在美國刑法中共犯責(zé)任的精神狀態(tài)要求外文文獻(xiàn)及翻譯

1、蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）1THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAWDue to the inconsistency between the plain language of states' accomplice liability legislation and its respective interpr

2、etation in the state courts, many states' accomplice laws present a confused picture in terms of the law's stance on accomplice liability. No aspect of this law is more complex than that relating to the mental st

3、ate requirement for accomplice liability. Nevertheless, if one engages in a cursory examination of the legal literature, case law, and state legislation concerning the mental state requirement for accomplice liability, e

4、ssentially three approaches surface. These approaches differ in the degree to which they hold an individual culpable for the conduct of another. First, there is the perspective (which is particularly popular in the acade

5、mic community) that favors a very limited, narrow approach whereby accomplice liability is dependent upon a finding that an accused's “purpose [was] to encourage or assist another in the commission of a crime.“'

6、Meanwhile, a second perspective (which the Model Penal Code follows to some extent2) tolerates a more expansive approach whereby an accomplice's liability turns on whether the accomplice harbored the mental state req

7、uired of the substantive crime allegedly aided or abetted.The first approach, asserts that an individual should only be liable for the acts of a principal if that individual acted with the specific intent to promote or a

8、ssist the principal's commission of the crime. This theory holds that a mental state of knowledge or recklessness on the part of an alleged accomplice is insufficient to hold the alleged accomplice culpable. Jurisdic

9、tions following this approach will only hold an alleged accomplice liable for the crimes that the alleged accomplice intended a perpetrator commit. Also, if the perpetrator commits a secondary crime in pursuance of the i

10、ntended crime, the accomplice is not liable for the secondary crime unless the accomplice intended to promote or facilitate this offense as well. So long as the alleged accomplice intended to somehow assist or encourage

11、the principal's criminality, the accomplice is liable even if the substantive crime only requires recklessness or negligence on the part of the principal. Thus, if A loans his gun to B knowing B intends to use it to

12、shoot his neighbor's barking dog, A would not be an accomplice to B's act unless he himself intends that B's neighbor's dog be shot. Likewise, if X gives the keys of her car to Y, who is intoxicated, know

13、ing Y 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）3that do not distinguish between conduct- and result-oriented crimes will hold an individual liable for the conduct of another as long as the individual possessed the statutorily prescribed mental st

14、ate for the substantive crime.' The third approach, which this Article refers to as Category 1I1, is the most expansive of the approaches. States following this approach will hold an actor liable for all the natural

15、and probable consequences of the intended crime. Although some jurisdictions may not use this exact language, these states reject the necessity of proving the accomplice had either the specific intent required by the Cat

16、egory I approach or the statutorily prescribed mental state mandated by the Category II approach. Therefore, if the principal committed a secondary crime in the course of carrying out the target crime even if the accompl

17、ice had no way of knowing or anticipating that an incidental or secondary crime would occur, a court will nonetheless convict the accomplice of the incidental crime if the court determines it to be a natural and probable

18、 consequence of the intended crime. Now the hypothetical above become really interesting. Assume after B shoots his neighbor's barking dog with A's gun, the neighbor, C, becomes angry and engages B in a physical

19、altercation during which B shoots and injures C. If we agree the altercation and resultant injury suffered by C are natural and probable consequences of A's arming B while knowing of B's intentions, A would be li

20、able as an accomplice for B's battery of C. In the example where X gives her keys to the intoxicated Y (which itself is a violation of the state's motor vehicle code), now assume Y not only recklessly becomes inv

21、olved in a fatal vehicle crash but also that Y collides with a gasoline truck, which explodes and causes a nearby building to catch fire. If we agree that when X gives the intoxicated Y the keys to her car she should be

22、held accountable for all natural and probable consequences, it is arguable that X is liable not only for reckless homicide if Y is involved in a fatal collision while driving X's car but also for criminal damage to p

23、roperty or perhaps arson. Or, worse yet, if a firefighter or building occupant dies in the fire, it might even be asserted that X is liable for manslaughter.Members of the academic community, including Professors Wayne L

24、a Fave, Joshua Dressier, and Audrey Rogers, have strongly criticized the Category III approach because it holds an individual to the same culpability as a principal for a crime the commission of which the accomplice had