外文翻譯--咖啡機(jī)的失效評(píng)估

1、<p>　　中文2300字,1.2萬英文字符,中文3700字</p><p><b>　　附錄3</b></p><p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Failure evaluation of coffee maker</p><p>　　ABSTRACT:The c

2、offee maker was disassembled, and the characteristics, working principle and process of each unit and component were investigated in this paper. The response of the system under abnormal operation conditions was found th

3、rough simulating test. And the failure modes of each unit failing in the test were analyzed based on the characteristics of mate-rial, structure and service condition. The failure evaluation of the coffee maker system wa

4、s made using the reliability analysis methods </p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　The main objective of this study is to evaluate whether the designed function of one kind of coffee maker can rea

5、lized and is safe enough or not in the work process when it is abnormally or improperly operated. First, the components and units of every subsystem were disassembled. Then possible failure modes of each unit were analyz

6、ed based on the characteristics of material, structure and service conditions. The possible failure modes of each component were inferred from the combina-tion of the </p><p>　　2. Structural features and ana

7、lysis of system functions</p><p>　　2.1. Classi?cation of subsystems</p><p>　　Structural features and analysis of system functions are fundamental to both failure and system safety evaluation [1,

8、2]. According to function characteristic, the coffee maker can be separated into three relatively independent subsystems. (1) Water circulation system. It is the center working system of the coffee maker which accomplish

9、ed by supply, drawing, heat-ing and output process. This circulation system consists of the following components, water reservoir, ?ow meter, pump, heater, trifurc</p><p>　　2.2. Analysis of working process&l

10、t;/p><p>　　Working process of the water circulation system is vital to coffee maker. On the basis tests, we can tentatively infer the working process of water circulation, as shown in Fig. 1. For example, when

11、the coffer maker make coffer of 7oz, at ?rst, the coffee maker is powered on, the heater will preheat itself up to about 65 ?C(149 ?F), the pump then starts pumping water into the heater through the ?ow meter and heated

12、water (not boiled) ?ows out of the spout. As soon as the ?ow meter reads 7oz (7oz</p><p>　　2.3. Overheating hazard protection process</p><p>　　Overheating may be the main cause of burning and ex

13、plosion of the coffee maker. Its overheating protection is realized by the following three grades, as shown in Fig. 2. Grade I hazard protection is made up of two parallel connected thermal resistances; grade II is a the

14、rmostat and grade III is a thermal cut off. When the temperature of the inner shell of the heater or heater spout is too high, the thermal resistance gets to work and the system is prevented from working. The thermostat

15、is contro</p><p>　　3. Safety evaluation</p><p>　　3.1. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)</p><p>　　FMEA is a qualitative method to analyze the hazards, which gradually analyzes

16、the in?uences of the failure of components and units on the personnel, operation and the whole system and its possible causes [3,4]. The analysis results of some units of water circle subsystem were only given here, as s

17、hown in Table 1.</p><p>　　3.2. Fault tree analysis (FTA)</p><p>　　Fault tree analysis adopts logical method to conduct dangerous analyzing work characterized by intuitiveness, straight-forwardne

18、ss, clear thinking and logic. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis can be conducted, which re?ects the sys-tematically, accuracy and predictability of the systematical project method to research safety problem. It

19、is one of the main analyzing methods of safety system projects. On the basis of FMEA, the failure modes that have the most possibility to occur are leak</p><p>　　4. Simulation test and analysis</p>&l

20、t;p>　　Simulation test aims to ?nd out the unknown design fault and validate FMEA conclusions by simulating failure of many kinds of main components. It is a testing way that is closest to the actual conditions. The re

21、port is concerned mainly on components in the water circulation system and the hazard protection system. The prefabricated failures often happen in actual service. </p><p>　　4.1. Outlet clogging of creamy po

22、d holder</p><p>　　This clogging often occurs in practical service. If coffee powder is carelessly put into the creamy pod holder, the water will ?ow to the cup through the pressure relief pipe, indicating th

23、at the pressure hazard protection system run normally. However, the pod holder is full of hot water. Under pressure the lid cannot be opened immediately so that users would open it forcibly to be scalded. This clogging e

24、xperiment also holds for the outlet clogging.</p><p>　　4.2. Clogging of waterspout of relief valve</p><p>　　Failure of the simulation test would occur if the relief piston was clogged as the sca

25、le deposits lie in the relief discharging outlet in the underpin or the spring is ruptured because of erosion. During the test, the system ran normally and the adhesive plaster clogging the discharging outlet was sunken.

26、 Therefore, only under great pressure would the relief pipeline be opened. Despite no signi?cant in?uence of the failure on the system, the failure still makes the pressure hazard protection sys</p><p>　　4.3

27、. Leakage of check valve</p><p>　　The failure of the check valve leakage was simulated in this test, which also holds for any leakage of the outlet pipeline of the heater. As aforementioned, the failure caus

28、ed by the aging, thermal melting, and hot water leakage possibly occurs for silicone tube, ?rmware, connector in the outlet pipelines in the high-temperature and high-pressure vapor. Once the failure takes place, the lea

29、kage of the outlet pipeline may cause the short circuit and scalding of people. Therefore, such leakage is </p><p>　　4.4. Replacement of NTC 1#and NTC 2#</p><p>　　This test has conducted a surve

30、y of the working situation of the protection system of temperature danger after the NTC 1# and NTC 2#and electromagnetic pump fails to function simultaneously. After the NTC 1#and 2#are invalidated simultaneously, the th

31、ermostat should exercise the function of overheating protection at the second level. After the heater reaches the critical temperature during the dry burning process, the thermostat will cut off the chief power. During t

32、he simulation test process, a</p><p>　　The NTC holder is made of PP plastic. PP plastic has good hardness, toughness, high thermal resistance temperature, good</p><p>　　fatigue property, good ch

33、emical stability and oxidation resistance. It can endure the high-temperature from 110 C(230 F) to</p><p>　　120 C(248 F), even 150 C(302 F) without force operation. NTC holder has strength much lower than th

34、at of trifur connector though they are made of the same PP. NTC holder is of semi-transparent and yellowish color while trifurcate tube connector is of opaque and white color. The obvious difference in color and roughnes

35、s can be ascribed to different processing qualities. These results show that NTC holder failure is due to the processing of manufacture. In addition, lid lower of the coffee maker w</p><p>　　5. Analysis and

36、discussion</p><p>　　The coffee maker can basically meet the demands for functionality according to test and analysis above. However, the hidden hazard also exists in design and few parts, which will detailed

37、 as follow, and needs further improving.</p><p>　　5.1. Design factor</p><p>　　Design fault is quite serious and unacceptable and thus must be improved in that probability of failure caused by un

38、reasonable design is highest. Test results showed that the main problems existed in design include:</p><p>　　(a) Unreasonable design of the heat tube. For example, the structure of the NTC holder is rather c

39、omplex and the innerdiameter of tube is small and the wall is too thin such that thermal melting, poring and rupturing are easy to occur.</p><p>　　(b) Hidden hazards in design of the pressure relief pipeline

40、. The exit of the pressure relief pipeline lies inside the chassis. It doesn’t work in normal service. But high-temperature vapor will leak rapidly through this pipeline under anomalous conditions such as overheat and ov

41、erhigh pressure etc, which would scald people. Therefore, the design of this pipe-line should be further considered. We propose that the pipeline should directly lead to the water reservoir.</p><p>　　(c) The

42、 PPS in the cover lower of the brew vessel is subjected to high stress and is the only connector to the shower cap. The aging or delamination of the PPS here will lead the inner bolt and the shower cap to drop off. There

43、fore, the hot water or steam will leak. This is the un-negligible hidden hazard.</p><p>　　5.2. Manufacture factor</p><p>　　The quality of processing is the important guarantee for the reliabilit

44、y of the coffee maker. The processing quality of NTC holder is poor. Early failure of NTC holder would lead to leakage of water circle subsystem, which may result in scald. </p><p>　　5.3. Unpredictable accid

45、ent</p><p>　　Accident in service cannot be controlled by designers and manufacturers. By designing a perfect protection system harm would be possibly minimized. These accidents mainly include bulk exotic art

46、icles introduced into the water-circulating system, incorrect operation and so on. Test clearly showed that the outlet would be completely clogged if coffee powder is put into the creamy pod holder. Improvement in design

47、 is indispensable for this component.</p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　(1) Design in system, structure and safety protection of the coffee maker is reasonable. This product satis?es the requirem

48、ents by safety design and will not fail severely in normal operation for a short term.</p><p>　　(2) The safety protection system of the coffee maker works well to be able to deal with accidents properly and

49、thus ensure that no severe safety events happen in service.</p><p>　　(3) In?ammation and explosion etc. can hardly occur to the coffee maker. However, leakage of steam etc. may take place, which should be av

50、oided.</p><p>　　(4) The processing quality of some particular elements is poor and will impose the hidden hazard on the whole system.</p><p>　　References</p><p>　　[1] Chunhu Tao, Na

51、n Du, Weifang Zhang. Tactic thought about progress of failure analysis. Fail Anal Prevent 2006;1(1):1–5.</p><p>　　[2] Seyed-Hosseini SM, Safaei N, Asgharpour MJ. Reprioritization of failures in a system fail

52、ure mode and effects analysis by decision making trial and</p><p>　　evaluation laboratory technique. Reliab Eng Syst Safe 2006;91(8):872–81. 1954</p><p>　　[3] Foster, Tandon, Zoghi. Evaluation o

53、f failure behavior of transversely loaded unidirectional model composites. Exp Mech 2006;46(2):217–43.</p><p>　　[4] Mosleh A, Parry GW, Zikria AF. An approach to the analysis of common cause failure data for

54、 plant-speci?c application. Nucl Eng Des 1999;(150):25–47.</p><p><b>　　中文翻譯：</b></p><p><b>　　咖啡機(jī)的失效評(píng)估</b></p><p>　　摘要：本文對(duì)某型咖啡機(jī)做了拆卸，對(duì)各個(gè)元器件的工作原理、工作過程和特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了研究。通

55、過模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)，對(duì)在異常運(yùn)行情況下的系統(tǒng)響應(yīng)做出監(jiān)測(cè)。根據(jù)材料的特點(diǎn)、結(jié)構(gòu)、和工作條件分析測(cè)試中每一個(gè)失效的單元模式。在咖啡機(jī)失效系統(tǒng)的評(píng)估中利用可靠性分析方法，如故障模式和影響分析，故障樹分析等。結(jié)果表明，咖啡機(jī)可滿足基本功能。然而，在設(shè)計(jì)中管道壓力隱患問題仍然需要改善。雖然一些爆炸和腐蝕不會(huì)發(fā)生在咖啡機(jī)上，但蒸汽泄露時(shí)有發(fā)生，應(yīng)該盡力避免?？Х葯C(jī)的一些元器件的質(zhì)量差，不利于長(zhǎng)期安全的使用，需要對(duì)其進(jìn)行一些改進(jìn)和提升。</p>

56、<p><b>　　1、引言</b></p><p>　　本研究的目的主要是評(píng)估某型咖啡機(jī)在異?；蛘卟徽２僮鞯臅r(shí)候是否能正常實(shí)現(xiàn)其設(shè)計(jì)功能和工作過程中是否安全兩個(gè)方面。首先，將整個(gè)咖啡機(jī)系統(tǒng)分解為幾個(gè)子系統(tǒng)。然后根據(jù)材料特點(diǎn)、結(jié)構(gòu)和工作環(huán)境條件分析每個(gè)單元可能的故障模式。在此基礎(chǔ)上，推斷出由元件組成的器件會(huì)出現(xiàn)何種失效模式以及失效后的影響，并通過模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)加以驗(yàn)證。最后，根據(jù)器

57、件分析結(jié)果評(píng)估整個(gè)咖啡機(jī)系統(tǒng)的安全性和可靠性。</p><p>　　2、結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)和系統(tǒng)功能分析</p><p><b>　　2.1子系統(tǒng)分類</b></p><p>　　系統(tǒng)功能的分析和結(jié)構(gòu)上的特點(diǎn)是失效和系統(tǒng)安全評(píng)估的基礎(chǔ)。根據(jù)功能特點(diǎn)，咖啡機(jī)可以分為三個(gè)相對(duì)獨(dú)立的子系統(tǒng)。（1）水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)。這個(gè)工作系統(tǒng)是通過供應(yīng)、汲取、加熱與輸出的開放性循環(huán)

58、系統(tǒng)過程構(gòu)成。這個(gè)循環(huán)系統(tǒng)通過一下部分構(gòu)成：水庫(kù)、流量計(jì)、泵、加熱器、三叉管接頭、咖啡泡制杯、熱熔器、安全閥、止回閥及水管等。（2）電氣控制系統(tǒng)。電氣控制系統(tǒng)是咖啡機(jī)的神經(jīng)中樞，它以程控的方式對(duì)咖啡機(jī)進(jìn)行自動(dòng)化控制，包括工作流程控制和誤差應(yīng)急處理等。該部分包括熱電阻（NTC）、恒溫控制器（Themostat）、熔斷器(ThermalCutOff)和蜂鳴器（Beef）等。該處理器涉及到掌握集成電路。電動(dòng)輔助電路包括電容，電阻，電感，三極管

59、，三電壓調(diào)節(jié)器，變壓器，導(dǎo)線和插件版。（3）外殼結(jié)構(gòu)體系。殼體結(jié)構(gòu)系統(tǒng)由前殼、后殼、底盤、蓋和骨架組成，發(fā)揮支撐和防護(hù)的功能。</p><p><b>　　2.2工作過程分析</b></p><p>　　水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)的工作過程對(duì)咖啡機(jī)至關(guān)重要。在一些測(cè)試資料的基礎(chǔ)上，我們可以初步推斷水循環(huán)的工作過程，如圖1所示。當(dāng)泡制7盎司的咖啡時(shí)，首先開機(jī)后，加熱器開始預(yù)熱，溫度升高

60、到65攝氏度左右，電磁擺動(dòng)泵開始工作，水通過流量計(jì)抽到加熱器中進(jìn)行加熱。加熱后的水從出水口處流出。當(dāng)流量計(jì)計(jì)算出到達(dá)指定7盎司的水量時(shí)，泵停止抽水，加熱器中的存水被繼續(xù)加熱至沸騰，水煮沸成蒸汽從出水口噴出。如果出現(xiàn)管路蒸汽壓力過大，安全閥開啟，多余蒸汽排在底盤內(nèi)。如果由于冷卻作用等原因，蒸汽壓力低于一個(gè)大氣壓時(shí)，止回閥開啟，將外界空氣抽回至水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)內(nèi)，以此來保持水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)蒸汽壓力的穩(wěn)定。這種設(shè)計(jì)構(gòu)成了咖啡機(jī)的壓力危險(xiǎn)防護(hù)體系。<

61、/p><p>　　圖1 水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)總圖</p><p>　　2.3過熱危險(xiǎn)防護(hù)方法</p><p>　　過熱可能是咖啡機(jī)燃燒和爆炸的主要原因。該咖啡壺過熱防護(hù)主要分為三個(gè)等級(jí)（圖2）I級(jí)危險(xiǎn)的保護(hù)是由兩個(gè)熱電阻并聯(lián)而成。Ⅱ級(jí)和Ⅲ級(jí)溫控器是一種熱切斷。</p><p>　　當(dāng)加熱器的內(nèi)腔或加熱器的出口溫度過高時(shí)，熱電阻發(fā)生作用，系統(tǒng)中斷工作。恒溫控

62、制器由強(qiáng)電控制。當(dāng)加熱管過熱時(shí)，溫控器工作，切斷加熱器電源，保證水泵安全。當(dāng)加熱器溫度恢復(fù)正常后，溫控器將重新連接電源。熱切斷是最高的安全等級(jí)保護(hù)，在前兩級(jí)未能起到作用的情況下，當(dāng)加熱器超過臨街溫度時(shí)，熔斷器將切斷全系統(tǒng)的供電。</p><p>　　圖2 咖啡機(jī)過熱防護(hù)體系</p><p><b>　　3、安全性評(píng)估</b></p><p>　

63、　3.1 失效模式與影響分析</p><p>　　FMEA是一種定性的危險(xiǎn)分析方法，是從元器件的失效開始，逐次分析其失效對(duì)人員、操作及整個(gè)系統(tǒng)的影響和可能產(chǎn)生失效的原因?？Х葯C(jī)水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)及部分元器件的失效模式見表1。</p><p><b>　　3.2 故障樹分析</b></p><p>　　故障樹分析的特點(diǎn)是直觀、明了，思路清晰、邏輯性強(qiáng)，可

64、以做定性分析，也可以做定量分析。體現(xiàn)了以系統(tǒng)公曾方法研究安全問題的系統(tǒng)性、準(zhǔn)確性和預(yù)測(cè)性，它是安全系統(tǒng)工程的主要分析方法之一。</p><p>　　在對(duì)FMEA失效模擬的基礎(chǔ)上，確定咖啡機(jī)最有可能的失效為高溫高壓水蒸汽的泄漏和漏電，繪出故障樹圖3和圖4。</p><p>　　圖3 高溫高壓水蒸氣泄漏</p><p><b>　　圖4 咖啡機(jī)漏電<

65、;/b></p><p><b>　　4、模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)及分析</b></p><p>　　失效模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)室通過對(duì)各類主要器件的失效模擬，驗(yàn)證FMEA的結(jié)論，找出設(shè)計(jì)中的未知缺陷。它是一種最接近實(shí)際情況的測(cè)試方式。本報(bào)告主要針對(duì)水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)和電氣信息輸入系統(tǒng)中的主要器件進(jìn)行失效模擬，這些失效都是在實(shí)際使用中容易出現(xiàn)的情況。</p><p>　　4.

66、1 奶油熱熔器出口堵塞</p><p>　　這種堵塞經(jīng)常發(fā)生在實(shí)際使用中。如果不小心把咖啡粉放入奶油熱熔器中，這時(shí)熱熔器出水口會(huì)被堵塞，壓力危險(xiǎn)防護(hù)體系啟用，水通過減壓管路，最終流出到杯中。然而由于此時(shí)熱熔器中盛滿熱水，導(dǎo)致頂蓋在壓力作用下不能立即開啟，使用者有可能強(qiáng)行開啟造成燙傷。試驗(yàn)表明，這種堵塞也會(huì)發(fā)生在出水管路。</p><p><b>　　4.2 排水閥堵塞</b

67、></p><p>　　如果有水垢沉淀堵塞位于底盤中的安全排水口，或因彈簧腐蝕斷裂等原因?qū)踩钊ㄋ?，都?huì)出現(xiàn)模擬試驗(yàn)的失效情況。試驗(yàn)過程中系統(tǒng)運(yùn)行正常，排水口堵塞的膠布凹陷，由此可見安全管路只有在壓力較大時(shí)才會(huì)開啟。雖然這種失效對(duì)系統(tǒng)正常工作影響不大，但會(huì)導(dǎo)致水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)壓力危險(xiǎn)防護(hù)喪失功能，且不易被人發(fā)現(xiàn)，有可能導(dǎo)致管路因壓力急劇升高而破裂，從而引發(fā)高溫水蒸汽的快速泄漏，對(duì)人造成燙傷或觸電等傷害。因此該

68、安全閥堵塞問題值得關(guān)注。</p><p><b>　　4.3 止回閥泄漏</b></p><p>　　試驗(yàn)?zāi)M了止回閥泄漏失效，對(duì)于加熱器出水管路任一點(diǎn)泄漏均適用。元器件在高溫高壓的蒸汽環(huán)境下有可能發(fā)生老化和熱熔而導(dǎo)致此類泄漏。一旦發(fā)生失效故障，出水管路中的泄漏點(diǎn)流出有可能早恒電氣系統(tǒng)短路和燙傷。因此這一類泄漏是比較危險(xiǎn)而又比較容易發(fā)生的失效。止回閥壓力保護(hù)的一個(gè)重要

69、功用是減輕系統(tǒng)的壓力負(fù)擔(dān)。與咖啡機(jī)內(nèi)泄漏不同的是，由于止回閥進(jìn)氣端直通外殼前擋板，如果其反向?qū)?，高溫高壓水蒸氣?huì)直接導(dǎo)出咖啡壺，有可能造成人員的嚴(yán)重傷害，因此止回閥的質(zhì)量非常值得關(guān)注。</p><p>　　4.4 1＃、2＃熱電阻同時(shí)置換模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)</p><p>　　本試驗(yàn)檢測(cè)了1＃和2＃熱電阻同時(shí)失效后，溫度危險(xiǎn)防護(hù)系統(tǒng)的工作親狂。在1＃和2＃熱電阻同時(shí)失效后，恒溫器應(yīng)承擔(dān)起二級(jí)過熱

70、防護(hù)的功能，加熱器在干燒過程中達(dá)到臨界溫度后，恒溫器切斷總電源。在模擬試驗(yàn)過程中雖然最終恒溫器發(fā)揮了作用切斷了電源，但熱電阻保持架在低于正常工作溫度下就發(fā)生了嚴(yán)重的熱熔變形和穿孔失效，導(dǎo)致整個(gè)水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)發(fā)生泄漏，其質(zhì)量應(yīng)引起高度關(guān)注。如圖5,和圖6所示。</p><p>　　保持架和三通采用PP塑料，PP塑料具有良好的硬度，韌性，高的熱電阻溫度，良好的抗疲勞性能，優(yōu)良的化學(xué)穩(wěn)定性和抗氧化性。耐熱溫度高，為110攝

71、氏度~120攝氏度，無外力作用時(shí)可達(dá)150攝氏度。通過觀察發(fā)現(xiàn)，熱電阻保持架與三通所用材料雖然相同，但可以觀察到熱電阻保持架的顏色為不透明乳白色，而三通的顏色為半透明的米黃色，此外熱電阻保持架表面比三通表面加工粗糙，熱電阻保持架材料強(qiáng)度明顯低于三通，這些現(xiàn)象說明二者在制備工藝的質(zhì)量控制上存在著很大的差距。所以說熱電阻保持架等同質(zhì)器件作為加熱管路中的最容易失效的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)，需要得到重視。</p><p>　　沖泡器采

72、用PPS塑料。PPS塑料具有較好的耐熱、阻燃、機(jī)械、耐化學(xué)腐蝕及耐磨性能，尺寸穩(wěn)定性好，比較適合作咖啡機(jī)的外殼結(jié)構(gòu)結(jié)構(gòu)材料。在實(shí)驗(yàn)分析中發(fā)現(xiàn)，下蓋安裝螺絲釘存在分層脫落，如圖7所示，但其原因可能是由于下蓋采用環(huán)保的再生PPS塑料制備或制備工藝控制不當(dāng)所致。如果采用合理的制備技術(shù)，提高材料質(zhì)量，能夠保證咖啡機(jī)的安全可靠性。</p><p><b>　　5、分析和探討</b></p>

73、<p>　　根據(jù)測(cè)試和分析的結(jié)果，該咖啡機(jī)基本可以滿足所要求的功能，但個(gè)別元器件還是存在安全隱患，將具體描述如下，需要進(jìn)一步的提高。</p><p><b>　　5.1 設(shè)計(jì)因素</b></p><p>　　設(shè)計(jì)上出現(xiàn)問題是比較嚴(yán)重和不可接受的，必須加以改進(jìn)。通過試驗(yàn)與分析，可知該咖啡機(jī)在設(shè)計(jì)方面存在的主要問題有：</p><p>

74、;　　加熱管路部分器件結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)不當(dāng)。如熱電阻保持架結(jié)構(gòu)比較復(fù)雜，但管路管徑和內(nèi)徑都過小，管壁過薄，容易造成熱熔穿孔或爆裂失效。</p><p>　　安全減壓管路設(shè)計(jì)存在隱患。該咖啡機(jī)的安全減壓管路出口設(shè)計(jì)在底盤內(nèi)部。在正常工作過程中，加壓管路并不使用，但在過熱過壓等非正常情況時(shí)，加壓管路會(huì)快速排泄高溫蒸汽，這些蒸汽從底盤直接排除很有可能造成人員的燙傷。因此，對(duì)該管路的設(shè)計(jì)還需要進(jìn)一步的考慮，建議排到水容器的冷水中

75、。</p><p>　　沖泡容器頂蓋中螺孔PPS材料剝層，此處受力較大，又是與金屬密封蓋的唯一連部位，該處的老化或受力剝層可能造成內(nèi)螺栓的脫落，進(jìn)而造成密封蓋的脫落，可能造成熱水的大量泄漏。因此該處為不可忽視的安全隱患。</p><p>　　5.2 加工制造因素</p><p>　　加工質(zhì)量是高品質(zhì)咖啡機(jī)可靠性的重要保證。在本系統(tǒng)內(nèi)電阻保持架的加工質(zhì)量是嚴(yán)重欠缺的，

76、該器件的早期失效導(dǎo)致水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)泄漏，存在燙傷的危害。</p><p>　　5.3 不可預(yù)知因素</p><p>　　使用中出現(xiàn)意外時(shí)設(shè)計(jì)和生產(chǎn)者無法控制的，只有通過完善的保護(hù)系統(tǒng)來保證在意外發(fā)生時(shí)將危害降到最低。這類因素主要指大塊異物進(jìn)入水循環(huán)系統(tǒng)、使用者誤操作等，根據(jù)模擬測(cè)試試驗(yàn)結(jié)果可知，咖啡機(jī)在使用中如果將咖啡粉直接放入奶油沖泡熱熔器，會(huì)導(dǎo)致出口的完全堵塞，存在燙傷危害。因此對(duì)該器件結(jié)

77、構(gòu)的再設(shè)計(jì)是必要的。</p><p><b>　　6、結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　咖啡機(jī)在結(jié)構(gòu)、系統(tǒng)、安全防護(hù)設(shè)計(jì)等方面較為合理，總體設(shè)計(jì)水平較高，正確使用情況下，短期內(nèi)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重事故，符合安全設(shè)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則。</p><p>　　咖啡機(jī)的安全保護(hù)系統(tǒng)運(yùn)作良好，在使用中能夠正確處理事故確保安全運(yùn)行。</p><p>　

78、　咖啡機(jī)發(fā)生燃燒、爆炸等安全爆炸的幾率較小，但存在蒸汽泄漏等需要改進(jìn)的地方。</p><p>　　一些特定元器件的加工質(zhì)量差，將對(duì)整個(gè)系統(tǒng)產(chǎn)生隱患。</p><p><b>　　參考文獻(xiàn)</b></p><p>　　[1] Chunhu Tao, Nan Du, Weifang Zhang. Tactic thought about prog

79、ress of failure analysis. Fail Anal Prevent 2006;1(1):1–5. </p><p>　　[2] Seyed-Hosseini SM, Safaei N, Asgharpour MJ. Reprioritization of failures in a system failure mode and effects analysis by

80、 decision making trial and </p><p>　　evaluation laboratory technique. Reliab Eng Syst Safe 2006;91(8):872–81. </p><p>　　[3] Foster, Tandon, Zoghi. Evaluation of failure behavior of transversel

81、y loaded unidirectional model composites. Exp Mech 2006;46(2):217–43. </p><p>　　[4] Mosleh A, Parry GW, Zikria AF. An approach to the analysis of common cause failure data for plant-specific application. Nu