外文翻譯--港口集群治理

1、<p>　　Governance In Seaport Clusters</p><p>　　Peter W. de Erlangen </p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　Apart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime a

2、ccessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance.</p><p>　　An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role

3、 of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic litera

4、ture offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. </p><p>　　In this paper we d

5、eal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam..</p><p>　　First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster gove

6、rnance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdam’s port c

7、luster. We feminality the paper with conclusions.</p><p>　　2.The Quality Of Cluster Governance </p><p>　　We define cluster governance as ‘the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of c

8、oordination used in a cluster’. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination beyond price’. Low coordination costs and mu

9、ch coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.</p><p>　　When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or whe

10、n benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordinati

11、on beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters.</p><p><b>　　2.1Trust </b></p><p>　　In clusters where the level of trust is high, (

12、average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond

13、price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust

14、is sustained.</p><p>　　2.2 Intermediaries</p><p>　　The presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond price, for three related reasons. First,

15、they provide a ‘bridging tie’ (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they ‘connect cognitions’. Intermediaries

16、can bridge cognitive differences between firms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is espec</p><p>　　2.3Leader firms</p><p>　　Leader firms are ‘stra

17、tegic Centre with superior coordination skills and the ability to steer change’ (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms ha

18、ve both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify three investments of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed ‘leader firm externalities’) on oth

19、er firms in the cluster:</p><p>　　Internationalism;</p><p>　　innovation;</p><p>　　contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971)</p><p>　　Thus, leader

20、 firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for that reason add to the performance of clusters. </p><p>　　2.4Collective action in clusters</p><p>　　The ‘problem’ of collective action (Olso

21、n, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always) develop spontaneously. Different CAP’s (Collectiv

22、e Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a ‘relatively stable collaborative agreemen

23、t that provides acto</p><p>　　3.Port authorities as ‘cluster managers’</p><p>　　Even though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most

24、 central actor. The term ‘cluster manager’ can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenu

25、e and investment decisions of port authorities. </p><p>　　3.1 The role of a ‘cluster manager’</p><p>　　A ‘perfect’ cluster manager would be an galvanization with the following four characteristi

26、cs.</p><p>　　1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The ‘perfect’ cluster manager would receive a share of the value

27、 added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a ‘cluster tax’.</p><p>　　2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster benefits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, t

28、he cluster manager aims to invest when ‘cluster benefits’ exceed costs.</p><p>　　3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves co-finance

29、 arrangements with a specific group of beneficiary firms.</p><p>　　4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.</p><p>　　The port authority matches all fo

30、ur criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they generally are self-sustaining and invest in the pe

31、rformance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit driv

32、en</p><p>　　The port authority owns and exploits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port author

33、ities collect ‘port dues’. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port authorities have a clear incentive to invest in the performance of the port cluster.Thus, port authorities

34、 can be regarded as cluster managers.</p><p>　　3.2 Revenues of port authorities </p><p>　　The port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various char

35、ges differs between ports (Asar, 2001). In general, port authorities generate revenue from three sources:</p><p>　　charges to shipowners/ ship operators;</p><p>　　charges to tenants in the port,

36、 including terminal operators;</p><p>　　charges to cargo-owners.</p><p>　　Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed ‘port dues’ and in most cases related to the size of vessels. These por

37、t dues are justified by investments in dredging, safety systems, and investments in port basins. Charges for tenants are lease charges to firms such as terminal operators and warehousing and production firms. Charges for

38、 cargo owners are termed wharfage and are mostly related to cargo volume or to the value of goods. Some port authorities do not have wharfage charges, because c</p><p>　　This implies that the port charges do

39、 not have to be fully justified on the basis of investments with benefits for either tenants or shipowners. Investments for the benefit of cargo owners, such as investments in hinterland infrastructure, hinterland access

40、 or warehousing facilities, can be justified because the cargo owners as users of the port pay the port charges ‘in the end’. Therefore, investments with benefits for these cargo owners are justified, even if port charge

41、s are paid only by tena</p><p>　　3.3 Investment decisions of port authorities</p><p>　　The port charges have to be justified by investments of the port authority. ‘Investment appraisal’ –on the

42、basis of which criteria do port authorities decide to invest- is therefore a central issue for port authorities. We claim that the following simple rule is a guideline for investment appraisal of port cluster managers:

43、benefits for the cluster of an investment should exceed costs for the cluster. Cluster benefits are the sum of all benefits of firms in the cluster, cluster costs are the co</p><p>　　4. Cluster governance in

44、 the port of Rotterdam</p><p>　　In this section we present an empirical case study of the port of Rotterdam. We interviewed 43 port experts in the port of Rotterdam. First, we deal with the importance of clu

45、ster governance for the performance of the cluster. In the next four paragraphs, we discuss the empirical results for the four variables that influence the quality of the cluster governance. Sixth, we briefly discuss the

46、 role of the port authority in Rotterdam and end with conclusions.</p><p>　　4.1 The importance of cluster governance in Rotterdam’s seaport cluster</p><p>　　These results show that cluster gover

47、nance is less important than the structure of the cluster and the economic development in general, but more important than national and international policies. The experts were also asked to indicate the relative importa

48、nce of the four variables of cluster governance, also by ranking them.</p><p>　　4.2 Trust in Rotterdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　Virtually all cluster experts agree with the proposition that trust

49、 is important for the quality of the cluster governance, and as discussed above, argue that trust is the most important ‘governance variable’. The cluster experts evaluated the port of Rotterdam and its main competitors,

50、 Antwerp and Hamburg, with regard to the presence of trust.</p><p>　　4.3 Leader firms in Rotterdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　Virtually all cluster experts also agree that the presence of leader fi

51、rms is an important determinant of the quality of cluster governance. The experts evaluate the three competing ports as follows:</p><p>　　b significantly better than in worst port</p><p>　　Antwe

52、rp is evaluated the most positive, Hamburg has the lowest score. In general the experts indicate that all three ports do score relatively good with regard to leader firms.</p><p>　　4.4 Intermediaries in Rott

53、erdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　With regard to intermediaries, a significant majority of the experts agree with the presumed positive effect of intermediaries on cluster governance, but nine out of the 43 disa

54、gree.</p><p>　　4.5 Solutions for CAP’s in Rotterdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　Finally, we discuss the quality of solutions for collective action problems. Out of the five proposed CAP’s in seaport

55、s, the cluster experts judged four relevant：</p><p>　　a significant majority</p><p>　　4.6 The role of the port authority in Rotterdam</p><p>　　The Rotterdam municipal port authority

56、 (RMPM) is a public landlord port. The galvanization formally is a part of the municipality Rotterdam but operates to a large extent autonomous. Currently, a modification of the institutional structure, to grant the port

57、 authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municip

58、ality will remain the </p><p>　　5. Conclusions</p><p>　　In this paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port competition, port development an

59、d port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the governance of a cluster depends on the level of transaction costs in a cluster and the ‘scope of co

60、ordination beyond price’. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and </p><p><b>　　港口集群治理</b></p><p>　　Peter

61、W. de Erlangen </p><p>　　1、Introduction引言</p><p>　　除了眾所周知的地理因素，如位置、海上交通方便程度和腹地的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，港口治理是其功能發(fā)揮的決定性因素。</p><p>　　作者分析了港口治理大多被限定為港口當(dāng)局的職能。盡管港口當(dāng)局在港口中起著核心作用, 但我們認(rèn)為分析港口治理對(duì)港口的作用同時(shí)需要關(guān)注（私營(yíng)）

62、企業(yè)。制度經(jīng)濟(jì)文獻(xiàn)分析提供了一個(gè)有益的框架，分析優(yōu)點(diǎn)和缺點(diǎn)替代治理機(jī)制提供基礎(chǔ)分析港口當(dāng)局的作用。</p><p>　　在本文中,我們處理港口集群治理的問(wèn)題，闡明我們的方法并分析了鹿特丹港。</p><p>　　首先,我們簡(jiǎn)要的討論了集群治理概念的理論基礎(chǔ)。其次,我們討論港口當(dāng)局在港口治理中的作用。第三,我們分析了來(lái)自于43位專(zhuān)家對(duì)鹿特丹市鹿特丹港口集群治理的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查的研究結(jié)果。最后完成文

63、章的結(jié)論。</p><p><b>　　2、集群治理的質(zhì)量</b></p><p>　　我們定義集群治理為“混合之間的關(guān)系，以及各種機(jī)制的協(xié)調(diào)用于集聚?！奔褐g的治理質(zhì)量不同。質(zhì)量取決于協(xié)調(diào)成本水平和“范圍”的“協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)價(jià)”。 低協(xié)調(diào)成本和多協(xié)調(diào)成本無(wú)價(jià)能提高治理質(zhì)量。</p><p>　　當(dāng)協(xié)調(diào)的利益分配不均，當(dāng)（威脅）防止投機(jī)行為協(xié)調(diào)或協(xié)調(diào)

64、利益不確定時(shí)，協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)價(jià)不會(huì)自發(fā)或立即產(chǎn)生，即使協(xié)調(diào)收益超過(guò)成本。因此一般缺少協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)價(jià)。更多的無(wú)價(jià)協(xié)調(diào)能改善集群治理的質(zhì)量。</p><p><b>　　2.1信任</b></p><p>　　在集群中信任水平高，（平均)交易成本則相對(duì)較低, 因?yàn)榈统杀局付ê贤捅O(jiān)督成本低。此外,協(xié)調(diào)成本無(wú)價(jià)越低，更多的協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)價(jià)會(huì)因此出現(xiàn)。在一個(gè)集群中的信任水平受到聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)的影響。如果

65、聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)強(qiáng), 濫用信任會(huì)產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響，因此信任文化是持續(xù)的。</p><p><b>　　2.2中介機(jī)構(gòu)</b></p><p>　　中介機(jī)構(gòu)存在降低協(xié)調(diào)成本和擴(kuò)大協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)價(jià)的范圍有三個(gè)相關(guān)的原因。首先, 他們提供了一個(gè)“橋梁紐帶” 在兩個(gè)或多個(gè)之間否則不能連接交換伙伴(Weevily and Zachery, 1999)。其次，中介機(jī)構(gòu)降低協(xié)調(diào)成本，因?yàn)樗鼈儭斑B接認(rèn)知

66、”。 企業(yè)之間的橋梁中介機(jī)構(gòu)可以認(rèn)知不同市場(chǎng)環(huán)境中運(yùn)作的差異。而連接認(rèn)知有特別重要的作用在集群中考慮集群實(shí)際的特征是“認(rèn)知分工” (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000)。</p><p><b>　　2.3領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司</b></p><p>　　領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司是“具有卓越協(xié)調(diào)能力和駕馭能力，改變戰(zhàn)略中心” (Lorenz and Baden fuller,

67、1995)。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的行為影響整個(gè)集群的功能，因?yàn)轭I(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)有能力和動(dòng)力投資于一個(gè)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的整體公司網(wǎng)絡(luò)。我們確定了三個(gè)投資于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的其他公司的積極作用（這些可以被稱(chēng)為“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司外部性”）在集群中:國(guó)際化、創(chuàng)新、有助于解決集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題(Olson, 1971)。</p><p>　　因此, 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司能加強(qiáng)合作,甚至可以增加企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)。</p><p>　　2.4集群中的集體行動(dòng)</p

68、><p>　　集體行動(dòng)的“問(wèn)題”在集群中是相關(guān)的 (Olson, 1971)。即使在合作的集體利益中實(shí)現(xiàn)集體（目標(biāo)）超過(guò)集體成本，這種合作不（總是）自發(fā)發(fā)展的。不同的集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題如教育、培訓(xùn)和創(chuàng)新是相互聯(lián)系的在集群中。對(duì)每個(gè)集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題會(huì)產(chǎn)生相應(yīng)的管理體制。在這種情形下, 一個(gè)管理體制可以被定義為一種“相對(duì)穩(wěn)定的合作協(xié)議處理克服集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題的能力?！?lt;/p><p>　　3、港口當(dāng)局作為集群管

69、理者</p><p>　　雖然有各種行為者參與集群治理，但港務(wù)局起著最核心的作用?？梢园选凹汗芾碚摺泵枋鰹楦劭诋?dāng)局的作用。我們討論集群管理者的一般作用，港務(wù)當(dāng)局所處的位置、收入來(lái)源和投資決策。</p><p>　　3.1集群管理者的作用</p><p>　　一個(gè)“完美”的集群管理者將是一個(gè)具有以下四個(gè)特點(diǎn)的組織：</p><p>　　1、集

70、群管理者激勵(lì)來(lái)投資在產(chǎn)業(yè)集群中，因?yàn)樗氖杖肱c集群績(jī)效有關(guān)。一個(gè)“完美”的集群管理者將收到一份增值產(chǎn)生的收入在集群中，比如通過(guò)“集群稅”。</p><p>　　2、集群管理者進(jìn)行投資活動(dòng)獲得集群收益（替代公司特殊收益）。此外, 集群管理者的目標(biāo)是當(dāng)投資的“集群收益”超過(guò)成本。</p><p>　　3、集群管理者的目的是把投資成本分配給那些投資獲益的公司。這涉及到一起籌措資金安排于一組特定的

71、受益人公司。</p><p>　　4、集群管理者經(jīng)營(yíng)達(dá)到自給自足：經(jīng)過(guò)一段時(shí)間投資等于收入。</p><p>　　港務(wù)局匹配所有四項(xiàng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：它們有動(dòng)機(jī)和資金投資于集群。在港口集群中港口費(fèi)和租賃向投資提供資金。此外,它們通常自給自足及投資于整個(gè)集群的績(jī)效。港口當(dāng)局投資于一般福利活動(dòng)，例如港口拓展、安全、疏浚?？紤]到制度的關(guān)系 ,大多數(shù)港口當(dāng)局沒(méi)有利潤(rùn)的驅(qū)動(dòng)。</p><p&

72、gt;　　港務(wù)局擁有并開(kāi)發(fā)港區(qū)而獲得收益，港口集群是一個(gè)具有吸引力的位置，因?yàn)樗鼈兛梢猿鲎飧嗟耐恋?，并且收取更高的價(jià)格。此外,港口當(dāng)局還征收“港口費(fèi)”。 因此,船只越多的港口會(huì)產(chǎn)生較高的港口費(fèi)。基于上述兩個(gè)原因，港口當(dāng)局有明確鼓勵(lì)投資于港口集群的性能。</p><p>　　3.2港口當(dāng)局的收入</p><p>　　港口當(dāng)局有各種來(lái)源的收入。對(duì)存在的各項(xiàng)費(fèi)用和相對(duì)重要性收取不同的費(fèi)用在不同

73、的港口之間(Asar, 2001)。一般來(lái)說(shuō),增加港口當(dāng)局的收入來(lái)源有三個(gè): 船東/船舶經(jīng)營(yíng)人費(fèi)用；在港口租借費(fèi),包括碼頭營(yíng)運(yùn)人；費(fèi)用為船方。費(fèi)用為船東/船舶經(jīng)營(yíng)人的被稱(chēng)為“港口費(fèi)”，大多數(shù)情況下與船只大小有關(guān)。這些港口費(fèi)是合理的從事疏浚，安全系統(tǒng),以及在港內(nèi)的投資。租賃費(fèi)用是公司按租約收取的，如碼頭營(yíng)運(yùn)人倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)和生產(chǎn)企業(yè)。貨主碼頭費(fèi)大多數(shù)與貨物大小或者商品價(jià)值有關(guān)。一些港口當(dāng)局沒(méi)有碼頭費(fèi)，因?yàn)樨浿鏖g接也支付其他費(fèi)用。在這樣的情況下, 部

74、分其他費(fèi)用都可以被看作是“偽碼頭費(fèi)”。</p><p>　　這意味著港口費(fèi)用不需要完全正當(dāng)在基礎(chǔ)投資上獲益對(duì)承租人或船東。投資為貨主的利益，如投資于腹地基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，接近腹地或倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)設(shè)施是合理的，因?yàn)樨浿髯鳛楦劭谑褂谜咧Ц丁白罱K”的港口費(fèi)。因此,這些貨主的投資收益是正當(dāng)?shù)模词垢劭谫M(fèi)用只能由居住者和運(yùn)輸公司支付。</p><p>　　3.3港口當(dāng)局的投資決策</p><p&g

75、t;　　港口費(fèi)用是合理的由港口當(dāng)局投資?！巴顿Y評(píng)估”—是根據(jù)港口當(dāng)局投資的一些準(zhǔn)則作出的投資。我們主張以下簡(jiǎn)單的規(guī)則為港口集群管理者投資評(píng)價(jià)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：集群的投資效益應(yīng)該超過(guò)集群成本。集群的好處是集聚企業(yè)利益的總和，集群的成本是集聚企業(yè)的投資成本。在大多數(shù)情況下,成本會(huì)損失，因?yàn)楦劭谫M(fèi)用需要集群投資。因?yàn)槌杀镜扔谑杖?，高投資水平需要高的港口費(fèi)用。</p><p>　　4、鹿特丹港的集群治理</p>&l

76、t;p>　　在本節(jié)中，我們提出一個(gè)對(duì)鹿特丹港的實(shí)證案例研究。我們采訪(fǎng)了43個(gè)港口專(zhuān)家在鹿特丹市的港口。首先,我們處理集群治理的重要性為了集聚的績(jī)效。在接下來(lái)的四個(gè)段落里，我們討論了四個(gè)變量影響集群治理質(zhì)量的實(shí)證結(jié)果。第六，我們也簡(jiǎn)要的討論港口當(dāng)局在鹿特丹市的作用并最后得出結(jié)論。</p><p>　　4.1集群治理的重要性在鹿特丹港口群</p><p>　　這些研究結(jié)果表明一般來(lái)說(shuō)集群

77、治理是同樣的重要與集群結(jié)構(gòu)和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，但更重要的是國(guó)際和國(guó)內(nèi)政策。專(zhuān)家們也要求它們的排名表明集群治理四個(gè)變量的相對(duì)重要性。</p><p>　　4.2信任在鹿特丹港口群</p><p>　　幾乎所有集群專(zhuān)家們都同意信任是很重要的對(duì)集群治理質(zhì)量這一觀點(diǎn)，如上所述，認(rèn)為信任是最重要的治理變量。集群專(zhuān)家評(píng)估關(guān)于信任的存在在鹿特丹港和它的主要競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手安特衛(wèi)普和漢堡。</p><

78、p>　　4.3領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司在鹿特丹的港口群</p><p>　　幾乎所有集群專(zhuān)家也同意領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的存在是集群治理質(zhì)量的重要因素。專(zhuān)家評(píng)估三個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)港口如下：</p><p><b>　　b明顯優(yōu)于最壞港口</b></p><p>　　安特衛(wèi)普被評(píng)為最積極的、漢堡得分最低?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō),專(zhuān)家表明這三個(gè)港口是評(píng)分方面相對(duì)較好的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)。</p>

79、;<p>　　4.4中介機(jī)構(gòu)在鹿特丹的港口群</p><p>　　關(guān)于中介機(jī)構(gòu),有相當(dāng)多數(shù)專(zhuān)家同意假定中介機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)集群治理有積極作用，但43個(gè)專(zhuān)家中有9個(gè)不同意。</p><p>　　4.5解決集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題在鹿特丹港口群</p><p>　　最后我們討論了集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題解決方案的質(zhì)量。提出了五個(gè)集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題建議在港口中，集群專(zhuān)家判斷四個(gè)相關(guān)：</p&

80、gt;<p><b>　　a相當(dāng)多數(shù)</b></p><p>　　4.6港口當(dāng)局的作用在鹿特丹市</p><p>　　鹿特丹市港口當(dāng)局(RMPM)是一個(gè)公共的地主港。該組織是一個(gè)正式的為鹿特丹港市的一部分，但是很大一部分有經(jīng)營(yíng)自主權(quán)。目前, 修改體制結(jié)構(gòu)，港口當(dāng)局授予更多的自主權(quán)，改變監(jiān)測(cè)和控制功能，從市議會(huì)到獨(dú)立董事會(huì)的討論。然而,即使當(dāng)建議新構(gòu)架被批

81、準(zhǔn)后，市政當(dāng)局仍然是主要的主導(dǎo)者。</p><p><b>　　5、結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　在本文中,我們認(rèn)為港口集群治理分析增加了我們了解港口競(jìng)爭(zhēng), 港口發(fā)展和港口的功能。我們已經(jīng)提供了一份分析框架用于分析(港口)集群治理。集群治理的質(zhì)量取決于在一個(gè)集群中的交易費(fèi)用和“協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)價(jià)的范圍”。而四個(gè)變量同時(shí)影響治理質(zhì)量：領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的存在，中介機(jī)構(gòu)的存在，信任水平和