工程招投標(biāo)外文翻譯--不平衡投標(biāo)的檢測(cè)和預(yù)防（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1900單詞，10200英文字符，3150漢字</p><p>　　出處：Chotibhongs D A R. Detection and prevention of unbalanced bids[J]. Construction Management & Economics, 2009, 27(8):721-732.</p><p>　　Detection

2、 and prevention of unbalanced bids</p><p>　　DAVID ARDITI* and RANON CHOTIBHONGS</p><p>　　Unbalanced bidding is a serious problem for the construction owner because it may increase the cost of co

3、nstruction The most common way to mathematically unbalance a bid is frontloading where a bidder overstates the unit price of line items scheduled to be performed early in the project and understates the unit price of lin

4、e items performed later. A bidder can also overstate the unit price of a line item whose quantity was somehow underrated by the engineer. If the owner proves that a mathematic</p><p>　　Keywords: Bids, mathem

5、atical models, financial management, construction costs, optimization.</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Unbalanced bids constitute a serious problem for construction owners. In competitive bidding

6、, awarding a contract to an unbalanced bid may cause the owner’s overall project cost to get higher. In some cases, it generates contentious change orders (Manzo, 1997). The owner has the right to reject unbalanced bids,

7、 but it is hard to detect unbalancing. While Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) linear programming model of unbalancing bids in highway construction contracts is relatively easy to detect by the o</p><p>　　After a d

8、escription of the forms and implications of unbalancing bids, a review is presented of current practices by some state and federal agencies in the US in relation to detecting unbalanced bids. A model is then proposed tha

9、t formalizes the detection of unbalanced bids and that automates the process, allowing the owner to reject unbalanced bids with confidence, hence deterring bidders from unbalancing their bids.</p><p>　　Unbal

10、anced bidding</p><p>　　Since unit price contracts are awarded on the basis of low bids, it is difficult to challenge the low bidders on the validity of their unit prices except for obvious unbalanced bidding

11、. A mathematically unbalanced bid is a bid that contains some line items’ unit price determined to be significantly overstated or under- stated. This can be determined by comparing the unit price of the line item with th

12、e engineer’s estimate, the unit prices quoted by the other bidders, or other historical data of </p><p>　　If a mathematically unbalanced bid is detected, the bid has to be further analysed to determine wheth

13、er it is also materially unbalanced. A materially unbalanced bid is a mathematically unbalanced bid that may cost more money to the owner. According to Heinz’s (1988) interpretation of FHWA guidelines, the materially unb

14、alanced bid is defined as a bid which generates ‘a(chǎn) reasonable doubt that award to the bidder submitting a mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to </p><p>　　Frontloading is th

15、e most common way to unbalance a bid. Frontloading refers to increasing unit prices on items to be completed in the early period of the project and decreasing the unit prices on items that are to be completed in the late

16、r stages. The main purpose of frontloading on the part of the contractor is to relieve the financial problems that contractors face early in the project such as the initial expenses of mobilization and setting up. But if

17、 a contractor is set to be paid out in the</p><p>　　Unbalanced bid analysis</p><p>　　In 2004, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) initiated a survey o

18、f unbalanced bids (AASHTO, 2004). Twenty- seven state departments of transportation (DOT) responded to this survey. Many state DOTs (such as Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts and Connecticut) discovered unbalanced bids w

19、ithout having in place any formal procedure to detect such occurrences. Some states quoted their standard contracts that specify the consequences of unbalancing bids, or s</p><p>　　Detection and prevention o

20、f unbalanced bids</p><p>　　Because the extra cost of an unbalanced bid cannot be justified by the owner, and because owners have the right to legally reject unbalanced bids, owners should be able to stop and

21、 prevent unbalanced bids. A bidder’s line item prices can be compared to the engineer’s estimates to see if there are significant differences, an indication that the bid is potentially unbalanced. One can also compare a

22、bidder’s line item prices to the aver- age line item prices of all bidders. Two separate models are </p><p>　　Discussion of the proposed models</p><p>　　The two models proposed here compare a bi

23、dder’s line item prices (1) to the engineer’s estimates; or (2) to the average line item prices of all bidders. Neither model is perfect as the engineer’s estimates and the average line item prices may not constitute exa

24、ct measures of the true value of the line items. Indeed, the engineer’s estimate may at times be quite inaccurate (Beeston, 1999), and average line item prices may be skewed by several unbalanced bids in the same batch.

25、It should also be n</p><p>　　It seems therefore that the major limitation of the proposed system lies in the absence of clear guidelines relating to the value of the four parameters one needs to specify to r

26、un the program, namely: (1) the accepted difference from the engineer’s estimate; (2) the accepted difference from the average line item prices;(3) the proportion of the project that describes ‘early’ schedule; and (4) t

27、he discount rate. On the other hand, one should note that the ability to input these parameters is an </p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　Unbalanced bidding is a serious problem for the construction o

28、wner. Unbalancing a bid is considered by many as unethical. Unbalanced bids can be rejected if caught by the owner. If awarded, the cost of these contracts to the owner is unjustifiably increased. Despite these facts, mo

29、st researchers appear to be interested in the optimization of a contractor’s cash flow by unbalancing a bid and how not to be caught in the process (e.g. Nassar, 2004; Cattell et al., 2007). Detecting an unbalanced bid&l

30、t;/p><p>　　FHWA and a number of state DOTs in the US have spelled out general principles to protect their interests with respect to unbalanced bids. Many DOTs routinely but informally check bids for unbalancing

31、 using different processes. Some DOTs such as the ones in Florida, Texas, North Carolina and Wisconsin have a formal process in place but each uses different approaches and different assumptions. The proposed model repre

32、sents a marked improvement on existing practice because it is an attempt to devel</p><p>　　The proposed model can be improved by further research into developing guidelines for the acceptable difference betw

33、een the engineer’s estimate and the estimate proposed by the bidder for any line item, and the acceptable difference between the average of the line item prices and the prices proposed by a bidder. It is also recommended

34、 that the owner keep bid price and final cost data in a database for future reference in tracking over-run and under-run trends in every bid item.</p><p>　　不平衡投標(biāo)的檢測(cè)和預(yù)防</p><p>　　摘要：不平衡投標(biāo)是建筑行業(yè)最常見的

35、問題之一，因?yàn)橥稑?biāo)人高估了項(xiàng)目前期單價(jià)，低估了項(xiàng)目執(zhí)行后的單價(jià)，可能會(huì)增加施工成本。投標(biāo)人也可以夸大項(xiàng)目的單價(jià)，再由工程師將其數(shù)量在某種程度上低估。如果業(yè)主證明，一個(gè)數(shù)學(xué)上不平衡的投標(biāo)需要更大的成本執(zhí)行，該出價(jià)被認(rèn)為是實(shí)質(zhì)性的不平衡，在這種情況下，業(yè)主可以拒標(biāo)。本文提出了一個(gè)模型，由項(xiàng)目的價(jià)格與工程師的估算和投標(biāo)人所提供的平均價(jià)格相比較來檢測(cè)數(shù)學(xué)和物質(zhì)不平衡投標(biāo)的過程，該模型允許業(yè)主檢測(cè)和拒絕不平衡出價(jià),并阻止投標(biāo)人重新投標(biāo)他們的出價(jià)。

36、</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：出價(jià)，數(shù)學(xué)模型，財(cái)務(wù)管理，工程造價(jià)，優(yōu)化。</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　不平衡報(bào)價(jià)是施工業(yè)主面臨的一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題。在競(jìng)標(biāo)中,將合同授予不平衡報(bào)價(jià)可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致業(yè)主項(xiàng)目的總體成本上升。在某些情況下,它會(huì)產(chǎn)生有爭(zhēng)議的變更(Manzo,1997年)。業(yè)主有權(quán)拒絕不平衡報(bào)價(jià),但很難檢測(cè)到失去平衡

37、。雖然斯塔克（1968年，1972年，1974年）在公路建設(shè)合同不平衡投標(biāo)的線性規(guī)劃模型，是相對(duì)容易被業(yè)主檢測(cè)，納薩爾（2004）研究的目的是不平衡的投標(biāo)，而不是陷入這一過程?？ㄌ貭柕热? 2007)總結(jié)了失去平衡投標(biāo)的方法,并認(rèn)為客戶得到了承包商項(xiàng)目定價(jià)的全部信息,客戶可以選擇在承包商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者中選擇,這意味著投標(biāo)沒有道德方面的影響。換句話說,如果業(yè)主遭受不平衡投標(biāo)的高成本,則是業(yè)主選擇不平衡投標(biāo)承包商的過失,而不是不平衡投標(biāo)承包商的過

38、失。然而,根據(jù)對(duì)美國(guó)建設(shè)管理協(xié)會(huì)(CMAA )的失敗管理研究所( FMI )對(duì)建筑行業(yè)中的270名業(yè)主、建筑師、工程師、建筑經(jīng)理、總承包商和分包商進(jìn)行的調(diào)查, 84%的受訪者認(rèn)為投標(biāo)被認(rèn)為是不道德的(多蘭, 2004)。此外，choi（2004）認(rèn)為不平衡投標(biāo)為“不道德的邊界”（第206頁）和紐約市的采購(gòu)道德指南（紐約市，2002年）明確要求承包商</p><p>　　在描述了失去平衡出價(jià)的形式和含義之后,介紹了

39、美國(guó)一些州和聯(lián)邦機(jī)構(gòu)在檢測(cè)不平衡報(bào)價(jià)方面的現(xiàn)行做法。然后提出了一個(gè)模型,即不平衡報(bào)價(jià)的檢測(cè)和自動(dòng)化過程,允許業(yè)主有信心拒絕不平衡報(bào)價(jià),從而阻止投標(biāo)人重新投標(biāo)他們的出價(jià)。</p><p><b>　　招標(biāo)不平衡</b></p><p>　　由于單位價(jià)格合同是在低出價(jià)的基礎(chǔ)上授予的,因此很難對(duì)低投標(biāo)人的單位價(jià)格的有效性提出質(zhì)疑,除了明顯的不平衡報(bào)價(jià)。數(shù)學(xué)上不平衡出價(jià)是包含

40、一些訂單項(xiàng)出價(jià)，其中包含一些項(xiàng)目的單位價(jià)格確定明顯夸大或低于規(guī)定。這可以通過將項(xiàng)目的單價(jià)與工程師的估算、其他投標(biāo)人的單價(jià)或其他歷史成本來確定。根據(jù)海因茨( 1988)所報(bào)告的聯(lián)邦公路管理局(美國(guó)聯(lián)邦公路局)準(zhǔn)則,不平衡投標(biāo)的含義是一種不反映合理實(shí)際成本加投標(biāo)人預(yù)期利潤(rùn)、間接費(fèi)用和其他間接費(fèi)用的合理比例的投標(biāo)項(xiàng)目。</p><p>　　如果檢測(cè)到不平衡的投標(biāo),則必須進(jìn)一步分析投標(biāo),以確定其是否在實(shí)質(zhì)上不平衡。實(shí)質(zhì)上

41、不平衡的出價(jià)是一個(gè)數(shù)學(xué)不平衡的出價(jià),可能會(huì)花費(fèi)業(yè)主更多的錢。根據(jù)海因茨( 1988)對(duì)美國(guó)聯(lián)邦公路局準(zhǔn)則的解釋,實(shí)質(zhì)上不平衡的投標(biāo)被定義為一種讓人產(chǎn)生合理懷疑的投標(biāo)，即向提交數(shù)學(xué)不平衡出價(jià)的投標(biāo)人授予的,將會(huì)使政府最終費(fèi)用最低。</p><p>　　前期投資是不平衡報(bào)價(jià)最常見的方法。前期投資是指在項(xiàng)目早期階段提高項(xiàng)目單價(jià),并降低后期階段完成的項(xiàng)目單價(jià)。承包商前期投資的主要目的是緩解承包商在項(xiàng)目初期面臨的財(cái)務(wù)問題,

42、如初步的動(dòng)員和建設(shè)費(fèi)用。但是,如果在項(xiàng)目的早期階段要支付承包商的工資, 在考慮貨幣時(shí)間價(jià)值時(shí)業(yè)主會(huì)支付更多費(fèi)用( mcgreevy,2002年)。</p><p><b>　　不平衡報(bào)價(jià)分析</b></p><p>　　2004年,美國(guó)國(guó)家公路和運(yùn)輸協(xié)會(huì)( AASHTO )發(fā)起了對(duì)不平衡報(bào)價(jià)的調(diào)查( AASHTO , 2004)。27個(gè)國(guó)家部門( dot)對(duì)這次調(diào)查作

43、出了答復(fù)。許多州(如伊利諾斯州、堪薩斯州、馬薩諸塞州和康涅狄格州)發(fā)現(xiàn)了不平衡報(bào)價(jià),而沒有建立任何檢測(cè)這類事件的正式程序。一些州援引了它們的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)合同,規(guī)定了失去平衡出價(jià)的后果,或提交不正常的提議。包括加利福尼亞、佛羅里達(dá)、北卡羅來納州、內(nèi)華達(dá)州、田納西州、得克薩斯州和威斯康辛在內(nèi)的7個(gè)州提供了評(píng)估不平衡出價(jià)的正式程序。其中一些使用的程序沒有公開具體說明出價(jià)中使用的具體參數(shù)和可接受范圍，例如項(xiàng)目成本與工程師估算之間的可接受差異,或項(xiàng)目成本

44、與該項(xiàng)目的平均費(fèi)用之間的可接受差異。然而,正如下文所示,一些州的投標(biāo)人確實(shí)可以查取這些參數(shù)和可接受的幅度。</p><p>　　檢測(cè)和預(yù)防不平衡的投標(biāo)</p><p>　　因?yàn)闃I(yè)主不能接受一個(gè)不平衡報(bào)價(jià)的額外費(fèi)用，業(yè)主有合法拒絕不平衡投標(biāo)的權(quán)利，業(yè)主應(yīng)該能夠制止和防止不平衡的投標(biāo)。投標(biāo)人的項(xiàng)目成本可以與工程師估算的作比較，確定是否有顯著差異，該出價(jià)是否可能不平衡。也可以將投標(biāo)人的成本價(jià)格與

45、所有投標(biāo)人的平均投標(biāo)價(jià)格相比較。因此，下文提出了兩個(gè)獨(dú)立的模型。由于失去平衡可以采用前期投資的形式或由工程師估算的項(xiàng)目單價(jià)進(jìn)行調(diào)整,兩種模型都設(shè)計(jì)用于處理這些情況。兩個(gè)模型都采用MS Excel的完全自動(dòng)化。</p><p><b>　　對(duì)提出模型的探討</b></p><p>　　這里提出兩種模式比較投標(biāo)者項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格（1）工程師的估算; 或（2）所有投標(biāo)人的平均項(xiàng)目的

46、價(jià)格。由于工程師估算和平均項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格不能構(gòu)成項(xiàng)目真實(shí)價(jià)格的精確度量,這兩種模型都不完美。事實(shí)上，工程師的估算可能有時(shí)是相當(dāng)不準(zhǔn)確（比斯頓，1999年），平均項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格可能會(huì)被同一批中幾個(gè)不平衡的出價(jià)影響。還應(yīng)當(dāng)指出的是，由投標(biāo)人提出的個(gè)別項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格也是估算的，因此增加了過程中固有的不確定性。結(jié)果表明,這兩種模型都是近似的,但如果分析者正確的設(shè)定模型參數(shù),可能仍然會(huì)產(chǎn)生有用的信息。在第一個(gè)模型中,如果業(yè)主確信工程師的估算是準(zhǔn)確的,業(yè)主可以通過尋

47、找與工程師估算相對(duì)較小的差異的項(xiàng)目來尋找不平衡報(bào)價(jià)。另一方面,如果業(yè)主對(duì)工程師估計(jì)的準(zhǔn)確性有懷疑,則要通過尋找工程師估算的相對(duì)較大的差異來進(jìn)行非平衡投標(biāo)。第二個(gè)模型,投標(biāo)人的項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格與平均線項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格相比,比前一個(gè)備選方案更穩(wěn)定,因?yàn)樵撃Ｐ褪褂盟谐鰞r(jià)的平均值,從而減少批量不平衡報(bào)價(jià)引起的異常影響。但是這個(gè)模型依賴于分析師對(duì)項(xiàng)目比例的輸入,這是計(jì)劃的“早期”部分。在項(xiàng)目的“早期”部分檢測(cè)前期投資是必要的。分析師還需要輸入折扣率,這個(gè)很難確

48、定。</p><p>　　因此，該系統(tǒng)的主要局限在于沒有涉及到運(yùn)行該程序四個(gè)參數(shù)值的明確準(zhǔn)則，即：( 1 )接受工程師估計(jì)數(shù)的差異;(二)與平均項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格的差額;(三)項(xiàng)目提前計(jì)劃的比例;( 4)貼現(xiàn)率。另一方面，我們應(yīng)該注意到它允許分析師輸入這些參數(shù)進(jìn)行假設(shè)分析，特別是對(duì)于最后兩個(gè)參數(shù)。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>

49、;　　不平衡報(bào)價(jià)是施工業(yè)主面臨的一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題。失去平衡的報(bào)價(jià)被許多人認(rèn)為是不道德的。如果業(yè)主遇到不平衡報(bào)價(jià),可以拒絕。如果中標(biāo),這些合同將給業(yè)主增加費(fèi)用。盡管有這些事實(shí),大多數(shù)研究人員似乎對(duì)承包商通過投標(biāo)和如何不被卷入的過程(例如納薩爾,2004年;卡特爾等人(2007年)的現(xiàn)金流量?jī)?yōu)化感興趣,。檢測(cè)不平衡報(bào)價(jià)通常是困難的,由于這些研究人員的努力,變得更加困難。鑒于目前的文獻(xiàn),積極試圖向承包商傳授失去平衡的各種方法,而不被抓住?，F(xiàn)在是時(shí)

50、候提供一個(gè)明智的工具允許業(yè)主檢測(cè)和拒絕不平衡報(bào)價(jià)。</p><p>　　美國(guó)聯(lián)邦公路局和美國(guó)的一些州已經(jīng)闡明了保護(hù)他們利益的不平衡出價(jià)一般原則。許多州的運(yùn)輸部門經(jīng)常通過不同的流程對(duì)不平衡報(bào)價(jià)進(jìn)行非正式的檢查。一些州像佛羅里達(dá)、德克薩斯、北卡羅來納和威斯康辛的運(yùn)輸部有一個(gè)正式的過程, 但是每個(gè)州的運(yùn)輸部都采用不同的方法和不同的假設(shè)。該模型代表了現(xiàn)行做法的明顯改善，因?yàn)樗噲D制定一種全面的方法,系統(tǒng)地涵蓋投標(biāo)的所有方