外文翻譯---當(dāng)?shù)睾康南拗婆c阻礙對(duì)服務(wù)業(yè)外商直接投資的影響

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Impact of Local Content Restrictions and Barriers Against Foreign Direct Investment in Services</p><p>　　The Case of Ka

2、zakhstan’s Accession to the World </p><p>　　Trade Organization</p><p>　　Jesper Jensen and David Tarr</p><p>　　The working party on the accession of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Org

3、anization (WTO) was established on February 6, 1996. Bilateral market access negotiations began in October 1997 and are continuing on the basis of revised offers in goods and services. Since 2004, the accession negotiati

4、ons have acquired increased momentum. A draft report of the working party was prepared by the WTO secretariat in May 2005. Based on this report, the chairman of the working party on the accession of Kazakhstan</p>

5、<p>　　He stated further that progress would not have been possible without key domestic reforms and the enthusiasm of the Kazakh negotiating team. By 2007, some Kazakh officials were (over) optimistically forecasti

6、ng accession by the end of the year.</p><p>　　We document that the Kazakh tariff structure is not highly distorted. On the other hand, barriers to foreign direct investors remain significant in several key b

7、usiness service sectors and are the focus of negotiations between Kazakhstan and the WTO working party. Despite the important role that the rights of multinational investors in business services play in WTO accession neg

8、otiations—and in the Kazakh negotiations in particular—until recently, modelers have been unable to assess the effect o</p><p>　　Local content policies in crude oil and gas are an important aspect of the acc

9、ession negotiations. At issue is whether multinational oil producers that invest in Kazakhstan are encouraged to purchase Kazakh inputs in a manner that is inconsistent with the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)

10、agreement of the WTO. Modeling local content policies requires a modeling framework that distinguishes domestic from foreign firms and gives foreign firms a domestic presence through FDI. Based on the t</p><p&

11、gt;　　We develop a fifty-six-sector, small, open economy comparative static computable general equilibrium model of Kazakhstan, which we believe is appropriate to evaluate the effect of Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO.

12、Our key modeling as-sumptions are as follows. We assume that additional varieties of business services—and those goods that are produced under increasing returns to scale—result in a reduction of the quality-adjusted cos

13、t of their use, according to the Dixit–Stiglitz framework. We als</p><p>　　We estimate that the gains to Kazakhstan from WTO accession, measured as Hicksian equivalent variation, are 6.7 percent of Kazakh co

14、nsumption, or 3.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the medium run; the gains could be as high as 17.5 percent of Kazakh consumption, or 9.7 percent of GDP, in the long run, using our comparative steady-stat

15、e model. We show that the gains from FDI liberalization in services are 4.9 percent of the value of Kazakh consumption, which amounts to over 70 per</p><p>　　Overview of the Model and Key Data</p><

16、;p>　　Overview of the Model Formulation</p><p>　　Our small, open economy (SOE) computable general equilibrium model is based on the model of Jensen et al. (2007). An algebraic formulation of the model may

17、be found in Jensen et al. (2004), which is based on Markusen et al. (2005). Consequently, we describe the model structure only briefly here. Because it is new in this paper, we discuss in more detail how we model local c

18、ontent policies and specialized VAT treatment for the multinationals in the oil and gas sectors. Primary factors include lab</p><p>　　There are fifty-six sectors in the model. Excepting crude oil and natural

19、 gas, the sectors fall into one of three categories (see Table 1). The categories are competitive goods and services sectors; imperfectly competitive goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale; and business se

20、rvices that are produced in Kazakhstan under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. In the imperfectly competitive sectors we allow for Dixit–Stiglitz, Ethier (1982) variety effects, whereby</p>&

21、lt;p>　　In business services, we allow for both cross-border trade and FDI by multinational service providers that choose to establish a presence in Kazakhstan to compete with Kazakh firms directly in the Kazakh market

22、. These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. For multinational firms, the barriers to FDI affect their profitability and entry. Reducing the constraints on FDI induces foreign entry that typi

23、cally leads to productivity gains, because when more varieties of serv</p><p>　　crude Oil and Gas Sector</p><p>　　We view oil and gas as goods produced under increasing returns to scale and impe

24、rfect competition. Unlike other goods in this model, we assume, for obvious reasons in the case of Kazakhstan, that there is FDI in the sector. The modeling of this sector is similar to the modeling of the increasing ret

25、urns to scale services sectors except that several new features have been added to incorporate a treatment of local content policies and specialized VAT treatment for the multinationals in the sector.</p><p>

26、;　　Local content policies encourage multinational oil firms to purchase some share of their inputs locally. The policies are reportedly negotiated on an individual basis as part of the contracts between the oil and gas f

27、irms and the government. Also, we understand that the policies could be characterized as voluntary agreements, whereby the oil and gas firms commit to making an effort to purchase inputs locally and regularly report on t

28、he local content in the contracts that they enter. We are not a</p><p>　　Policies in the sector have offsetting effects on multinational firms’ use of Kazakh inputs. The discriminatory VAT encourages the use

29、 of imported inputs, whereas local content favors Kazakh inputs. Local content requirements imply a distortion that increases the use of domestic inputs beyond the point where the (true) value of its marginal product equ

30、als its cost. In our model, the nonrefundable VAT is incorporated as an ad valorem tax rate applying to all domestic inputs that multinational fir</p><p>　　The modeling of the oil and gas sectors differs fro

31、m other services sectors in two more respects. First, we assume that all firms, domestic and multinational, use sector-specific capital, which is perfectly mobile across all oil and gas firms. This factor reflects that o

32、il and gas are exhaustible resources. Second, we assume national product differentiation (in addition to firm-level product differentiation) to add convexity to the model.</p><p><b>　　Key Data</b>

33、;</p><p>　　Key barriers</p><p>　　We first highlight the key barriers in the business services sectors. See the appendices of Jensen and Tarr (2007) for an elaboration of the barriers and the key

34、 policy objectives.</p><p>　　In telecommunications, there is strong restriction on entry in some areas of services; incumbent operators have excessively long exclusivity rights in areas such as long-distance

35、 and international telephone services and with respect to interconnection for mobile operators; foreign ownership of a company cannot exceed 49 percent; and cross ownership among the incumbents limits competition. The co

36、sts of long-distance telephone services and broadband Internet access are three to six times the costs</p><p>　　In banking, up to the end of 2005, branches of foreign banks were prohibited and banks with for

37、eign participation were limited to a maximum of 50 percent of the aggregate authorized capital of the sector. In addition, banks with foreign participation could be subjected to additional requirements, such as the type

38、of business in which they could engage, reporting procedures, and the makeup of their boards of directors. In transportation services, railroad tariffs differentiate between imports, ex</p><p><b>　　譯

39、 文：</b></p><p>　　當(dāng)?shù)睾康南拗婆c阻礙對(duì)服務(wù)業(yè)外商直接投資的影響</p><p>　　哈薩克斯坦加入世界貿(mào)易組織的案例</p><p>　　哈薩克斯坦申請(qǐng)加入世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）的工作小組成立于1996年2月6日。雙邊市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入談判開始于1997年10月，而且在修改的基礎(chǔ)上提供商品和服務(wù)。自2004年以來(lái)，入世談判已取得進(jìn)展。根據(jù)200

40、5年5月世界貿(mào)易組織秘書處編制的工作小組的報(bào)告草案，工作小組組長(zhǎng)表示，哈入世“邁出了重要一步?！彼€說(shuō)，如果沒(méi)有國(guó)內(nèi)的重要改革和富有激情的哈薩克談判小組的努力，將不可能取得進(jìn)展。2007年，一些哈薩克官員（過(guò)度）樂(lè)觀的預(yù)測(cè)在今年年底前加入。</p><p>　　我們的文件證明，哈薩克關(guān)稅結(jié)構(gòu)并沒(méi)有高度扭曲，另一方面，外國(guó)直接投資的障礙仍然在幾個(gè)關(guān)鍵的服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)部門，是哈薩克斯坦的工作小組和世貿(mào)組織之間談判的重要的焦

41、點(diǎn)?？鐕?guó)投資者在商業(yè)服務(wù)中的的權(quán)利在哈薩克斯坦加入世貿(mào)組織談判中盡管有重要的作用，特別是在哈薩克斯坦的談判中，直到最近，建模一直無(wú)法評(píng)估在商業(yè)服務(wù)的外國(guó)直接投資障礙的自由化的影響。本文遵循最近的Jensen等(2006，2007)的具有創(chuàng)新結(jié)構(gòu)的俄羅斯的模型。也就是說(shuō)，我們對(duì)多部門外國(guó)直接投資服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)障礙的自由化的數(shù)值評(píng)估應(yīng)用一般均衡模型，其中Dixit–Stiglitz (1977)的品種生產(chǎn)力效應(yīng)的影響是至關(guān)重要的。</p&g

42、t;<p>　　本地的石油和天然氣含量政策是加入世貿(mào)組織談判的一個(gè)重要方面。爭(zhēng)議焦點(diǎn)是跨國(guó)石油生產(chǎn)國(guó)在哈薩克斯坦的投資，鼓勵(lì)以哈薩克輸入方式購(gòu)買，是否與世界貿(mào)易組織的貿(mào)易有關(guān)的投資措施(TRIMS)相抵觸。本地含量政策的建模需要一個(gè)建?？蚣?，從外國(guó)公司區(qū)分國(guó)內(nèi)公司，通過(guò)外國(guó)直接投資給外國(guó)公司提供一個(gè)國(guó)內(nèi)的存在?；贕rossman (1981)理論模型，本文創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)在于擴(kuò)大Jensen等（2006，2007）的分析，研究本地

43、含量政策在應(yīng)用的一般均衡模型的影響。我們也使用這個(gè)框架來(lái)檢查哈薩克斯坦正在選擇的政策：對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)石油和天然氣的輸入減免增值稅。這樣做的目的是把國(guó)內(nèi)的投入與原油和天然氣行業(yè)的進(jìn)口放在平等的增值稅基礎(chǔ)上，據(jù)在這些部門的跨國(guó)公司報(bào)道，通過(guò)談判達(dá)成了進(jìn)口投入的增值稅減免。</p><p>　　我們開發(fā)了56個(gè)部門，體積小的開放型經(jīng)濟(jì)模型，可比較靜態(tài)分析，可計(jì)算一般均衡模型，我們認(rèn)為可以恰當(dāng)?shù)脑u(píng)價(jià)哈薩克斯坦加入世界貿(mào)易組織的影

44、響。我們的主要模型假設(shè)如下。我們假定其他品種的服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)，在生產(chǎn)中的報(bào)酬遞增的情況下使用的質(zhì)量調(diào)整成本的降低，根據(jù)Dixit–Stiglitz的框架。我們也假設(shè)商業(yè)服務(wù)的很大一部分需要國(guó)內(nèi)的存在，另一部分就是外商直接投資，作為跨國(guó)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商進(jìn)口，他們決定成立一部分專門的國(guó)內(nèi)存在的資本或勞動(dòng)力，商業(yè)服務(wù)提供國(guó)內(nèi)存在均為不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的公司，而產(chǎn)生了各種各樣的具獨(dú)特競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的服務(wù)企業(yè)。</p><p>　　我們?cè)u(píng)估哈薩克斯坦

45、加入世界貿(mào)易組織的收益，衡量Hicksian的等價(jià)變量，消費(fèi)總額的6.7%，或運(yùn)行中國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的3.7%。收益可能高達(dá)消費(fèi)總額的17.5%，國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的9.7%，從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，利用我們的相對(duì)穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)模型。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)服務(wù)業(yè)外國(guó)直接投資的自由化的收益是消費(fèi)總額的4.9%，金額超過(guò)哈薩克加入世界貿(mào)易組織總收益的70%。這些收益比規(guī)模報(bào)酬不變模型多十倍以上。</p><p><b>　　概述模型及關(guān)鍵數(shù)據(jù)<

46、;/b></p><p><b>　　概述模型公式</b></p><p>　　我們的在Jensen等(2007)的小型開放經(jīng)濟(jì)模型的基礎(chǔ)上的可計(jì)算一般均衡模型?？赡軙?huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)在Jensen等（2004年）模型的代數(shù)制定是基于對(duì)Markusen等（2005年）的。因此，我們?cè)谶@里描述了簡(jiǎn)單的模型結(jié)構(gòu)。因?yàn)樗诒疚闹惺切碌?，我們將更詳?xì)地討論我們?nèi)绾文M本地含量政策和

47、專門處理跨國(guó)公司石油和天然氣行業(yè)的增值稅問(wèn)題。主要因素包括勞動(dòng)力，流動(dòng)資本，在用得盡的資源的能源領(lǐng)域反映出的專業(yè)資本，在不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行業(yè)部門專業(yè)資本，由跨國(guó)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商進(jìn)口的主要投入，反映專業(yè)管理知識(shí)和該公司的技術(shù)。某些行業(yè)的專業(yè)資本的存在，使用非固定的因素意味著規(guī)模報(bào)酬遞減。這些行業(yè)的供給曲線向上傾斜。</p><p>　　模型中有56個(gè)部門。除原油和天然氣部門外，其他部門分到三大類中（見表1）。類別中具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的

48、商品和服務(wù)部門，服從規(guī)模收益遞增的不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的產(chǎn)品，在規(guī)模收益遞增和不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的哈薩克斯坦的商務(wù)服務(wù)。在不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性行業(yè)，我們?cè)试SDixit–Stiglitz, Ethier (1982)的各種影響，由此產(chǎn)生的內(nèi)源性生產(chǎn)力額外的變化，下游行業(yè)生產(chǎn)率的提高，使用了新的變化作為輸入的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　在商業(yè)服務(wù)方面，我們?cè)试S跨境貿(mào)易和跨國(guó)服務(wù)提供商的外國(guó)直接投資選擇建立在哈薩克斯坦，在哈薩克市場(chǎng)與哈薩克斯

49、坦的企業(yè)存在直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。這些服務(wù)的特點(diǎn)是企業(yè)層面的產(chǎn)品差異化。對(duì)于跨國(guó)公司，外國(guó)直接投資的障礙，影響到他們的盈利和進(jìn)入。減少對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的限制，引起外資進(jìn)入，通常會(huì)導(dǎo)致生產(chǎn)率的提高，因?yàn)楫?dāng)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商提供更多的品種，購(gòu)買者可以獲得更多的品種更好的滿足需求。（即Dixit–Stiglitz的品種效應(yīng)）。</p><p><b>　　石油和天然氣部門</b></p><p>

50、;　　我們認(rèn)為，石油和天然氣產(chǎn)品是規(guī)模收益遞增和不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的。不同于在這種模式下的其他商品，我們假設(shè)，哈薩克斯坦的情況的原因是顯而易見的，在該領(lǐng)域的外國(guó)直接投資。這一部門的模型類似規(guī)模收益遞增的模型，除了幾個(gè)新的服務(wù)功能部門已經(jīng)納入該部門，跨國(guó)公司的本地含量政策和增值稅專用待遇。此外，我們認(rèn)為這個(gè)部門的具體因素反映了原油和天然氣儲(chǔ)備的需要。</p><p>　　本地含量政策鼓勵(lì)跨國(guó)石油公司一部分購(gòu)買當(dāng)?shù)卦牧稀?jù)

51、報(bào)道，個(gè)人之間的政策基礎(chǔ)的談判是石油天然氣公司和政府的合同的一部分。此外，據(jù)我們了解這些政策可以作為自愿協(xié)議，據(jù)此，石油和天然氣公司承諾并做出努力，并定期報(bào)告在當(dāng)?shù)刭?gòu)買的投入，他們進(jìn)入需要的本地含量。我們不清楚當(dāng)?shù)氐木唧w含量要求，如要求百分比指定的國(guó)內(nèi)成本投入關(guān)聯(lián)一個(gè)非直接處罰規(guī)定。據(jù)報(bào)道,增值稅政策也在個(gè)人能力上協(xié)商。據(jù)報(bào)道，跨國(guó)石油公司免征進(jìn)口增值稅，但有一些例外，支付購(gòu)買的投入國(guó)內(nèi)的百分之十五左右不能退還增值稅。</p>

52、;<p>　　該部門的政策已抵銷跨國(guó)公司的投入使用效果。歧視性增值稅鼓勵(lì)進(jìn)口投入的使用，而本地含量有利于哈薩克斯坦的投入。當(dāng)?shù)睾恳笠馕吨黾恿藝?guó)內(nèi)投入，其邊際產(chǎn)品（真）值等于它的使用成本。在我們的模型中，不能退還的增值稅合并為從價(jià)稅，適用于所有跨國(guó)公司的國(guó)內(nèi)采購(gòu)的投入。在我們的模型中，不能退還的增值稅合并為從價(jià)稅，適用于所有跨國(guó)公司的國(guó)內(nèi)采購(gòu)的投入。根據(jù)Grossman (1981)的理論模型，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)哈薩克當(dāng)?shù)睾空?/p>

53、策對(duì)跨國(guó)公司的國(guó)內(nèi)投入20%的優(yōu)惠 (補(bǔ)貼) 資金，是跨國(guó)石油企業(yè)的總收入。這些建模假設(shè)意味著，這兩個(gè)政策影響跨國(guó)公司輸入的選擇，但只有增值稅政策涉及的資金轉(zhuǎn)移到政府。</p><p>　　石油和天然氣部門模型不同于其他服務(wù)行業(yè)，有兩個(gè)方面。首先，我們假設(shè)所有的國(guó)內(nèi)和跨國(guó)公司，利用部門特有的資本，這是完全可以在所有的石油和天然氣公司移動(dòng)的。這一因素反映了石油和天然氣是可耗盡資源。第二，我們假設(shè)國(guó)家產(chǎn)品的差異（除了

54、企業(yè)層面產(chǎn)品差異）添加到模型中。</p><p><b>　　關(guān)鍵數(shù)據(jù)</b></p><p>　　關(guān)鍵障礙我們首先強(qiáng)調(diào)在商業(yè)服務(wù)行業(yè)的主要障礙。可以看Jensen and Tarr (2007)的附錄中對(duì)障礙和主要政策的目標(biāo)的詳細(xì)闡述。</p><p>　　在電信行業(yè)，進(jìn)入某些服務(wù)領(lǐng)域具有強(qiáng)烈的限制。主導(dǎo)運(yùn)營(yíng)商在諸如長(zhǎng)途電話和國(guó)際電話服務(wù)具

55、有排他性的權(quán)利，關(guān)于移動(dòng)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的互連上。一個(gè)公司的外資持股不得超過(guò)49%，以及在職人員之間的交叉持股限制了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。長(zhǎng)途電話服務(wù)和寬帶互聯(lián)網(wǎng)接入的費(fèi)用是俄羅斯，選出的歐盟國(guó)家和澳大利亞等國(guó)家的三到六倍。</p><p>　　在銀行業(yè)，截至2005年底，外資銀行分行被禁止和與外國(guó)銀行的參與最多僅限于部門授權(quán)總資本的50%。此外，與外國(guó)銀行的參與可能有附加要求，如它們可以從事的業(yè)務(wù)類型，報(bào)告程序，以及董事會(huì)的組成。在運(yùn)輸