(huì)參與的結(jié)構(gòu)性變化。因此，對(duì)于民粹主義來說，必須改變選民與政客之間的關(guān)系。后者的解決方法是為達(dá)到目的，可以付出任何代價(jià)。前者是

56、在對(duì)短期解決辦法感興趣的同時(shí)，延緩不受歡迎的決定和隱藏結(jié)構(gòu)性問題。</p><p>　　拉美教育在這樣的情況下不能僅僅認(rèn)為是管理不善的結(jié)果。我們需要考慮結(jié)果，就像需要考慮采取何種手段一樣。在大多數(shù)國(guó)家，教育資源的技術(shù)能力和財(cái)務(wù)資源比實(shí)際還要進(jìn)行的更深入。一方面，金錢被浪費(fèi)在人員和其它形式的支出。另一方面，從事教育的工作者普遍對(duì)自己的收入不滿意。留級(jí)率和輟學(xué)率持續(xù)在高水平。不過，Schiefelbein和Olive

57、ira等人提出，增加每名學(xué)生百分之五的平均成本，就能夠在大多數(shù)的拉美國(guó)家提供必要的資源設(shè)施，設(shè)備和人員的升級(jí)。</p><p>　　盡管如此，教育與政治力量之間的關(guān)系幾乎保持現(xiàn)狀不變。各國(guó)政府輕松地處理有關(guān)教育方面的事情，如學(xué)校的擴(kuò)招，學(xué)校的建設(shè)和改革，學(xué)校的午餐方案等等。然而，結(jié)果卻不盡人意。因此，拉美教育并沒有如期望中的改變，除非發(fā)生由民眾支持為后盾的政治變革。只有合理地結(jié)合與刺激社會(huì)行動(dòng)者之間的行為，才有可

58、能提供有效的教育方式。但眾所周知，建立這一可能是極其困難的。</p><p>　　教育的希望來自于教育的現(xiàn)代化。進(jìn)行基本技能和能力的需求，創(chuàng)造性地處理與社會(huì)的互動(dòng)，至少可以降低刺激帶來的壓力，改善基礎(chǔ)教育。最近巴西的基礎(chǔ)教育似乎關(guān)注從中獲得一種刺激。因此，盡管存在經(jīng)濟(jì)問題，中央政府和州級(jí)政府都集中在低收入的兒童上，力求公正公平。</p><p><b>　　展望未來</b&

59、gt;</p><p>　　拉美教育的未來是什么？對(duì)這個(gè)問題的答復(fù)，涉及到內(nèi)部和外部的前景。從內(nèi)部立場(chǎng)上來看，在很大程度上取決于誰掌權(quán)?，F(xiàn)在我們都無法預(yù)測(cè)到底未來的掌權(quán)人。對(duì)新自由主義和傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)整已表明要很高的社會(huì)成本。國(guó)家普遍過大，要求嚴(yán)格，降低了申請(qǐng)的成功率。改革是必要的，但以盡量減少對(duì)低收入群體的不利影響的補(bǔ)償政策往往被忽視。經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的利益者通常不是那些承受較重負(fù)擔(dān)者。相反，利益往往被特殊群體所得。因此

60、，幾乎在所有年齡段增加了犯罪，如民族主義，民眾騷亂，軍事動(dòng)亂等，尤其是一些內(nèi)戰(zhàn)國(guó)家。至少在某種情況下，這已成為公開的事實(shí)。年輕的民主國(guó)家都面臨著嚴(yán)峻的考驗(yàn)，其中一些是很難解決的。</p><p>　　這種內(nèi)部的觀點(diǎn)表明了形式不容樂觀，那么，以外部來看前景又會(huì)怎么樣呢？最悲觀的觀點(diǎn)是在冷戰(zhàn)后，拉丁美洲將被忽視。即使是廉價(jià)的人力供應(yīng)，也扭轉(zhuǎn)不了一個(gè)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的局面。對(duì)此，我們不應(yīng)該感到驚訝。在北美貧民區(qū)里有許多勞動(dòng)

61、者在經(jīng)濟(jì)“第三次浪潮”中無法找到合適的工作，而被稱為有很高需求，賺取豐厚薪水的“象征分析師”。拉美國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)低下，技術(shù)落后，對(duì)于擺脫貧窮沒有合理的解決方案，因此，被認(rèn)為沒有希望，沒有前途。由于發(fā)展不會(huì)一般化，富裕國(guó)家在任何時(shí)期都會(huì)保護(hù)自身的利益。</p><p>　　另一方面，民眾更樂于接受的建議是減少軍費(fèi)開支。拉丁美洲是一個(gè)資源豐富的國(guó)家，有水，農(nóng)田和礦物質(zhì)。工業(yè)化國(guó)家的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)將有助于拉丁美洲的發(fā)展。拉丁美洲“失去

62、的十年”造成了今天經(jīng)濟(jì)落后的局面，也影響了冷戰(zhàn)期間國(guó)際資本的流向?，F(xiàn)在，國(guó)內(nèi)投資加上外商投資，將促進(jìn)拉丁美洲國(guó)家和地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。南方共同市場(chǎng)，南部拉丁美洲自由貿(mào)易協(xié)會(huì)將會(huì)是一個(gè)開始的里程碑。</p><p>　　無論拉丁美洲以后的發(fā)展會(huì)怎樣，但出口戰(zhàn)略與內(nèi)向型的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)不一定互相排斥。亞洲的新興工業(yè)化國(guó)家的發(fā)展模式就向我們證明了這一點(diǎn)。在過去，拉丁美洲國(guó)家發(fā)展計(jì)劃的失敗導(dǎo)致了進(jìn)口發(fā)揮不了其應(yīng)有的作用。然而，東亞

63、模式很成功，但不一定適合拉美國(guó)家。市場(chǎng)是動(dòng)態(tài)的，不能一概而論，每個(gè)國(guó)家都有所不同。在工業(yè)化國(guó)家的保護(hù)主義趨勢(shì)下，產(chǎn)生了廣泛的擴(kuò)張活動(dòng)。這就像電梯門開了，有些乘客走了進(jìn)去，但拉丁美洲卻錯(cuò)過了。不管怎樣，電梯的空間是有限的，不可能人人都能搭上。如果將戰(zhàn)略正確地結(jié)合起來，加強(qiáng)國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的同時(shí)，加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部和區(qū)域市場(chǎng)，那么，拉丁美洲的未來還是很有希望的。當(dāng)然，教育和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)在戰(zhàn)略中將發(fā)揮重要作用。</p><p><b&g

64、t;　　總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　拉丁美洲進(jìn)行改革是非常必要的。然而，經(jīng)濟(jì)改革依賴于國(guó)家政策的規(guī)劃、實(shí)施和評(píng)估等。教育是國(guó)家極度關(guān)注的一個(gè)領(lǐng)域。正如前面所說，拉美教育面臨著許多技術(shù)、管理和財(cái)務(wù)等問題。但是，教育最大問題是政治問題。任何分析方法或手段都不能忽視政治的巨大作用。一個(gè)國(guó)家的教育要發(fā)展，需要國(guó)家，政客，商人，工人，教育工作者和其他社會(huì)團(tuán)體等共同的努力。改善教育需要把握好每一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)。公平

65、，質(zhì)量和效率是拉丁美洲獲取獨(dú)立的必要條件。拉丁美洲對(duì)世界作出的貢獻(xiàn)是重要的。但是，就目前來看情況不容樂觀。即使是在短期和中期來看，也只有少數(shù)人感到滿意。</p><p>　　繼美國(guó)獨(dú)立之后，殖民化和發(fā)展分化為盎格魯撒克遜和拉丁美洲領(lǐng)域。第二次世界大戰(zhàn)之后，出現(xiàn)了新的三方格局：第一世界，第二世界和經(jīng)濟(jì)欠發(fā)達(dá)的第三世界。對(duì)第三世界的概念，或許來自于法國(guó)大革命，既意味著斗爭(zhēng)，又代表平等和希望?，F(xiàn)在，第二世界已經(jīng)在很大程

66、度上崩潰，國(guó)際體系又劃分為：北方地區(qū)和南方地區(qū)。</p><p>　　自1981年的坎昆會(huì)議之后，國(guó)際議程很少提到發(fā)展問題。也許這代表了挫敗和失望。北方地區(qū)已對(duì)毒品生產(chǎn)，污染和爆炸，以及南方的人口膨脹問題表示關(guān)切。在北方，確實(shí)存在藥物濫用，衍生嚴(yán)重的心理和社會(huì)問題，生態(tài)破壞嚴(yán)重，鋪張浪費(fèi)等現(xiàn)象。因此，南北方互相指責(zé)。我們?cè)絹碓角宄卣J(rèn)識(shí)到，如今世界各國(guó)家與地區(qū)聯(lián)系越來越緊密，我們都依賴于對(duì)方。如果歐洲人發(fā)現(xiàn)美洲大