pay enough, don't pay too much or don't pay at all the impact of bonus intensity on job satisfaction.【外文翻譯】

1、原文二：原文二：PayEnoughDontPayTooMuchDontPayatAllTheImpactofBonusIntensityonJobSatisfaction.PouliakasKonstantinosTheprincipalagentmodelwithitsconvincingillustrationofthetradeoffthatarisesbetweenriskincentiveprovisionwhenattemp

2、tingtoaligntheconflictinginterestsoftwocontractingpartiesremainscentralfourunderstingofthecompensationstrategiesemployedbyfirms(Mirlees1976Holmstrom1979).Accdingtothestardmodelofagencytheytheintroductionoffinancialincent

3、ivesaspartofanagent’sremunerationpackagewillincreasehisherproductivityasitisassumedthatindividualsderiveutilityfromincomewhilsttheexertionofefftentailsautilitycost.Imptantlyiftheadditionaldisutilityofhigherefftiscompensa

4、tedbyanadequatewagepremiumanimplicationofthetheyisthatthemarginalutilitiesofwkersunderfixedvariablecompensationschemesshouldbeequalizedinthelongrun.Whatthisimpliesisthatthereshouldbenodifferencebetweenthejobsatisfactiono

5、femployeesreceivingmoaryincentivesthoseonnoncontingentpaymentarrangementsotherthingsequal.Theaboveconclusionhasbeendisputedbyapsychological(increasinglyeconomics)literaturewhichhasstressedthattheincpationofnonpecuniarymo

6、tivesintotheeconomicparadigmsuchasthedesirefreciprocationfengagingininterestingtaskshasimptantimplicationsfanindividual’smotivationjobsatisfaction(Deci1971Lepperetal.1973DeciRyan1985Frey19861997Kreps1997FreyJegen2001).In

7、additionithasbeenarguedthat‘wrong’moaryincentivesmayincitedysfunctionalbehaviouralresponsesbyemployees(HolmstromMilgrom1991Baker1992Prendergast1999)haveadetrimentaleffectonemployeemalejobsecurityviatheinequitableriskypay

8、distributionsthatariseasaconsequence(Bakeretal.1988).Oncethesemechanismsaretakenintoconsiderationitbecomesclearthat2002BlanchflowerOswald2004VanPraagFerreriCarbonell2004EPICURUS2007Frey2008)hasemphasizedthatmeasuresofjob

9、satisfactionaresignificantpredictsofemployeebehaviour[e.g.quits(Freeman1978)absenteeism(Clegg1983)wkerproductivity(Judgeetal.2001)].Itfollowsthatunderstingtheinfluenceofmoaryincentivesonjobsatisfactionisimptantgiventhatt

10、hecompositionofanemployee’sremunerationpackageisanintegralelementofhisheroverallwkingconditions.OtheraspectsofPRPmaynohelessdiminishproductivitywkersatisfaction.Ithasbeenillustratedthatwronglydevisedcompensationschemesca

11、nhavecounterproductiveconsequencesastheymayencouragewkersto‘game’thecompensationsystemtotheiradvantagebymultitasking(Baker1992)byengaginginrentseekingbehaviouraimedatinfluencingthesubjectiveevaluationsoflinemanagers(Pren

12、dergast1999).Holmstrom’s(1982)seminalpaperhasalsoshowedthatutilizingteamproductionincentiveschemes(suchasprofitsharing)maydiluteindividualperfmanceasaresultoffreeriding.Inthefaceofevidencesuggestingthatthejobsatisfaction

13、ofemployeesisintrinsicallylinkedtotheirrelativepaystatus(ClarkOswald1996Clark1999FerreriCarbonell2005Clarketal.2008[a])thedemalizingdispersionvariabilityinwagesthatensuesfromPRPschemesisalsolikelytoaffectattitudestowkina

14、negativefashion.Furthermeithasoftenbeenclaimedthatfinancialincentivesunderminecollabationteamwkemphasizethepowerasymmetrybetweenmanagementthewkfcereduceemployeerisktakinginnovation(Kohn1993).Animptantcommonelementoftheab

15、oveexperimentsisthat‘‘small’’incentivesarelikelytoexertanegativeeffectonbehaviour(withdiscontinuityclosetozero)whilefhighpoweredrewards(punishments)thestardpriceeffectisexpectedtoprevail.4Thispredictionhasbeencrobatedint