全球化與跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的盈利能力【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions</p><p>　　Material Source: Economi

2、c Theory (2008) 35: 241–266</p><p>　　Author: Pehr-Johan Norbäck · Lars Persson</p><p>　　Abstract This paper studies how the surplus generated by the globalization process is divided be

3、tween MNEs and owners of domestic assets.We construct an oligopoly model where the quilibrium acquisition pattern, the acquisition price and firms’ greenfield investments are endogenously determined. Acquisition entry is

4、 shown to bemore likelywhen the complementarity between domestic and foreign assets is high. However, we show that such acquisitions might have a low profitability, since the bidding c</p><p>　　Keywords FDI

5、. Mergers and acquisitions. Greenfield investments. Investment liberalization</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　One of the most prominent features of the globalization process is the emergence of n

6、ew investment opportunities in developing and transition countries for leading firms in developed countries, referred to asMultinational Enterprises (MNEs), due to large privatizations and deregulation programs1 and the

7、increase in local demand. Indeed, the increase in foreign direct investment, both in the form of cross-border acquisitions and de novo entry (greenfield), has been strong in the last decade: in t</p><p>　　Th

8、e purpose of this paper is to study how the surpluses generated by this part of the globalization process are divided between MNEs and owners of domestic assets and how this division depends on how the entry into the dom

9、estic market takes place, i.e. cross-border acquisitions or greenfield entry, and the level of complementarity between domestic and foreign assets. To this end, we construct</p><p>　　a model with the followi

10、ng features. The domestic firm is initially located in the domestic market. There are also several symmetric MNEs located in the world market. The domestic market will now be exposed to international competition and inte

11、raction takes place in three stages. In the first stage, MNEs might acquire the domestic firm’s assets and in the second stage, MNEs have the option of investing greenfield in new assets where greenfield entry is associa

12、ted with a risk of failure. Finally,</p><p>　　We first address the issue of how entry into these new markets will take place. To this end, we make the following distinction between entry by acquisition and g

13、reenfield entry: the domestic assets held by domestic firms are assumed to be in scarce supply, and the price is determined in an auction acquisition game. The limited availability of these assets may be associated with

14、the domestic target firm having privileged access to a distribution system, ownership of land or permits, knowledge of </p><p>　　Then we show that, in equilibrium, a high complementarity between domestic and

15、 foreign assets is indeed conducive to acquisitions. However, while acquisition entry is associated with a high complementarity between foreign and domestic assets,we also showthat, in equilibrium, such acquisitions migh

16、t have lowexpected profitability. The result that the acquirer’s expected profit (i.e. the expected product market profit net the acquisition price) may decrease in the complementarity</p><p>　　between forei

17、gn and domestic assets seems counterintuitive at first sight, since the domestic firm’s assets are then more valuable to the MNEs when acquired. However, this result is intuitive when taking into account howthe level of

18、complementarity between the foreign and the domestic assets affects the equilibrium acquisition price. It is shown that, in equilibrium, the price of the assets is a non-acquiring MNE’s willingness to pay, which consists

19、 of two profit terms: the expected product</p><p>　　market profit for this firm if it were instead to obtain the domestic firm’s assets, net the corresponding profit when not buying. It then follows that the

20、 first profit term increases to exactly the same extent as that of the acquirer due to an increase in the strategic value of the domestic assets, and will thus off-set the acquirer’s profit increase. Moreover, the second

21、 profit term will decrease, the more strategically valuable the domestic assets are, since the non-acquirer will then face a </p><p>　　The motive for paying a high price for important complementarity assets

22、indeed seems to have been important in several recent large acquisitions. One example is the bidding competition between Britain based SABMiller and its American rival Anheuser-Busch (the largest brewers in the world) f

23、or Harbin Brewery (China’s fourth-largest brewer). On May 5, 2004, SABMiller launched a $550m bid since Anheuser had in the previous week agreed to buy a 29% stake in Harbin, a firm that SAB thought it had al</p>

24、<p>　　The related theoretical literature on foreign direct investment FDI and MNEs is surveyed in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), and Markusen (1995). Typically, this literature does not explicitly address the

25、question of whether entry into a foreign market is greenfield or through the acquisition of assets already in the market, or both; an issue which constitutes the focus of our study. There is also a recent theoretical lit

26、erature addressing aspects of cross-border mergers in international oli</p><p>　　This paper could also be seen as a contribution to the literature on the interplay between mergers and other firm investments

27、in concentrated markets.9 We add to this literature by constructing an oligopolymodelwhere the equilibrium acquisition pattern, the acquisition price and firm investments are endogenously determined and where comparative

28、 statics analysis is tractable. These features should make this framework useful for analyzing issues where the focus is on the interplay between M&A, fir</p><p>　　Concluding remarks</p><p>

29、　　The starting point of this paper is that the globalization process implies that crossborder acquisitions and newentry (greenfield) bymultinational national enterprises (MNEs) into developing countries play a very impor

30、tant role for the future profits of these firms.We show that how the surpluses generated by the globalization process are divided between MNEs and owners of domestic assets crucially depends on how entry into the domesti

31、c market takes place, i.e. acquisitions or greenfield entry, a</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　全球化與跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的盈利能力</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源:經(jīng)濟(jì)理論（2008） 作者：Pehr-Johan Norbäck ·

32、Lars Persson</p><p>　　[摘要]本文研究了全球化進(jìn)程中如何在跨國(guó)公司以及國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)之間產(chǎn)生盈余。我們構(gòu)造一個(gè)模型，類(lèi)似于寡頭壟斷格局的平衡收購(gòu)，并購(gòu)的價(jià)格與企業(yè)由內(nèi)生的新投資決定。并購(gòu)項(xiàng)目可能顯示，國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外資產(chǎn)的互補(bǔ)性是高的。然而，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，這種并購(gòu)可能有一個(gè)低盈利能力，因?yàn)樵趪?guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)申辦競(jìng)爭(zhēng)如此激烈，因此，這些公司涉及的是最好不要啟動(dòng)競(jìng)購(gòu)戰(zhàn)。不同進(jìn)入模式的相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)還在審查。</p&g

33、t;<p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：外商直接投資，并購(gòu)和兼并，投資自由化</p><p><b>　　簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　對(duì)全球化進(jìn)程中最突出的特點(diǎn)之一是新的投資機(jī)會(huì)在發(fā)展中國(guó)家和轉(zhuǎn)型國(guó)家的出現(xiàn)。由于私有化和放松管制的大項(xiàng)目和在本地需求的增長(zhǎng)，以發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家為主導(dǎo)的企業(yè)，簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)跨國(guó)公司正在興起。事實(shí)上，在外國(guó)直接投資的增加無(wú)論是以跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的形式還是全新項(xiàng)目（

34、新建項(xiàng)目），在過(guò)去十年一直處于強(qiáng)勁發(fā)展趨勢(shì)：在90年代初，外來(lái)直接投資在發(fā)展中國(guó)家的價(jià)值為50美元億元，在本世紀(jì)初，它超過(guò)2000億美元。由于在中國(guó)，印度和前蘇聯(lián)龐大的市場(chǎng)開(kāi)放，預(yù)計(jì)這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)會(huì)進(jìn)一步增加。例如，在中國(guó)，三分之二省市中央政府的公司在上海和深圳證券交易所上市，市值約有4000億美元。 2005年5月1日，中國(guó)證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)發(fā)布了如何出售這些股票的準(zhǔn)則。作為一項(xiàng)試驗(yàn)計(jì)劃的一部分，國(guó)家將開(kāi)始銷(xiāo)售在上市公司少數(shù)股份。預(yù)計(jì)這種發(fā)

35、展導(dǎo)致了跨國(guó)公司的利潤(rùn)流動(dòng)大量增加。</p><p>　　本文的目的是研究如何通過(guò)這一全球化進(jìn)程所產(chǎn)生的盈余通過(guò)跨國(guó)公司和國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)所有者的分工而進(jìn)入國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)，即跨國(guó)并購(gòu)。而產(chǎn)生的資產(chǎn)在水平國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外之間具有互補(bǔ)性。為此，我們構(gòu)造了一個(gè)模型具有以下特點(diǎn)。國(guó)內(nèi)公司最初設(shè)在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)。也有在世界市場(chǎng)的跨國(guó)公司地區(qū)幾家對(duì)稱(chēng)。國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)在將面臨國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和相互作用發(fā)生在三個(gè)階段進(jìn)行。在第一階段，跨國(guó)公司可能并購(gòu)國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)的資產(chǎn)，

36、在第二階段，跨國(guó)公司已在那里投資新建項(xiàng)目是一個(gè)失敗的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。最后，在第三階段，在寡頭壟斷企業(yè)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)方式產(chǎn)生利潤(rùn)。</p><p>　　我們首先解決這些新的市場(chǎng)會(huì)發(fā)生的問(wèn)題。為此，我們提出通過(guò)并購(gòu)和新建項(xiàng)目下列項(xiàng)目之間的區(qū)別：國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)持有的國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)被認(rèn)為是稀缺的供應(yīng)，而且價(jià)格在拍賣(mài)并購(gòu)中決定的。這些資產(chǎn)的有限可能與國(guó)內(nèi)的目標(biāo)具有優(yōu)先獲得公司分配制度，土地或許可證，對(duì)本地市場(chǎng)的具體特點(diǎn)，知識(shí)的所有權(quán)，當(dāng)?shù)刂钠?/p>

37、牌名稱(chēng)或資產(chǎn)已在市場(chǎng)上早已生效。對(duì)新投資可變成本，另一方面，假定不變。這是出于在這些投資上，在相當(dāng)大程度上許多其他行業(yè)使用的經(jīng)濟(jì)投入組成的投入（勞動(dòng)和資本）的供應(yīng)。在一個(gè)特定行業(yè)的投資者便可以看作是一個(gè)價(jià)格接受者。這似乎符合商業(yè)文獻(xiàn)中，其中選擇跨國(guó)并購(gòu)及由于超過(guò)新投資的主要?jiǎng)訖C(jī)，然后迅速得到買(mǎi)方自有資產(chǎn)。國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)的重要性將取決于跨國(guó)公司之間的實(shí)力，公司特定資產(chǎn)和國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)的互補(bǔ)性。例如，組合一個(gè)跨國(guó)公司的強(qiáng)勢(shì)品牌和被并購(gòu)公司的市場(chǎng)或銷(xiāo)售力

38、量的知識(shí)，可以給跨國(guó)公司的并購(gòu)提供一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的市場(chǎng)地位。</p><p>　　然后我們得出結(jié)論，在平衡時(shí)，國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外資產(chǎn)的高互補(bǔ)性確實(shí)是有利于并購(gòu)。不過(guò)，雖然并購(gòu)項(xiàng)目是與外國(guó)和國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)互補(bǔ)性強(qiáng)有關(guān)，我們也承認(rèn)，處于平衡狀態(tài)，這樣的并購(gòu)可能l期望較低。盈利與能力有關(guān)。并購(gòu)的結(jié)果，可能是會(huì)降低在國(guó)外和國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)之間的互補(bǔ)性預(yù)期利潤(rùn)（即預(yù)期產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)利潤(rùn)凈并購(gòu)價(jià)）。乍一看似乎違反常理，因?yàn)閲?guó)內(nèi)公司，當(dāng)跨國(guó)公司并購(gòu)明星資產(chǎn)就

39、會(huì)更有價(jià)值的。然而，這一結(jié)果很直觀，當(dāng)考慮到與國(guó)外和國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)的互補(bǔ)性影響均衡價(jià)格并購(gòu)時(shí)。結(jié)果表明，在處于均衡狀態(tài)時(shí)，資產(chǎn)的價(jià)格是一個(gè)非考慮因素?？鐕?guó)公司，支付意愿，其中包括兩個(gè)利潤(rùn)方面：本公司產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)利潤(rùn)的預(yù)期，如果它是不是國(guó)內(nèi)公司獲得，資產(chǎn)，凈相應(yīng)的利潤(rùn)無(wú)法達(dá)到滿足。然后，它遵循的第一個(gè)任期的利潤(rùn)上升到完全一樣的并購(gòu)，由于在國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值相同程度的增加，并因此抵消了并購(gòu)，而利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)。此外，第二個(gè)任期將利潤(rùn)減少，更多的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值的國(guó)

40、內(nèi)資產(chǎn)，因?yàn)榉遣①?gòu)將面臨在產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)形成強(qiáng)大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。這意味著愿意支付的非并購(gòu)進(jìn)一步增加。此次并購(gòu)的價(jià)格升幅高于并購(gòu)產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)利潤(rùn)，使國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)變得更具戰(zhàn)略性更有價(jià)值。因此，它并不像第一眼可以預(yù)料。在全球化進(jìn)程中，選取最合</p><p>　　在最近幾次大型并購(gòu)，重要的互補(bǔ)性資產(chǎn)支付高價(jià)的動(dòng)機(jī)的確重要。一個(gè)例子是中英之間的SABMiller和其美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手Anheuser-Busch（世界上最大的啤酒制造商）和哈爾

41、濱啤酒（中國(guó)第四大啤酒生產(chǎn)商）投標(biāo)。 2004年5月5日，因?yàn)樵谶^(guò)去一周已同意購(gòu)買(mǎi)哈爾濱啤酒的一個(gè)子公司，審計(jì)局米勒推出了5.5億美元并購(gòu)安海斯。審計(jì)局認(rèn)為它已通過(guò)于2003年并購(gòu)其所有縫制29.6％的股份，并增長(zhǎng)29％的股份。 SABMiller公司提供了5.5億美元再加上由哈爾濱安海斯的7200萬(wàn)美元，這使SABMiller不得不聽(tīng)之任之。據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家分析，政府官員用中國(guó)兩家公司之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)使他們“多付”金錢(qián)。“投標(biāo)戰(zhàn)是多付的食譜。中國(guó)

42、政府官員沒(méi)有顧忌而使外國(guó)人的資產(chǎn)相互抵銷(xiāo)?！?lt;/p><p>　　在關(guān)于跨國(guó)公司的文獻(xiàn)中，也有人認(rèn)為，從并購(gòu)一家本地競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手公司，而不是進(jìn)入新市場(chǎng)的主要好處之一是，因?yàn)閷?duì)當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)的具體特點(diǎn)認(rèn)識(shí)不足，并購(gòu)幫助本公司避免風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。通過(guò)并購(gòu)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)，跨國(guó)公司避免了新建項(xiàng)目不成功的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但公司也面臨著其他市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)樗鶎?shí)現(xiàn)的利潤(rùn)為一般市場(chǎng)而不同于預(yù)期的利潤(rùn)，由于新市場(chǎng)的不確定性而不能決定是否能夠成功地進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)。我們證明了若

43、并購(gòu)進(jìn)入意味著巨大的市場(chǎng)份額和產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的日趨強(qiáng)硬而好于預(yù)期，事后利潤(rùn)將低于進(jìn)入一個(gè)新市場(chǎng)。因此，并購(gòu)項(xiàng)目可能會(huì)超過(guò)新建項(xiàng)目由于市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　相關(guān)的外國(guó)直接投資和跨國(guó)公司理論文獻(xiàn)中，有Barba Navaretti調(diào)查和探索研究（2004年）以及Markusen（1995年）。通常情況下，這些文獻(xiàn)沒(méi)有明確地址，或通過(guò)已經(jīng)在市場(chǎng)上并購(gòu)資產(chǎn)，或兩者是否為外資進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)是全新的問(wèn)題;這個(gè)問(wèn)題，構(gòu)

44、成了我們今天這篇文章研究的重點(diǎn)。還有一個(gè)最近的理論文獻(xiàn)解決在國(guó)際寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)的跨國(guó)并購(gòu)方面的問(wèn)題。不過(guò)，我們的重點(diǎn)研究是均衡并購(gòu)的價(jià)格。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)束語(yǔ) </b></p><p>　　本文的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是，全球化進(jìn)程意味著跨境并購(gòu)和新興企業(yè)到發(fā)展中國(guó)家成為跨國(guó)公司。國(guó)家發(fā)揮企業(yè)對(duì)這些做出的反應(yīng)顯示，未來(lái)的利潤(rùn)非常重要的作用在于如何將產(chǎn)生的盈余達(dá)到全球化過(guò)

45、程，以及跨國(guó)公司和國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)所有者關(guān)鍵如何進(jìn)入國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入發(fā)生，即并購(gòu)或新建項(xiàng)目，這是由國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外資產(chǎn)的互補(bǔ)性而定。更具體地說(shuō)，我們表明，在市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入的地方是通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)資產(chǎn)的并購(gòu)充分稀少的地方，對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)目標(biāo)公司投標(biāo)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是如此嚴(yán)重，如果這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)，跨國(guó)公司的利潤(rùn)會(huì)更高。此外，這意味著，國(guó)內(nèi)公司將出售其保留價(jià)格比預(yù)期更高，并有可能大幅度提升其資產(chǎn)價(jià)格。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，在跨國(guó)公司的市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入全新或有賣(mài)方競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)，他們將捕獲更大的盈余，在這種情況下