財務(wù)報告和披露規(guī)則的經(jīng)濟后果回顧和對未來研究的建議【外文翻譯】

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　題 目 論財務(wù)報表列報的改革 </p><p>　　專 業(yè) 會 計 學(xué) </p

2、><p>　　外文題目 Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation :A Review and Suggestion for Future Research</p><p>　　外文出處 SOCAIL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK </p>&l

3、t;p>　　外文作者 Christian Leuz Peter D.Wysocki </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosur

4、e Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research*</p><p><b>　　Abstract </b></p><p>　　This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic consequence

5、s of financial reporting and disclosure regulation. We integrate theoretical and empirical studies from accounting, economics, finance and law in order to contribute to the cross-fertilization of these fields. We provide

6、 an organizing framework that identifies firm-specific (micro-level) and market-wide (macro-level) costs and benefits of firms? reporting and disclosure activities and then use this framework t</p><p>　　Thre

7、e recent trends have spurred the debate about financial reporting and disclosure regulations around the world. First, international financial crises and corporate scandals often bring about securities regulation reforms

8、and greater reporting and disclosure requirements. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Enron debacle in the U.S., and the recent credit market crisis are but a few important examples. In the aftermath of these events

9、, regulators and policy makers have called for improved </p><p>　　Despite the importance of corporate transparency as a recurring policy issue, there is (i) limited research on the costs and benefits of fina

10、ncial reporting and disclosure regulation, (ii) few attempts to systematically organize the key economic principles of and empirical findings on this type of regulation, and (iii) little guidance on important unanswered

11、questions about the economic consequences of regulating financial reporting and corporate disclosure. </p><p>　　This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic consequences of fin

12、ancial reporting and disclosure regulation, with a particular emphasis on recent research advances in the literature. We integrate theoretical and empirical studies from accounting, economics, finance and law in order to

13、 contribute to the cross-fertilization of these fields. </p><p>　　Generally speaking, our survey finds a paucity of evidence on market-wide and aggregate economic and social consequences of reporting and dis

14、closure regulation, rather than the consequences of individual firms? accounting and disclosure choices. Until recently, most of the literature focuses on managers? voluntary disclosure and financial reporting choices.3

15、These studies provide important insights into the nature of the private costs and benefits of voluntary reporting and disclosure choices an</p><p>　　2. Theory of Corporate Disclosure and Reporting Regulation

16、</p><p>　　In this section, we outline the theory of firms? disclosure choices and the theory of disclosure regulation. We use a framework that first identifies possible firm-specific (micro-economic) and mar

17、ket-wide (macro-economic) costs and benefits of firms? disclosure activities in the absence of regulation. We then overlay the potential effects of disclosure and reporting regulation. Finally, we give some consideration

18、 to the question of how to mandate disclosures, i.e., the mechanism and at which le</p><p>　　Current theories typically focus on direct capital market outcomes of firms? disclosure activities. These market o

19、utcomes include liquidity, cost of capital and firm valuation.5 Arguably, the firm-specific benefit of disclosure best supported by theory is the effect on market liquidity (see also, Verrecchia, 2001). At its core is th

20、e insight that information asymmetries among investors introduce adverse selection into share markets. Uninformed or less informed investors have to worry about tradi</p><p>　　This form of price protection w

21、hen buying or selling shares introduces a bid-ask spread into secondary share markets.7 Similarly, information asymmetry and adverse selection reduce the number of shares that uninformed investors are willing to trade. B

22、oth effects reduce the liquidity of share markets, i.e., the ability of investors to quickly buy or sell shares at low cost and with little price impact. </p><p>　　Corporate disclosure can mitigate the adver

23、se selection problem and increase market liquidity by leveling the playing field among investors (Verrecchia, 2001). Its effect is two-fold. First, more information in the public domain makes it harder and more costly fo

24、r traders to become privately informed. As a result, fewer investors are likely to be privately informed, which reduces the probability of trading with a better informed counter party. Second, more disclosure reduces the

25、 uncertainty abou</p><p>　　An important question is whether and how these effects map into firm value or the cost of capital. Illiquidity and bid-ask spreads essentially impose (out-of-pocket) trading costs

26、on investors, for which investors need to be compensated in equilibrium. Thus, the required rate of return of a security increases by its per-period transaction costs (e.g., Constantinides, 1986; Amihud and Mendelson, 19

27、86). In addition, adverse selection can distort investors? trading decisions and result in inefficie</p><p>　　In addition, information asymmetry and adverse selection in primary share markets can reduce the

28、offering price and lead to underpricing. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that a firm may be willing to pass up profitable investment opportunities if the firm has to issue new securities to finance the investment and inform

29、ation is asymmetrically distributed managers and outside investors. </p><p>　　2.2. Firm-Specific Costs of Corporate Disclosures</p><p>　　The direct costs of corporate disclosures, including the

30、preparation, certification and dissemination of accounting reports, are conceptually straightforward. However, as illustrated by the recent debate about the economic consequences of SOX (e.g., Wall Street Journal, 2/10/2

31、004; Ribstein, 2005), these direct costs can be substantial, especially considering the opportunity costs of those involved in the disclosure process. Moreover, fixed disclosure costs lead to economies of scale and can m

32、ake</p><p>　　Disclosures can also have indirect costs because information provided to capital market participants can also be used by other parties (e.g., competitors, labor unions, regulators, tax authoriti

33、es, etc.). For example, detailed information about line-of-business profitability can reveal proprietary information to competitors (e.g., Feltham et al., 1992; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996). The fact that other parties may

34、use public information to the disclosing firm,s disadvantage can dampen its disclosure</p><p>　　In summary, there are numerous direct and indirect reporting and disclosure costs, which in turn are likely to

35、make the optimal amount of disclosure specific to each firm.</p><p>　　出處：http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105398 </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　財務(wù)報告

36、和披露規(guī)則的經(jīng)濟后果：回顧和對未來研究的建議</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文研究關(guān)于財務(wù)報告和披露規(guī)則的經(jīng)濟后果的理論和實驗資料。我們?nèi)诤狭藭?、?jīng)濟、融資和法律的理論和實驗研究，希望有助于這些領(lǐng)域間的相互溝通。我們提供了定義具有企業(yè)特性（微觀層面）和廣泛市場特性（宏觀層面），列示和披露企業(yè)活動的成本和收益的組織框架，然后，用這個框

37、架來討論規(guī)范這些活動以及從資料中組織這些關(guān)鍵內(nèi)涵的潛在成本和收益。我們的研究強調(diào)重要的未被回答的問題以及總結(jié)對未來研究的多條建議。</p><p>　　最近的三個趨勢促使了有關(guān)財務(wù)報告和信息披露的爭論。第一，金融危機和公司丑聞會引起證券改革和披露要求的提高。一些重要的例子如下：1997年的亞洲金融危機，美國安然公司的倒閉以及最近的信貸危機。這些事件發(fā)生以后，政策制定者要求提高公司的透明度，增強監(jiān)視力度，并根據(jù)披露

38、要求來改變重要的會計政策。第二，證券交易所和來自很多國家的會計準(zhǔn)則，已經(jīng)采用國際財務(wù)報告準(zhǔn)則來達到會計準(zhǔn)則“協(xié)調(diào)”和“接軌”的目標(biāo)。第三，關(guān)于美國資本市場競爭力和資本市場日益國際化的爭論是一個全球性的問題。盡管公司透明度是一個政策性問題，但研究也限制財務(wù)報告的成本和收益，以及披露管理；很少有人試圖系統(tǒng)地研究這種類型的準(zhǔn)則中重要的經(jīng)濟原理和實證發(fā)現(xiàn)；對那些有關(guān)財務(wù)報告和披露的經(jīng)濟后果中的重要問題很少有指導(dǎo)意見。</p>&l

39、t;p>　　一般來說，我們的調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)關(guān)于市場范圍和經(jīng)濟總體及報告和信息披露監(jiān)管的社會后果，而不是個別公司的會計和信息披露選擇的后果的證據(jù)很少，直到最近，絕大多數(shù)的文獻才專注于管理者自愿性信息披露和財務(wù)報告選擇。這些研究提出了關(guān)于私人成本本質(zhì)和自愿性報告和信息披露選擇的好處的重要見解，并在此意義上，提供了微觀基礎(chǔ)。然而，這些研究關(guān)于總體可取性，經(jīng)濟效率或者報告和信息披露監(jiān)管的總體結(jié)果幾乎沒有提出見解。另一方面，出現(xiàn)了在不同監(jiān)管制度作

40、用下國際研究分歧的混亂和監(jiān)管變化的經(jīng)濟后果，如公平披露監(jiān)管和薩班斯法案。我們在我們的調(diào)查中綜合了這些研究。然而，仍然有許多懸而未決的問題，特別是，（i）為什么披露監(jiān)管是這么普通；(ii)動態(tài)性和(iii)監(jiān)管過程；(iv)披露監(jiān)管的實際和宏觀經(jīng)濟結(jié)果，(v) 與其他法規(guī)的互補性，(vi)提供不完善執(zhí)法的最佳形式；和(vii) 監(jiān)管競爭的問題。我們討論這些懸而未決的問題，并完成我們在這些領(lǐng)域與未來研究建議調(diào)查。</p>&l

41、t;p>　　公司法人關(guān)于披露和報告的管理。在這些領(lǐng)域，我們概述公司的理論“披露的選擇和披露規(guī)律的管理的理論。我們利用一種框架，首先定義一種公司特權(quán)的可能（微觀經(jīng)濟）和市場寬度（宏觀經(jīng)濟）對公司的好處”對披露活動管理的缺乏。然后我們覆蓋了會計報告和披露潛在的作用。最終，我們關(guān)心的問題是如何授權(quán)披露，機制處在什么樣的水平和如何實施準(zhǔn)則。</p><p>　　公司的獨特性和市場寬度的作用與評估管理披露和報告的經(jīng)濟

42、后果有關(guān)。前者比較重要是因為公司特有的支出和收入的匯合，自愿披露對公司有利的信息，看這些信息是否增加公司的價值。然而，僅僅自愿披露純收益不是強制披露的補充，因為假若這樣，一個公司已經(jīng)獎勵自愿提供信息（羅絲等，1979）.這樣，就可以就定位公司的收入在哪里超過支出，沒有明確指出需要的規(guī)則。不幸的，有關(guān)披露和報告錯誤的反映公司的利潤的爭論，是自愿披露的選擇而不是準(zhǔn)則效果的集合。然而，公司特有的披露與管理的爭論仍然有關(guān)如果（1）他們披露自然的

43、利潤和支出，（2）他們告訴我們強制性的披露如何區(qū)別的影響公司的（包括關(guān)聯(lián)方的交易），（3）他們也幫助我們預(yù)測公司可能進行戰(zhàn)略或也會帶到避免或者反對該規(guī)定提出了在企業(yè)中的不同作用。市場寬度影響公司，披露(規(guī)則的缺乏)都是相關(guān)的因為他們抓住了公司忽視披露的收益和支出或者沒有完全被感知當(dāng)他們決定個人披露的決定。了解這些市場寬度和外部效應(yīng)提供了收入和費用的基本定義和強制實施法人的披露和財務(wù)報告。</p><p>　　目前

44、的理論特別注重企業(yè)披露活動在資本市場的直接后果。這些市場后果包括流動資金、資本成本和公司價值。有證據(jù)表明，理論最支持的公司披露收益是影響市場流動性。它的核心是投資者間的信息不對稱會是否進入股票市場做出不同選擇。沒有信息或信息不足的投資不得不擔(dān)心他們與私人或消息靈通的投資者間的交易。結(jié)果是，沒有信息的投資者會以他們?yōu)楸苊庑畔⒊湓５耐顿Y者間交易的損失而愿意以更低（更高）的價格買入（或賣出）。價格調(diào)節(jié)反應(yīng)了與信息靈通的投資者間交易的可能性以及

45、這些投資者擁有潛在信息的優(yōu)勢。這種在買賣股票時的價格保護形式導(dǎo)致了股票二級市場出價-詢價的價差。同意地，信息不對稱和選擇多樣性減少了信息不足的投資愿意交易股票的數(shù)量。這些影響都會降低股票市場的流動性。</p><p>　　企業(yè)披露能夠緩和多種選擇問題并通過投資者間投資層次的劃分增加市場流動性。效果是兩面的。首先，公共領(lǐng)域的信息越多，交易者越難或者要花費越多的成本使自己獲得更深層的信息。結(jié)果是，更少的投資者可能獲得

46、私密的信息，這會降低了信息充足的投資者間交易的可能性。其次，更多的披露會降低公司價值的不確定性，者反過來又會減少信息充足的投資者可能擁有的潛在信息優(yōu)勢。二者均會降低沒有信息的投資者的價格保護程度，因此增加股票市場流動性。</p><p>　　一個重要的問題是，這些影響是否以及如何映入公司價值或資本成本。流動性差以及出價-詢價的價差從根本上增加了投資者的交易成本，這是投資者必須在均衡中得到補償?shù)?。因此，證券的投資回

47、報率會因為每期的交易成本的增加而增加。此外，截然不同的選擇會打亂投資者的交易決定且降低效率，因此，投資者需要得到補償?shù)馁Y本分配成本導(dǎo)致了更高的投資 回報率或者是資本成本。</p><p>　　更重要的是，截然相反的選擇問題和二級市場的交易成本又回到了公司發(fā)放股票的問題上。投資者希望在他們將來賣股票時有價格保護，因此，他們愿意降低在一級市場提供的股票的買入價。結(jié)果是，公司必須發(fā)行更多的股票來提高資本的固定數(shù)量。這樣

48、，信息不對稱也演變成了提高資本成本的因素。</p><p>　　此外，信息不對稱和在二級股票市場截然相反的選擇會降低出價并導(dǎo)致價值低估。Myers和Majluf(1984)提出如果不得不發(fā)放新的證券來為新的投資項目融資且管理者和外部投資者間存在信息不對稱，公司可能寧愿錯過有利可圖的投資機會。</p><p><b>　　企業(yè)披露的微觀成本</b></p>

49、<p>　　企業(yè)披露的直接成本包括準(zhǔn)備費用、確認(rèn)費用以及會計報表的宣傳費用，在概念上都不復(fù)雜。然而最近關(guān)于經(jīng)濟后果的討論表明這些直接成本可能是重大的，特別是考慮到披露過程中的相關(guān)的機會成本。此外，固定披露成本導(dǎo)致規(guī)模經(jīng)濟。</p><p>　　由于向資本市場提供的信息也會被其他群體（如競爭者、工會、規(guī)則制定者及稅收部門）所使用，因此披露還有間接成本。例如，關(guān)于業(yè)務(wù)部門例如的相信信息會向競爭者揭示私有信

50、息。其他群體可能使用公司披露的公共信息中含有的不利信息這個事實會減弱它的披露意愿。然而，競爭威脅可能不會總是促使企業(yè)保留信息。例如，市場中的先進廠商可能會披露信息來威懾競爭者的進入。企業(yè)也可能共享關(guān)于市場需求的信息來避免行業(yè)內(nèi)的生產(chǎn)過剩。而且，競爭者會根據(jù)企業(yè)沒有披露的信息來推斷信息。因此，披露和私有成本將的關(guān)系式復(fù)雜并且依賴于競爭的類型。</p><p>　　總之，多種多樣的、直接或間接的報告和披露成本反過來可