反腐敗政策和方案外文翻譯

1、中文 中文 3023 字出處： 出處： General Information, 2000, volume 47(2):133-136(25).原文 Anti-corruption Policies and ProgramsAuthor: Jeff Huther ,Anwar Shah The Executive Board of the World Bank approved its anti-corruption strategy

2、in September 1997. The strategy defined corruption as the “use of public office for private gain“ and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1 Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects 2

3、Helping countries that request Bank assistance for corruption 3 Mainstreaming a concern for corruption in Bank's work 4 Lending active support to international efforts to address corruption Following the adoption of

4、this strategy, concrete steps to prevent fraud and corruption in Bank projects have included: the introduction of a confidential hotline, tightening of procurement guidelines, intensive audits of projects, and support fo

5、r improving procurement systems in client countries. Mainstreaming a concern for corruption has taken place through the Bank's economic and sector work which provides the analytic basis for country assistance strateg

6、y documents which, in turn, underlie the Bank's lending programs. Of the analytical tools used in economic and sector work, institutional reviews, country financial accountability assessments and public expenditure r

7、eviews offer substantial scope for addressing the governance failures that permit wide spread corruption, country procurement assessment reports identify sources of corruption in procurement and recommend remedies, count

8、ry economic memoranda can be used for relatively quick assessments of corruption sources, and country assistance evaluations may highlight areas where corruption concerns are undermining Bank work. In addition to economi

9、c and sector work, all country assistance strategy documents are now required to diagnose the state of governance and the risks that corruption poses to Bank projects. The Comprehensive Development Framework unveiled in

10、1999 underscores the importance of governance and public sector institutional reform issues in the Bank's development assistance dialogue. The World Bank Institute has initiated courses on corruption for developing c

11、ountry officials and conducted surveys on service delivery. The Bank has also put a greater emphasis on institutional reform and capacity building through its lending program. Bank assistance for international efforts to

12、 curtail corruption has been mainly in the form of sponsorship of major conferences, dissemination notes and support for the adoption of the 1999 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Intern

13、ational Business Transactions. The impact of corruption on public service delivery performance and poverty alleviation is widely recognized. A wide consensus has also recently emerged that corruption is a symptom of fail

14、ed governance see World Bank 2000 and hence curtailing sometimes corrupt interests so businesses operating in a competitive environment, free of state financing, and with adequate governance safeguards may or may not eme

15、rge from privatization. Increasing the Probability of Paying Penalties: Increasing the probability of penalties is a three step process: detection, prosecution, and exacting the penalty. In cases where corruption is exto

16、rtion for jobs that should be done as a matter of public service, improved detection is straight-forward - increase citizen participation in the electoral process, establish citizens' charters specifying expected ser

17、vice standards, allow media independence, make interactions between the public and private sectors more transparent, and strengthen the rule of law so that both individuals and the media do not fear reprisals. Increasing

18、 the Magnitude of Penalties: There are corrupt societies which have stiff penalties for corruption, suggesting the magnitude of penalties may not be a strong deterrent to corruption. In general, people may not respond mu

19、ch differently to, say, an increase in penalties from five to ten years in prison, as Malaysia did in 1997 with no discernible change in perceptions of corruption as measured by Transparency International. In some countr

20、ies, however, the legislation setting penalties may be ambiguous or penalties may be set at the discretion of judges. In either case, a country may discourage corruption by clarifying corruption penalties. While the Bank

21、 may provide assistance in clarifying legislation, setting criminal penalties is outside the scope of its work. In cases where corruption is in the form of bribes to alter the normal course of government, increased trans

22、parency of government operations reduces the opportunity for undetected corruption e.g. clearly defined bidding processes, open judicial proceedings, strict rules on gift-giving and increasing the number of competitors r

23、educes the potential gains while increasing scrutiny of bidding processes. Prosecution requires judicial independence and transparency. For the judicial system to exact penalties, it must have sufficient resources and in

24、dependence. To the extent that penalties are reputational, media independence is a crucial element to deterrence. While a more complete treatment would include the incentives of private sector agents who interact with pu

25、blic officials, policies affecting private sector incentives are largely outside the scope of Bank work. Policies which increase the magnitude of penalties or the expected probability of paying penalties, however, are li

26、kely to have similar effects on the private sector as they do on the public sector. The focus on public officials excludes consideration of policies, typically in countries with low levels of corruption, that penalize pr

27、ivate sector efforts to participate in corruption in other countries. These policies are potentially relevant to anti-corruption efforts, but are outside the scope of our framework and most Bank work. In terms of domesti

28、c policies, we believe that the focus on public officials is appropriate even if well-designed policies may reduce the incentives of the private sector to engage in corruption. The argument is that a goverunent which can

29、not influence the incentives of its own officials is unlikely to be able to reduce private sector incentives to engage in corruption. In the formulation above, an official's income does not have an effect on whether

30、or not to engage in corrupt activities. Two concerns have been raised with this approach. One is that officials paid less than subsistence income are forced to undertake corrupt activities to survive, the second is that,