污染控制與墨西哥吸收外商直接投資一個產(chǎn)業(yè)層面的分析外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：Pollution Control and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: An Industry-Level Analysis </p><p>　　出 處：Environmental and Resource Economics

2、 </p><p>　　作 者：Andreas Waldkirch and Munisamy Gopinath </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　Pollution Control and Foreign Direc

3、t Investment in Mexico: An Industry-Level Analysis</p><p>　　Andreas Waldkirch and Munisamy Gopinath </p><p><b>　　ABSTRACT</b></p><p>　　Foreign direct investment (FDI) f

4、lows into developing countries have been increasing dramatically over the past decade. At the same time, there has been widespread concern that lax environmental standards are in part responsible for this surge. This pap

5、er revisits the question of the existence of a pollution haven effect by examining the extent to which the pollution intensity of production helps explain FDI in Mexico. We focus on pollution intensities, which are direc

6、tly related to emission reg</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Concerns about the effects of environmental standards on trade and investment flows abound. There is much talk about a “race to the bot

7、tom”, where developing countries in particular are said to be increasing their competitive advantage in the world economy due to lower labor and environmental standards. Some in the developed world view the lower standar

8、ds as “unfair” cost advantages and have suggested ways to limit or eliminate them. For instance, the labor and environmental side agreements to t</p><p>　　A review of the literature is given by Jaffe et al.

9、(1995) and Wheeler (2001), who conclude that there is hardly any empirical support for the existence of a pollution haven effect. More recently, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) find that abatement cost and pollution intensi

10、ty do not affect foreign direct investment (FDI) into Morocco, Côte d’Ivoire, Venezuela, and Mexico. Smarzynska and Wei (2004) for a sample of 24 transition countries and Dean et al. (2005) in a study of China find

11、some, though </p><p>　　There are a variety of factors, theoretical as well as empirical, that must be considered in a study of pollution haven effects. On the theoretical side, as a country develops and inco

12、mes rise, several forces are at work simultaneously. Low environmental standards during the early stages of industrial development should attract a disproportionate amount of polluting industries, which is a composition

13、effect . Moreover, the increased scale of production should give rise to more pollution. On the </p><p>　　On the empirical side, many studies face problems such as unobserved heterogeneity, aggregation bias

14、or possible endogeneity of proxies for environmental stringency (Levinson and Taylor 2004). Since decisions on output, inputs, and pollution abatement are made simultaneously, regressions of trade or FDI on pollution aba

15、tement costs have produced counter-intuitive results, e.g., significant pollution haven effects for less pollution intensive industries (Kalt 1998; Grossman and Krueger 1993). Com</p><p>　　Another reason why

16、 developing countries do not tend to become pollution havens may be that the stringency of a country’s environmental standards is only one, and perhaps not the most important, factor determining comparative advantage amo

17、ng countries (Ederington et al. 2005). In particular, endowment of factors such as skilled labor and capital largely determine where industry is located and which goods a country will export. To the extent that heavily p

18、olluting industries also tend to be capita</p><p>　　This study contributes to the literature on the existence of pollution havens in several ways. First, we use pollution intensities, which follow directly f

19、rom emission control, as a measure of the stringency of environmental standards (Xing and Kolstad 2002). The focus on pollution intensity is useful since it allows for substitution between capital and pollution and does

20、not require data on unobservable pollution taxes. It is also consistent with actual US policy, which does not impose taxes bu</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　This study has tested for and quantifie

21、d a pollution haven effect for the case of Mexico. We investigate whether FDI flows into Mexico are indeed affected by the pollution intensity of production. In spite of recent improvements in laws and enforcement in the

22、 wake of NAFTA, looser environmental regulation in Mexico may make it an attractive production location for polluting industries. The existing literature has largely failed to find much evidence of a pollution haven effe

23、ct, in accordance wit</p><p>　　We improve on and complement the existing literature in several ways. By focusing on pollution intensities rather than abatement cost, we allow for the substitution of pollutio

24、n and capital and avoid the problem of identifying pollution expenditures. We have information on host country pollution intensities and thus do not need to assume identical pollution intensities in Mexico and its source

25、 countries. The availability of detailed FDI information, including the source country of investment, al</p><p>　　We find that there is indeed evidence of a pollution haven effect. While only a few industrie

26、s are estimated to have a positive correlation between pollution and FDI flows, these account for a nontrivial share of received FDI and output of up to 30%. At the same time, there are a number of industries for which t

27、he FDI-pollution relationship is negative. Other than that, FDI is largely driven by Mexico’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive production processes. Finally, these results are obt</p><p>　　The findin

28、g that pollution and FDI flows have a positive relationship has important policy implications. Lowering developed (home) country environmental regulations may not be desirable or politically feasible, but options exist t

29、o induce a host country to raise its regulatory level (e.g., side agreements to NAFTA or EU accession). However, inducing one or a small group of countries to tighten regulation is likely to simply shift the problem of p

30、ollutionintensive production to other favorable de</p><p>　　污染控制與墨西哥吸收外商直接投資：一個產(chǎn)業(yè)層面的分析</p><p>　　Andreas Waldkirch and Munisamy Gopinath</p><p><b>　　引 言</b></p>&

31、lt;p>　　在過去的十年中，外商直接投資大幅流入發(fā)展中國家，而且數(shù)量還在不斷地增加。與此同時，出現(xiàn)了一個普遍關(guān)注的問題---環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是不是放寬松了；本文帶我們?nèi)ヌ剿鬟@個問題，在墨西哥的生產(chǎn)污染強(qiáng)度很好的解釋了外商直接投資在污染問題上的。我們將問題的焦點(diǎn)集聚到了排污標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上，而不是在排污稅上。檢查了幾個不同的污染物后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一個外商直接投資與污染（如高度管制下的二氧化硫）存在正相關(guān)的統(tǒng)計(jì)關(guān)系，這是具有經(jīng)濟(jì)意義的。在行業(yè)內(nèi)，外商直接

32、投資與環(huán)境污染是呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系的，估計(jì)高達(dá)30%的外商直接投資總額會產(chǎn)生30%的制造業(yè)產(chǎn)量。雖然我們證實(shí)了墨西哥是勞動密集為主的生產(chǎn)工序，與以前的文獻(xiàn)相比，在這方面有比較優(yōu)勢。經(jīng)分析結(jié)果表明，環(huán)境因素可能對企業(yè)的投資決策有所影響。</p><p>　　關(guān)于貿(mào)易和投資流動影響了環(huán)境的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這里可以說是一個“競相殺價(jià)”，其中特別的是發(fā)展中國家對世界經(jīng)濟(jì)增長起到了作用，由于較低的勞工和環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這些情況在發(fā)達(dá)國家中被認(rèn)為

33、是“不公平”的較低了成本，產(chǎn)生的優(yōu)勢，發(fā)達(dá)國家建議如何限制或者消除它們。例如，勞工和環(huán)境方面，北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定在尋求美國與墨西哥之間的“標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。本方協(xié)議希望墨西哥避免成為美國和加拿大它們的國內(nèi)污染較大的企業(yè)的避難所，因?yàn)槟鞲缇哂休^低的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。然而，學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)報(bào)告好壞各參一半。許多研究并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)這樣的現(xiàn)象。只有少數(shù)的報(bào)告支持了受環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)影響的實(shí)證，表示對貿(mào)易或企業(yè)的投資決策起了重大影響。</p><p>　　謝斐

34、等人在文獻(xiàn)中表明，幾乎沒有一個實(shí)證支持說一個污染避難所效應(yīng)的存在。最近，Eskeland 和Harrison（2003）發(fā)現(xiàn)，減排成本和污染強(qiáng)度不影響外商直接投資進(jìn)入墨西哥，科特迪瓦，委內(nèi)瑞拉和摩洛哥。Smarzynska和Wei 在2004年做了24個轉(zhuǎn)型期國家為樣本。2005年在中國的一些研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，污染避難所的作用相對來說是比較微弱的，后者只是對香港，臺灣和澳門的投資者有效。一個例外是Ederington和米尼爾在2003年的研究，

35、發(fā)現(xiàn)環(huán)保法規(guī)對貿(mào)易的流量有影響。</p><p>　　這里有很多因素和經(jīng)驗(yàn)理論，在一個污染避難所里面被考慮。在理論方面，作為一個發(fā)展和經(jīng)濟(jì)收入的增加，幾個因素在同時工作的時候。在工業(yè)發(fā)展早期階段較低的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)會吸引過多的污染行業(yè)。此外，生產(chǎn)規(guī)模的不斷擴(kuò)大，會引起更多的污染。在另一方面，隨著新工廠取代了舊工廠，他們都會因此使用先進(jìn)的設(shè)備和最先進(jìn)的技術(shù)。因此，對投資和貿(mào)易的流動其決定作用的是污染標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的凈影響。<

36、/p><p><b>　　實(shí)證分析</b></p><p>　　在實(shí)證方面，許多研究面臨著諸如未觀察到的異質(zhì)性，聚集的偏見或者對環(huán)境嚴(yán)格可能會有內(nèi)生性問題。由于產(chǎn)出，投入和污染治理的決策同時，貿(mào)易或外商直接投資可以回歸污染減排成本產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果。例如，少污染的勞動密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)產(chǎn)生重大的污染避風(fēng)港效應(yīng)。污染治理的成本的使用強(qiáng)度和環(huán)境的環(huán)保法規(guī)的復(fù)合，代表了他們在墨西哥的執(zhí)法很低，

37、低可以一直延續(xù)到20世紀(jì)80年代。環(huán)境規(guī)制的范圍也只是在最近才有所回升。污染控制與外商直接投資在發(fā)達(dá)國家和發(fā)展中國家的法規(guī)是不一樣的。當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)范圍內(nèi)的數(shù)據(jù)使用時，國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的組成可能隨時間的改變而改變。因此，輸出地變化歸因于污染環(huán)境的緊縮，只有在這個組合效果下才不會改變。最后，當(dāng)許多不可觀測特性等，在生產(chǎn)勞動強(qiáng)度較高的情況下，是否在實(shí)證分析下，此估計(jì)是失之偏頗的。</p><p>　　另一個原因，發(fā)展中國家往往不

38、會成為污染的避難所，可能是一個國家的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不嚴(yán)格下，其決定因素的是一個國家的比較 。特別是熟練的勞動力和資本要素稟賦在很多程度上起到了決定性的作用，決定； 一個工業(yè)的定位和一個國家的商品出口。早某種程度上，污染嚴(yán)重的行業(yè)往往是資本密集型的，資本的相對缺乏的發(fā)展中國家的減排成本可能超過其優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　他的研究有助于對污染避難所在文學(xué)方面的幾個解釋。首先，我們使用的污染強(qiáng)度是按照直接排放量來控制的，作

39、為對環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)施比較嚴(yán)格的國家。關(guān)注污染強(qiáng)度時有用的，因?yàn)樗鼘①Y產(chǎn)和污染進(jìn)行替代，并不需要對污染稅的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行觀察。這也符合美國實(shí)際的政策，不征收調(diào)節(jié)稅，而是通過設(shè)置不同的限制。我們專注于外商直接投資的沒有，而不是因我們認(rèn)為發(fā)展中國家知識在環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方面有比較低的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)優(yōu)勢。</p><p><b>　　結(jié) 論</b></p><p>　　在這項(xiàng)研究測試中，量化了墨西哥的

40、為污染避難所的情況。我們調(diào)查到外商直接投資是否進(jìn)入墨西哥是受生產(chǎn)的污染強(qiáng)度影響。在法律和執(zhí)法情況有所改進(jìn)的墨西哥，在北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定后，墨西哥的寬松環(huán)境法規(guī)可能會使其成為一個有吸引力的污染性工業(yè)生產(chǎn)基地?，F(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)在很多程度都沒有找到一個避風(fēng)港效應(yīng)污染多的證據(jù)，按照這個概念，污染減排成本只是構(gòu)成總成本大小的一個小部分，以推動企業(yè)的選址決策。</p><p>　　我們改進(jìn)和補(bǔ)充了幾個方面的現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)后，通過對污染治理成

41、本的強(qiáng)度，而不是重點(diǎn)，我們允許對污染和資本替代，避免污染的支出，查明問題的所在。我們對東道國污染強(qiáng)度信息分析，從而得到不必承擔(dān)其在墨西哥和來源國相同污染強(qiáng)度。外商直接投資的詳細(xì)信息，包括投資來源國的可用性，是我們能夠通過理論控制得出了一個從廣泛的外商直接投資的決定因素，從而大大降低了虛假的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。</p><p>　　我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)，污染避難所效應(yīng)存在的證據(jù)。雖然只有少數(shù)幾個行業(yè)，估計(jì)有和污染有正相關(guān)的，這些外商直

42、接投資的份額占據(jù)了一次的外商直接投資。與此同時，有許多行業(yè)的外商直接投資和污染的關(guān)系都是負(fù)面的，更甚是，外商直接投資在很大程度上被墨西哥的比較優(yōu)勢勞動密集型生產(chǎn)所代替。最后，結(jié)果是二氧化硫排放量被高度管制，主要來自于工業(yè)。對于其他污染物比較少的監(jiān)管或大部分來自非業(yè)內(nèi)人士透露，外商直接投資與污染之間沒有檢測到系統(tǒng)的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　這一發(fā)現(xiàn)對污染和外商直接投資的資金流入有著重要且積極地政策含義。降低開發(fā)東