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1、 Procedia Economics and Finance 36 ( 2016 ) 108 – 112 2212-5671 © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
2、0/). Peer-review under responsibility of SCIJOUR-Scientific Journals Publisher doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(16)30021-1 ScienceDirectAvailable online at www.sciencedirect.com1st International Conference on Applied Economics a
3、nd Business, ICAEB 2015 Ownership Structure and Disclosure Quality: Case of Iran Sahar Sepasia,*, Morteza Kazempourb, Roya Mansourlakorajc aAssistant Prof., Faculty of Management Governmental ownership; Managerial owner
4、ship; Disclosure quality 1. Introduction Accounting disclosure is very important to all stakeholders; it provides them with the necessary information to reduce uncertainty and helps them to make suitable economic and fi
5、nancial decisions (Amer, et.al, 2013). The main * Corresponding author.Tel: +98 9112927554 E-mail address: Sepasi@modares.ac.ir © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
6、license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of SCIJOUR-Scientific Journals Publisher110 Sahar Sepasi et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 36 ( 2016 ) 108 – 1
7、12 effectively, he also found the companies tend to be audited by the Big 4 if the level of institutional ownership increases. Gerald and Sidney (2010) examine the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosur
8、e and levels of family ownership and board independence including the influence of an independent chairman. the results show that at moderate to low levels of family shareholding (25% or less), the convergence of inter
9、est effect is dominant and the extent of voluntary disclosure is relatively low. At higher levels of family shareholding (more than 25%), the entrenchment effect dominates and is associated with higher voluntary disclo
10、sure. In addition, the results show that the appointment of an independent chairman is positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. Samaha et al. (2012), examined the impact of a comprehensive set of co
11、rporate governance attributes on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. Their results showed that the extent of governance disclosure is lower for companies with duality in position and highe
12、r ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership and increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and also firm size. Alves et al. (2012), examined the relations between corporate go
13、vernance variables and voluntary disclosure in Portugal and Spain. Their results indicated that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure are firm size, growth opportunities, organizational performance, board compe
14、nsation and the presence of a large shareholder. Motavassel et al. (2013) concluded that there is not any meaningful relationship between the features of corporate governance and the quality of information disclosure.
15、3. Hypotheses Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between governmental ownership and disclosure quality. Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and disclosure qualit
16、y. 4. Research Methodology The statistical population of this research included firms accepted and operating in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 2010-2014. The data was collected from the TSE database ava
17、ilable. The research sample is 80 companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange. ?????? ?? ? ???? ? ??????????? ?? ? ?????????? ?? ? ????????? ? (1)? GOWNi,t: Government ownership will be measure by percentage of shares owned
18、by government to total number of shares issued, following (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al, 2008). ? MOWNi,t: Management ownership will be measure by percentage of shares owned by management to
19、 total number of shares issued. ? Sizei,t : logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. 5. Findings The co-linearity of independent variables investigated by SPSS before testing hypotheses. Results showed that all
20、 condition index values are less than 15; implying that there is no co-linearity between variables. Then, F-Limer test was used by applying E-Views 7 software. As it can be observed in table 1, its value is equal to 0.0
21、51 indicating that data are pooled. Durbin-Watson statistic is also 1.80 showing no autocorrelation. Table 1: Results of F-Limier test Model VDIS=β0 + β1 GOWN + β2 MOWN + β3 FSIZE Test type Statistic d.f Prob. F-L
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