公平分配阻塞成本交易外文翻譯

1、<p>　　Equitable Allocation of Congestion Relief Cost to Transactions </p><p>　　公平分配阻塞成本交易</p><p>　　Mesut E. Baran, Venkat Banunarayanan, and Kenneth E. Garren </p><p>　　Abstrac

2、t—This paper investigates a bid based congestion management scheme for a system that accommodates many bilateral transactions. The paper proposes a new allocation method for allocating the cost of congestion relief to tr

3、ansactions that cause the congestion. The allocation reflects the actual usage of the congested facilities by the transactions and recovers the cost. Also proposed in the paper is a “consistency” test to quantify and tes

4、t the equity/fairness of the method. Test results ill</p><p>　　摘要---這篇論文研究投標(biāo)擁塞管理方案的系統(tǒng)，可容納許多雙邊交易。提出了一種新的分配方法分配成本的擁塞以緩解交易造成的擁塞。該分配反映了擁擠的交易設(shè)施的實際使用情況和恢復(fù)的成本。本文提出的是一個“一致性”測試量化和測試公平/公正的方法。試驗結(jié)果表明，該方法提供了更好的價格信號的擠塞線比影

5、子價格。試驗結(jié)果還表明，該方法恢復(fù)的成本。結(jié)果的一致性表明，所提出的方法一致的規(guī)定，交易造成反流擁擠線補(bǔ)償指數(shù)條款----擁塞管理，成本分配，傳輸接入。</p><p>　　I. I NTRODUCTION</p><p><b>　　I. 引言</b></p><p>　　CONGESTION in a transmission grid o

6、ccurs due to an operating condition that causes limit violations on one or more of the “flow-gates” in the system [1]. Congestion has become more important in the emerging deregulated environment as the number and magnit

7、ude of power transactions increase.The importance of congestion relief as a transmission service is recognized by both the regulating bodies, especially by FERC[2], and by utilities and NERC [3].Congestion management is

8、especially challenging in</p><p>　　adopts a similar allocation approach.</p><p>　　由于經(jīng)營條件，擁塞在輸電網(wǎng)發(fā)生，導(dǎo)致限制行為的一個或多個“流量門”的系統(tǒng)[ 1]。在新興市場環(huán)境下隨著電力交易的數(shù)量和規(guī)模的增加，擁塞問題已經(jīng)變得越來越重要。作為一種傳輸服務(wù)擁塞緩解的重要性同時被規(guī)管機(jī)制意思到，尤其是聯(lián)邦能

9、源管制委員會[2]，公用事業(yè)和自然環(huán)境研究理事會[3]。在雙邊交易環(huán)境下，其中個別交易雙方相互間[ 5]的阻塞管理是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性。在美國，自然環(huán)境研究理事會[6]提出一種保留必要能力的“流道”交易阻塞管理方案。這種方法試圖提前避免阻塞，如果在操作過程中發(fā)生阻塞，那么交易各方將被要求削減其交易。該方法相當(dāng)?shù)谋Ｊ?，將?dǎo)致系統(tǒng)[1]的低效利用。在[7]-[9]中，提出了一種以節(jié)點(diǎn)/緯向價格與零收入為基礎(chǔ)的方法用來解決上述的一些挑戰(zhàn)?；趦r格

10、的擁塞管理，獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商在需要重新調(diào)度從市場參與者收到的投標(biāo)為基礎(chǔ)的資源管理擁塞中發(fā)揮積極作用。最近，斯堪的納維亞半島[4]和加利福尼亞州[10]采用以這種價格為基礎(chǔ)的方法。市場參與者的擁堵成本/收入的分配是擁塞管理的重要問題之一。在節(jié)點(diǎn)/緯向定價的擁塞管理方案中，擁塞產(chǎn)生收入。這項收入可分布到傳輸?shù)挠脩簦ㄈ缗餐?，或（如加州），?lt;/p><p>　　In this paper, a new allocati

11、on method is proposed for a bid based congestion management system in a bilateral transaction environment. The new method, outlined in the next section, reflects the actual usage of the congested facility by the transact

12、ions and recovers the cost. Cost recovery eliminates financial stakes for the ISO in congestion management. In Section III,the method is analyzed from the equity/fairness point of view by using a “consistency” test which

13、 has been developed based on th</p><p>　　在本文中，提出了一種在雙邊交易模式下基于投標(biāo)的擁塞管理系統(tǒng)的新的分配方法。新方法，概述在下一節(jié)中，反映了實際使用的擁擠的交易成本和恢復(fù)。成本回收，消除了擁塞管理的獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商的金融股權(quán)。在第三部分，分析的方法從公平/公正的角度使用“一致性”的測試，已經(jīng)制定了基于公平分配的概念，用于各種分配問題的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。公平分配是重要的，以便獲得

14、之間的合作，市場參與者也發(fā)送正確的”市場價格信號”為擁塞，從而提供效率。第四節(jié)概括說明了該方法的進(jìn)行測試的主要特點(diǎn)，結(jié)論五給出了結(jié)論。</p><p>　　II. CONGESTION MANAGEMENT</p><p><b>　　II. 擁塞管理</b></p><p>　　The congestion management scheme

15、 considered in this paper is specially tailored for a bilateral transaction environment. We assume that the ISO receives all the transaction requests in advance of an hour/day and makes a congestion assessment study for

16、the given conditions. If the analysis indicates some congestion conditions, then these conditions are announced to the market participants and the parties are asked to submit bids for re-dispatch for congestion relief. B

17、ased on the bids received, t</p><p>　　本文考慮的擁塞管理方案是特別針對雙邊交易環(huán)境。我們認(rèn)為獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商提前一小時/天收到所有的分配請求，并根據(jù)給定的條件制定擁塞評估方案。如果分析表明一些擁塞的條件，這些條件是宣布向市場參與者和當(dāng)事人要求提交投標(biāo)再調(diào)度擁塞緩解。根據(jù)收到的標(biāo)書，獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商確定最經(jīng)濟(jì)再調(diào)度的出價，資源（與工具等潮流或傳輸約束的經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)度，TCED）。然后，

18、如果一個可行的調(diào)度被發(fā)現(xiàn)，為了收回調(diào)度成本，獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商分配以一種公平的方式對所有參與輸送擁塞進(jìn)行擁塞費(fèi)用的分配。</p><p>　　The congestion management method considered here is similar to the Sweden’s “buyback” method, since it pools all the resources (bids) toget

19、her for the congestion relief, and thus the method differs from California model which does not allow pooling of the bids together. The congestion relief considered is also similar to current utility practice, as the uti

20、lities currently use all the resources available to them to relieve congestion with a minimum congestion relief cost objective. The goal, and</p><p>　　challenge taken in this paper is to develop an allocatio

21、n method that is equitable and that it recovers the cost.</p><p>　　這里提到的擁塞管理方法與瑞典的“回購”方法類似，因為它把所有的資源（價格）都集中到擁塞中，而與不允許將價格統(tǒng)一的加利福尼亞州模式不同。擁塞緩解也被認(rèn)為與現(xiàn)在使用的方法類似，作為公用事業(yè)目前使用的所有資源提供給他們，以紓緩擠塞紓緩交通擠塞最低成本目標(biāo)。本文的目標(biāo)和挑戰(zhàn)是建立一個公平

22、和分配方法，使其恢復(fù)成本。</p><p>　　The cost of congestion relief can be allocated easily if the congestion occurs only on one facility. Consider congestion on a transmission line , for example. Assume that the ISO solic

23、ited the resources to relieve the congestion (by performing a TCED, for example) and the total cost incurred for relieving the congestion on this line is . To recover this cost, the ISO can allocateto the transactions in

24、 proportion to transaction’s usage of line; that is,</p><p><b>　　(1)</b></p><p>　　where , is the cost of congestion allocated to transaction ,and is the power-flow in MVA on line all

25、ocated to transaction before the congestion relief. The complex power-flows are obtained by using the aggregated allocation approach proposed in [11]. The allocation uses the complex power-flow, rather than the real powe

26、r-flow since complex power is a better measure of the actual usage of a line.</p><p>　　A unique problem arises when two or more lines become at the same time. Then the congestion cost allocation becomes chal

27、lenging due to the fact that only one re-dispatch is done to relieve congestion on all the lines simultaneously. The approach in this case is to allocate the total congestion relief cost first to the lines that are conge

28、sted and then, further distribute the allocated cost for each line to the transactions that are using the line. Two main approaches were investigated in this st</p><p>　　如果擁塞僅發(fā)生在一個設(shè)備，那么將很容易的分配擁塞費(fèi)用。例如，假設(shè)在傳輸線路

29、上存在擁塞。假設(shè)獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商為緩解擁塞征求資源（例如，通過擔(dān)當(dāng)一個TCED）并且在線路上為緩解擁塞產(chǎn)生的總的費(fèi)用為。為恢復(fù)成本，獨(dú)立系統(tǒng)運(yùn)營商可以計算出在線路上在總的交易中占得比例，即</p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　這里，是交易分配的擁塞費(fèi)用，是潮流增值在線路分配給交易之前的擁塞緩解。通過使用匯總分配方法提出[11]復(fù)雜的功率流。由

30、于復(fù)雜的功率是一種更好衡量線路實際使用量的工具，所以使用的是復(fù)合的潮流，而不是實際的潮流。當(dāng)在同一時間有兩條或者多條線路產(chǎn)生擁塞時問題將變得復(fù)雜。阻塞費(fèi)用分?jǐn)傋兊镁哂刑魬?zhàn)性的，因為只有一個再調(diào)度，以減輕對所有的線同時擠塞。本文主要研究兩種方法，方法如下</p><p>　　Nodal Method</p><p><b>　　A、節(jié)點(diǎn)法</b></p>

31、<p>　　This method makes use of the nodal/zonal based pricing schemes [9]. Assuming that the congestion relief is provided through an optimization procedure (such as TCED or OPF), the method uses the shadow prices as

32、sociated with congested lines to allocate the cost of congestion relief to the congested lines.For example, if is the shadow price for congestion relief on line , then congestion relief cost for line is:</p><p

33、><b>　　(2)</b></p><p>　　where is the minimum amount of MVA “relief” needed to relieve the congestion (i.e., the amount of MVA which is over line ’s limit). Once the cost is allocated to the ind

34、ividual constraints, then we use (1) to allocate to individual transactions.</p><p>　　這種方法使節(jié)點(diǎn)/緯向為基礎(chǔ)的定價計劃[9]。假設(shè)，通過優(yōu)化程序（，如TCED或自有）提供紓緩交通擠塞，該方法使用擁擠的線路分配擁擠的線路成本，以紓緩交通擠塞的影子價格。例如，假設(shè)線路上擁塞的影子價格為，則線路上的擁塞費(fèi)用為：</p>

35、;<p><b>　　（2）</b></p><p>　　這里是需要緩解阻塞的最低數(shù)額（即MVA的增值超過了線路的限度），一旦成本分配給個人的限制，那么我們使用（1）分配給個別交易。</p><p>　　Shadow prices are good price indicators for small corrections around the unc

36、onstrained operating point at which they are calculated. However, these prices may not be correct especially when the congestion requires considerable amount of re-dispatch, as it will be illustrated in the test results

37、section.Furthermore, the shadow prices will not recover the cost, i.e.,, (where, is the total cost of congestion), and therefore, we will have a mismatch that needs to be allocated for cost recovery.</p><p>

38、　　影子價格是好的價格指標(biāo)小更正圍繞約束工作點(diǎn)的計算。然而，特別當(dāng)擁堵需要大量的再調(diào)度時，這些價格可能不正確，因為它將會在測試結(jié)果部分說明。甚至，影子價格將不能恢復(fù)成本，即，（這里是擁塞的總費(fèi)用），因此，我們需要一個糾正錯誤的式子以恢復(fù)分配成本。</p><p>　　B. Aggregated Allocation Method</p><p><b>　　B .匯總分配方法&l

39、t;/b></p><p>　　This method adopts the allocation approach proposed in [11] (in which the method is used to allocate transmission line flows to transactions) to allocate the total congestion relief cost to

40、 the congested line as the first step of the allocation. In the second step, as in the nodal method, the costs allocated to congested lines are further allocated to transactions. The aggregated allocation method adopted

41、for the first step calculates the marginal and incremental cost of relieving each congested</p><p>　　在[11]中提出了這種分配方法（這種方法用于輸電線路流量分配交易），分配的總阻塞成本的擁擠線路作為第一步的分配。在第二步，同節(jié)點(diǎn)法一樣，成本分配到線路的阻塞進(jìn)一步分配給交易。集合分配方法第一步進(jìn)行每條線路邊際成本

42、和增量成本的計算，然后這些平均費(fèi)用分配線路綜合成本。以下是它的主要步驟：</p><p>　　Step 0 Determine the total congestion relief cost (with all the transactions and all the constraints),.</p><p>　　步驟0、確定總的擁塞緩解費(fèi)用（包括所有的交易和所有的約束）。</

43、p><p>　　Step 1 For each congested line</p><p>　　步驟1、假設(shè)每條擁塞線路</p><p>　　? Consider only the congested line , and determine the cost of relieving this congestion,This is the marginal cost

44、 associated with constraint .</p><p>　　假設(shè)只有一條擁塞線路，并且已知緩解這條線路的擁塞費(fèi)用為，這是邊際成本與約束，</p><p>　　? Consider all congested lines except , and determine the cost of relieving congestion for this case, . The

45、 incremental cost associated with constraint is then .</p><p>　　假設(shè)除了線路外的所有擁塞線路，并且確定這種情況下緩解線路擁塞的費(fèi)用為。線路邊際成本與約束為。</p><p>　　? Calculate the aggregated congestion relief cost allocated to line as,<

46、;/p><p><b>　　(5)</b></p><p>　　計算分配給線路上的匯總阻塞成本為，</p><p><b>　?。?）</b></p><p>　　Step 2 Distribute the cost allocated to lines to the transactions:<

47、/p><p>　　步驟2、分發(fā)分配給線路的交易成本：</p><p>　　? Calculate the total allocation mismatchand distribute it to the lines in proportion to the relief each line receives:</p><p><b>　　(6)</b&

48、gt;</p><p>　　計算總的分配，然后計算每條線路上的擁塞費(fèi)用（6）</p><p>　　? For each transaction , Calculate the congestion relief cost allocated to transactionby summing the allocations to transactionfrom each congested

49、line :</p><p><b>　　(7)</b></p><p>　　假設(shè)每個交易為，計算從每個擁塞線路交易的擁塞緩解費(fèi)用占總的交易的費(fèi)用：</p><p><b>　?。?)</b></p><p>　　As it will be illustrated in the test resul

50、ts section, the aggregated costs calculated for congested lines in the first step of this method provide more accurate cost signals than the shadow prices used in nodal method. The method, as the first method,explicitly

51、incorporates the actual usage of the congested lines by transactions into the allocation process, especially in the second step, by distributing the line congestion charges to the transactions in proportion with the tran

52、sactions’ usage o</p><p>　　測試結(jié)果說明，該方法第一步中匯總成本計算阻塞線路提供了比節(jié)點(diǎn)法中影子價格更準(zhǔn)確的成本。作為第一種理論，該方法在分配過程中通過交易明確納入擁塞線路的實際使用情況，特別是在第二步，通過在交易中分發(fā)線路擁塞費(fèi)用使用比例。該法還在原有的分配錯誤下重新分配，以收回交易成本。我們將使用這種不匹配的項來評估該方法的性能，因為它是得出應(yīng)盡可能小的不匹配最好的方法。</

53、p><p>　　One of the important issues in allocation process is the counter-flow a transaction may cause on a congested line, i.e., the line-flow due to a transaction on a congested line being in the opposite dire

54、ction to the net line-flow. The implication of the counter-flow is that, the transaction causing the counterflow is actually helping to ease the congestion. The issue is then, whether the transaction with the counterflow

55、 should be compensated. The proposed method compensates the counterflows, as i</p><p>　　分配過程中的一個重要的問題是在一個擁塞的線路上可能會導(dǎo)致逆流交易， 這個流線是由交易在擁塞線路上相反方向上的網(wǎng)線流引起的。逆流的含義是引起逆流交易，實際上是幫助，以紓緩交通擠塞。問題是，是否應(yīng)補(bǔ)償與逆流交易。該方法補(bǔ)償反流，因為在第二步分

56、配在總的交易中所占有的線電流的比例。然后在測試結(jié)果部分，它將會顯示，這是必要的補(bǔ)償方法，以便為“一致”。在下一節(jié)中介紹了一致性的概念。 </p><p>　　III. CONSISTENCY IN COST ALLOCATION</p><p>　　III.成本分配的一致性</p><p>　　The allocation methods int

57、roduced above try to be “equitable” by considering the usage of the congested facilities by the transactions in the allocation process. In economics, the equity or fairness of an allocation method is usually measured in

58、terms of stand-alone (marginal) cost, the cost the player would incur if the participant engages in the activity by himself [12].For equitable allocation, the participant should be allocated a value that is smaller than

59、the stand-alone cost but greater t</p><p>　　上面介紹的分派方法試圖就擁塞設(shè)備交易在分配過程中的使用情況而言是合理的。在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)上，一個分配方法的公平性通常由單機(jī)（邊際）成本來衡量，如果參與者參與這個交易，那么將由他自己來承擔(dān)費(fèi)用[12].對于公平分配，參與者應(yīng)分配一個值，這個值要小于單機(jī)成本但要大于增量成本（總成本減去包含其它組的所有邊際成本）。第一個條件給參與者合作提

60、供經(jīng)濟(jì)誘因，而第二個條件確保任意一組不能資助另一組。然而，這樣一個分配方法雖然可行，它的單機(jī)（邊際)成本將大于或等于增量成本。滿足這種條件的成本計劃有一個核心，然后公平分配參與交易并選擇一個核心。為確保這種分配方法選擇一個適當(dāng)?shù)暮诵狞c(diǎn)，用所謂的一致性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來核對該方法，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)要求一個公平分配對于任何分組的參與者而言是“公平的”，達(dá)到的效果是沒有分組需要“重合同”。</p><p>　　Unfortunately, a

61、s it will be illustrated in the test results section, in congestion relief, the incremental cost could be greater than the stand-alone (marginal) cost. This indicates that in congestion relief the core is empty, and ther

62、efore, it is not possible to</p><p>　　develop an allocation procedure that is based solely on marginal and incremental prices and satisfy the equity condition outlined above. Therefore, we adopted an equity

63、test for the congestion cost allocation by tailoring the consistency criteria as follows:for an allocation method to be consistent, the amount allocated to a coalition (subgroup) should be greater than or equal to the su

64、m of the allocations made to the members of the coalition; i.e.,</p><p><b>　　(8)</b></p><p>　　不幸的是，由于該方法將要在測試結(jié)果部分論證，在擁塞緩解，增量成本要大于單機(jī)（邊際）成本。這表明擁塞緩解的核心是不存在的，因此，制定一個完全基于邊際和增量價格，并滿足上述公平條件

65、的分配程序是不可能的。因此，我們對擁塞成本采用一種公平的測試，分配通過剪裁一致性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)如下：為使分配方法變得一致，一個聯(lián)盟（分組）的分配要大于或等于聯(lián)盟成員的分配總和，即</p><p><b>　　(8)</b></p><p>　　Fig. 1. Transactions & constraints in Case 1.</p><p&g

66、t;<b>　　TABLE I</b></p><p>　　A LLOCATION OFLINE FLOWS (MVA) TO TRANSACTIONS</p><p>　　for all coalitions . In (8), is the total amount allocated to coalition by the allocation method,

67、and is the allocated amount for each member of the coalition , if it were to participate individually. Ensuring that (8) is fulfilled would provide no incentive for any participants to form a coalition in order to decrea

68、se its allocation. A similar consistency test was used in [13] to test the “fairness” of the method proposed for allocating the cost of a new transmission line among its users. In th</p><p>　　在公式 (8), 對聯(lián)盟所有，

69、是分配方法分配到聯(lián)盟的總金額，是單獨(dú)參加的情況下聯(lián)盟的每個成員的分配金額。確保公式(8)是完整的，任何參與者結(jié)成聯(lián)盟提供無明顯誘因，以減少其分配。在[13]提到一個相似的一致性測試，測試所提出的方法在一條新的輸電線路其用戶的成本分配上的“公平性”。在測試結(jié)果部分，我們使用這種測試來檢驗本文所提到的擁塞緩解成本分配方法的一致性。</p><p>　　IV. TEST RESULTS</p><p

70、><b>　　IV. 測試結(jié)果</b></p><p>　　The proposed congestion relief method has been tested by performing simulations on two test systems, a 5-bus system similar to the one used in [14], and the IEEE-11

71、8 bus system. Simulations performed on these systems and the results obtained are summarized below.</p><p>　　所提到的擁塞緩解方法已經(jīng)通過兩個測試系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行模擬測試過了，一個類似在[14]的5總線系統(tǒng)，一個IEEE-118總線系統(tǒng)。在這些系統(tǒng)上進(jìn)行模擬和取得的成果概括如下。</p><p

72、><b>　　Case 1</b></p><p>　　The system, the transactions, and the congestion (overloaded lines) considered in this case are shown in Fig. 1. As indicated in the figure, there are three transacti

73、ons considered on the 5-bus system and these transactions cause two of the lines on the system to overload. The magnitudes of the transactions and the line flow limits are indicated on the figure. As the figure indicates

74、, the transactions T1 and T2 are scheduled to supply the load at node 3, and the transaction T3 is scheduled to su</p><p><b>　　案例1</b></p><p>　　圖1顯示此案例的系統(tǒng)、交易、擁塞（重載線路）。如圖所示，在5總線系統(tǒng)上有三個

75、交易，這些交易導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)中兩條線路超載。交易的大小和流線的限制在圖上標(biāo)明。如圖所示，交易T1和T2計劃給節(jié)點(diǎn)3提供負(fù)載，交易T3計劃給節(jié)點(diǎn)4提供負(fù)載。</p><p>　　To simplify the simulation, all the lines are represented by a series reactance of 0.1 p.u. and the generators are assumed

76、to regulate their buses at 1.05 p.u. The line-flows the transactions will create on the lines and the allocation of these flows to transactions are given in Table I. The allocations shown in the table are obtained by the

77、 method proposed in [11]. The table indicates that none of the transactions will cause congestion on the lines by themselves, and thus, their marginal (stand</p><p>　　Fig. 2. Generation bids for congestion r

78、e-dispatch.</p><p>　　Fig. 3. Generation redispatch for congestion relief in Case 1.</p><p><b>　　TABLE II</b></p><p>　　A LLOCATION OFCOST TO LINES IN CASE 1</p>&l

79、t;p>　　higher incremental cost than marginal cost. Hence, as pointed out in previous section, this is a challenging case (which has no“core”) for testing the “equity” of the allocation method.</p><p>　　為了簡

80、化模型，所有線路代表一個0.1 p.u的串聯(lián)阻抗，發(fā)電機(jī)近似為它所在線路的1.05 p.u。該交易的行流將會在線路產(chǎn)生而交易的這些資金分配在表格I給出。表中所示的分配可由[11]所提出的方法獲得。該表顯示交易本身在線路上不會造成擁塞，因此，他們的邊際（單機(jī)）成本將為0。這種情況表明，在此案例中，交易的增量成本高于邊際成本。因此，正如上一節(jié)指出，對測試分配方法的“公平性”這是一個具有挑戰(zhàn)性的案例（它沒有核心）。</p>&l

81、t;p>　　To relieve the congestion, the proposed bid based congestion relief procedure is simulated for this case. The generators are assumed to submit the re-dispatch prices shown in Fig. 2.Note that, as indicated in th

82、e figure, the price curves have usually two segments, one for increasing, and the other for backing down the generation from the desired operating point. To determine the amount of re-dispatch for each generator, we used

83、 an OPF package [15] which tries to minimize the cost of re-dispatch </p><p>　　為緩解擁塞，基于擁塞緩解過程提出的投標(biāo)是這種情況的模擬。圖2顯示發(fā)電機(jī)提交的重新派遣的價格。需要注意的是，如圖中所示，價格曲線通常有兩段，一段表示增長，另一端表示發(fā)電機(jī)退縮到所需的操作點(diǎn)。為判定每個發(fā)電機(jī)重新派遣的金額，我們使用一種OPF組件，這種組件在緩

84、解擁塞的時候最大限度的減少重新派遣的成本。重新派遣的結(jié)果在圖3中顯示，它表明擁塞緩解已由發(fā)電機(jī)2 實現(xiàn)，退縮已由發(fā)電機(jī)5實現(xiàn)，發(fā)電機(jī)4增加其輸出以提供每條擁塞線路15MVA 的擁塞緩解。</p><p>　　The total cost of this re-dispatch for congestion relief, based on the bid prices, is $/hr. This cost ne

85、eds to be allocated to the three transactions that are causing the congestion.By following the proposed method, the cost is allocated to the two congested lines first, based on the marginal and incremental cost of reliev

86、ing congestion on these two lines. This allocation is illustrated in Table II. The results indicate that it costs more to ease congestion on line 2–3 than on line 1–3, based on</p><p>　　基于投標(biāo)價格，擁塞緩解重新派遣的總成本，，

87、單位為$/hr。這筆費(fèi)用需要被分配到造成擁塞的三個交易。按照建議的方法，費(fèi)用首先要分配給兩條擁塞線路，根據(jù)這兩條線路擁塞緩解的邊際和增量成本。分配如表II所示。結(jié)果表明基于重新派遣出價，擁塞緩解在線路2–3比在線路1–3花費(fèi)更多的費(fèi)用，然而分配恢復(fù)成本，即不存在不匹配。</p><p>　　In the second step the allocation procedure, the line costs ar

88、e allocated further to individual transactions based on their share of MVA flow on these lines, i.e., by using Eq. (7). Table III illustrates this step and gives the results for this Case. The numbers in parenthesis in t

89、he table indicate the transaction line shares which are listed in Table I. The results in Table III indicate that the method allocates about the same amount (about $250) to the transactions T1 and T2 and about twice th&l

90、t;/p><p>　　在分配過程的第二步，線路成本基于這些線路上的MVA的流量份額進(jìn)一步分配到個別交易，即使用公式(7)。表格III論證了這一步驟并給出了這種情況下的結(jié)果。表中括號中的數(shù)字顯示共享表I列出的數(shù)據(jù)。表III的結(jié)果表明該方法分配給交易T1和T2約相同的數(shù)額（約$250）將近是交易T1和T2的兩倍數(shù)額（約$551）給交易T3。</p><p>　　To compare these r

91、esults with that of the nodal approach out-lined in the previous section, the shadow prices for the two congested lines, which are obtained from the OPF simulation, are employed to determine the cost of relief associated

92、 with these two lines by using Eq. (2). The results are summarized in TableIV. Comparing the results in the table with that of Table II, it is seen that: (i) the shadow prices give the wrong signal in that the shadow pri

93、ce of the first line (line 1-3) is more th</p><p>　　將這些結(jié)果于上一節(jié)概述的節(jié)點(diǎn)方法比較，從OPF 仿真取得的兩條擁塞線路的影子價格，通過公示(2)被用來決定與這兩條線路相關(guān)的緩解成本。其結(jié)果匯總在表IV。將這些結(jié)果與表II的結(jié)果進(jìn)行比較，可以看出：影子價格給出了錯誤的信號，即第一條線路（線路1-3）的影子價格比線路2–3的影子價格要高，而提出的方法的其他方面

94、包括邊際成本和與這些線路相關(guān)的增量成本：該方法并沒有恢復(fù)成本，即分配的總和不等于總成本。</p><p>　　Finally, the method is checked for “fairness” by using the proposed consistency test to see if the method favors any coalition among the transacting part

95、ies such that it will lower their allocation. Table V shows the possible coalitions for this case and their allocations if they were to form coalitions by combining their transactions. As the table indicates, in this cas

96、e, the allocation satisfies the consistency test, since the allocation to every coalition is the same as the sum of the allocat</p><p>　　最后，通過使用提到的一致性測試來檢測該方法的“公平性”，看該方法是否適合交易各方的任一聯(lián)盟，以此降低它們的分配成本。如果通過聯(lián)合它們的交易形

97、成聯(lián)盟，表V顯示了這種情況下的可能聯(lián)盟和它們的交易。如表所示，在這種情況下，分配滿足一致性測試，因為每個聯(lián)盟的分配與聯(lián)盟參與分配的總和相同（“Ind. Sum”在表中顯示）。我們注意到聯(lián)盟只影響分配的第二步——分配線路共享交易——因此，如果交易元件的線流的分支是附加的，那么分配將是一致的。附加在大多數(shù)情況下都是存在的，如同這種情況，因為交易大多影響實際功率在系統(tǒng)中的流動模式。</p><p>　　Fig. 4.

98、Congestion relief for Case 2.</p><p><b>　　TABLE VI</b></p><p>　　A LLOCATION OFCOST TO LINES IN CASE 2</p><p><b>　　TABLE VII</b></p><p>　　ALLOCAT

99、ION OFCOST TO TRANSACTIONS IN CASE 2</p><p><b>　　Case 2</b></p><p>　　This case is the same as Case 1, except in this case line 1–2 is considered to be congested rather than line 2–3,

100、 by setting a 15 MVA flow limit on it. Congestion on line 1–2 differs from congestion on the other lines in this system since there is a counter-flow on this line due to transaction T2, as indicated Table I. Since the co