經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化、環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)、公司搬遷【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Economic integration , environmental harmonization and firm relocation</p><p>　　Material Source: PATRIK T

2、. HULTBERG Kalamazoo College </p><p>　　Author: EDWARD B.BARBIER</p><p>　　ABSTRACT :As different regions of the world integrate ,many questions arise regarding the effect on the location

3、of firms．A firm’s decision to relocate operations when its home country integrates with another region is in general influenced by the relative marginal cost of production between the regions ,the cost of relocation ,the

4、 cost of exporting its good across borders as well as the relative size of the two regions．Expect for market size ,these variables crucially depend upon the degress o</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p&

5、gt;　　The aim of the following paper is to explore how economic integration, combined with environment policy’ harmonization’ , may affect the plant location decisions of competing firms．This topic is of growing importanc

6、e in the policy debates surrounding economic integration．One side of the debate argues that ,if two countries agree to greater economic cooperation but do not adopt the same environmental policy framework and regulations

7、, then ‘dirtier’ industries will relocate their plants to the cou</p><p>　　In the analysis and discussion presented in this paper, we hope to resolve some of the issues arising from this policy debate on int

8、egration, environmental harmonization, and firm relocation ．To do this ,we employ the standard modeling framework for analyzing economic integration, consisting of a world with two countries(or region),with one firm in e

9、ach country(region)．Within this model ,we analyze three possible scenarios, or levels, of economic integration, which we characterize as bilateral t</p><p>　　Thus ,we explore whether a firm in America should

10、 relocate in response to NAFTA given our three distinct degrees of integration．In the case of a bilateral trade agreement ,we predict that the US firms will indeed relocate to Mexico as export（tariff）costs decline and th

11、e countries grow．This outcome is magnified if partial economic integration were to take place; lower export costs combined with foreign investment encouragement further induce US firms to leave America．However ,if enviro

12、nment harmo</p><p>　　Result that are quantitatively similar to the NAFTA case of US firms moving to Mexico apply to the case of whether a firm within the European Union should relocate to the CEEC region．How

13、ever ,this is not true in the case of a CEEC firm relocating to existing European Union(EU) countries, which some models of European Union enlargement suggest is a likely scenario (Zhu and van Ireland,2001)．Applying our

14、set-up to the location that it is unlikely to relocate within the present EU borders ,unless t</p><p>　　The outline of the paper is as follows．In the next section, we discuss further the prevailing views in

15、the debate on economic integration, environmental policy harmonization, and firm relocation．In section 3,we develop our analytical model and derive the conditions for the optimal location choices of a representative firm

16、 under different economic integration scenarios．Section 4 and 5 introduce our NAFTA and Europe Union applications respectively, and through these examples demonstrate how bilate</p><p>　　2．The current policy

17、 debate on economic integration and environmental harmonization</p><p>　　In recent years, increased regional economic integration between trading partners has resulted in calls for ‘harmonization’ of environ

18、mental policy; that is, a country that has adopted stricter environmental standards and regulation may accept greater economic integration with another country only if the latter agrees to adopt more stringent environmen

19、tal policies．The reasons for this concern are twofold ．Environmentalists worry that the increased trade liberalization accompanying economic integ</p><p>　　However, other maintain that the case for harmonizi

20、ng environmental standards and regulations as a precondition for greater economic integration is overstated． Review of empirical evidence suggests that there is not strong evidence that environmental regulations per se l

21、ead to reduced international competitiveness and firm relocation abroad (Beghin et al．1996;Levinson,1996) ．The main reason is that in most advanced economies the cost of complying with environmental standards by industry

22、 are rela</p><p>　　As one commentator on NAFTA has argued ,’if low environmental standards were a significant plant-sitting incentive ,there should be many identifiable cases of American companies moving to

23、Mexico for that reason in the 1980s,when regulations were easier and enforcement was even spottier．But there aren't’”(Orme,1996;162-163)</p><p>　　In fact, there is some empirical evidence that stringent

24、adherence to environmental policy harmonization could undermine some of the welfare gain from greater economic integration．A general equilibrium analysis of the enlargement of the European Union to include some Central E

25、astern European countries suggests that, if both regions try to integrate economically while simultaneously achieving the same level of emissions reductions ,the overall utility of the expanded EU will be lower than if o

26、nly</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化、環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)、公司搬遷</p><p>　　資料來源：PATRIK T. HULTBERG Kalamazoo College 作者：EDWARD B.BARBIER</p><p>　

27、　摘要：作為世界上不同地區(qū)的整合，許多問題就出現(xiàn)在關(guān)于公司的選址。當(dāng)一個(gè)公司決定其本國與其他地區(qū)的整合時(shí)，一般都受到了區(qū)域間的相對(duì)邊際成本，搬遷費(fèi)用，貨物跨越國界的出口成本以及兩區(qū)域的相對(duì)大小的影響。除了這市場(chǎng)規(guī)模，至關(guān)重要的是取決于經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的程度，從最簡(jiǎn)單的雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)議， 到為外國直接投資提供更簡(jiǎn)便手續(xù)和便宜的價(jià)格，再到完全經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化。 我們建立一個(gè)探討集成在應(yīng)用程序上兩個(gè)方面說明的模型：美國和墨西哥的北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定下，中歐和歐洲

28、國家和歐洲聯(lián)盟。</p><p><b>　　1 簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　下文的目的是探討如何使經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化與環(huán)境政策相協(xié)調(diào)，這將會(huì)影響競(jìng)爭(zhēng)工廠選址的決策。這個(gè)主題是圍繞日益重要的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的政策的爭(zhēng)議。爭(zhēng)論的一方認(rèn)為，如果兩個(gè)國家同意更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作，但不采用相同的環(huán)境政策和法規(guī)框架，從而污染較大的行業(yè)將會(huì)把他們的工廠遷到環(huán)境政策較寬松的地方。與此相反，其他人

29、認(rèn)為，實(shí)際上用環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和法規(guī)以避免的污染避風(fēng)港＇是夸大了法規(guī)的作用，而其實(shí)上可能破壞環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)的區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的好處。</p><p>　　在分析和討論，本文提出，我們希望能解決一些整合的政策爭(zhēng)辯，環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)政策辯論與企業(yè)搬遷的問題。要做到這一點(diǎn)，我們使用了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)模型框架，分析經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化，世界與兩國(地區(qū))，一個(gè)國家(地區(qū))的一個(gè)公司。在這個(gè)模型中，我們分析三種可能的方案，或經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化水平，我們定性為雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定，部分

30、經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化和完全一體化。只有在充分整合兩國的情況并同意＂和諧＂的完全相同的環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。通過數(shù)值模擬的方法，對(duì)兩種模型應(yīng)用于我們的政策背景：(ⅰ)更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化與美國和墨西哥在北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定下，和(ⅱ)歐洲聯(lián)盟的擴(kuò)大，包括中歐和東歐國家</p><p>　　因此，我們探討是否應(yīng)在美國公司賦予給我們的三個(gè)不同程度的一體化應(yīng)對(duì)北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。 作為出口的雙邊案（關(guān)稅）成本的下降和增長(zhǎng)的國家。在一項(xiàng)雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)議，我們

31、預(yù)測(cè)，美國公司將搬遷到墨西哥以降低出口關(guān)稅費(fèi)用和加快國家的成長(zhǎng)。這一成果被放大，如果局部經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化被發(fā)生；降低出口成本和外商投資成本，進(jìn)一步促使美國公司離開美國． 然而，如果環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)下取得的區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化，我們不希望看到這樣的公司，盡管美國子公司可以建立在墨西哥。因此，環(huán)境政策的協(xié)調(diào)程度是最終影響美國公司的的關(guān)鍵因素。</p><p>　　結(jié)果，類似于NAFTA情況進(jìn)行定量的美國公司搬到墨西哥案件適用于，歐盟公司

32、是否應(yīng)該遷移到CEEC地區(qū)。然而，這并不是真實(shí)的CEEC公司搬遷到現(xiàn)有的歐盟(EU)國家，這個(gè)可能是一些歐盟國家擴(kuò)大的事實(shí)(Zhu and van Ireland，2001)。利用我們?cè)O(shè)置的位置， 這是不太可能搬遷至目前歐盟邊界的，除非環(huán)保政策的CEEC地區(qū)納入了歐盟的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。有趣的是，如果她的目的是為了提高CEEC地區(qū)的產(chǎn)量，同時(shí)降低關(guān)稅壁壘和維護(hù)相關(guān)的環(huán)境的相對(duì)成本是可能達(dá)到的。但是，如果目標(biāo)是改善歐洲環(huán)境，那么相反的政策選擇是必要的

33、，保持關(guān)稅壁壘和協(xié)調(diào)環(huán)境政策． 同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)這兩個(gè)目標(biāo)的可能有點(diǎn)困難。</p><p>　　本文的大綱如下。在下一節(jié)里，我們將討論在討論經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化、環(huán)境政策協(xié)調(diào)，與公司搬遷。在第三節(jié)中，我們發(fā)展我們的分析模型，并得出不同經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的情況下為一個(gè)代表公司的最佳位置選擇的條件。第4和第5分別介紹我們的北美自由貿(mào)易區(qū)和歐洲聯(lián)盟，并通過這些例子說明雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定和局部的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化，而不是充分與環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化，如何影響公司的

34、行為。第6節(jié)總結(jié)了主要的分析結(jié)果和回顧主要政策問題。</p><p>　　2 關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化和環(huán)境的協(xié)調(diào)現(xiàn)行政策辯論</p><p>　　近年來，加強(qiáng)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的貿(mào)易伙伴之間造成的＇統(tǒng)一＇的環(huán)保政策要求，也就是說，一個(gè)已經(jīng)通過了嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和法規(guī)的國家可以接受另一個(gè)更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的國家，只有在后者同意向國家采取更加嚴(yán)格的環(huán)保政策。對(duì)這一問題的原因有兩個(gè)方面。環(huán)保人士擔(dān)心這將伴隨經(jīng)濟(jì)

35、一體化貿(mào)易自由化將開放國內(nèi)市場(chǎng)，也將伴隨著環(huán)境破壞加快。</p><p>　　這是一個(gè)問題往往被提出關(guān)于歐盟和東歐國家更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的可能性。此外，商業(yè)和勞工權(quán)益的維護(hù)，國內(nèi)企業(yè)將搬遷工廠到國外做為＇污染＇避風(fēng)港＇，或關(guān)閉在應(yīng)對(duì)國外競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，減少應(yīng)對(duì)繁重的環(huán)保法規(guī)，從而降低生產(chǎn)成本。這種觀點(diǎn)經(jīng)常用來表達(dá)相對(duì)于美國和墨西哥的北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定下的整合。上述觀點(diǎn)的支持者從實(shí)證研究表明，實(shí)證研究；污染密集型科技產(chǎn)業(yè)在發(fā)展中

36、國家較為普遍，而這些行業(yè)的出口一直在下降，而工業(yè)化國家在發(fā)展中國家（Low and Yeats，1992；Lucat et al，1992）。他們還涉及到從美國提供的環(huán)境法規(guī)搬遷效應(yīng)的證據(jù)。（Nordstrom and Vaughn，1999）．因此，越來越多的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化與環(huán)境和諧被看作是必要的補(bǔ)充，特別是為了阻止威脅公司的搬遷或不公平的外國企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。</p><p>　　然而，其他觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和法規(guī)作為

37、一個(gè)更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的先決條件的這一說法過于夸大。經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)的審查表明，沒有強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù)表明本身的環(huán)保法規(guī)導(dǎo)致國際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，減少國外公司搬遷（Beghin et al．1996；Levinson，1996）。主要的原因是，在大多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的行業(yè)遵守環(huán)境與符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的成本對(duì)于成產(chǎn)成來說相對(duì)比較小。例如，在美國，加權(quán)平均比率的環(huán)境成本輸出1988年百分之0．54在所有行業(yè)，具有最高的比為百分三在水泥行業(yè)(Low ，1992)。為一位評(píng)論員在北美

38、自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定中認(rèn)為，如果低的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是工廠一個(gè)重要的選址獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)應(yīng)該有很多美國公司搬到墨西哥，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因，在20世紀(jì)80年代，當(dāng)法規(guī)比較寬松，甚至不容易實(shí)行。但也有例外（Orme，1996；162-163）</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，有一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明嚴(yán)格遵守環(huán)境政策協(xié)調(diào)可能破壞獲益更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的福利。以歐洲聯(lián)盟的擴(kuò)大一般均衡分析，包括一些中東歐國家的建議，如果試圖整合這兩個(gè)地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)，同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)減排同一水平，