外文翻譯--環(huán)境信息披露的規(guī)范理論分析

1、<p>　　中文4540字，2485單詞</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation:</p><p>　　A The

2、oretical Analysis</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information

3、. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior - often resulting in lower levels of pollution - little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or

4、not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of in</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　Governmen

5、ts around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. Perhaps the best-known example is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program in the U.S., whereby

6、firms are required to disclose legally emitted chemical releases. TRI has brought about significant reductions in chemical emissions.For example, total on-site and off-site releases of toxic emissions are reportedly down

7、 by 45.5% between 1988 and 1999 (EPA, 2001: Table E</p><p>　　The mechanisms by which information disclosure programs lead to reductions in pollution are varied and still being studied (see e.g., Maxwell, Lyo

8、n and Hackett, 2000; and Konar and Cohen, 2000). Depending on the context, consumers may decide to reduce or withdraw from consuming the product of a firm that is a high polluter. Investors may shun the stock of firms th

9、at are found to be high polluters – either through socially active investment decisions or by an assessment that highly polluting firm</p><p>　　Regardless of the mechanism, information disclosure programs ap

10、pear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior. Tietenberg (1998) has characterized information disclosure as being the third wave of environmental regulation – following the original command and control approach and

11、 the subsequent introduction of market-based incentives such as emission fees and marketable permits. Information disclosure programs have been widely touted by policymakers for numerous reasons. One obvious benefit i<

12、;/p><p>　　Despite these presumed benefits, information disclosure programs are not free. As with any government policy, they should be subject to the scrutiny of a cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are obviou

13、s – improvements in the environment that are presumably valued by some members of society. On the cost side, information disclosure requires some amount of government rule-making along with data collection, verification,

14、 and dissemination. Firms also incur the costs of collecting and disseminating d</p><p>　　To date, virtually all of the literature on information disclosure has been empirical –either demonstrating the aggre

15、gate effect of an information disclosure program on emissions or attempting to characterize the mechanisms by which information disclosure leads to these emission reductions. Examples include Hamilton (1995), Konar and C

16、ohen (1997 and 2000), Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova (1998), and Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000). In spite of this growing literature on information disclosure, no a</p><p>　　2. Bargaining between polluter and

17、 victim: The impact of victim’s ignorance of his damage</p><p>　　The problem we are considering is similar to – but not typical of – a Coasean bargaining model with asymmetric information (see Coase, 1960; a

18、nd Huber and Wirl, 1998). In a standard asymmetric information problem, the victim knows the damage caused by pollution, but does notknow the cost of pollution control. However, in this model, the victim does not know th

19、e damage. She may or may not know the cost of pollution control.</p><p>　　Consider the problem of a single polluter whose pollution causes damage to a single victim. Let D be the damage and C be the cost of

20、controlling pollution. Thus, one can characterize the state of knowledge based on a combination of four parameters, {(D,C); (D,C)} where the first pair is the state of knowledge of the polluter and the second characteriz

21、es the knowledge of the victim. Thus, for example, {(0,1); (1,0)} indicates that the polluter knows his costs (but not the damage to victim) and th</p><p>　　3、Extensions of the Model</p><p>　　Ou

22、r results thus far assume no transactions costs, only one polluter and one victim. While we leave extensive modeling to future research, in this section, we briefly explore some of the obvious extensions of the model and

23、 provide conjectures about their implications.</p><p>　　3.1．Information Disclosure with Transactions Costs</p><p>　　Our model assumed zero transactions costs and efficiency has been defined sole

24、ly in terms of costless bargaining. In reality, there can be numerous forms of transactions costs including the cost of negotiation, monitoring to ensure that the provisions of any contract are adhered to, and enforcemen

25、t/punishment costs to the government to ensure that information is honestly disclosed. Introducing transactions costs into the bargaining process reduces the likelihood that information disclosure progr</p><p&

26、gt;　　3.2．Multiple Polluters or Types of Pollution</p><p>　　We also assumed only one polluter and one type of pollution. If there are two polluters with different cost structures, or two types of pollution wi

27、th different damages, the government must decide whether to require disclosure of all pollution types and/or all sources. If the government arbitrarily decides to impose an information disclosure program on one polluter

28、but not the other, it is possible that this will distort the expected benefits of pollution reduction in such a manner that the vict</p><p>　　The policy implications of this extension appear to be either tha

29、t the government should require disclosure of all pollution by all sources, or focus its information disclosure programs on those sources that victims are most likely to underestimate. We are unaware of any attempt to co

30、nsider these concerns in designing information disclosure programs. Thus, this is an important area for future research.</p><p>　　3.3．Multiple Victims and the Collective Action Problem</p><p>　　

31、Finally, we assumed only one victim. Once multiple victims are allowed, the collective choice problem brings with it the well-known free-rider problem associated with provision of a public good. Generally, since it is be

32、neficial for one victim to free ride if the other victim contributes, there is no dominant strategy for either victim. Instead, a victim’s decision to contribute depends on her expectation of the behavior of the other vi

33、ctim. While information disclosure is not a solution to the </p><p>　　4、Summary of Findings and Concluding Remarks</p><p>　　Information disclosure programs have been touted as the next wave of r

34、egulation and they have been shown to result in lower levels of pollution as firms voluntarily reduce pollution below their legally required amounts. Yet, not all programs have resulted in significant reductions in pollu

35、tion, and there is often a differential effect on firm responsiveness to these new mandates. Ultimately, we know little about the costs and benefits of information disclosure programs. This paper takes an initi</p>

36、<p>　　In the process of eliminating the various potential circumstances in which mandatory disclosure is needed for efficiency purposes, we identified several instances where the role of government is essentially

37、one of certification. In these cases (discussed in Proposition 2), there is an incentive for the firm to disclose actual pollution levels, but for some reason they might not be able to do so credibly. Of course, the poli

38、cy prescription in those cases does not necessarily need to be a governme</p><p>　　We also show that it does not matter for efficiency purposes whether or not the victim knows the actual cost of pollution co

39、ntrol. In addition, it does not generally matter whether or not the polluter knows the actual damages caused by his pollution.</p><p>　　We extend our model briefly to examine the effect of two sources of pol

40、lution, only one of which is subject to information disclosure. Once transactions costs are entered into the model,we show that one might not end up with an improvement in social welfare. It is possible, for example, tha

41、t a mandatory disclosure program will focus on the polluting industry whose damages are lower and/or the cost of pollution reduction is higher. The policy implication is that in the absence of requiring mandat</p>

42、<p>　　Our theoretical results are difficult to test empirically without good data on the information sets of the victims and the costs and benefits of pollution abatement. Nevertheless,focusing on the polluter pays

43、 principle (which more closely approximates real world policy), we note that our main result is consistent with the experience of information disclosure programs.For example, Afsah, Laplante, and Wheeler (1997) study a g

44、overnment disclosure program in Indonesia that identified the relative p</p><p>　　We also found that information disclosure is likely to be more effective in reducing pollution when the cost of collective ac

45、tion is low and relative income of the public is high. This finding is consistent with a study of water pollution in China, where it was found that despite there being a uniform law on the books, pollution charges and qu

46、ality varied significantly depending on the “capacity” of the community including education, income and bargaining power (Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler, 1996</p><p>　　Environmental & Resource Economics. Ma

47、rk A. Cohen, V. Santhakumar.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　環(huán)境信息披露的規(guī)范：理論分析</p><p>　　摘要：世界各地的政府都開始采用新形式的環(huán)保信息披露的模式——強(qiáng)制性信息披露。信息披露計(jì)劃似乎對(duì)企業(yè)的以后行為產(chǎn)生了影響，使得企業(yè)的污染水平有所降低，但是對(duì)這個(gè)模式的費(fèi)用和利益

48、以及是否能夠提高社會(huì)福利了解的甚少。本文提出了一種簡(jiǎn)單的強(qiáng)制信息披露談判模式，它是用來克服在公開情況下信息的缺乏。在信息披露的前提下，我們對(duì)減排進(jìn)行分類，從根本上提高社會(huì)的福利。同時(shí)本文研究了一些額外的模型包括兩種污染所產(chǎn)生的影響——其中只有一個(gè)是要求對(duì)信息進(jìn)行披露的。</p><p><b>　　1、引言</b></p><p>　　世界各國(guó)政府開始實(shí)施新的環(huán)保信息

49、披露模式-強(qiáng)制性信息披露，即企業(yè)應(yīng)該依法根據(jù)披露方案對(duì)化學(xué)物品的排放進(jìn)行披露，美國(guó)有毒物質(zhì)排放清單項(xiàng)目也許是最能體現(xiàn)這一模式的例子。有毒物質(zhì)排放清單使得企業(yè)的化學(xué)排放量有了顯著的減少，例如根據(jù)美國(guó)環(huán)保局在2001對(duì)1999年和1988年之間的企業(yè)化學(xué)排放量進(jìn)行對(duì)比發(fā)現(xiàn)，1999年總的有毒物質(zhì)排放量比1988年下降到了45.5%。另一個(gè)信息披露方案的重點(diǎn)是飲用水安全和化學(xué)物質(zhì)排放管理的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。印度、印度尼西亞、菲律賓、哥倫比亞、墨西哥和巴西

50、等國(guó)家也相應(yīng)的建立了相似的項(xiàng)目體系(Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler, 1996)。</p><p>　　通過運(yùn)用信息披露項(xiàng)目機(jī)制達(dá)到減少各種污染的目的，目前仍然還處于研究當(dāng)中（如Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000; 和 Konar and Cohen, 2000)，同時(shí)在這種情況下，消費(fèi)者會(huì)減少對(duì)一個(gè)高污染企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的消費(fèi)。投資者可能會(huì)避開對(duì)那些高污染的上市公司的

51、投資，因此，無論是通過社會(huì)活動(dòng)投資決定還是通過對(duì)高污染的上市公司的評(píng)估，高污染的上市公司利潤(rùn)最終還是會(huì)減少。受害者可能會(huì)通過罷工，向當(dāng)?shù)匾?guī)劃委員會(huì)提出對(duì)污染企業(yè)實(shí)施嚴(yán)格管制的要求，或讓政府執(zhí)法機(jī)關(guān)嚴(yán)格審查污染嚴(yán)重的企業(yè)，或提出一個(gè)新的法令來對(duì)污染企業(yè)進(jìn)行施壓，他們的行動(dòng)迫使政府執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)更加仔細(xì)的審議那些重污染企業(yè)，或者制定新的法規(guī)以制約污染企業(yè)，同時(shí)受害者可能還會(huì)要求根據(jù)侵權(quán)法來進(jìn)行賠償。</p><p>　　不

52、管是信息披露的方案還是機(jī)制都會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)以后的行為產(chǎn)生影響。美國(guó)學(xué)者鐵滕伯格(1998)形象化地說明了信息披露方案是第三次改革——根據(jù)原始的制度與控制的方法作為隨后引入市場(chǎng)的一種激勵(lì)措施,例如排污費(fèi)用和市場(chǎng)化許可。由于眾多的原因使信息披露方案被決策者廣泛宣傳，其中一個(gè)明顯的好處就是信息披露使得環(huán)境質(zhì)量得到了改善。此外，信息披露方案能夠得到公眾的信任，使他們有權(quán)利了解他們可能受到第三方污染的影響。在更實(shí)際的水平下，相對(duì)于起草和執(zhí)行產(chǎn)業(yè)范圍的規(guī)

53、章制度，人們普遍認(rèn)為信息披露項(xiàng)目能使政府的花費(fèi)更少，而且這個(gè)假設(shè)的好處是，信息披露的計(jì)劃可能比新的強(qiáng)制性法規(guī)更加有可行性。</p><p>　　不管這些假設(shè)有什么好處，信息披露方案的使用并不是免費(fèi)的。就像那些政府政策一樣，我們應(yīng)該對(duì)成本效益的分析進(jìn)行監(jiān)督，顯而易見的好處是一些社會(huì)成員對(duì)環(huán)境的重視度有所提高。在成本方面，信息披露需要政府制定一些法律法規(guī)以及企業(yè)對(duì)成本數(shù)據(jù)的收集，核算和披露。企業(yè)也會(huì)因收集和傳播數(shù)據(jù)產(chǎn)

54、生成本，據(jù)推測(cè)這可能是企業(yè)自愿減少污染所產(chǎn)生的成本。消費(fèi)者和其他非政府團(tuán)體，以集體行動(dòng)、游說、訴訟等方式對(duì)污染企業(yè)施加壓力，以減少其排放量。這些成本從某種程度上代替了來自于減少政府監(jiān)控和干預(yù)的節(jié)余。最后，還有一個(gè)與潛在成本有關(guān)的信息披露方案——即企業(yè)預(yù)知外部的信息披露受到因污染降低而獲得機(jī)會(huì)成本的好處。也就是說，通過關(guān)注一個(gè)污染的形式，強(qiáng)制性信息披露方案可能會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)移目標(biāo)來限制消費(fèi)者和社會(huì)所用的資源，從信息泄露管制的角度來說，環(huán)境團(tuán)體在某種

55、程度上甚至比其他形式的污染更糟，或者說更加難以控制。信息泄露活動(dòng)很可能導(dǎo)致環(huán)境質(zhì)量在根本上沒有得到改善，甚至更糟的是這些機(jī)構(gòu)用一種污染替代了另一種污染。</p><p>　　迄今為止，幾乎所有有關(guān)的信息披露的文獻(xiàn)都已經(jīng)被實(shí)證——根據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)顯示不管是信息披露對(duì)排放的影響還是試圖運(yùn)用該種機(jī)制的特性，都會(huì)使排放減少。例如Hamilton(1995),Konar和Cohen（1997和2000），Khanna,Quimio

56、和Bojilova(1998),和Maxwell,Lyon和Hackett(2000)。雖然有關(guān)信息披露的文獻(xiàn)還在不斷增加，但是卻沒有從理論上對(duì)已經(jīng)取得的潛在的成本進(jìn)行分析并且從中獲利。為了符合成本和利益原則，首先必須通過信息其本身特征的行為變化對(duì)其進(jìn)行披露。那么在什么條件下可以通過信息披露使得企業(yè)的污染排放量能夠減少，并且同時(shí)使信息使用者能夠收集到準(zhǔn)確的信息呢？還有在什么條件下可以通過信息披露來加強(qiáng)社會(huì)福利，這些問題是本文需要進(jìn)行探討

57、的。</p><p>　　2、污染企業(yè)和信息使用者之間的合同：對(duì)于信息使用者不知情信息的影響</p><p>　　我們正在考慮相似的問題——但是它并不是最為典型的——如Coasean交易模型（ Coase, 1960; Huber 和 Wirl, 1998）。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的信息不對(duì)稱問題是指信息使用者認(rèn)識(shí)到污染所造成的損失，但是他們并不了解污染成本的控制。在這個(gè)模型中，信息使用者是即沒有認(rèn)識(shí)到污染

58、會(huì)造成損失他們也并不了解污染成本的控制。</p><p>　　我們單考慮一個(gè)污染企業(yè)會(huì)對(duì)一個(gè)信息使用者造成的損害。假設(shè)D代表損害，C代表的是控制污染的成本。由此，我們以四個(gè)參數(shù)為基礎(chǔ)來表現(xiàn)特征{(D,C); (D,C)}，第一組代表污染企業(yè)所對(duì)著兩項(xiàng)假設(shè)的了解狀況，第二組是信息使用者對(duì)信息的了解程度。例如，{(0,1); (1,0)}表示污染企業(yè)了解他污染成本的控制（但是不清楚對(duì)于信息使用者的危害），同理信息使用

59、者了解自己所要受到的危害（但是并不了解污染成本的控制）。我們尋求各種可能狀態(tài)的信息，可以讓信息使用人了解這兩項(xiàng)中的其中一項(xiàng)，但是污染企業(yè)卻是一直了解其污染成本的控制，即C。盡管，我們假定了污染企業(yè)總是知道有多少污染會(huì)產(chǎn)生，但是我們并沒有假設(shè)污染企業(yè)總是知道污染和損害的基本關(guān)系。換句話說就是污染企業(yè)可能并不知道其生產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的污染所造成的損害，即使信息使用者了解這其中的危害。</p><p><b>　　3、

60、模型延伸</b></p><p>　　到目前為止，我們沒有涉及任何的交易費(fèi)用，只有一個(gè)污染企業(yè)和一個(gè)信息使用者。在這一節(jié)中我將脫離了這個(gè)模型簡(jiǎn)要的對(duì)該模型進(jìn)行延伸，推測(cè)其其中的理論。</p><p>　　3.1信息披露和交易成本</p><p>　　我們的模型假定零交易成本和效率確定為僅就低成本議價(jià)而言。事實(shí)上，交易成本有許多形式，包括談判和監(jiān)測(cè)成本以確

61、保在執(zhí)行任何合同過程中遵守規(guī)定，否則有關(guān)部門將對(duì)其進(jìn)行懲罰，以確保披露的信息是真實(shí)的。交易成本在協(xié)商過程中可能會(huì)有所減少，而后通過信息披露使污染減少。當(dāng)然高預(yù)期的污染讓受害者更加愿意投入資源以減少污染議價(jià)。其中的一個(gè)明顯的影響因素是當(dāng)其他條件不變的情況下，我們所期望的是在社會(huì)財(cái)政狀況良好或者時(shí)間充裕時(shí)信息披露能夠達(dá)到最佳水平(即有一個(gè)較低的時(shí)間機(jī)會(huì)成本)，有關(guān)部門將通過對(duì)資源進(jìn)行議價(jià)對(duì)企業(yè)施加壓力以減少污染。</p>&l

62、t;p>　　3.2多個(gè)污染以及污染類型</p><p>　　我們還是假定一個(gè)污染者和一類污染。如果有兩個(gè)不同成本結(jié)構(gòu)的污染者，或者兩個(gè)不同的污染類型，政府就必須決定是否需要對(duì)污染類型以及污染來源進(jìn)行全部披露。如果政府任意決定一個(gè)信息披露方案讓一個(gè)污染企業(yè)使用，這種方式有可能導(dǎo)致預(yù)期效益的減少，使利益相關(guān)者會(huì)因?yàn)樵撐廴酒髽I(yè)的錯(cuò)誤披露要求賠償。這個(gè)可能就是現(xiàn)在的一種趨勢(shì)。舉一個(gè)例子，假設(shè)有兩種污染類型P1和P2

63、。如果信息披露顯示P1的損害比受害者預(yù)期的要嚴(yán)重，她有可能會(huì)把該資源當(dāng)做污染來源，即使她有了解更多的關(guān)于P1的信息但是她寧愿減少P1與P2的差距。同樣的，當(dāng)信息披露顯示，P1的損失比受害者預(yù)期要小，她就會(huì)把資源轉(zhuǎn)移，即使她了解更多的P2的信息但是他寧愿減少P2與P1的差距。</p><p>　　政府制定這一政策并不是要企業(yè)對(duì)所有污染來源進(jìn)行披露，只是對(duì)那些使受害者會(huì)低估的污染的信息進(jìn)行披露。我們現(xiàn)在正試圖設(shè)計(jì)信息

64、披露方案。因此，這個(gè)將是未來研究的重要領(lǐng)域。</p><p>　　3.3多個(gè)受害者和集體行動(dòng)的問題</p><p>　　之前我們假設(shè)的只有一個(gè)受害者。但是一旦出現(xiàn)了多個(gè)受害者，集體行動(dòng)就會(huì)帶來搭便車的問題，這個(gè)問題是和公共產(chǎn)品供給有關(guān)。通常來說，搭便車能夠使受害者從其他受害者那里得到好處，這是因?yàn)闆]有主要的受害者。相反，那個(gè)真正的受害者她就會(huì)期望于其他受害者的反應(yīng)。而信息披露并沒有解決集體

65、行動(dòng)的問題，但是有可能在潛在確定的情況下能夠解決這個(gè)問題。特別是在有關(guān)損害賠償?shù)姆秶鷥?nèi)增加一個(gè)或者兩個(gè)受害人能夠降低交易成本（通過減少受害者之間的信息差距），信息披露方案也很有可能會(huì)發(fā)生集體行動(dòng)的問題。</p><p>　　4、調(diào)查結(jié)果和結(jié)束語</p><p>　　信息披露方案已經(jīng)成為下一輪的調(diào)控方案，調(diào)查顯示企業(yè)較低水平的污染會(huì)使企業(yè)自愿把污染降低到法律規(guī)定范圍以下。然而，這也并不是表示

66、所有的方案都能夠使污染減少，因?yàn)槊總€(gè)企業(yè)在對(duì)于這種新方案的反應(yīng)程度也會(huì)有所差異。最終，我們能夠從這個(gè)信息披露的方案中得到好處，即減少成本。本文開始的第一步是以理解信息披露計(jì)劃的理論為導(dǎo)向。我們目前有一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的信息披露模式其主要的特點(diǎn)是，信息的不對(duì)稱導(dǎo)致信息的使用人不能夠知道個(gè)別污染所造成的損害。我們檢查了幾個(gè)信息披露的情況（如信息使用人是否了解該企業(yè)的成本和效益），成本情況（如排污的邊際成本是否高于邊際損害），以及法律機(jī)構(gòu)的情況（如污染

67、者應(yīng)該支付的污染費(fèi)用是多少）。</p><p>　　上述例子使我們發(fā)現(xiàn)強(qiáng)制性信息披露的關(guān)鍵是有可能使企業(yè)的外部污染內(nèi)部化。在污染企業(yè)自付的情況下，最適合對(duì)信息進(jìn)行披露的是當(dāng)信息使用者低估了污染所造成的損害以及當(dāng)實(shí)際的成本超過了實(shí)際污染水平的時(shí)候。同樣的，在被污染企業(yè)自付的情況，最適合進(jìn)行信息披露的是當(dāng)被污染企業(yè)過高的估計(jì)損失以及控制的成本比損失來的大的時(shí)候。</p><p>　　在消除強(qiáng)制

68、披露各種潛在情況下，效率目標(biāo)是需要這個(gè)過程的，從根本上來說，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在這個(gè)過程中政府起了一定的作用。在這種情況下，公司有可能處于某種原因不會(huì)將實(shí)際污染水平披露出來或者只是部分披露，但是我們還是要激勵(lì)企業(yè)真實(shí)完整的將污染水平披露出來。當(dāng)然，這種政策規(guī)定并不一定要成為政府政策。更有可能在實(shí)施過程中，只要企業(yè)自愿進(jìn)行信息披露以及有第三方審計(jì)和認(rèn)證就已經(jīng)足夠了。</p><p>　　我們同時(shí)也表明了提高效率的目的與信息使

69、用者是否了解控制污染的實(shí)際成本是沒有什么多大的聯(lián)系。另外，在一般情況下其與污染企業(yè)是否了解污染所引起的損失也沒有什么大的聯(lián)系。</p><p>　　我們對(duì)模型的兩個(gè)污染源的效果進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)單的檢查，只有對(duì)其中的一個(gè)進(jìn)行了信息披露。一旦把交易費(fèi)用考慮到模型中，顯示結(jié)果是社會(huì)福利不一定會(huì)有所提高。這個(gè)有可能的，舉一個(gè)例子，信息披露計(jì)劃將側(cè)重于那些損害低或者污染成本減少過多的污染產(chǎn)業(yè)。政策并不是意味著需要所有的污染源進(jìn)行強(qiáng)制

70、和統(tǒng)一的披露，只是要求重污染產(chǎn)業(yè)進(jìn)行信息披露以便其能將污染減少到最低。</p><p>　　我們的理論模型在沒有充足的數(shù)據(jù)情況下是很難進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究的，包括信息使用者和污染的成本收益的信息收集。然而，對(duì)于污染企業(yè)自付原則（實(shí)際更加接近政策），值得注意的是，我們主要的成果是將信息披露方案的理論與實(shí)踐相結(jié)合。例如，Afsah，Laplante，Wheeler（1997）研究印度尼西亞的政府披露計(jì)劃，確定了當(dāng)?shù)刂圃焐滔嚓P(guān)

71、的污染記錄。在程序?qū)嵤┖?，污染方面的效果卻并不是很大，許多學(xué)者發(fā)現(xiàn)信息披露方案是最有效的減少污染的方法，但卻從來沒有將污染的損害降低到最小值——即損失高成本低。然而，信息披露的程序在實(shí)施過程中并沒有任何顯著的效果來扮演其相對(duì)應(yīng)的角色。就像Afsah，Laplante，Wheeler所說的，這些企業(yè)已經(jīng)運(yùn)用了基本控制污染的方法，需要更進(jìn)一步的對(duì)其方法進(jìn)行改善。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，信息披露很可能是最為有效的減少污染、降低費(fèi)用的方法，即高成本降低相對(duì)