外商直接投資如何使發(fā)展中國家收益外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3773字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries? </p>&l

2、t;p>　　出 處： Finance & Development, June 2001 </p><p>　　作 者： Prakash Loungani and Assaf Razin </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　How Beneficial Is Foreign D

3、irect Investment for</p><p>　　Developing Countries?</p><p>　　The resilience of foreign direct investment during financial crises may lead many developing countries to regard it as the private ca

4、pital inflow of choice. Although there is substantial evidence that such investment benefits host countries, they should assess its potential impact carefully and realistically.</p><p>　　Foreign direct inves

5、tment (FDI) has proved to be resilient during financial crises. For instance, in East Asian countries, such investment was remarkably stable during the global financial crises of 1997-98. In sharp contrast, other forms o

6、f private capital flows—portfolio equity and debt flows, and particularly short-term flows—were subject to large reversals during the same period (see Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha, 2000; and Lipsey, 2001). The resilience

7、of FDI during financial crises was also </p><p>　　This resilience could lead many developing countries to favor FDI over other forms of capital flows, furthering a trend that has been in evidence for many ye

8、ars (see Chart 1). Is the preference for FDI over other forms of private capital inflows justified? This article sheds some light on this issue by reviewing recent theoretical and empirical work on its impact on developi

9、ng countries' investment and growth.</p><p>　　The case for free capital flows</p><p>　　Economists tend to favor the free flow of capital across national borders because it allows capital to

10、seek out the highest rate of return. Unrestricted capital flows may also offer several other advantages, as noted by Feldstein (2000). First, international flows of capital reduce the risk faced by owners of capital by a

11、llowing them to diversify their lending and investment. Second, the global integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread of best practices in corporate governance,</p><p>　　In addition to these

12、 advantages, which in principle apply to all kinds of private capital inflows, Feldstein (2000) and Razin and Sadka (forthcoming) note that the gains to host countries from FDI can take several other forms:</p>&l

13、t;p>　　（1）FDI allows the transfer of technology—particularly in the form of new varieties of capital inputs—that cannot be achieved through financial investments or trade in goods and services. FDI can also promote com

14、petition in the domestic input market.</p><p>　?。?）Recipients of FDI often gain employee training in the course of operating the new businesses, which contributes to human capital development in the host cou

15、ntry.</p><p>　?。?）Profits generated by FDI contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host country.</p><p>　　Of course, countries often choose to forgo some of this revenue when they cut corpor

16、ate tax rates in an attempt to attract FDI from other locations. For instance, the sharp decline in corporate tax revenues in some of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development may

17、 be the result of such competition. (For a discussion, see the article by Reint Gropp and Kristina Kostial in this issue.)</p><p>　　In principle, therefore, FDI should contribute to investment and growth in

18、host countries through these various channels.</p><p>　　FDI versus other flows</p><p>　　Despite the strong theoretical case for the advantages of free capital flows, the conventional wisdom now

19、seems to be that many private capital flows pose countervailing risks. Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) suggest why many host countries, even when they are in favor of capital inflows, view international debt flo

20、ws, especially of the short-term variety, as "bad cholesterol":</p><p>　　It [short-term lending from abroad] is driven by speculative considerations based on interest rate differentials and exchang

21、e rate expectations, not on long-term considerations. Its movement is often the result of moral hazard distortions such as implicit exchange rate guarantees or the willingness of governments to bailout the banking system

22、. It is the first to run for the exits in times of trouble and is responsible for the boom-bust cycles of the 1990s.</p><p>　　In contrast, FDI is viewed as "good cholesterol" because it can confer

23、the benefits enumerated earlier. An additional benefit is that FDI is thought to be "bolted down and cannot leave so easily at the first sign of trouble." Unlike short-term debt, direct investments in a country

24、 are immediately repriced in the event of a crisis.</p><p>　　Recent evidence</p><p>　　To what extent is there empirical support for such claims of the beneficial impact of FDI? A comprehensive s

25、tudy by Bosworth and Collins (1999) provides evidence on the effect of capital inflows on domestic investment for 58 developing countries during 1978-95. The sample covers nearly all of Latin America and Asia, as well as

26、 many countries in Africa. The authors distinguish among three types of inflows: FDI, portfolio investment, and other financial flows (primarily bank loans).</p><p>　　Bosworth and Collins find that an increa

27、se of a dollar in capital inflows is associated with an increase in domestic investment of about 50 cents. (Both capital inflows and domestic investment are expressed as percentages of GDP.) This result, however, masks s

28、ignificant differences among types of inflow. FDI appears to bring about a one-for-one increase in domestic investment; there is virtually no discernible relationship between portfolio inflows and investment (little or n

29、o impact); and the i</p><p>　　Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that FDI increases economic growth when the level of education in the host country—a measure of its absorptive capacity—is high. Th

30、e World Bank's latest Global Development Finance (2001) report summarizes the findings of several other studies on the relationships between private capital flows and growth, and also provides new evidence on these r

31、elationships. (For a summary, see the article by Deepak Mishra, Ashoka Mody, and Antu Panini Murshid in thi</p><p>　　Reasons for caution?</p><p>　　Despite the evidence presented in recent studie

32、s, other work indicates that developing countries should be cautious about taking too uncritical an attitude toward the benefits of FDI.</p><p>　　Is a high FDI share a sign of weakness? Hausmann and Fern

33、5;ndez-Arias (2000) point to reasons why a high share of FDI in total capital inflows may be a sign of a host country's weakness rather than its strength.</p><p>　　One striking feature of FDI flows is th

34、at their share in total inflows is higher in riskier countries, with risk measured either by countries' credit ratings for sovereign (government) debt or by other indicators of country risk (see Chart 3). There is al

35、so some evidence that its share is higher in countries where the quality of institutions is lower. What can explain these seemingly paradoxical findings? One explanation is that FDI is more likely than other forms of cap

36、ital flows to take place </p><p>　　In a similar vein, Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000, page 5) suggest that "Countries should concentrate on improving the environment for investment and the func

37、tioning of markets. They are likely to be rewarded with increasingly efficient overall investment as well as with more capital inflows." Although it is very likely that FDI is higher, as a share of capital inflows,

38、where domestic policies and institutions are weak, this cannot be regarded as a criticism of FDI per se. Indeed, without it</p><p>　　Fire sales, adverse selection, and leverage. FDI is not only a transfer of

39、 ownership from domestic to foreign residents but also a mechanism that makes it possible for foreign investors to exercise management and control over host country firms—that is, it is a corporate governance mechanism.

40、The transfer of control may not always benefit the host country because of the circumstances under which it occurs, problems of adverse selection, or excessive leverage.</p><p>　　Krugman (1998) notes that so

41、metimes the transfer of control occurs in the midst of a crisis and asks:</p><p>　　Is the transfer of control that is associated with foreign ownership appropriate under these circumstances? That is, loosely

42、 speaking, are foreign corporations taking over control of domestic enterprises because they have special competence, and can run them better, or simply because they have cash and the locals do not? . . . Does the fire-s

43、ale of domestic firms and their assets represent a burden to the afflicted countries, over and above the cost of the crisis itself?</p><p>　　Even outside of such fire-sale situations, FDI may not necessarily

44、 benefit the host country, as demonstrated by Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1999) and Razin and Sadka (forthcoming). Through FDI, foreign investors gain crucial inside information about the productivity of the firms under thei

45、r control. This gives them an informational advantage over "uninformed" domestic savers, whose buying of shares in domestic firms does not entail control. Taking advantage of this superior information, foreign

46、dire</p><p>　　Excessive leverage can also limit the benefits of FDI. Typically, the domestic investment undertaken by FDI establishments is heavily leveraged owing to borrowing in the domestic credit market.

47、 As a result, the fraction of domestic investment actually financed by foreign savings through FDI flows may not be as large as it seems (because foreign investors can repatriate funds borrowed in the domestic market), a

48、nd the size of the gains from FDI may be reduced by the domestic borrowing done by fore</p><p>　　FDI reversals? Recent work has also cast the evidence on the stability of FDI in a new light. Though it is tru

49、e that the machines are "bolted down" and, hence, difficult to move out of the host country on short notice, financial transactions can sometimes accomplish a reversal of FDI. For instance, the foreign subsidia

50、ry can borrow against its collateral domestically and then lend the money back to the parent company. Likewise, because a significant portion of FDI is intercompany debt, the paren</p><p>　　Other considerati

51、ons. There are some other cases in which FDI might not be beneficial to the recipient country—for instance, when such investment is geared toward serving domestic markets protected by high tariff or nontariff barriers.

52、Under these circumstances, FDI may strengthen lobbying efforts to perpetuate the existing misallocation of resources. There could also be a loss of domestic competition arising from foreign acquisitions leading to a cons

53、olidation of domestic producers, through ei</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　Both economic theory and recent empirical evidence suggest that FDI has a beneficial impact on developing host countries.

54、 But recent work also points to some potential risks: it can be reversed through financial transactions; it can be excessive owing to adverse selection and fire sales; its benefits can be limited by leverage; and a high

55、share of FDI in a country's total capital inflows may reflect its institutions' weakness rather than their strength. Though the empirical relevance of some of </p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>

56、;　　外文題目： How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries? </p><p>　　出 處： Finance & Development, June 2001

57、 </p><p>　　作 者： Prakash Loungani and Assaf Razin </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　外商直接投資如何使發(fā)展中國家收益</p>&l

58、t;p>　　引言：外國直接投資在金融危機中的應(yīng)變能力會導(dǎo)致許多發(fā)展中國家視其為私人資本流入而選擇它。盡管有大量證據(jù)表明，這種投資對東道國有好處，應(yīng)該仔細評估其對外商的潛在影響和現(xiàn)實。</p><p><b>　　正文：</b></p><p>　　外國直接投資（FDI）已被證明在金融危機中具有彈性。例如，外來直接投資早對1997-1998年期間發(fā)生在東亞國家的全

59、球金融危機中起到了穩(wěn)定的作用。與此形成鮮明對比的是私人資本流動，投資組合的資產(chǎn)和債務(wù)流動，尤其是短期流動的其他形式，能在同一時期使經(jīng)濟格局受到大逆轉(zhuǎn)。外國直接投資在其他形式的金融危機中的應(yīng)變能力也很明顯，在1994-1995年的墨西哥危機和20世紀80年代拉丁美洲的債務(wù)危機起到了決定性作用。</p><p>　　這種彈性可能會導(dǎo)致許多發(fā)展中國家更喜歡通過其他形式流動的外國直接投資，可以證明在一個已經(jīng)被眾多周知了（

60、見圖表1）許多年的趨勢。是不是外國直接投資中的私人資本流入超過其他形式的就是合理的嗎？本文通過回顧最近理論和實證及其對發(fā)展中國家的投資和增長的影響對這個問題上進行分析和理解。</p><p>　　對于資本自由流動的情況</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟學(xué)家傾向于資本的跨國自由流動，因為它會能資本尋求最高的回報率。無限制的資本流動也可能會提供一些其他優(yōu)點，如一篇費爾德斯坦在2000年寫的書中指出。首

61、先，國際資本流動的減少會使他們分散貸款和投資的資本從而降低所有者所面臨的風險。其次，資本市場的全球一體化可以最好的促進公司治理，會計規(guī)范及其法律傳統(tǒng)的傳播。第三，資本全球流動限制了政府通過使用不良政策來限制資本自由流動的行為</p><p>　　除了這些優(yōu)勢，這些原則適用于各種私人資本的流入，在費爾德斯坦（2000年）和拉津和斯達卡的文章中可以知道外商對東道國的直接投資可以采取以下各種形式：</p>

62、<p>　　1.外國直接投資允許技術(shù)的轉(zhuǎn)移，特別是對各種各樣的新的資本投入的形式上，無法通過金融投資或商品和服務(wù)貿(mào)易取得的轉(zhuǎn)移。通過將外國直接投資投入本國市場可以提升競爭力。</p><p>　　2.外國直接投資的接受者往往在經(jīng)營有助于在本國人力資源的發(fā)展的員工培訓(xùn)的新業(yè)務(wù) 3.外商直接投資產(chǎn)生的利潤對東道國企業(yè)的稅收具有很大的貢獻。</p><p>　　當然，各國往

63、往會選擇放棄這部分收入當他們試圖降低公司的稅收收入用來吸引其他地區(qū)的外國直接投資時。例如，在經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織成員國（經(jīng)合組織）中對企業(yè)的稅收收入的明顯下降的原因可能是競爭的結(jié)果。（有關(guān)對這個問題的討論可以看Reint Gropp和Kristina Kostial的文章。）</p><p>　　原則上，外國直接投資應(yīng)有助于投資，并可以通過各種渠道使東道國的經(jīng)濟迅速增長。</p><p>　

64、　外國直接投資與其他流量</p><p>　　盡管有強大的理論支撐資本自由流動的優(yōu)勢，現(xiàn)在的傳統(tǒng)智慧似乎對很多私人資本的流動造成了對抗風險。哈市曼娜和費爾南德斯，阿里亞斯在2000年發(fā)表的書中說明為什么許多東道國，他們在資金流入中受到國際債務(wù)流動的青睞，尤其是短期投入，就有如“壞的膽固醇”一樣：</p><p>　　它[短期貸款從國外]是由利率差和匯率預(yù)期的投機因素所造成而不是長遠考慮所驅(qū)

65、使。其行動往往是隱含的，如匯率擔?；蛳蛘戎y行體系的道德風險的意愿扭曲的結(jié)果。這是第一次運行時失敗的，并且要對20世紀90年代全球經(jīng)濟從繁榮到蕭條的周期負責</p><p>　　與此相反，外國直接投資被認為是“好的膽固醇”，因為它可以賦予很多的較早被證明的好處。另外一個好處是，外商直接投資被認為是“囫圇吞下，很容易的不會留下任何不好的麻煩”，不同于短期債務(wù)，在危機事件中一個國家的直接投資會立即造成重新定價。&

66、lt;/p><p><b>　　最近的跡象</b></p><p>　　在何種程度上是對外國直接投資的有利影響的實證來支持經(jīng)濟的這種說法？</p><p>　　按博斯沃思和柯林斯（1999年）的綜合研究中提供了對國內(nèi)投資的影響，并提供了58個發(fā)展中國家在1978年至1995年的資本流入的依據(jù)。其樣本涵蓋幾乎所有的拉美和亞洲，以及在非洲許多國家。筆者

67、區(qū)分三種類型的流入：外國直接投資，證券投資和其他資金流動（主要是銀行貸款）。</p><p>　　博斯沃思和柯林斯發(fā)現(xiàn)一個每當資本流入增加一美元，在國內(nèi)投資的約增加50美分有關(guān)聯(lián)系。（兩個資本流入和國內(nèi)投資是國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分比表示。）但是這個結(jié)果在流入類型的區(qū)分上有著明顯差異。外國直接投資出現(xiàn)帶來了對國內(nèi)的投資項目的增加;而且與任何證券投資和投資（很少或沒有影響）幾乎沒有明顯關(guān)系，以及另外兩個人的范圍之間貸款的

68、影響。這些結(jié)果都為58個國和18個新興市場提供了依據(jù)。（見圖表2）博斯沃思和柯林斯總結(jié)說：“什么事可以使這些金融資本流入足以抵消發(fā)展中國家境內(nèi)資本對其自本國的好處和風險呢？答案是似乎是一個強大的外國直接投資?！?lt;/p><p>　　Borensztein，德格雷戈里奧和李（1998）發(fā)現(xiàn)，外國直接投資的增長多少取決于東道國的教育水平的程度，從而決定了它吸收能力測量高。世界銀行的最新全球發(fā)展金融（2001）的報告中

69、總結(jié)了私人資本之間流動和增長的關(guān)系決定了其他研究結(jié)果，并提供了對這些關(guān)系的新證據(jù)。（對于這個問題的總結(jié)，看看迪帕克米什拉，阿育王么，和安圖帕尼尼Murshid的文章。）</p><p><b>　　謹慎的理由？</b></p><p>　　盡管在最近的研究提出的證據(jù)和其他的工作表明，發(fā)展中國家應(yīng)采取對有關(guān)外國直接投資的益處不加批判的態(tài)度謹慎。</p>&

70、lt;p>　　是不是高的外國直接投資份額就是軟弱的表現(xiàn)呢？Hausmann和費爾南德斯，阿里亞斯（2000）指出外國直接投資在總資本流入較高的市場份額可能是東道國的示弱而不是它的實力弱小的原因。</p><p>　　外國直接投資流動的一個顯著特點是，它們流入總量的比例在高風險國家更高，風險衡量的主權(quán)（政府）債務(wù)的國家的信用評級按國家風險（見圖表3）或其他指標來衡量。也有一些證據(jù)表明其份額較高的國家如該機構(gòu)的

71、質(zhì)量較低。什么可以解釋這些看似矛盾的問題呢？一種解釋是外國直接投資的可能比其他形式的資本流動的國家采取丟失或低效的市場的行為中占有一席之地。在這樣的設(shè)置下外國投資者會更喜歡直接操作，而不是通過對本地金融市場及供應(yīng)商或依靠法律安排。這一觀點的政策含義根據(jù)阿爾布開克在2000年發(fā)表的書中表明： “各國試圖擴大它們進入國際資本市場的力度并集中力量發(fā)展可信的執(zhí)法機制，而不是試圖獲得更多的外國直接投資?！?lt;/p><p>

72、　　與此類似，Hausmann和費爾南德斯，阿里亞斯（2000年，第5頁）認為，“各國應(yīng)集中力量改善投資環(huán)境和市場的運作。它們可能要與整體的投資效率越來越高，以及有更多的回報資本的流入有關(guān)?！半m然這極有可能是外國直接投資作為一種較高的資本流入，使其國內(nèi)政策和機構(gòu)的份額降低，但這不能被視為外國直接投資對其本身的批評。事實上，如果沒有它東道國很可能更差。</p><p>　　降價銷售，逆向選擇和杠桿。外國直接投資不僅

73、是從國內(nèi)到國外的居民轉(zhuǎn)移資金所有權(quán)，但同時這也是一種機制。它使外國投資者在東道國的公司行使管理和控制手段，這是一個公司治理機制。在控制轉(zhuǎn)移中可能并不總是有利的情況下，由于東道國根據(jù)它發(fā)生時逆向選擇或過度杠桿的問題導(dǎo)致了問題的出現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　克魯格曼（1998）指出，有時在發(fā)生危機之中進行轉(zhuǎn)移控制中要求：控制權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)移在外國所有權(quán)的這種情況下是否合適？是不是就是說超過國內(nèi)企業(yè)到對外國公司控制，因為它們具有

74、特殊的能力，并能更好地運營，或僅僅是因為他們有充足的現(xiàn)金，二當?shù)厝藳]有？是否由國內(nèi)公司和對他們資產(chǎn)的甩賣代表了受災(zāi)國的負擔，從而超出了危機本身的成本？</p><p>　　即使是在這樣的大甩賣的情況下，外國直接投資可能不一定有利于東道國，由拉津，斯達卡和圓（1999年）和拉津和斯達卡（即將出版）證明。通過外國直接投資，外國投資者在獲得有關(guān)的公司在其控制下的生產(chǎn)能力的重要信息。這使他們在“不知情”的國內(nèi)儲蓄者在國內(nèi)

75、企業(yè)的股票買盤中并不意味著控制的信息優(yōu)勢。利用這種優(yōu)越的信息優(yōu)勢，外國直接投資者將傾向于保持其所有權(quán)和控制下的高生產(chǎn)力公司并出售低生產(chǎn)力的公司而儲戶不了解情況。與其他不利的問題是這一過程可能導(dǎo)致外國直接投資者過度投資。</p><p>　　過高的杠桿影響率也會限制外國直接投資的好處。通常情況下，國內(nèi)投資機構(gòu)所進行的大量外國直接投資的杠桿涉及由于在國內(nèi)信貸市場借貸。因此，國內(nèi)的投資比例實際上是通過外國直接投資流動資

76、金，特別是來自外國儲蓄可能不會很大，因為它似乎（因為外國投資者可以在國內(nèi)市場遣返借貸基金），以及外國直接投資的收益的大小可能會減少由國內(nèi)借款從而由外商獨資企業(yè)完成。</p><p>　　外國直接投資逆轉(zhuǎn)？最近的工作是對外國直接投資穩(wěn)定在一個新的輕的水平的證據(jù)。雖然這是事實，機器是“囫圇吞下”，因此，難以移動的東道國資本在短時間內(nèi)釋放出來，有時還可以完成金融交易的外國直接投資逆轉(zhuǎn)。例如，可以借鑒國外子公司在國內(nèi)反對

77、其抵押，然后借給錢還給母公司。同樣，因為有很大一部分是外國直接投資的公司間債務(wù)，母公司可以快速調(diào)用它。</p><p>　　其他的考慮因素。還有一些其他案件中，外國直接投資可能不利于受援國，例如，當這種投資是對高關(guān)稅或非關(guān)稅壁壘保護的國內(nèi)市場服務(wù)為目標。在這種情況下，外國直接投資可能會加強流通努力，以延續(xù)現(xiàn)有的資源配置不當。也有可能成為導(dǎo)致?lián)p失國內(nèi)競爭力，通過鞏固外資收購國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者的競爭所產(chǎn)生，或者通過收購或使企

78、業(yè)倒閉。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論朗讀</b></p><p>　　無論是通過經(jīng)濟理論還是最近的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)都表明，外國直接投資對發(fā)展中東道國的有利影響。但最近的工作也指出了一些潛在的風險：它可以使金融交易的逆轉(zhuǎn)，并被過度用于逆向選擇和降價銷售，其好處是可以通過有限的杠桿作用和外國直接投資較高的市場份額在一個國家的總資本流入中可能反映了其機構(gòu)的弱點，而不是通過自己

79、的力量。盡管對這些風險相關(guān)來源還有待進一步的證實，但潛在的風險似乎的確存在，通過采取為外國直接投資可能產(chǎn)生的影響進行細致入微的查看。對發(fā)展中國家的政策建議是應(yīng)著眼于提高所有類型的資本，以及國外國內(nèi)的投資環(huán)境。</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細內(nèi)容</p><p>　　Jīngjì xué jiā qīngxiàng yú zīběn de

80、kuàguó zìyóu liúdòng, yīnwèi tā yǔnxǔ zīběn xúnqiú zuìgāo de huíbào lǜ. Wú xiànzhì de zīběn liúdòng yě kěnéng huì tígōng

81、 yīxiē qítā yōudiǎn, rú fèi ěr dé sītǎn (2000) zhǐchū. Shǒuxiān, guójì zīběn liúdòng de jiǎnshǎo shǐ tāmen fēnsàn tāmen de dàikuǎn hé tóuzī de zīběn suǒyǒu zhě

82、suǒ miànlín de fēngxiǎn. Qícì, zīběn shìchǎng de quánqiú yītǐ huà kěyǐ cùjìn zuì jiā zuòfǎ de gōngsī zhìlǐ, kuàijì guīzé hé fǎlǜ chu

83、25;ntǒng de chuánbò. Dì sān, zīběn quánqiú liúdòng, x</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細內(nèi)容</p><p><b>　　朗讀</b></p><p>　　Zhè zhǒng rènxì

84、;ng kěnéng huì dǎozhì xǔduō fāzhǎn zhōng guójiā de zīběn liúdòng yǒu lìyú duì qítā xíngshì de wàiguó zhíjiē tóuzī, tuīdòng zài yīg

85、è yǐjīng bèi zhèngmíng (jiàn túbiǎo 1) xǔduō nián de qūshì. Wàiguó zhíjiē tóuzī shì sīrén zīběn liúrù chāoguò qítā xíngsh

86、6; de yōuhuì hélǐ de? Běnwén tōngguò huígù zuìjìn jiēshì de lǐlùn hé shízhèng jí qí duì fāzhǎn zhōng guójiā de tóuzī hé zēngz